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Abstract 
The scope of the study is to investigate the disclosure behaviour in Jordan after 
important changes in the economic and accounting regulations. The Securities Law 
No. 23 in 1997 was a significant turning point for the Jordanian Capital Market (JCM). 
The Law restructured JCM and imposed new regulations to achieve the transparency in 
the market in line with international standards. Thus, this study aims to expand our 
understanding about the financial disclosure for Jordanian companies, since the 
introduction of this Law. In particular, the major objectives of the study are: 
1) To evaluate the extent of aggregate, mandatory and voluntary disclosure practices for 
Jordanian companies listed in Amman Stock Exchange (ASE). 
2- To examine the relationship between the aggregate disclosure (mandatory and 
voluntary) and a number of company characteristics (financial and non-financial) for 
Jordanian companies listed in ASE. 
3- To investigate whether or not Jordanian corporations in ASE comply with mandatory 
disclosure requirements when they prepare their annual reports. 
4- To develop a disclosure framework by undertaking interviews with related parties (i. e. 
regulators, auditors and financial analysts) in order to enhance our understanding about 
the disclosure issue in Jordan and to understand and explain the findings of the 
quantitative approach which was applied to meet the first three objectives of the study. 
A sequential explanatory triangulation design was adopted, incorporating both 
quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis. Quantitative data collection and 
analysis was used to achieve the first three objectives of the study. For the purpose of 
the first and second objectives, an aggregate comprehensive disclosure index of 331 
items was constructed (278 mandatory items and 53 voluntary items). In addition, 17 
hypotheses were formulated in order to examine the relationship between the extent of 
aggregate disclosure (dependent variable) and the company's characteristics 
(independent variables): firm size, leverage, profitability, number of shareholders, 
listing status, industry type, assets-in-place, ownership structure, liquidity, audit firm 
size, and listing age. A sample of 121 companies (55 services and 66 industries) for the 
year 2003 was selected to fulfil the first and second objectives of the study. 
As regards the third objective, an index of mandatory items (278 items) was employed 
in order to measure compliance with the new disclosure requirements. A matched 
iv 
sample of 60 companies was selected for two years, 1996 and 2003 (before and after the 
new regulations). 
Qualitative data were collected by means of semi-structured interviews to address the 
fourth objective. The resulting data was analysed using general analytical procedures. 
The results of the study revealed that there was a significant increase in the level of 
aggregate disclosure (its average was 69%) compared to previous studies in Jordan. The 
extent of mandatory and voluntary disclosures was 83% and 34% respectively. 
Disclosure level was high in financial statements of Jordanian companies (e. g. balance 
sheet and income statement) and general information in the annual reports, but low in 
the voluntary item groups such as market based and financial history information. 
Univariate analysis revealed that firm size, profitability, number of shareholders, listing 
status, industry type, audit firm size and listing age are significant variables in 
explaining the variation in the level of aggregate disclosure among Jordanian companies. 
Multivariate analysis showed these variables to be significantly associated with the level 
of aggregate disclosure: firm size (sales), profitability (ROE), audit firm size, industry 
type and listing status. 
The study also found that there was a significant increase in the level of aggregate and 
mandatory disclosure for Jordanian companies in 2003 compared with 1996. However, 
the level of voluntary disclosure did not differ significantly in the two periods. 
Qualitative analysis was used to develop a framework which includes four main factors 
related to the disclosure issue: extent of disclosure, content of disclosure, relationship 
between disclosure and some variables and the regulations and role of regulators. 
This study makes the following contribution to the knowledge: 
1- It investigates the scope of aggregate disclosure (mandatory and voluntary) in Jordan 
after the new regulations. As far as the researcher is aware, the previous studies in 
Jordan focused either on voluntary disclosure (i. e. Suwaidan, 1997) or part of 
mandatory disclosure (i. e. Al-Shiab, 2003). 
2-The disclosure index used in this study is one of the largest indices used in disclosure 
studies, since it contains 331 mandatory and voluntary items. This index can be utilized 
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by different users (e. g. investors, financial analysts) to assess the extent of disclosure by 
companies. 
3- Exploring the disclosure behaviour in Jordan using a triangulation design (sequential 
explanatory design) implies a new approach to understand the issue of disclosure in 
developing and developed countries. Using both quantitative and qualitative methods 
provides a fuller and more comprehensive picture about disclosure issues. 
Finally, the study discusses implications of the increased regulatory environment, 
recommendations for improving disclosure in Jordan and suggests areas for future 
research. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
The Jordanian Capital Market (JCM) has been developed significantly during the last 15 
years. The Jordanian government has adopted a comprehensive policy which aimed to 
increase the role of the private sector. To achieve this purpose, a plan for a five-year 
period (1993-1997) was set up in order to adopt a private sector led approach and to 
start privatisation of major state-owned enterprises. In addition, the economy has 
developed significantly under the reign of His Majesty (HM) King Abdullah II, from 
1999 when Jordan has undertaken a fundamental programme of economic reform, 
supported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. This 
programme has opened Jordan to the world and various agreements with the USA and 
European Union (EU) have been signed in order to develop the Jordanian economy'. 
Moreover, the incentives for investments in Jordan have attracted a variety of investors 
and hence Jordan has signed a number of investment agreements with different 
countries. Consequently a stable regulatory environment has become essential and is 
required by the different investors. One of the most important features which investors 
rely on for decision making is the disclosure requirements. 
The enactment of the Temporary Securities Law No. 23 in 1997 was a qualitative leap 
and turning point for the Jordanian Capital Market. The major purpose of this enactment 
is to restructure and regulate the Jordanian Capital Market and to achieve transparency 
in the market in line with international standards. 2 Directives of Disclosure and 
Auditing and Accounting Standards (DDAAS) are the main feature of this enactment. 
1 Source: Jordan Investment Board: http: //Nvww. jordaninvestment. com [Accessed: 21/10/2006] 
2 Source: Amman Stock Exchange, http: //www. ase. com. io [Accessed: 15/01/2007] 
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The intention is to enhance the disclosure and transparency in JCM, and to provide 
investors with all the necessary information for decision making. These directives came 
into effect in September 1998, and all companies were asked to comply with them. 
In addition, International Accounting Standards (IASs)3 were applied in Jordan from 
1998 under The Securities Law No. 23 for the year 1997. 
The aforementioned developments and the incentives which have enhanced investments 
in Jordan have influenced the development of financial reporting and disclosure 
practices for Jordanian corporations. Information about a company's performance 
should be available to all users for decision making. Disclosure practices are the means 
to satisfy the crucial need for such information. "The disclosure of accounting 
information has a great impact on the behaviour of investors with respect to buying and 
selling of stocks in the capital and financial market" (Al-Mulhem, 1997: 1). 
Before 1997, disclosure practice in Jordan was voluntary in nature. Suwaidan (1997: 2) 
argued that due to the lack of regulations and the unregulated nature of The Amman 
Financial Market (AFM), the majority of annual reports information for listed 
companies was disseminated voluntarily. In addition, Solas (1994: 45) reported two 
major attributes of financial reporting practice in Jordan before 1997: 
1- The AFM had no disclosure regulations. 
2- Jordanian companies disseminated information to users on a voluntary basis. 
However, one could argue that the change in disclosure practice could be ascribed to the 
changing of regulations. Inchausti (1997: 6) pointed out that the changing of regulators 
and enactments in Spain was one of the main reasons for change in disclosure practices. 
He argued that new legislation in 1989 had led to major improvements in the quality of 
3IASs stand for all the standards issued by International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) including 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRs). Following the conversion of the International 
Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) into the IASB in 2002, IASs were succeeded by IFRs. However, 
IFRs were not included in the IASs in 2003 (year of the study) and it came to effect in 2004. 4 Article 24, Chapter Six, The Securities Law No. 23,1997 
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disclosure in the annual reports. He mentioned new changes in regulations such as Law 
19/1989 of 25 July relating to Political Reform Adoption of Commercial Legislation to 
EU Company Law Directives, the General Accounting Plan (1990) and improvements 
in Stock Exchange Reforms. Such changes have opened the doors for accounting 
researchers to explore the effect of the new regulations on information disclosure by 
companies. In addition, Owusu-Ansah (2005: 106) in New Zealand found that the 
compliance with disclosure requirements was higher for the post mandatory action 
period (1996-1997) than the pre mandatory action period (1992-1993). He (2005: 108) 
ascribed this result to the stringent enforcement introduced by the regulators. 
In recent years, a few studies have been conducted in developing countries which deal 
with the influence of new regulations on disclosure practices. 
Abd-Elsalam (1999) explored the disclosure practices in the Egypt, which has adopted 
the International Accounting Standards (IASs). The economic policy has been changed 
from state control to privatisation. The study measured the effects on the disclosure 
level of changes in economic and regulation policy. Abd-Elsalam found that disclosure 
in Egyptian listed companies was greater in 1995 than 1991.5 
The extent of financial disclosure among Saudi Arabian Corporations was investigated 
by Al-Mulhem (1997). Before 1986, the disclosure requirements were very limited and 
were mentioned only in a small paragraph in the Company Act (Al-Mulhem, 1997: 4): 
"The Companies Law requires all corporations to disclose the important 
information to the users at the end of each fiscal year. The documents 
required are a balance sheet, a profit and loss account, a summary of the 
directors' report and an auditor's report" (Article No. 89 of the Saudi 
Company Act) 
In 1986, a General Presentation and Disclosure Standard (GPDS) was prepared to 
ensure that companies apply the required level of disclosure in their annual reports 
5 Abd-Elsalam's study will be discussed in more detail in the methodology chapter 
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which present the relevant information for decision making. Al-Mulhem (1997: 8) 
asserted the importance of his research, saying that: 
"Most of the studies on the extent of disclosure by Saudi companies were 
conducted before the 1990 regulation requiring adherence to the 1986 
standard. However, this study will attempt to investigate the level of 
disclosure after the new regulations. Such study is important to reveal 
whether Saudi corporations have responded to the new development in the 
disclosure of information in their annual reports ". 
In Jordan, Al-Shiab (2003) examined the compliance with IASs for Jordanian industrial 
companies over the period 1995-2000. He (2003: 280) found that the compliance with 
IASs was higher for the post mandatory action period (1998-2000) than the pre 
mandatory action period (1995-1998). Nonetheless, he (2003: 280) discovered that there 
was a drift up (not a jump up as he expected) in the level of disclosure over the period 
1995-2000. Moreover, the overall disclosure for both periods (pre and post mandatory 
action period) was low because the regulation system in Jordan was less effective (Al- 
Shiab, 2003: 282). However, Al-Shiab's study focused on IASs which are only part of 
the mandatory disclosure requirements in Jordan, whereas this study will explore all 
mandatory requirements (basically Stock Exchange requirements and IASs) and 
voluntary disclosure. More discussion about Al-Shiab's study will come later in this 
thesis. 
This study aims to investigate the extent of disclosure in corporate annual reports for 
Jordanian companies listed in The Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) since the 
introduction of the new regulations affecting the Jordanian Capital Market (e. g. The 
Temporary Securities Law No. 23,1997). The next section will set out the major 
objectives of this study. 
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1.2 The Research Objectives 
The major objectives of this study are: 
1- To evaluate the extent of aggregate, mandatory and voluntary disclosure practices for 
Jordanian companies listed in Amman Stock Exchange (ASE). 
2- To examine the relationship between the aggregate disclosure (mandatory and 
voluntary) and a number of company characteristics (financial and non-financial) for 
Jordanian companies listed in ASE. 
3- To investigate whether or not Jordanian corporations in ASE comply with mandatory 
disclosure when they prepare their annual reports. 
4- To develop a disclosure framework by undertaking interviews with related parties (i. e. 
regulators, auditors and financial analysts) in order to enhance our understanding about 
the disclosure issue in Jordan and to understand and explain the findings of the 
quantitative approach which was applied for the first three objectives of the study. 
Therefore, this study employs a triangulation design (sequential explanatory design) 
which uses both quantitative and qualitative methods. The components of the research 
objectives and its linkage with the fourth objective (interview framework) are shown in 
Figure 1.2.1. 
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Figure 1.2.1: Components of the Research Objectives 
Objective Objective 
Two One 
Company's Aggregate 1 11 Disclosure Characteristics Relationship Disclosure Explore Practices in Jordan 
Examine Compliance 
Objective 
Three 
Mandatory Voluntary 
Disclosure Disclosure 
Pre Act Post Act 
Interviews 
Framework 
Objective 
Four 
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The first objective of the study is related to aggregate, mandatory and voluntary 
disclosure practices for Jordanian companies in 2003. The evaluation of these practices 
will be expanded to include the extent of disclosure for each group of information in the 
annual reports (e. g. general information, balance sheet information). In addition, a 
detailed analysis for the IASs compliance will be discussed in order to determine the 
IASs for Jordanian companies. 
The second objective of the study is to determine the different variables which affect the 
level of aggregate disclosure in Jordanian annual reports. Al-Mulhem (1997: 4) argued 
that the extent of disclosure varies among companies according to a number of factors. 
In this research, eleven variables were chosen as follows: firm size, leverage, 
profitability, number of shareholders, listing status, industry type, assets-in-place, 
ownership structure, liquidity, audit firm size and listing age. Seventeen hypotheses 
were formulated to test the effect of these variables. An aggregate disclosure index was 
constructed, including 331items: 278 mandatory and 53 voluntary, which is considered 
to be one of the most comprehensive disclosure indices used so far. 
The sample consists of all Jordanian corporations listed in AFM for the year 2003. The 
disclosure index, the hypotheses and the sample are discussed in the methodology 
chapter. 
The third objective is concerned with examining the level of mandatory disclosure for 
Jordanian companies listed in AFM. The study will attempt to reveal whether Jordanian 
corporations comply with the regulations and enactments, specifically the new ones (e. g. 
The Temporary Securities Law No. 23,1997). This objective will be accomplished by 
comparing disclosure for a matched sample in two periods: before the new regulations, 
1997 (Pre Act), and after (Post Act). 
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The above objectives focus on quantitative methods in order to achieve them. While 
quantitative methods are precise and focus on a very limited number of variables, 
qualitative methods are broader and less precise but take into consideration a wider 
number of variables (Gray, 2002: 365-367). 
Consequently, the researcher will focus in the fourth objective on explaining the results 
of the previous objectives. This objective was achieved by conducting semi-structured 
interviews with the relevant parties (such as regulators and auditors). The interview 
questions were designed in accordance with the results of the quantitative data analysis. 
The purpose of these interviews was to provide an understanding about the disclosure 
issue in Jordan. The interview results are summarized in a framework which contains 
the main subjects of disclosure in Jordan: extent of disclosure, content of disclosure, 
relationship between disclosure and some variables and the regulations and role of 
regulators. Detailed discussion of the interviews is found in Chapter Nine: the interview 
analysis and results. 
1.3 Overview of the Amman Financial Market (AFM) 
The Amman Financial Market (AFM) is a public financial institution with legal, 
administrative and financial independence from the state. It was established in 1976 and 
operations on AFM started on January 1,1978. 
The market started with 57 listed companies with a market value of about 400 million 
US$. At the end of 2005,201 companies were listed, with more than 36 billion US$ as 
the market value of firms listed. 6 
One of the most important developments in the market is the enactment of the 
Temporary Securities Law No. 23 of 1997. Its aim was to reorganize the structure of 
AFM. An intrinsic feature of this reorganizing process was the separation of the 
6 Source: Amman Stock Exchange, http: //www. ase. com. io [Accesses: 15/01/2007] 
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supervisory and legislative role from the executive role of the capital market. The 
executive role was performed by Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) and the Securities 
Deposit Centre (SDC), whereas Jordan Securities Commission (JSC) played the 
supervisory and legislative role. 7 
The Amman Financial Market Law 1976, no. 31 indicated the following objectives for 
the AFM: 
1- To encourage savings and investment in securities to serve the needs of the national 
economy. 
2- To regulate the process of issuance and dealing in securities in order to ensure the 
soundness, ease and speed of transactions, and to protect small savers. 
3- To collect, classify, analyse and disseminate important data and statistics to achieve 
AFM objectives. 
The Law provided three new institutions to replace the AFM. The following discussion 
will give a brief general introduction to these institutions. More details will come later, 
in the chapter on the Jordanian Environment. 
1.3.1 Jordan Securities Commission (JSC) 
The purpose of the Commission is to supervise the issuance and dealing in information 
related to all activities and operations of securities, issuers, insider trading and major 
shareholding. 
1.3.2 Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) 
The Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) was established on March 11,1999. As a result of 
the privatisation policy, ASE is considered to be a private sector, non profit organisation 
with legal and non-financial independence. 
Source: Amman Stock Exchange, http: //www. ase. com. io [Accessed: 15/01/2007] 
9 
The electronic trading in ASE started on March 26,2000.8 The change from traditional 
to electronic trading has increased the efficiency and the speed of trading. ASE is one of 
the largest and fastest growing markets in the region. The market capitalization to Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) ratio of 73.1% for the year 2000 is one of the highest in the 
region, exceeding those of Egypt, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and Israel9. Moreover, the 
market capitalization for the ASE by the end of 2005 went up by 104.6% (26667.1 
million dinars compared to 13033.8 million dinars by the end of 2004), representing 
326.6% of the GDP 10. Foreign investments are permitted in the ASE and the 
government is keen to improve the structure and regulations of ASE in order to 
encourage investments to achieve AFM purposes. 
1.3.3 Securities Deposit Centre (SDC) 
SDC was established on May 10,1999 as a non profit entity, with the aim of protecting 
the ownership of securities. Its concern also is with the processes of registration and of 
securities' ownership among brokers. SDC is an independent institute managed by the 
private sector and has a separate financial and administrative structure. 
1.4 Importance of the Study 
The primary motivation of this research is to investigate the scope of disclosure in 
Jordan after the stringent changes in the economic and accounting regulations. It must 
be pointed out that this study covers an area in which there are relatively few studies on 
emerging financial markets, in general and AFM in particular. 
Suwaidan's survey (1997) is one of the most comprehensive studies which investigated 
the disclosure practices and the impact on disclosure of some characteristics of 
8 Source: Jordan Securities Commission, http: //www. jsc. pov. io [Accessed: 17/01/2007] 9 Source: Jordan Investment Board, http: //www. iib. com. io [Accessed: 18/01/2007] 10 Source: Amman Stock Exchange: www. ase. com. io [Accessed: 18/01/2007] 
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Jordanian firms. However, Suwaidan explored the disclosure issue before the new 
regulations and the important changes in financial reporting standards (e. g. The 
Temporary Securities Law No. 23,1997). He concluded that the level of voluntary 
disclosure in Jordanian corporate annual reports was low. The lack of such regulations 
and the ambiguity of many financial reporting requirements were the main reasons for 
this result. Suwaidan recommended that the regulatory authorities should play a more 
active role in improving the levels of disclosure of accounting information. "The 
government must strengthen the position through appropriate laws" (Suwaidan, 
1997: 233). Consequently, this study will explore the level of mandatory and voluntary 
disclosure in Jordan after these regulations were implemented. In addition, Al-Shiab's 
study (2003) examined the compliance with IASs for two periods: the pre mandatory 
action period (1995-1998) and the post mandatory action period (1998-2000). Although 
he found that the compliance with IASs was higher for the post- action period than the 
pre- action period, he discovered that there was a drift up in the level of disclosure over 
the whole period 1995-2000. In addition, Al-Shiab (2003: 381) concluded that the 
overall disclosure was low for both periods (pre and post). In this regard, Al-Shiab 
supported Ahmed and Nicholls' (1994: 62) view, that there are incentives for voluntary 
disclosure when companies will not comply with mandatory requirements. 
Furthermore, Al-Shiab's study focused on compliance with IASs, which is only part of 
mandatory disclosure requirements in Jordan, whereas this study will explore all 
mandatory requirements in\Jordan (basically stock exchange requirements and IASs). 
Stock exchange requirements are an important source of disclosure requirements which 
improve the level of disclosure in developing countries. Craig and Diga (1998: 251) 
argued that stock exchange requirements are often a significant disclosure source of 
mandatory disclosure. "They determine company listing criteria, impose continuing 
11 
reporting obligations and mandate specific items of disclosure" (Craig and Diga, 
1998: 251). 
This research aims to extend the previous work to expand our understanding about the 
financial disclosure of Jordanian companies, especially since the issue of the new 
regulations. Such a study is important to reveal whether the disclosure of information 
for Jordanian companies has been influenced positively or negatively by the new 
developments in the Jordanian Capital Market. The study also derives importance from 
the role of the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) in encouraging investment. Increasing 
the disclosure of information to protect investors from any misleading or non-disclosure 
is one of the most important incentives to encourage such investments. In addition, ASE 
is one of the biggest capital markets in the region (with a capitalisation of 36 billion 
US$). 11 These features provide an impetus for a study to discuss the effect on disclosure 
practices of those improvements. 
The findings of this research will help legislators to improve the regulation policy and 
alleviate the vagueness of such regulations. 
Al-Mulhem (1997: 8) argued that previous studies in different countries revealed that the 
level of disclosure varies significantly among companies according to specific variables 
(for instance: size, liquidity). These variables determine why companies disclose more 
or less than others. Accordingly, this study will attempt to determine the characteristics 
which affect the extent of disclosure for Jordanian firms. Such an examination will 
enable regulators to focus on these factors which cause the variation of disclosure 
among companies. For example, this research is the first to examine the effect of listing 
status on the level of disclosure in Jordan. If the results reveal that listed companies 
11 Source: Amman Stock Exchange, http: //hwww. ase. com. jo [Accessed: 19/01/2007] 
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disclose more information than unlisted ones, then the regulation system may mandate 
some disclosure items in order to minimize this variation between listed and unlisted 
firms. 
Another significant feature of this research is that (as far as the researcher is aware) this 
study is the first of its kind in Jordan to examine compliance with mandatory disclosure 
after the major developments in Jordan's economy and regulatory system since 1997. 
However, previous studies in Jordan (i. e. Al-Shiab's study) tested part of mandatory 
disclosure requirements (IASs) and did not take into consideration the Stock Exchange 
requirements. This study will cover both requirements (IASs and Stock Exchange 
requirements) and will focus on the compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements 
and not IASs requirements only. 
It is expected that this research will provide comprehensive feedback for legislators 
about the effect of the new enactments on the degree of compliance to the mandatory 
disclosure. The benefit from such feedback is shown in Al-Mulhem's perspective 
(1997: 9): 
"Similar studies in other countries reported that compliance with mandatory 
regulations was very low. If this also occurs in Saudi Arabia, then it is 
essential that the regulatory authorities should look for sufficient means to 
ensure compliance with any obligatory role ". 
One of the most significant features in this study is that it employs quantitative and 
qualitative methods in order to explore the disclosure behaviour in Jordan. Quantitative 
methods will be used to develop and test the hypotheses of the study. Qualitative 
methods (interviews) will be used to enhance our understanding about the findings of 
the quantitative methods. This is the first time such a design (triangulation) used in 
disclosure studies in Jordan. The previous studies in Jordan (i. e. Al-Issa, 1988; 
Suwaidan, 1997 and Al-Shiab, 2003) used quantitative methods only to investigate the 
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disclosure issue in Jordan and none of them used qualitative methods. Hence, this study 
will provide a comprehensive and deeper understanding about disclosure issues in 
Jordan. 
Finally, this study will not be focused on specific users of information but rather related 
to all users. Therefore, both mandatory and voluntary disclosures are included. "When 
the focus of disclosure is different users, an extensive index that includes mandatory 
and voluntary items, is appropriate (Hooks, Coy and Davey, 2002: 504). Consequently, 
companies, financial analysts, investors and other users of financial information in this 
market should find the results of this study useful. Companies need to attract investors 
by disclosing relevant information. Financial analysts aim to collect, classify, analyse 
and disseminate the information for the needs of their clients. Their primary resource to 
achieve this purpose is the information which companies disclose. Investors are 
concerned with evaluating this information so they can decide to buy, sell or hold 
company shares. Besides, it is hoped that this study will provide beneficial insights, 
policy implications and recommendations for the legislators, the accounting profession 
and other researchers. 
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1.5 Organization of the Study 
This study is divided into three main parts and nine chapters as shown in Figure 1.5.1 
Figure 1.5.1: Thesis Organization 
Part One: 
The Theoretical Argument 
Chapter'One: Chapter Two: Chapter Three: 
Introduction Literature Review Jordanian Regulatory 
Environment 
Part Two: 
The Methods and Analysis 
Chapter Six: 
Chapter Four: Chapter Five: The Relationship between 
Research Evaluation of Aggregate Disclosure and 
Methodology Disclosure Practices for Company's 
Jordanian Companies Characteristics 
Part Three: 
Discussion and Results 
Chapter Eight: 
The Interviews 
Analysis and Results 
Chapter Nine: 
Discussion and 
Conclusion 
Chapter Seven: 
The Change of 
Disclosure in 
Compliance with 
New Regulations 
in Jordan 
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The first part presents the Theoretical Argument and it contains three chapters: 
Chapter One: Introduction 
Chapter Two presents the general aspects of financial disclosure: definitions, theories, a 
comparison between mandatory and voluntary disclosure and explanation of the 
interaction between them. The chapter also reviews previous empirical studies related to 
each objective of the study. The aim of so doing is to enhance our theoretical 
understanding about disclosure by exploring the concepts, methodology and results of 
these studies. Therefore, the theoretical framework of the study will be supported by the 
appropriate methods to deal with the research problem. 
Chapter Three highlights the background of the Jordanian environment. The regulations 
and the different enactments will be explained in this chapter. The major developments 
in the Jordanian Capital Market, specifically the recent changes in the Amman Financial 
Market (AFM) and the establishment of the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) will be 
described. Moreover, the financial reporting framework in Jordan will be presented in 
this chapter, together with a discussion of the Jordanian economy, Jordanian investment 
environment and privatization in Jordan. 
The second part contains Methods and Analysis and it includes four chapters: 
Chapter Four explains the methodology employed to achieve each objective of the 
study. It discusses the quantitative and qualitative methods (triangulation) which were 
employed. For quantitative methods, it discusses, step by step, the construction of the 
disclosure index: the aggregate index which consists of mandatory and voluntary items, 
the weighting and scoring of the index and the decision as to which index (aggregate 
and mandatory) was used for the research purposes. In addition, the research hypotheses 
are formulated in this chapter and the measurement for each variable is defined. A 
general view about the sample selection and the sources of information is given in this 
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chapter. As regards qualitative methods, an overview is given of different types of 
interviews (e. g. structured and unstructured interviews) and the choice made for this 
study justified. In addition, it explains some important issues related to the interview 
analysis such as: coding and memoing. Different qualitative data analysis approaches 
are discussed in order to clarify and which approach (general analytical approach) was 
applied in this study. 
Chapter Five explains the descriptive statistics related to the evaluation of aggregate, 
mandatory and voluntary disclosure for Jordanian companies. In addition, the extent of 
each of these types of disclosure will be measured for each company in the sample in 
order to assess the disclosure extent for each Jordanian company. This chapter will 
describe the disclosure level for each item in the index and for each group of items (e. g. 
balance sheet items and income statement items). Furthermore, the compliance with 
IASs will be shown in order to indicate the disclosure practices in Jordan through the 
IASs. 
Chapter Six contains the essential statistics and analyses for examination of the 
relationship between the extent of aggregate disclosure and the company's variables. 
The chapter also reports the results of this analysis and the effect of each explanatory 
variable on the extent of aggregate disclosure. 
Chapter Seven presents the analysis related to compliance with the mandatory 
requirements among Jordanian corporations. The results of testing a matched sample for 
two periods (before 1997 and after) will be provided and explained, in order to draw 
conclusions on the effect of the new regulations. 
The third part of the thesis is The Discussion and Results. It encompasses two chapters: 
Chapter Eight discusses the analysis of the interviews which were conducted in order to 
understand and explain the results of the quantitative methods. This chapter explains the 
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interview design, the interview details and description of the informants, and the 
framework used to summarize the results into general themes or ideas. Moreover, the 
interviews are linked with the research objectives and literature in order to enhance our 
understanding about disclosure in Jordan and to compare the interview results with 
previous studies to validate these results. 
Chapter Nine summarises the major features of the thesis. The conclusions drawn from 
the research, limitations, recommendations and suggestions for future research will be 
presented in this chapter. 
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Chapter Two 
Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter is divided into two parts. The first part will highlight the theoretical and 
fundamental issues with regard to disclosure, such as disclosure definitions, levels and 
types of disclosure. In addition, mandatory and voluntary disclosure will be discussed in 
terms of relevant theories and the nature of each of them. Moreover, the interaction and 
the relationship between mandatory and voluntary disclosure will be considered in this 
chapter. The disclosure environment and its components will be explained, with 
particular reference to users and their needs for financial disclosure. 
The second part of this chapter is concerned with previous studies relating to the 
research objectives. The first objective of the study is related to the evaluation of the 
disclosure practices for Jordanian companies. Previous studies in developed and 
developing countries which present the level of aggregate, mandatory and voluntary 
disclosure are reported. In addition, multinational studies which tested the level of 
disclosure for different countries are shown, as are studies which investigated the 
observance of IASs in developed and developing countries. Previous findings in relation 
to annual report contents (e. g. balance sheet and income statement) and its disclosure 
level are also discussed. 
The second objective of this study is to examine the relationship between the company's 
characteristics and the extent of aggregate disclosure. Therefore, studies which have 
investigated the relationship between aggregate, mandatory and voluntary disclosure 
and company characteristics are considered. The variables (e. g. firm size, leverage and 
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listing status) which affect the disclosure level are discussed, both from a theoretical 
perspective and in terms of the evidence from the previous studies. 
The third objective is to explore level of the compliance with mandatory disclosure. 
Previous studies which have investigated this issue are reviewed, focusing on those 
which compared two periods: before and after the mandatory action period. 
2.2 Disclosure Definitions 
Disclosure of information is the process of presenting information to the public in order 
to facilitate users' economic decisions. According to Hendriksen and Breda (1992: 851) 
"disclosure in financial reporting is the presentation of information necessary for the 
optimum operations of efficient capital market". Moreover, Gibbins, Richardson and 
Waterhouse (1990: 122) defined financial disclosure as "any deliberate release of 
financial information, whether numerical or qualitative, required or voluntary, or via 
formal or informal channels". 
Disclosure has a significant relationship with the communication process in accounting. 
Firms disseminate their results to the community through the most common type of 
disclosure: financial reporting, particularly the annual reports. 
Cooke (1989: 6) pointed out that disclosure is related to financial reporting. He added: 
"Disclosure consists of those items in corporate annual reports that are 
relevant and material to the decision-making process of users who are 
unable to demand information for their particular needs. If an item of 
information is relevant and material and it is not disclosed then the decision 
users are likely to be less than optimal". 
What can be inferred from this definition is the kind of information which should be 
disclosed. Petersen and Plenborg (2006: 130) pointed out that companies might realize 
that it is advantageous to disseminate additional information (i. e. voluntary disclosure) 
to investors through the annual reports. In addition, Most (1982: 182) argued that many 
companies include more data and additional information in their annual reports than 
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required by regulations. He pointed out that it is generally agreed that the accounting 
reports should disclose the important information which ensure that they are not 
misleading, but this appears to be an open-ended context, and attempts to make it more 
specific lead only to confusion. 
Disclosure is a vague term which interacts with many accounting terms. For instance, 
Belkaoui (2000: 210) highlighted the distinction between recognition and disclosure 
emphasized by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). FASB Concepts 
Statements No. 5, Paragraph 9, Recognition and Measurement in Financial Statements of 
Business Enterprises: 
"Recognition is the process of formally recording or incorporating an item 
into the financial statements of an entity as an asset, liability, revenue, 
expense or the like. Recognition includes depiction of an item in both words 
and numbers, with the amount included in the totals of the financial 
statements. " 
The same statement in Paragraph 9 states that: 
"Since recognition means depiction of an item in both words and numbers, 
with the amount included in the total of the financial statements, disclosure 
by other means is not recognition. 
Disclosure of information about the items in financial statements and their 
measures that maybe provided by notes or parenthetically on the face of 
financial statements by supplementary information or by other means of 
financial reporting is not a substitute for recognition in financial statements 
for items that meet recognition criteria. " 
Another direction from which to explore the disclosure concept is the nature of 
disclosure, which varies between the different groups of users. Solomons (1986: 74) 
argued that there are at least five different typical user groups, with different interests 
and needs: investors and creditors, managers, auditors, regulators and the public. 
The fact that the users of disclosure have different needs and purposes is apparent; 
therefore there is potential for conflict between many parties. 
From the above brief discussion concerning the concept of disclosure, it is noteworthy 
that there is no precise definition of the disclosure concept. Each definition attempts to 
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clarify disclosure as a process of communication or attempts to discuss the quantity and 
the quality of information which should be disclosed. Indeed, disclosure is a complex 
phenomenon and there is no single theory which comprehensively explains it (Hope, 
2003: 220). However, disclosure has become one of the main tools of communicating 
information in order to enable those who use it to take their economic decisions 
effectively and improve the meaningfulness of their decisions. Entwistle (1997: 4) 
argued that companies should strategically manage their disclosure activities as they 
manage other companies activities. 
"Disclosure activity does not differ in principle from other corporate 
activities, such as investment, production and marketing. Disclosure shares 
with these activities the fundamental characteristics of providing benefits 
and incurring costs, and it therefore warrants the careful attention and 
long-term planning accorded to any major corporate activity. Hence, the 
need for an information disclosure strategy" (Lev, 1992: 10). 
Entwistle (1997: 4) pointed out that a well-planned disclosure strategy brings various 
benefits such as enhancing stock liquidity, minimizing political and regulation 
intervention, and improving the competitive aspect of the firm in the market. 
It is noticeable that the magnitude of disclosure has attracted attention in recent years. 
Many studies have examined the impact of disclosure, the disclosure environment, the 
attributes of disclosure and the relationship between disclosure and many financial 
terms such as liquidity, risk, stock price and the cost of capital (Weidman, 2000: 663). 
Consequently, the disclosure issue has become a well researched area. This concept is 
essential to the needs of the financial community, specifically, the users of the financial 
statements, regulators and policy makers. For this reason, it has been said, "We believe 
that financial reporting and disclosure will continue to be a rich field of empirical 
enquiry" (Helay and Palepu, 2001: 407). 
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2.3 Levels and Types of Disclosure 
Many approaches have been used to codify disclosure into subheadings. Hendriksen and 
Breda (1992: 856) classified disclosure into three concepts: adequate, fair and full 
disclosure. Al-Mulhem (1997: 24) believes that adequate disclosure consists of at least 
the amount of information which makes the financial statements appropriate to decision 
makers and deters any distortion which could affect these statements. "Financial 
statements are considered adequate if all relevant information has been reported and 
disclosed". In addition, Owusu-Ansah (1998: 608) argued that disclosure is considered 
to be adequate if it is relevant and fulfils the needs of users and is released on time. Fair 
disclosure implies an ethical perspective in which all potential users should be treated 
equally when disclosing information and also alleviating any bias when disseminating 
this information. Full disclosure is the presentation of comprehensive information to the 
public. Sometimes, full disclosure can have detrimental effects if inappropriate 
information is disclosed, because unimportant details hide the significant information 
and make the financial reports difficult to interpret (Hendriksen and Brida, 1992: 856). 
Hendrickson and Brida (1992: 856) mentioned that there is no real difference among 
these concepts if they are used in a proper context. Indeed, the purpose of disclosure is 
to provide users with substantial and relevant information, with the limitation that the 
firm will disclose the information if the benefits from this information exceed the costs 
of preparing it. Hendrickson and Breda reported that an appropriate disclosure of 
information should be adequate, fair and full. 
Jan (1998: 1) noted that disclosure remains a complex and difficult characteristic to 
measure. He pointed out that the definitions and the levels of information range from 
non disclosure of private information which the firm prefers not to disclose, partial 
disclosure (where the firm chooses to disclose specific kinds of information, usually 
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relatively good news), to full disclosure (complete and comprehensive disclosure of all 
relevant information). 
2.3.1 Mandatory versus Voluntary Disclosure 
A growing body of studies have examined the differences between voluntary disclosure 
and mandatory disclosure. The next section discusses these types of disclosure. 
2.3.1.1 Mandatory Disclosure 
Mandatory disclosure comprises all information which is required to be disclosed 
according to regulations such as Companies Act, stock exchange regulations and 
accounting standards. "It is described as mandatory if companies are obliged under a 
disclosure regulatory regime to disclose in so far as they are applicable to them" 
(Owusu- Ansah, 1998: 608). Schroeder and Clark (1995: 755) argued that if mandated 
accounting information were perfect, all relevant information would be disclosed and 
the required and relevant information would be identical. The authors added, "In fact, 
accounting information is less than perfect; some relevant information is not required 
and some required information is not relevant". This imbalance could be ascribed to 
changing socioeconomic conditions, inadequate measurement techniques and the effects 
of politics on accounting policies. 
The importance of mandatory disclosure could be noticed in the objectives of financial 
reporting. Solomons (1986: 68) pointed out that regulators such as the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) emphasize the importance of financial reporting 
in Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 1 entitled "Objectives of Financial 
Reporting by Business Enterprises as follows: 
"Financial reporting should provide information that is useful to present 
investors and creditors and other users in making rational investment, 
credit, and similar decisions. The information should be comprehensive to 
those who have a reasonable understanding of business and economic 
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activities and are willing to study the information with reasonable 
diligence " [paragraph 34]. 
Darrough (1993: 535) argued that mandating disclosure through regulatory agencies 
such as the SEC (Securities Exchange Committee) or the FASB will force firms to 
disclose the type of information that firms wish hidden. 
Hendrickson and Breda (1992: 860) pointed out that the failure of the market is a 
significant motivation for regulators and governments to require such disclosures in the 
market, to ensure that sufficient information is disclosed. 
The SEC Advisory Committee mentioned six reasons to continue mandatory disclosure 
(Al-Mulhem, 1997: 54): 
1) To motivate the market mechanism in order to assure the timeliness and the 
reliability of the information. 
2) To protect the shareholders from information such as bad news being hidden by 
managers. 
3) Many equities analysts deem that their efforts to obtain information would be 
lessened without federal disclosure regulations. 
4) Most public companies are not followed by analysts who can offer the information 
they need. Hence, mandatory disclosure supplies these companies with essential 
information. 
5) The concern of analysts is to collect information for themselves, their companies or 
their clients. 
6) Investors have a high level of confidence in the information related in mandatory 
requirements, because it is constructed under regulations which emphasize the fairness, 
equity and the reliance of the information. Therefore, any attempts to amend the 
disclosure system destabilize it and resistance to such changes can be expected. 
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The enforcement of financial reporting disclosures could be described as a three-part 
process (Brown and Tarce, 2005: 183): 
1- Efficient control system in the company and management awareness of good 
disclosure. 
2- Independent and expert auditors. 
3- An oversight regulatory system with sufficient power and expertise to achieve 
effective enforcement. 
The third part of enforcement of the financial reporting process is considered to be an 
essential one. "Companies do not comply with mandatory disclosure requirements 
unless stringent enforcement mechanisms are in place" (Owusu-Ansah, 2005: 92). 
The regulatory and legal system affects financial disclosure directly or indirectly (Jaggi 
and Low, 2000: 500). The direct effect could be noticed through the development of 
regulations such as Companies Act, Accounting Regulations and Tax Laws. The 
indirect effect is shown through legal protection rights provided to investors or creditors. 
Regulation theory is used to interpret the behaviour of mandatory disclosure. Al- 
Htaybat and Napier (2005: 11) argued that the existence of disclosure regulation affects 
the credibility of the information in the capital market. In addition, regulations affect 
companies by allowing them to organize and publish their annual reports whether 
nationally or internationally, at a generally acceptable level. 
"Ultimately, it can be concluded that reporting regulation exists as a result 
of market failure and is regarded as the way to make companies disclose 
their information to interested users according to a uniform set of 
accounting standards and requirements " (Al-Htaybat and Napier, 2005: 11) 
Regulation theory contains two main directions (Taplin, Tower and Hancock, 2002: 174): 
1- Public direction: where regulation is a tool of maximizing social welfare. 
2- Private direction: regulation oriented toward improving the wealth of specific 
group(s). 
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Taplin, Tower and Hancock (2002: 174) pointed out that private direction offers a better 
explanation for regulation. The reason could be that under the private theory, the 
regulation is a mechanism designed to maximize the benefits of a politically effective 
group (i. e. authorities). Thus, 
"Regulation is viewed as the product of coalitions between regulated 
industry and related interest groups, the former obtaining some monopoly 
profits from regulation, the latter obtaining higher prices" (Taplin, Tower 
and Hancock, 2002: 174-175). 
Helay and Palepu (2001: 413) argued that regulations provide valuable information to 
users in order to reduce information asymmetry between informed and uninformed 
people. 
In this study, the influence of regulation on the disclosure level in Jordan is discussed in 
detail in Chapter Three. 
2.3.1.2 Voluntary Disclosure 
FASB reports that companies who voluntarily disclose extensive financial information 
differentiate themselves by providing an enhanced level of information that empowers 
the investors and the creditors to comprehend the company (Levinsohn, 2002: 13). 
"It is often argued that firms find it advantageous to provide additional 
pieces of information (i. e. voluntary disclosure) to investors and analysts 
through the annual reports " (Petersen and Plenborg, 2006: 130) 
Voluntary disclosure is defined as information which is better for a firm to disclose but 
which is outside the requirements of regulations, for instance, Companies Act, securities 
exchange regulations and International Accounting Standards (IASs). For example, 
Barako, Hancock and Izan (2006: 114) defined the voluntary disclosure for the purpose 
of their research in Kenya as follows: 
"The discretionary release of financial and non-financial information 
through annual reports and above the mandatory requirements either with 
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regards the Kenyan company laws, professional accounting standards or 
any other relevant regulatory requirements. " 
Mandatory disclosure may not be effective because adherence to the regulations is 
limited or the regulations themselves are vague and difficult to interpret; in such cases, 
voluntary disclosure can be used to compensate for deficiencies in mandatory disclosure. 
Annual reports are the most explored and analysed source of financial disclosure. They 
consist of both mandatory and voluntary items. Ho and Wong (2001: 140) argued that 
voluntary disclosure has been a significant research area since the 1970s. Several 
empirical studies have examined voluntary disclosure in annual reports (Firth 1979; 
McNally, Eng and Hasseldine 1982; Chow and Wong-Boren 1987; Hossain, Tan and 
Adams 1994; Frost and Pownall 1994; Hussein, Perera and Rahman 1995; Grey, Meek 
and Roberts 1995; Raffournier 1995; Botosan 1997; Inchausti 1997; Patton and Zelenka 
1997; Suwaidan 1997; Jan 1998; Depoers 2000; Chau and Gray 2001; Ho and Wong 
2001; Richardson and Welker 2001; Robb, Single and Zarzeski 2001; Singleton and 
Globerman 2002; Ferguson, Lam and Lee 2002; Haniffa and Cooke 2002; Eng and Mak 
2003; Barako, Makhija and Patton 2004; Barako, Hancock and Izan 2006; Ghazali and 
Weetman 2006; Peterson and Plenborg 2006). 
In addition, other studies have investigated voluntary disclosure through diverse 
channels of information, e. g. earnings disclosures (Skinner 1994; Baginski, Hassell and 
Kimbrough 2002; Francis; Skipper and Vincent 2002; Lundholm and Myers 2002), 
stock prices (Gelb and Zarowin 2002), financial analysts (Lang and Lundholm 1993), 
press releases (Lang and Lundholm 2000), accounting ratios (Watson, Shrives and 
Marston 2002), balance sheet with quarterly earnings announcements (Chen; DeFond 
and Park 2002) and forward looking information (Johnson, Kasznik and Nelsen 2001). 
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Gray and Skogsvik (2004: 788) argued that voluntary disclosure is presented at the 
discretion of managers of the company. Indeed, this kind of disclosure is related to the 
influence of essential accounting numbers when alternative measurement principles are 
used. In addition, information about financial numbers and more qualitative data are 
reasons for such disclosures. 
Attention should be drawn to the fact that the decision to disclose additional information 
should be made under a costs and benefits framework (Jan 1998; Levinsohen 2001; 
Ferguson, Lam and Lee 2002; Al-Htaybat and Napier 2005). Managers are aware that 
financial disclosure is not a costly process (Al-Htaybat and Napier, 2005: 18). Costs of 
information include collection, processing and disseminating of this information. The 
costs also imply litigation costs, competitive and political costs. Benefits of information 
comprise enhanced credibility and improved investor relations, lower costs of capital, 
improved liquidity and marketability of company shares with narrower price changes 
between transactions. Managers will assess the costs and benefits of any decision 
before disclosing, and "will provide voluntary information when the benefits of this 
information exceed its direct and indirect costs" (Al-Htaybat and Napier, 2005: 18). 
One explanation for the voluntary disclosure of accounting information is based on the 
principal-agent problem (Gray, Meek and Roberts 1995: 46). The agency problem arises 
when ownership is separated from control and the owners (the principals) nominate 
managers (the agents) in order to perform the plans and manage the firm through taking 
decisions that affect both parties. 
The friction between the shareholders and the managers is caused by asymmetric 
information. Asymmetric information means that the information systems used by the 
parties in any relationship differ (Bromwich 1992: 319). In our example, managers' 
objectives, attitudes and interests differ from those of the shareholders, especially with 
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regard to the risk of actions. The managers have superior information that affects the 
firm's value; hence the shareholders tend to decrease the risk of these actions and the 
conflict between the two groups is solved by contracting with the managers in such a 
way as to alleviate the effect of asymmetric information. 
"In this agency relationship, insiders (managers) have an information 
advantage. Owners therefore face moral dilemmas because they can not 
accurately evaluate and determine the value of decisions made. The agent 
may take advantage of unobservability of his actions to engage in activities 
to enhance his personal goals. Formal contracts are thus negotiated and 
written as a way of addressing agent-shareholder conflicts" (Barako, 
Hancock and Izan, 2006: 110). 
Bromwich (1992: 320) mentioned three agency costs that could be incurred and 
associated to some degree with all contracts written by the enterprise: 
1) Monitoring costs: the principal seeks to control and observe the agent's behaviour 
and remuneration is linked with the outcome of monitoring. The monitoring role 
includes activities such as imposing budget and operating restrictions. 
2) Bonding activities: the agent endeavours to assure that he will not exploit or harm the 
principal's interests. The agent may accept contractual limitations on his-decision 
making power and to have accounts audited by qualified auditor. 
3) The remaining loss to the principal: this occurs when the principal cannot be assured 
that the agent acts fully in the principal's interest; thus, the principal takes action 
himself. 
The significance of the agency problem and the resultant agency costs is that various 
researchers have agreed that voluntary disclosure minimises the agency monitoring 
costs (Suwaidan 1997; Al-Mulhem 1997; Helay and Palepu 2001; Al-Htaybat and 
Napier 2005; Barako, Hancock and Izan 2006). Monitoring costs reduce the manager's 
remuneration (e. g. salaries and rewards); therefore the manager has an incentive to 
disclose detailed information to lower the monitoring cost. Managers in this case are 
evaluated and compensated by the amount of information they will disclose. 
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Another interpretation of voluntary disclosure is the market signalling model or theory. 
(Suwaidan, 1997: 9) and Watson, Shrives and Marston (2002: 291) claimed that 
companies disclose additional information in the market to distinguish themselves from 
other low-performance companies. "Expanded disclosure could correct any firm 
misevaluation" (Helay, Hutton and Palepu 1999: 488). On the other hand, Flower 
(2002: 660) pointed out that voluntary disclosure creates disadvantages when 
competitors use the disclosure to serve their own interests. However, Hendriksen and 
Breda (1992: 860) reported that firms could alleviate this disadvantage, since 
competitors could collect this information through other sources and channels, i. e. press 
and media releases and financial analysis. Moreover, Watson, Shrives and Marston 
(2002: 291) argued that for the signal to be credible, managers should signal the quality 
of firms accurately. Thus, if the signal was shown falsely by managers as high quality 
(when in fact quality is low), the disclosure in this case will not be credible. "A 
management team that has confidence in both its own abilities and its strategy will not 
shy away from telling the market its plans for the future and how well it is doing today" 
(Watson, Shrives and Marston, 2002: 291). 
Capital need theory could be used to interpret voluntary disclosure. Cooke (1989a: 28) 
stated that in order to raise capital on stock markets, companies will increase their 
voluntary disclosure. He argued that there are scarce funds in the market and firms 
compete with each other to maximize their share of these funds. Thus, voluntary 
disclosure is a fundamental element to enhance the credibility of information and enable 
the firm to raise capital. In addition, Suwaidan (1997: 22) argued that firms which seek 
to raise new capital in the market disclose more voluntary information than others 
which do not use external funds. Similar to previous studies (i. e. Choi, 1973; Firth, 
1980), Suwaidan (1997: 1) found that companies in AFM significantly increased the 
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level of voluntary disclosure around the time of raising equity capital. The major 
justification for this behaviour is to improve the liquidity of the firm, which is reflected 
in a lower cost of equity capital. The work of Lang and Lundholm (2000: 653) showed a 
similar conclusion. They discovered that firms increase voluntary disclosure before the 
issue of new capital, which leads to reduction in the cost of equity capital. 
Supporting this concept, many empirical studies have shown that voluntary disclosure 
has reduced the cost of capital (Baiman and Verrecchia 1996; Botosan 1997; Verrecchia 
1999; Botosan 2000; Bloomfield and Wilks 2000; Richardson and Welker 2001; Helay 
and Palepu 2001; Botosan and Plumlee 2002; Hail 2002; Gietzmann and Irland 2005; 
Poshakwale and Courtis 2005; Cheng, Collins and Huang 2006). 
Moreover, Hail and Leuz (2006: 524) discovered that mandatory disclosure is negatively 
related to the cost of equity capital. Indeed, more disclosure requirements, stronger 
securities regulations and stricter enforcement mechanisms reduce significantly the cost 
of equity capital. However, Daske (2006: 369) discovered no relationship between the 
adoption of IASs (IFRs) or US-GAAP and the cost of equity capital in Germany. They 
ascribed this result to the difficulties of estimating the cost of equity capital or the 
nature of the transaction process of employing IFRs in Germany. 
"This variety and speed of the `accounting revaluation' together with the 
lack of available accounting information for comparable prior periods may 
have affected the apparent uncertainty among investors during the 
transition period" (Daske, 2006: 369). 
Diamond and Verrecchia (1991: 1326) argued that revealing public information to 
reduce information asymmetry can reduce a firm's cost of capital by increasing the 
demand for its securities from large investors. 
According to Suwaidan (1997: 20), many authors argued that increased disclosure 
reduces the firm's security risk and decreases the rate of return required by investors; 
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consequently this would produce a lower cost of capital for the disclosing firm. In 
addition, Botosan (1997: 324) argued that an increased level of disclosure is supposed to 
be related with the cost of equity capital; this is because "greater disclosure enhances 
stock market liquidity, thereby reducing cost of equity capital either through reduced 
transactions costs or increased demand for a firm's securities" (Botosan, 1997: 324). 
In the same context, Gray, Meek and Roberts (1995: 47) argued that companies in 
capital markets compete with each others in the types of securities they issued and terms 
of expected returns. Hence, there is uncertainty related to these securities and returns. 
Companies will disclose additional information in order to reduce the uncertainty and 
"as a result, firms have an incentive to provide information that enables them to raise 
capital on the best available terms" (Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995: 4). 
Opponents of voluntary disclosure expose detrimental effects on the firm. For instance, 
complete disclosure provides unions an advantage in wage bargaining (Hendrickson and 
Breda 1992: 860). Moreover, Flower (2002: 660) mentioned costs associated with 
voluntary disclosure as follows: 
1) Collection and Processing costs: compiling data from many sources, analysing it and 
disseminating to the public. 
2) Litigation cost: could be incurred due to misleading information which the company 
has disclosed. For instance, one argument against voluntary disclosure of earnings 
forecasts is that they may be overly optimistic; hence, investors may rely upon this 
information and sue management to obtain compensation for a drop in the price of their 
equity investment. 
3) Political cost: governments' role is to increase the welfare of society. The financial 
statements are an abundant source of information that enables the government to 
redistribute income from the successful companies, particularly high profit companies, 
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to other parties in society. This might inhibit companies from disclosing information 
voluntarily and cause them to choose to aggregate items in such a way as to reduce their 
political cost. 
4) Competitive cost: as discussed before, the competitors want to know more about 
information policies and the purpose of the expanded voluntary disclosure. 
2.3.1.3 The Relationship and Interaction between Mandatory and Voluntary 
Disclosure 
Mandatory disclosure may not be effective because the adherence to regulations is 
limited or the regulations themselves are vague and difficult to interpret; in such cases, 
voluntary disclosure can be used to compensate the deficiencies in mandatory disclosure. 
Solomons (1986: 198) expressed a similar view, that standards may become too 
numerous and too complicated, so the costs of disclosure exceed the benefits. The idea 
behind voluntary disclosure is to provide additional information about the company's 
activities for different reasons. Those reasons have been discussed before in this chapter, 
particularly, the theories related to voluntary disclosure (e. g. agency theory, signalling 
theory and cost and benefit theory). "Voluntary disclosure in excess of the minimum, 
may arise where corporate perceptions of the benefit arising outweigh the costs" 
(Marston and Shrives, 1991: 196). 
However, mandatory and voluntary disclosures are not separated elements in financial 
reporting. Both should be taken into consideration when exploring the disclosure issue 
and its related behaviour. Einhorn (2005: 594) argued that most of the literature has 
focused on exploring voluntary disclosure, treating it as the only available disclosure 
and ignoring the presence of mandatory disclosure. However, mandatory disclosure 
may affect the incremental content of the voluntary disclosure and hence it could play a 
significant role in the firm's discretionary disclosure strategies (Einhorn, 2005: 594). 
34 
Dye (1985: 546,1986: 353) discussed proprietary costs in modelling the influence of 
mandatory requirements on voluntary disclosure. This influence depends on whether 
mandatory and voluntary disclosures are substitutes or complements. If they are 
substitutes, more disclosure requirements will reduce voluntary disclosure. However, if 
they are complements, more mandatory disclosure may increase the level of voluntary 
disclosure (Dye, 1985: 546). In addition, Watson, Shrives and Marston (2002: 289) 
argued that companies still disclose voluntary disclosure even when mandatory 
requirements are increased. 
The relationship between mandatory and voluntary disclosure has been examined by 
previous researchers (e. g. Naser and Nuseibeh, 2003; Al-Razeen and Karbhari, 2004). 
Naser and Nuseibeh (2003: 57) found a positive and significant association between 
mandatory and voluntary disclosure. Their result supported Dye's perspective that 
voluntary disclosure complements mandatory disclosure. Meanwhile, Al-Razeen and 
Karbhari (2004: 358) revealed that there are no clear patterns of relationship between 
mandatory and voluntary disclosure. The absence of such a relationship could imply 
low cooperation between management and board of directors in preparing the annual 
reports. Indeed, most if not all, the items of voluntary disclosure which are not related to 
mandatory disclosure were found in the directors' report, while the other types of 
information were found in the financial statements and the notes. Moreover, Al-Razeen 
and Karbhari (2004: 360) found that "investors are advised not to assume that the 
companies that are better in observing the mandatory disclosure are also the companies 
that disclose voluntarily most of the information they want about their companies". 
Finally, Einhorn (2005: 613) analysed the various features of disclosure requirements 
that affect the company propensity for making voluntary disclosures. His analysis 
shows the likelihood of providing voluntary disclosure by companies is independent on 
the mandatory disclosure contents. In addition, there is a nonmonotonical association 
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between the likelihood of voluntary disclosure and the information quality of mandatory 
disclosure. Furthermore, the overall disclosure could be enhanced by limiting their 
discretion in mandatory reporting or by extending the scope of mandatory disclosure 
requirements. 
2.3.1.4 Summary 
From the above comparison between mandatory and voluntary disclosure, it seems 
reasonable to assert that both types of disclosure have advantages and disadvantages. 
Mandatory disclosure could be more widely applied and the regulations can be too rigid. 
The closely regulated environments of the United States and United Kingdom are 
examples of mandatory disclosure. In addition, the voluntary disclosure is encouraged 
in these environments because the efficiency of the capital markets is high and the 
companies become more reliant on international capital markets. "They tend to make 
voluntary disclosure appropriate to the financial markets in which they hope to raise 
capital" (Hendrickson and Brida, 1992: 859). 
On the other hand, Ahmed and Nicholls (1994: 62) argued that the incentives for 
voluntary disclosure are greater in developing countries. They stated that reasons for not 
complying with mandatory disclosure regulations include inadequate regulatory 
framework and enforcement mechanisms, and a lack of both an effective capital market 
and an accounting profession. ' 
Nonetheless, 
"it is important for regulatory agencies to sort out the disclosure incentives 
of firm in order to promote more efficient disclosure policies that are 
consistent with the goals of the agencies" (Darrough, 1993: 535). 
It could be concluded that mandatory disclosure is superfluous if firms disclose 
information voluntarily; and to deal with this situation, the government and the 
regulation agencies should be focused on voluntary disclosure policies and how firms 
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would behave in the absence of mandatory disclosure requirements (Darrough, 1993). 
This will enable the regulators to draw new policies of disclosure requirements in order 
to enhance the welfare of their society. 
However, exploring the extent of disclosure could be more effective if it takes into 
consideration the interaction between mandatory and voluntary disclosure. Mandatory 
disclosure could play a determinant role in shaping the voluntary disclosure policies 
(Einhorn, 2005: 613). In addition, Einhorn (2005: 613) summarizes the importance of 
both types of disclosure in the capital markets as follows: 
"The results of this paper clarify that the information flow through each of 
the two most important communication channels in capital markets, firms' 
mandatory and voluntary disclosures, can not be fully understood without 
taking into consideration the interaction between them. In particular, firms' 
strategies for providing voluntary disclosures can not be studied in isolation 
without considering the impact of their mandatory disclosures. 
Correspondingly, the value of mandatory disclosure requirements can not 
be properly assessed without an understanding of what, if any, voluntary 
disclosures might be made in addition to the mandatory disclosures. " 
2.4 Disclosure Environment 
The disclosure process is a communicative function between the firm and its 
environment. The linkage between financial disclosure components and the 
environment still needs more research. Cooke and Wallace (1990: 81) specified two 
problems with existing studies as follows: 
"The absence of a well-defined theory for specifying the linkage between 
the regulations of accounting disclosure and its environment and the 
inability of empirical tests to specify this linkage ". 
Beaver (1989: 16) analysed the financial reporting environment from the perspectives of 
five major constituencies. Table 2.4.1 summarizes those constituencies as follows: 
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Table 2.4.1: The constituencies in the financial reporting environment 
1- Investors 
A. Diversified vs. Undiversified 
B. Active vs. Passive 
C. Professional vs. Non-professional 
2- Information Intermediaries 
A. Financial Analysts 
B. Bond Rating Agencies 
C. Stock rating Agencies 
D. Investment Advisory Services 
E. Brokerage Firms 
3- Regulators 
A. FASB 
B. SEC 
C. Congress 
4- Management 
A. Large vs. Small firms 
B. Publicly vs. Closely held firms 
5- Auditors 
A. National vs. Local firms 
B. SEC practices vs. Non-SEC practices 
Source: Beaver (1989: 16) 
Each constituency has different purposes, interests, and role. In addition, each group is 
heterogeneous (Beaver, 1989: 10). 
Regarding investors, some invest in different securities to minimise the risk of their 
investments (diversified), and some invest in a limited number of securities 
(undiversified). The behaviour towards trading strategy differs between active and 
passive investors; active investors seek to gather information about the prices and their 
portfolios change continually based on any mispriced information which causes them to 
trade their securities. By contrast, passive investors hold their securities for a long-term 
period and do not pay attention to speculation, like active investors (Beaver, 1989: 11). 
Professional investors (i. e. financial and information intermediaries) gather, classify, 
disseminate and interpret the information. Meanwhile, non-professional investors (e. g. 
individual or non-institutional investors) depend on the professional investors in their 
investment decisions due to their lack of ability to access and interpret financial 
information (Beaver, 1989: 9). 
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Competition among information intermediaries for disclosure and for the interpretation 
of disclosure is apparent. Each party serves its clients by presenting more 
comprehensive information about the different types of securities. Regulators organize 
the communication process between the intermediaries and the investors in order to 
ensure that information is reliable as a basis for investors' decisions. Therefore, 
"The role of information and financial intermediaries in the financial 
reporting environment has been receiving increasing recognition by the 
financial reporting regulators" (Beaver, 1989: 13) 
The financial reporting environment is organized by regulators. International 
Accounting Standards (IASs) and the Securities Exchange Regulations are major 
institutions in the regulation system. In the USA, the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board (FASB) and Securities Exchange Committee (SEC) are primary regulators whose 
role is to deter failure by companies to disclose material information. The distinction 
between FASB and SEC has been defined by legislation. Components of financial 
reporting (disclosure and financial accounting) are the basis of this definition; "The 
jurisdiction of the FASB was said to be the setting of financial accounting standards, 
while the jurisdiction of the SEC was said to be disclosure" (Beaver, 1989: 15). 
However, this distinction has not been defined precisely and the interaction between the 
two components (disclosure and financial accounting) makes this distinction fuzzy. 
FASB standards include disclosure requirements. For instance, the segment reporting 
standard (Financial Accounting Standard No. 14) includes many disclosure requirements 
to ensure the credibility of financial reports. In the same way, the SEC includes many 
financial accounting standards in its release, for example, the SEC Accounting Release 
(Accounting Standard Release No. 190) which deals with replacement costs, which is a 
significant issue in price level accounting (i. e. asset valuation and expense recognition). 
"ASR No. 190 effectively pre-empted the FASB efforts in price level accounting at that 
time" (Beaver, 1989: 15). On the basis of this, it may be inferred that the jurisdictional 
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boundaries are still blurred. More efforts are needed to determine the role of each 
regulator precisely. 
Management has a significant role in the financial reporting environment. Managers' 
responsibilities include providing financial information to investors. This responsibility 
varies between large and small firms. In large firms, managers are under more pressure 
to supply more precise information to investors than in small firms. Therefore, the 
balance between benefits and costs of disclosure for small firms is a difficult task (Wolk, 
Tearney and Dodd, 2001: 315). Hence, 
"The FASB specifically considers implications of disclosure for smaller 
firms with the express purpose of requiring disclosure only where they are 
relevant and cost effective" (Wolk, Tearney and Dodd, 2001: 315). 
The reasons why managers in large firms have incentives to disclose more information 
than in small firms will be discussed later in this chapter. Moreover, public firms are 
subject to more financial reporting requirements than close-held firms (Beaver, 
1989: 16). For instance, 
`privately held companies-which are generally smaller than publicly held 
firms- are exempt from segmental disclosure and earnings per share 
requirements" (Wolk, Tearney and Dodd, 2001: 315). 
As with management, financial reporting requirements are an important issue for 
auditors. Beaver (1989: 16) argued that whether the firm is audited by a national or local 
auditing firm, and whether the auditing firm is big (e. g. Big Five Firms) or medium or 
small, there are certain main factors that affect the financial disclosure practices of the 
company. The extent of the auditors' role in disclosure practices will be illustrated later 
in this chapter. 
Figure 2.4.1 shows the main components of the disclosure environment 
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Figure 2.4.1: Disclosure Environment 
Disclosure practices: 
- Mandatory disclosure 
- Voluntary disclosure 
- Social disclosure 
Disclosure users: 
- Investors (existing and 
potential) 
- Creditors 
- Managers 
- Auditors 
- Analysts Advisor 
- Governmental Agencies 
- Others (employees, 
customers, competitors) 
Financial 
Disclosure 
Types of disclosure: 
- Adequate disclosure 
- Fair disclosure 
- Full disclosure 
Regulations and 
requirements, e. g. 
- FASB, IAS, SEC 
- Companies Act, 
Stock exchange 
requirements, Audit 
Law, Tax Law 
Disclosure impact: 
-Cost of capital 
- Stock prices 
- Liquidity 
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The intrinsic feature of the disclosure environment is regulation of the flow of financial 
information to the users (Beaver, 1989: 14). 
Disclosure is formulated under regulations, such as International Accounting Standards 
and stock exchange requirements. 
Disclosure practices reflect the extent of financial disclosure, which varies between 
countries. One of the main approaches to evaluate this extent is to explore mandatory, 
voluntary and social disclosure among companies. Mandatory disclosure comprises all 
information which is required to be disclosed according to regulations. Voluntary 
disclosure is defined as information which firms may disclose outside the requirements 
of regulations: Companies Act, FASB and Stock Exchange Requirements. Social 
disclosure is concerned with financial and non financial, quantitative and qualitative, 
information about the social activities of the company. This includes information on 
human resources, pollution and any issue related to social responsibility accounting 
(Cooke, 1989a: 7). 
"Social and environmental disclosure can typically be thought of as 
comprising information relating to a corporation's activities, aspirations 
and public image with regard to environmental, community, employee and 
consumer issues " (Gray, Javad, Power and Singlair, 2001: 327). 
Different users are interested in financial disclosure for various purposes. Investors need 
to be able to evaluate the reliability and the relevance of this information for decision 
making. Indeed, investors include existing (shareholders) and potential ones. Both of 
them are concerned about financial information as Alexander and Britton (1993: 11) 
commented, "This group is considering whether or not to invest in a business: to buy 
shares or to buy more shares; or alternatively, whether or not to dis-invest, to sell shares 
in the business. " 
Creditors have greater interest in liquidity and the default risk of the firm. This group 
contains short and long term creditors (Alexander and Britton, 1993: 12). Short-term 
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creditors are concerned about the amount of cash they will get very soon and the net 
realizable value, meanwhile long-term creditors are interested in the future cash flow of 
the company, the overall strength and of the company and its likely position in the 
future (Alexander and Britton, 1993: 12). 
Managers compile and analyse information in order to evaluate the performance of the 
company, which reflects the management process in achieving the purposes of the 
company. 
Auditors are the party often most directly concerned with the financial disclosure. The 
magnitude of their role derives its importance from the responsibility they are given; 
they are responsible to indicate whether the financial statements fairly represent the 
financial position of the company or not. 
The need to gather precise information, analyse and publish this information is the 
interest of financial analysts. They interpret the results and the statistics to assist other 
users in making investment decisions. 
"It is a collection of experts who advise other groups. Stockholders and 
investment analysts will advise shareholders, trade union advisers will 
advise employees, government statisticians will advise the government, and 
so on. The needs of the analyst-adviser group are obviously essentially the 
needs of the particular group they are advising. However, being advisers 
and presumably experts they will need more detail and more sophistication 
in the information presented to them " (Alexander and Britton, 1993: 13). 
Governmental agencies formulate and organize policies and legislation (i. e. disclosure 
policies) in order to control the disclosure process among firms. Their role is to ensure 
that companies disclose the significant information which will enable the other users to 
take appropriate decisions. The information required by government should be very 
detailed and more than the historical information in the annual reports. 
Other users are interested to evaluate the performance of the company through financial 
disclosure. For example, employees aim to improve their positions; high performance of 
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the company could offer them better incentives. Alexander and Britton (1993: 12) 
pointed out that there are two main reasons for obtaining information by employees: 
1- Open and fair collective bargaining (i. e. salaries negotiations). 
2- Assessment job security in the present and future. 
In addition, employees may pay attention to non-financial information (e. g. 
management attitudes to staff involvement in decision making, conditions and services 
such as health and insurance services). "It can be seen that the employee group may 
require particular statements for its own use, and that it may require information not 
traditionally regarded as `financial' at all" (Alexander and Britton, 1993: 13). 
Customers pay more attention to companies which have credible performance and 
disclose more information. Their concern about the company's information is to assess 
the reliability of the company in the short and long term (Alexander and Britton, 
1993: 13). In the short term, they need to ensure that they will receive their goods or 
services in the appropriate time and of sufficiency quality. In the long term, they require 
a guaranteed after sale service. 
Meanwhile, competitors are keen to know their rivals' strategies and plans in the market. 
At the same time, the company itself is reluctant to disclose some information about its 
activities, in order not to provide any benefits for its rivals. Indeed, it is reasonable for a 
company to have the right to keep the sources of its own competitive advantage secret 
(Alexander and Britton, 1993: 14). 
Generally, financial disclosure is the mirror which could provide all these parties with 
the information they need. 
Finally, the impact of disclosure on some financial concepts (e. g. cost of capital, 
liquidity and stock prices) has been discussed by many researchers (e. g. Sengupta 1998; 
Verrecchia 1999; Richardson and Welker 2001; Lang and Lundholm 2001; Botosan and 
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Plumlee 2002; Poshakwale and Courtis 2005). The influence of disclosure on such 
concepts and many other financial, economic and social concepts still needs more 
research due to the importance effects in clarifying many issues in accounting, 
economic and finance. 
"The stream of research on the relationship between the disclosure and its 
impact is less-well developed, in part because the difficulties in both 
measuring disclosure impact and establishing the causality of the relation " 
(Wiedman, 2000: 664). 
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2.5 Exploring the Aggregate, Mandatory and Voluntary Disclosure Practices: The 
First Objective 
The first objective of this study is to evaluate the extent of disclosure practices for 
Jordanian companies. This evaluation will include aggregate disclosure (AD), 
mandatory disclosure (MD) and voluntary disclosure (VD). In addition, the extent of 
disclosure will be measured for each group of items (e. g. general information, balance 
sheet information) and for each IASs. 
The level of aggregate, mandatory and voluntary disclosure was measured in the 
previous studies in developed and developing countries as shown in the following tables: 
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The above studies explored the extent of financial disclosure in the context of a single 
country. It should be noted that the results of Jordanian studies related to voluntary 
disclosure extent produced contradictory results. While Al-Issa (1988) and Suwaidan 
(1997) found the extent of VD was consistent with previous studies in developing 
countries (44% and 39% respectively), Naser (1998) and Naser, Al-Khatib and Karbhari 
(2002) found the level of VD was higher (63% and 63.51% respectively). Naser (1998) 
tested the level of comprehensiveness of disclosure for 54 non-financial Jordanian 
companies listed in AFM in 1994. He (1998: 102) ascribed the high level of disclosure 
to the adoption of IASs, which were required by the Companies Act 1989. However, 
Suwaidan (1997: 1) pointed out that the Companies Act 1989 required companies to 
prepare their annual reports in accordance with GAAP, which were not defined in the 
Act. Indeed, the contents and format of such financial statements were not specified in 
the Act. 
"Therefore, one would argue that, with the exception of a few items of 
information, most of the contents of corporate annual reports fall into the 
category of voluntary disclosure" (Suwadian, 1997: 2). 
Moreover, the adoption of IASs in 1989 was not applied in practice by shareholding 
companies 12 in Jordan. Although the Jordanian Association of Certified Public 
Accountants (JACPA) adopted the IASs in 1989, it did not have the power to impose its 
requirements on companies or its members (Suwaidan, 1997: 79). 
"The accounting profession in Jordan has recently been formally 
established and has yet to issues local statements of accounting practice. It 
has recommended adoption of International Accounting Standards, with 
effect from January 1990, but in the absence of any legal power or effective 
disciplinary mechanism, the use of these standards is likely to come about 
slowly and in a limited way. The Amman Financial Market has so far issued 
no requirements relating to the content of company annual accounts" (Abu- 
Nassar and Rutherford, 1996.74). 
12 A Shareholding company is one which was established for an unlimited time. It includes at least two 
stakeholders and its securities are traded in stock markets. The liability of each stakeholder is limited and 
its responsibility is only on the shares he owns in the company (Companies Act 1989, Articles 90-91). 
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Al-Shiab (2003: 105) supported Suwaidan's view that JACPA could not impose 
compliance with IASs from 1989. Indeed, the IASs were applied in Jordan from 1998 
under the Securities Law No. 23 of 1997. 
"The JACPA exercised a great deal of effort to incorporate IAS in the 
provision of the Companies Act 1989 and in the 1990 Amman Financial 
Market (AFM) Law, but without success. Recently, the Companies Act 
No. 22 of 1997 and Securities Law No. 23 of the 1997 asked companies under 
their authorities to fully adopted the IASs" (Al-Shiab, 2003: 106). 
Given the evidence, it could be said that the level of disclosure in Jordan before 
adopting the IASs was low. Naser's (1998) argument that the high level of disclosure 
(63%) he found could be ascribed to the adoption of IASs contradicts Suwaidan's and 
Al-Shiab's findings, which indicated that the adoption was not implemented in Jordan 
until 1998, under the Securities Law 1997. 
Naser, Al-Khatib and Karbhari (2002: 142) found a similar result (63.51%) to Naser 
(1998) with regard to the mean level of disclosure for Jordanian companies. They tested 
the depth of corporate disclosure for non-Jordanian companies for a sample of 84 non- 
financial Jordanian companies in 1998. Using an index of 104 items, they discovered 
some improvements in the level of disclosure compared to previous studies in Jordan 
(e. g. Al-Issa, 1988: 445, Naser, 1998: 63%). It could be argued, however, that there was 
no improvement of disclosure level compared to Naser's study (1998) since the level 
was approximately similar. Moreover, Naser, Al-Khatib and Karbhari (2002: 148) 
argued that it is difficult to ascribe this improvement of disclosure extent to the adoption 
of IASs 1989. "Given that the mean disclosure index can be used as an indicator of 
compliance, the level of compliance with IASs is still low" (Naser, Al-Khatib and 
Karbhari, 2002: 148). However, the application of the disclosure index as an indicator of 
compliance with IASs is not appropriate according to Suwaidan's (1997) and Al- 
Shiab's (2003) perspectives. As discussed above, the application of IASs came into 
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effect in 1998 under the Securities Law No. 23 of 1997 and they found the adoption of 
IASs in 1989 was sporadic and many companies were not complying with IASs. 
Furthermore, the disclosure index of Naser, Al-Khatib and Karbhari's (2002) study 
included 104 items, which can be considered low, compared to other studies which 
applied IASs (e. g. Abd-Elsalam, 1999: 247 items, Al-Shiab, 2003: 273 items). Thus, it 
could be concluded that Naser, Al-Khatib and Karbhari's study reflected voluntary 
disclosure, not IASs in application. However, neither Naser (1998) nor Naser, Al- 
Khatib and Karbhari (2002) provided details of their indexes so follow up is not 
possible. 
The extent of financial disclosure has also been examined for companies located in 
different countries (international disclosure studies). For example, a study by Barrett 
(1976) investigated the overall extent of disclosure for fifteen firms in each of the 
United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, France, Germany and Sweden, and thirteen 
firms listed in the Netherlands, for the years 1963-1972. Barrett (1976: 24) concluded 
that the American and British firms had a greater level of disclosure than firms in the 
other five countries. In addition, French firms were found to have the lowest extent of 
financial disclosure. This result could be explained as reflecting greater efficiency of the 
U. S and UK equity markets than those in the other five countries. Thus, "there is a link 
between the quality of financial reporting practices and the degree of efficiency of 
national equity markets" (Barrett, 1976: 24). 
Barrett's study was supported by Zarzeski (1996) who examined the level of aggregate 
disclosure for 256 firms in France, Germany, Hong Kong, Japan, Norway, UK and USA 
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for the period 1991-1993. US firms had the highest average disclosure (735) and the UK 
firms came second (68%) as shown in Table 2.5.3. 
Table 2.5.3: Disclosure Practices in Zarzeski's Study13 
Country No of Companies Average extent of 
disclosure (%) 
USA 65 73 
UK 47 68.7 
France 31 62.8 
Japan 39 59.7 
Norway 16 59.3 
Germany 29 57.3 
Hong Kong 29 56.8 
All the firms 256 61.8 
In a more comprehensive study, Camfferman and Cooke (2002) evaluated the 
comprehensiveness of disclosure in annual reports for UK and Dutch companies in 
1996. The study used a comparative approach by analysing 93 disclosure items (the 
disclosure index included the items specified in the Fourth and Seventh EU Directives) 
for each one of the 322 companies (161 companies for each country). The 93 items were 
classified into 13 categories of disclosure. Significant differences in disclosure between 
the two countries were found in 11 categories. The other two categories of disclosure 
items (three items on revaluation and two on deferred tax) were discovered to have no 
significant difference in disclosure between the UK and the Netherlands. The next table 
shows the differences in disclosure between Dutch and British companies using Mann- 
Whitney and T-Tests. 
13 Source: Zarzeski, M. T, 1996: 30 
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Table 2.5.4: Difference in Disclosure in Dutch and British Annual Reports in 
Camfferman and Cooke's Study (2002) 14 
Means 
EU Main 
Headings 
No of 
Items 
M-W 
Sign. 
Netherlands 
(sample= 161) 
UK 
(sample=161) 
t-score Sign. 
Fixed assets 0-8 0.000 0.7319 0.8293 -11.971 0.000 
Long-term 
investments 0-9 0.000 0.5562 0.5942 -2.933 0.004 
Current assets 0-17 0.000 0.3778 0.4337 -5.778 0.000 
Intangible 
assets 0-6 0.000 0.3861 0.1041 7.450 0.000 
Current 
Liabilities 0-3 0.004 0.8634 0.9110 -2.657 0.008 
Long-term debt 0-5 0.000 0.8944 0.7031 7.109 0.000 
Contingent 
liabilities 0-3 0.000 0.5839 0.6832 -2.746 0.006 
Pension 
provisions 0-4 0.000 0.3385 0.6211 -9.912 0.000 
Income 
statement 0-17 0.000 0.5470 0.6149 -6.652 0.000 
Shareholder 
information 0-9 0.000 0.4251 0.6259 -14.833 0.000 
Total EU score 0-93 0.000 0.5432 0.5874 -7.164 0.000 
The results from the table above revealed that there is a significance difference in the 
comprehensiveness of disclosure between the two countries, with mean scores 58.74 
and 54.32 for the UK and the Netherlands respectively. Hence, "the evidence in Table 2 
indicates that British companies provide more comprehensive disclosures to comply 
with EU requirements than their Dutch counterparts and reduce information 
asymmetries" (Camfferman and Cooke, 2002: 15). 
In addition, eight of the eleven categories of disclosure were found to be greater in the 
UK than the Netherlands. Camfferman and Cooke (2002: 4) argued that this difference is 
14 Source: Camfferman, K. and Cooke, T. E, 2002: 15 
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due to more stringent regulations in the UK than in the Netherlands, which allows more 
flexibility. They (2002: 4) concluded: 
"Thus, despite attempts by the EU to harmonize financial reporting, there 
remain important differences between these two countries. This has 
implications for harmonization in the EU and the ability of EU-listed 
companies to coverage by producing consolidated accounts to comply with 
IASs by 2005 ". 
A multinational study of corporate disclosure was conducted by Archambault and 
Archambault (2003). They tested the cultural, national and corporate factors which 
affect disclosure for 761 corporations in 37 countries in 1992 and 1993. The average 
total disclosure was 75.69%, with a range from 16% to 94%. The study explained that 
disclosure is affected by a large number of factors that represent a broad range of social 
systems: culture, national political and economic systems, corporate financial and 
operating systems. In addition, the model which includes these variables could be 
employed to interpret why disclosure varies among countries (the national system and 
cultural variables) as well as among firms within a country (the corporate system 
variables). The model of corporate disclosure in Archambault and Archambault's study 
is shown in Figure 2.5.1 and more discussion about the variables related to this study 
(corporate systems variables) will come later in this chapter. 
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Figure 2.5.1: Model of Corporate Disclosure in Archambault and Archambault 
Study 15 
Culture 
Power distance Education 
Individualism Religion 
Uncertainty/Avoidance 
Masculinity 
National Systems 
Political Economic 
Freedom Development 
Legal Inflation 
Corporate Systems 
Financial Operating 
Ownership Size 
Exchanges Industries 
Dividends Foreign Sales 
Auditors 
Leverage 
Response 
Disclosure 
15 Source: Archambault and Archambault (2003: 176). 
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Mandatory and voluntary disclosures have been investigated in some Asian countries by 
some researchers (Craig and Diga 1998; Chau and Gray 2001; Ali, Ahmed and'Henry 
2004; Askari and Jackling 2005). 
The corporate disclosure requirements were analysed in five countries in the 
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN): Singapore, Malaysia, The 
Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand by Craig and Diga (1998). Their sample contained 
145 consolidated annual reports for companies listed on principal stock exchanges at the 
end of 1993 (30 companies each from Singapore, Malaysia, The Philippines and 
Indonesia, and 25 from Thailand). The disclosure index included 530 items required in 
at least one of the five ASEAN countries. The results of the study are summarized in 
Table 2.5.6. 
Table 2.5.6: Extent of ASEAN disclosure requirements in Craig and Diga's study16 
Country 
Items Required 
Max-- 530 
By Accounting 
Standards 
By Government 
Regulations 
No % No % No % 
Indonesia 275 52 165 31 233 44 
Malaysia 388 73 330 62 218 41 
The Philippines 358 68 314 59 189 36 
Singapore 393 74 330 62 203 38 
Thailand 345 65 312 59 200 38 
From the above table, it could be concluded that Singapore had the highest level of 
disclosure requirements (74%), followed closely by Malaysia (73%), while the lowest 
was Indonesia (52%). In addition, Craig and Diga (1998: 249) pointed out that about 
33% (177 items) of the required 530 items were common in all five countries. At the 
other extreme, 18% (95 items) were disclosed by one country only. Moreover, 68% 
(359 items) were disclosed by at least three countries. The study found that there was a 
16 Craig and Diga, 1998: 249 
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high level of harmony in ASEAN countries, which could be due the impact of IASs 
regulations on national accounting standards. Nonetheless, there were some differences 
in the volume and extent of disclosure among these countries. Craig and Diga 1998: 251) 
argued that ASEAN governments delegated the formulation of disclosure requirements 
to stock exchanges or professional accounting bodies. In some cases, the government 
authorities overlapped with the requirements of such professional bodies and reinforced 
the authoritativeness of external professional regulations. In other cases, government 
disclosure requirements differed from those established by professional bodies, 
especially in fields where government was looking to enforce or monitor progress as 
regards particular regulatory purposes. 
In South Asia, Ali, Ahmed and Henry (2004) tested the level of compliance for 
mandatory disclosure requirements by fourteen national accounting standards all 
adopted by India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. The researchers developed a checklist of 
131 items required by these 14 standards and applied it in 1998 for 566 companies (118 
in Bangladesh, 219 in India and 229 in Pakistan). The results indicated that the level of 
compliance was 80% for the whole sample, 81% for Pakistan, 79% for India and 78% 
for Bangladesh. However, "it is interesting that compliance index scores for Pakistan 
are higher, but not statistically different than those for Indian companies" (Ali, Ahmed 
and Henry, 2004: 193). 
Furthermore, the study found that the compliance level varied significantly across the 
14 national accounting standards. The highest level of compliance was found for 
standards relating to depreciation, inventories and property, plant and equipment. Ali, 
Ahmed and Henry (2004: 197) commented on this high level of compliance for such 
standards as follows: "We believe that this higher level of compliance is due to detailed 
disclosure requirements embedded in the Companies Act, within each country". 
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On the other hand, standards regarding leases and accounting borrowing costs had the 
lowest level of compliance, which implies a need for regulators within each country to 
take essential steps, such as improving the dissemination of information among 
preparers and auditors (Ali, Ahmed and Henry, 2004: 197). 
In another study by Askari and Jackling (2005), financial disclosure was examined in 
Asian and Middle Eastern countries. The purpose of the study was to determine the 
similarities and differences in respect to the compliance with IASs. 126 annual reports 
were collected from companies listed in the stock exchange in these countries: Bahrain, 
Bangladesh, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia and Turkey. A disclosure index containing 306 items was employed to measure 
the compliance with IASs in these countries. The findings indicated that Indonesia had 
the highest average disclosure level (76.95%), while Saudi Arabia had the lowest 
(55.97%). As regards the level of disclosure with the selected disclosure practices in this 
study, Jordan had the lowest level (74.26%) of disclosing general information about the 
entity, while Malaysia had the highest (98.44%). In addition, Saudi Arabia had the 
lowest value for balance sheet and cash flow disclosures (51.6% and 41.67% 
respectively). The lowest level of disclosure of income statement practices, accounting 
policies practices, disclosure of notes to financial statements was for Bahrain (52.5%), 
Iran (46.39%) and Qatar (48.85%) respectively. Meanwhile, the highest level of 
disclosure for the same items was for Malaysia (77.08%, 77.31% and 73.64% 
respectively). Askari and Jackling (2005: 60) pointed out that the significant differences 
in the actual disclosure level among these countries indicate that harmonization with 
IASs is possible to be achieved, but with some difficulties. 
However, the differences of these disclosures among countries will provide support for 
strengthening the adherence to IASs. Moreover, Askari and Jackling (2005: 61) 
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recommended that the impact of the cultural value system on disclosure practices 
should be investigated further, since its effect on some variables in the study was 
noticed. 
The observance and adoption of IASs in developed and developing countries has been 
discussed in many studies (e. g. Grove and Bazley 1993; Emenyonu and Gray 1996; 
Hora, Tondkar and Adhikari 1997; Abd-Elsalam 1999; El-Gazzar, Finn and Jacob 1999; 
Street, Gray and Bryant 1999; Tower, Hancock and Taplin 1999; Chamisa 2000; 
Murphey 2000; Street and Bryant 2000; Al-Shiab 2003; Glaum and Street 2003; Tarca 
and Brown 2005; Whittington 2005). More discussion about IASs and harmonization 
will be discussed in the next chapter of the theses. 
Moving to the evaluation of the disclosure practices in the annual report studies, the 
extent of financial disclosure could be measured for each type of information in the 
annual reports (e. g. balance sheet information, income statement information). Wallace 
(1988) disaggregated the overall level of disclosure into different types of disclosure as 
shown in Table 2.5.7. 
Table 2.5.7: Spatial Disclosure in Annual Reorts (1982-1986) in Wallace's Study 
(1988)1 
Disclosure Level 1982 (%) 1983 (%) 1984 (%) 1985 (%) 1986 (%) 
Overall 39.75 38.23 43.11 40.64 37.55 
Balance sheet 60.43 61.76 65.21 64.37 62.01 
Income statement 34.51 35.21 27.48 27.32 27.11 
Other financial statements 57.35 59.45 46.74 41.25 38.32 
Forecasts 12.14 13.57 14.66 10.72 9.12 
Statistical data 33.35 30.94 27.26 24.91 22.16 
Valuation method 58.72 52.36 47.43 45.75 44.43 
Social data 27.24 27.98 30.40 22.65 18.35 
Historical summary 67.25 69.45 77.13 77.72 78.52 
17 Wallace, 1988: 358 
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Wallace (1988: 358) found the following results, as regards the above table: 
1- There is a high level of disclosure for balance sheet and historical summary 
information. 
2- There is a low level of disclosure for forecasts, social data, statistical data and income 
statement information. 
Wallace (1988: 358) explained the high level of disclosure of balance sheet information 
to its being required by the Companies Act. In addition, historical summary data were 
requested by the Nigerian Stock Exchange. On the other hand, the poor level of 
disclosure for forecasts, social data, statistical data and income statement information 
was due the absence of regulations which required disclosure of such information, and 
the lack of demand for such information by the Nigerian Stock Exchange. 
In Sweden, Cooke (1989a) reported a low level of disclosure for some areas in the 
balance sheet and income statement (e. g. leased property, provision for doubtful debts, 
goodwill recognition in each acquisition in the balance sheet; cost of good sold, a 
breakdown of operating expenses and advertising expenses in the income statement). In 
addition, he found that value added statements were not a common feature in Swedish 
annual reports. 
However, Swedish companies provided a high level of information about acquiring and 
disposing of business. Hence, disclosure was extensive in consolidated accounts. In 
regard to research and development information, only 7% of companies disclosed such 
information. Although 87 of 90 companies (97%) disclosed income tax on the face of 
the income statement, deferred taxes were rarely recognized. In addition, only 23% of 
the companies disclosed information about revenue recognition, and only 10% disclosed 
information about long term leases. As regards inventory information, the majority 
(98%) of the companies (86 out of 88) disclosed such information. 57 companies (65%) 
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used lower of cost and net realizable value as the basic for valuing inventories, while the 
others used different valuation methods (e. g. lower of historic cost and replacement 
cost). Finally, as regards depreciation, 70% of companies disclosed methods and rates 
of depreciation, 11% disclosed the depreciation methods only, 13% disclosed the rates 
of depreciation only and 6% did not disclose any information about depreciation. In 
addition, 80% of the companies used the straight-line method for depreciation. 
An investigation about the extent of Saudi annual reports contents was conducted by Al- 
Mulhem (1997). He examined the annual reports for 40 companies in 1994, which 
included five main parts: the list of directors, directors' report, financial statements, 
notes to the financial statements and auditors' report. Table 2.5.8 summarizes the 
number of companies which disclosed the above parts and other supplements of these 
parts: 
Table 2.5.8: Summary of companies which disclosed the contents of annual reports 
in Al-Mulhem's study 
Annual reports contents Companies 
disclose this item 
No % 
1- List of directors 
- Name of directors 34 85 
- Directors' interests in the company or the interests of any other parties on their 0 0 
behalf 
2- Directors' report 
- Board of directors' report 36 90 
3- Financial statements 
- Statement of financial position (balance sheet) 40 100 
- Statement of income (loss) 40 100 
- Statement of retained earnings or statement of changes in owners' equity 37 92.5 
- Statement of sources and application of funds (cash flow statement) 33 82.5 
4- Notes to the financial statements 
- Summary of accounting policies used 38 95 
- Accounting convention (historical cost convention) 37 92.5 
- Revenue and expenditure recognition 29 72.5 
- Method of depreciation 37 92.5 
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- Rate of depreciation 33 82.5 
- Inventory method 20 50 
- Foreign currencies 32 80 
- Employee retirement provisions 31 77.5 
- Account receivable and doubtful debts 5 12.5 
- Reserve amounts 11 27.5 
- Cash and cash equivalents 4 10 
- Sales 4 10 
5- Auditor's report 39 97.5 
Al-Mulhem (1997: 232) argued that there were some mandatory items where 
requirements were not fully complied with (the overall non-compliance level was 
21.42%). Thus, he recommended strengthening the enforcement and monitoring process 
and imposing stringent penalties. In addition, companies used different methods when 
recording some voluntary items (e. g. statement of owners' equity, treatment of 
inventory valuation). "It is assumed that the lack of legal requirements controlling many 
items has led to these inconsistent applications" (Al-Mulhem, 1997: 232). 
Chau and Gray (2001) examined the disclosure extent of different information types 
(strategic information, nonfinancial information and financial information) for Hong 
Kong and Singapore companies in 1997. For Hong Kong companies, the overall mean 
disclosure was 12.23% and the extent of disclosure varied from 9.77% for financial 
information to 18.49% for strategic information, with 10.49% disclosure for 
nonfinancial information. Meanwhile, for Singapore companies, the overall mean 
disclosure was 13.83% and the extent of disclosure varied from 10.68% for financial 
information to 16.76% for nonfinancial information with 16% disclosure for strategic 
information. Chau and Gray (2001: 116) reported that the level of voluntary disclosure, 
with the exception of nonfinancial information, was approximately similar for 
companies in both countries. The level of disclosure for nonfinancial information, they 
considered to be a particularly Singaporean phenomenon. 
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Hooks, Coy and Davey's study (2002) identified the information gap for the items in 
1999 annual reports for New Zealand companies in the electricity industry. The 
disclosure index included 67 items (13 mandatory and 44 voluntary), weighted by on 
expert group of stakeholders. The results indicated that many voluntary items, which 
stakeholders believed to be very important or essential, were not disclosed adequately. 
Hence, there was a wide gap in many annual reports. Hooks, Coy and Davey (2002: 517) 
summarized the areas needed by stakeholders. Examples of these areas are: 
- Management objectives and strategies (very important). 
- Major contractual relationships (very important). 
- Segmental information: assets, revenue, expenses, profit (very important/essential). 
- Major elements of costs: marketing, salaries, restructuring, asset maintenance 
(essential). 
- All performance measures: financial, pricing, efficiency, market (intermediate/very 
important). 
The study determined the type of information and disclosure needed to reduce the 
information gap in the future. Therefore, 
"The results, and especially the information gaps that have been identified, 
should assist report preparers, accounting regulators, and legislators in 
improving reporting in future to the extent that it may come closer to 
meeting public expectations" (Hooks, Coy and Davey, 2002: 518). 
In Jordan, Suwaidan (1997) evaluated the voluntary disclosure practices for seven types 
of information in the 1992 annual reports of 102 Jordanian companies. Table 2.5.9 gives 
a summary of statistics for the different types of information in Suwaidan's study. 
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Table 2.5.9: Disclosure of different types of information in annual reports in 
Suwaidan's study18 
Information Groups 
No. of 
items 
Group mean disclosure 
(%) 
Standard deviation 
(%) 
1- General 17 39.88 33.92 
2- Balance sheet 15 65.39 34.38 
3- Income statement and 
other statements 
14 56.53 30.46 
4- Projections 9 17.21 18.63 
5- Financial history 7 32.52 29.20 
6- Ratios and other statistics 10 17.99 13.89 
7- Market-based 3 2.61 1.66 
As seen from the table above, the market-based information group had the lowest level 
of voluntary disclosure (2.61%), while the balance sheet group had the highest (65.39%). 
In addition, there was wide variation in disclosure for individual items within each type 
of information, as indicated by the standard deviation (i. e. balance sheet = 34.38%, 
general = 33.92%, income statement and other statements = 30.46%, financial history = 
29.20%). Suwaidan's (1997: 142) analysis revealed the following results: 
1- The level of disclosure for balance sheet and income statement was good. This could 
be due to the greater emphasis of these statements in the Companies Act 1989. 
2- There was an average level of disclosure for general and financial history information. 
3- There was a poor level of disclosure in each of projections information, ratios and 
other statistics and market-based information. 
Suwadian's study will be discussed further and a comparison made between his study 
and this study, in Chapter Four. 
18 Source: Suwaidan, 1997: 137 
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2.5.1: Summary 
The first objective of the study is to evaluate the extent of aggregate disclosure (AD), 
mandatory disclosure (MD) and voluntary disclosure (VD) practices for Jordanian 
companies. Previous studies measured the level of financial disclosure in developed and 
developing countries as seen in Tables 2.5.1 and 2.5.2. These evaluations were for a 
single country. Other studies (e. g. Barnett 1976; Zarzeski 1996; Camfferman and Cooke 
2002; Archumbault and Archumbault 2003) explored the disclosure practices of 
different countries. The purpose of these multinational studies was to identify the 
similarities and differences in the financial disclosure among the countries concerned. 
Furthermore, harmonization and compliance with IASs were investigated in a number 
of different studies (e. g. Grove and Basley 1993; Chamisa 2000). 
Another aspect of exploring financial disclosure is by investigating the extent of 
disclosure for different types of information in the annual reports (e. g. balance sheet 
information, income statement information). This kind of analysis will enable 
information gaps in the annual reports to be identified. "Accountability requires 
broadening the scope of disclosure beyond a financial focus to ensure that sufficient and 
meaningful qualitative information is also included in the corporate annual reports" 
(Hooks, Coy and Davey, 2002: 502). 
In this study, the extent of AD, MD and VD will be explored in the Jordanian annual 
reports. The AD will be disaggregated into different indices to reflect the level of 
disclosure for different groups (e. g. general information, balance sheet information). In 
addition, the mandatory disclosure will be discussed according to the requirements of 
Directives of Disclosure and Auditing and Accounting Standards (DDAAS) and IASs. 
Hence, the first objective of this study will be to provide a comprehensive picture of the 
extent and content of the financial disclosure in Jordan. 
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2.6 Disclosure and Company Characteristics: The Second Objective 
"Firms vary widely in their disclosure practices, both within and across 
countries, and researchers have investigated association between corporate 
characteristics and disclosure for more than 40 years. This is still a subject 
of research interest" (Hope, 2003: 218). 
The second objective of the study is concerned with testing the relationship between a 
number of variables (e. g. firm's size, leverage and liquidity) and the extent of aggregate 
disclosure. Many studies have examined this relationship (Singhvi 1968; Singhvi and 
Desai 1971; Buzby 1975; Stanga 1976; Wallace 1988; Cooke 1989a; Cooke 1992; 
Malone, Fries and Jones 1993; Zarzeski 1996; Inchausti 1997; Al-Mulhem 1997; Aksu 
and Kosedag 2006). Some researchers have investigated the extent of voluntary 
disclosure and many company factors (Firth 1979; McNally, Eng and Hasseldine 1982; 
Chow and Boren 1987; Al-Issa 1988; Cooke 1989b; Hossain, Tan and Adams 1994; 
Raffournier 1995; Hossain, Perera and Rahman 1995; Patton and Zelenka 1997; 
Suwaidan 1997; Naser 1998; Depoers 2000; Ho and Wong 2001; Robb, Single and 
Zarzeski 2001; Haniffa and Cooke 2002; Naser, Al-Khatib and Karbhari 2002; Eng and 
Mak 2003; Anderson and Daoud 2005; Barako, Hancock and Izan 2006; Ghazali and 
Weetmna 2006). Other studies have examined the association between mandatory 
disclosure and company variables (Tai, Au-Yeung Kwok and Lau 1990; Ahmed and 
Nicholls 1994; Wallace, Naser and Mora 1994; Wallace and Naser 1995; Craig and 
Diga 1998; Owusu-Ansah 1998; Abd-Elsalam 1999; Tower, Hancock and Taplin 1999; 
Al-Shiab 2003; Glaum and Street 2003; Ali, Ahmed and Henry 2004; Akhtaruddin 
2005). 
Table 2-6.1 summarizes those studies and their findings regarding the effect of each 
characteristic on each type of disclosure (aggregate, voluntary or mandatory). 
67 
rA 
0 
to 
aio an 
I- 
CCi 
H 
is 
-° 9 I ý I = eöö , (D cu z 
Ici 
- w~ aý 
2 *zý o .ý ,Ga re rn t '-- Gn 
" 
y 'v1 1ý 
Or 
QG " 
ON 
i "' 
N -ti 
ý' N° aý 
N hy -ci ýcý+ iii F 
N 
"ý 
N 
' a . r + r j Gn 
W 8 z of 
4bä 
z ý ä v w w -ci w v , Q -w 
.ý ýQ , 0 
t 
bv o 
A 
rn ö 
~ 
w ... w N "ý r. fti p2 A M M 
M 
O\ ý ~Mr. 
ME 
" ý 
y 
Ici '2 
C"" 
ö 
Ion p 
o E 
'bßä 
+ 
0 
U O . 
- w 
'O V Z 0 iC 
cu 'n be C) ° Ü O9 .d u a 1. ei Ü C. 
to .. 
n. 
'C 
wem, 
`ý 
L1.0 
ýp 
h 'fl O 
00 
VO 
Ü q ] z 
N M ýO 
00 
Lý M 
ýO 
N 
00 
N 
00 ö m 
W 
t- 
cý 
O 
O\ 
00 00 
2 
° 
m 3 
00 
i1ý 
Ua, 
ß 
'ö 
ate; "N 
O° 
o ' ý 
Up, 
i a 
U 
p ý QQ + p pw o A 
5 
12 
.N 
VJ VJ 
. rl 
w 
V7 
ýI iY 
(ý "w' ,N 
.i 
Hb 
F3 
Q (4 . 
E9 ti 9 
N 
N 
". 
- 
° 
'Vi 
U 
43 
o' Q) 
E. 
0 y. y O "O 
b cg 
00 cuEj 
Q ý 
9 3w `° ä 5 ö° L 
fn c C QO to E° " rn rn 
rm. 
Zo vi 
~ ý U 9 E 
Ö 
C) 
a' 00 0Q 
. . E 
N 
4+ 
Gz. 
ä AD 
° 
"ci 2 . 
ý(DO 
10 v ö° - ,5 
° 
c't y ö 
ai aý a ý ab Ts .., ° 
'r ° Op- 0 
4.1 c°) 
2 0 Ch CD 
<21 
M 9u 
- 
m a" ä 
0 o än 
', 'W w'ä 
° 
0r 
- ¢' ° -S U- 
ä. K 
W 
CD m ß 
. 
14 
O U 
t) 
U N 0 
QC M 
M .r 
to 
M 
Nm 
- 
rn 
N 
9 0 
' CO 
00 
011 
0ý0 
°> 
00 
O\ 
C 
Q\ 
Ö 
N 
00 
r. l- 
N 
o 
CÄ 
.2 olý 
00 O\ 
. - U 
Oll 4) (: E 
p 
M 
p p ti M 
4) 
i. - cl qN 
U 
C; I\ 
I'D 
c 
0 
v 
.0 
E- 
N C3 .ý O U 
iý ''ý'U 'Li ri " ,ý 
ei ce p. waU 
& 
Chi ý+ f/I ±, 
, 
ý, 
ý 
> 
ä 
a) 
b z 
E 
UN N N 
-- 
NC bA 
+ u2 u2 
u2 
0 P. 4 w 
t9ÖC? 
U 
a 
O 
ý 
'ý"Ur 'U V) v' Ei 
"0 
r. e a 
tr' 
W a 
0 , OA 0 
9 9 
A ° Q N Ö 
ä ä 
= .2- CJ r'n 
1 "E 2 ri u 5 cu °a °n"CJ mow' 1 
9 
c °' 
. O 
GO2 
, - .... ä 
2 
° cis tC cc fS+ " 
eL) öu ö 
° 3 
N 
ýi rd ° 
-ý 
m 
Zi = 
a) 
F 
`ý m3 N °" t CD CD Mti 
Ü 
+- Fi 
cu 
k 
z 
ti 
0 0 aJ ö O\ M 
U 
- - ö 
N 00 
rs 
0 
C> 
- 
00 00 
-0 
L> W 4) 0 u 
v) - v 
M 
U 
0 N 
cct ý' 
ov 
N cl aý+ U 
O 
Ö 
OJD 
°> Ö 4 
j w > 
, p 
a) 
th 
U 
w. N. 
N GD 
, 
Ny V4 4" 
0 
G"' L ' 
Nb 
A 
CU 
y 
> 
bj) 
ý, 
4-4 
Ow a vý 0 
W 
C bC ä 
~Ü 
a+ ß, 2' 
b0 Vi 
U ý' O O U 
00 
O 
N 
Ü 
0 h 
p\ 
.O t 
r-+ 
w M ýD 
'4 ' 1: $ 0 al 4212 ° v OC . "4 UW ii $ '" b dU .: UM 
V] bUq "" 
N 
cn " 
o 
Q 
cý 
v 
Ov 
^ 
E 
A. 
0 
c 4Qy 
'b - 
b cd w ch ý 
480 
n a> U vk 
o 
Z. 
a. 
ö i: "° 
b 
, 
cl 4) a' 
0 
0 
18 r. v 0 cc co 4) 
p ý' v rnQ? ö 
. co "ýý. 
ýw UN ö ö o 00 4-4 O : 
0 
vZU 
U 
ß, 
U 
.D 
03 N 
A z 
iC 
Fý 
_62 
N ¢, 
U 
00 . -i 
- 
Q% 
. -"ý 
ON 
M 
CN 
M 
00 g O\ N 
0 
p Q o cc 0 ° U 
x ä 
N- 
"o > UNC QJ ý, . 
ý. 
O 
Ü 
il 25 -fl C äi ~ 
ÜN 
'L7 Om Ry 
y a "ý 
y O 
ý 
y, 
w äQä'ß Q 92 c) 
p5 lo cj ý w oa; Q ' o b 
N° 
Zi °'ý O 
aý äö ö,,. ßä ýöý 
UU G 
U 0 
4. ý 
U 
r 
OU QÜ 
(C vý N 
i 
O 
p, 0 
g. M 
vN 
? bA 
le N 
yp p 
rn 121 
O 
NY 
4r 
N 
O Z 
E iCÖ 
r - 
- ýyÖ. ý E 
tu O 
Ö O 
O 
. 
t2 
ci Zc 
Z oý 
9 b 
j 
oo ýs o 
+. a aý w 0 k; p 
C 
ao e 9 
t- 
2 w+ :i ein 
Ca 
OO 
"U CI o 
Q °v w 
N4 ,n M 
,ß O 
Q~ 
All bO 
ýö äm 
ý 
9 u 2 = 0 . Ö 1 2 
, 
¢Ö :+ 
/" 0 
N 
N 
O 
Ü 
00 
N 
b4 
'b 
j q 
0 
rYi 
ti w 0 
0 
M 
c> Omi 
00 
00 CD 
O 
O 
N 
Omi 
O 
vi 
Ö 
0 
N 
CÜO (D 4 
(D 
OR 
9 *2 2 - C 2 C. ) 1,4-1 ýiýy öY QI aR yO fA Zy it 
Iý-1 
S, A ý , "+ýý -1 öa 
O( 1 
U 
1 
UU, pQ 
U yý 
"ý^r vý 
". 
N. 
4U. 
U 
ty" 
,OÖ 
tO 
UN ý' 
N 
P, ý 
"O 
"ý 
CI" 
ýl 
a+ N bA 
'rn 
"ý ý Np CU 
Ö p r O" O - 
ý 
,ý ý q , R. 
ý -cy 
° 
U 1w 
Ici 
4ýn u = 
, ci cu e> i. 3ýti;; ö oo ä °2'ý ý- b 
'd bU 
ö 
. t.. 
q j O ° 
ÖV 
'O 
Ly 
0g 
`' 
$A 
OEN 
' 'w O 
CA 0 
rn 
"CJ 9Uu 
rn U 
N fn 
U 
°öö 
t. 
Ei g t- 0. ) cu . lj . il JA 
Oco 
o 1rR a 
k41) 
Z 
`` 
0 
U ýt 00 
b 
22 ä . RQ 9'L7 
vA 
VJ 
Co 
Q 
R 
' 0 
:2 
4 
0 
u 
°` rn Omi 
b 
R CD 
o° I°pö 
JD 
ö 
wo pq cd O 
N 
N 
GO 
Vg id 
M 
t- 
vR ýy 
y4 
O 
N 
y Zi 
.5 Q ýä ° tu y ýn CKJ 
CC 
N rn p,. Uo+ 
N 
. L: m 
aý 
"- 
b ý, " wem., ö 
yM a) 00 ä -w °ä"v10 c 0 0M o °x' ý 0 pa 
' ýö c , >p' 
0'L7 ß' 
'ý 
ý ° q= Oý N , r "=O, M 
VJ 1 I I ' 
en 
b ý 
°' a o °' ö ä° 'o g 
0 
öo N b. 
ý ö a 
° N 
N L"' U 'Sy 0 p° , to N ýi '7 N 
G 
ý 
O (ý 
fr 
N0 .9 
.D 
QOw Ö 
A G5 -0 w0=- o 
QL) 
P . 
no $GCN yy 
Gn x,. 
' U LS ÜN 
U 
N s0, 
ýt 
N äÜ 
00 'ý O 
OA 
1 00 N 
N 
bA 
'b 
O 
O 
. y Tcý k 
.E . 
fie C1. 
ýý" W 
0 "M 
10 U C) 
00 pp 
ý" 
V] 
".. 
O 
N 
Ö 
tti 
«3 y 
I 
all M O M O 
N 
N 
Ö b 
0 O 
N C O 0 
ce 
b 
N .b 
a 
Co Ö 
ÖN 
Q U 
q 
N 
oar ß, a) ä 
-CJ . ar wo 
0 o u oO m= U ý o 42 3ä °- ö - ä Ü°n 
o N 
-U U Co ,, 
0 
im - 
I 
- "ný+ .a 
c 00 
pb p_ý 
O'O 
ÖN 
tom. 
O G"" U0 ,p Gý U 
O N U ÖU 
O 
!3 
O4" 
O 
.ý ^O Q. E vý b NO 
OU 
U 
u t n ö 
py 
ö 2 
Ü 
O¢ 
y 4. a >, MÖ 
O ýA O 
u5 f! u P. C, 
m2 
cl 
2 
0 4 . 
CO 
Gr 
Ü 
OO 
U O 
ao 
I 
9 
w 
b w 
w 
M N 00 
C 
N 
ü 
O 
O 
lýI 
N 
C 
Ö 
N 
I- 
CO 
ÖÖ u 
O 
N O p C c ,b 
CO 
Ln 
S 
vi 
.. r 
CAS 
H 
O oÜ= Oq W O 
>' 
vi M 
.ýUö°p Ö' i ;>&b' 'r -a 9 
öA p 
ce . o 
° ý' ° 
E 
C 
I 2 4 . aý tCb - aý a i z a i 
a% äi " 5 9) F CA r, ' ä Flaö°ä aCc ° c+ p. Zo 
I I 
a) z ö 
b ä 
tý 
O ö p, N IM °ö 
2: M In 0 
NÖ 
U 
Q. 
iO 
~U 
_y Nu . 
vA 
5 
rýA+ 
G 
NN bCQ 
a cu 
20 
2. e 
a" 
a 4. 
tu 
0 
2 
b b 
tu WO 
O cC , ., y rA O" ei 
(Z 
A 
y" <e 
`0 3 CD 
0, n 
b ö ö 
C 
O 9 
OÜ 
uu 
ce 
4 
to 
cu 
OA 00 
5 tu u2 V) 
'b EI r. b 
ÖO t3ý 
vio 00 v 
3onaýCý OO 0 ~O M .C O M cn 
ý 
M u2 rZ U 
' i". o 
C"i 
b 
[n O Cd Cý O 
' 
"ý ºý°i 
ß+ 
(D E) "Ä. 
a) 
00 G7. 
cn c,, on nn is 
öaF, 
L ° 
`. -4 ä ` ' 
a) 
00 
ý 
o 
00 
0\ 
00 00 
0\ - 
D\ 
M 
tý oö 
"ö 
o 
00 
°\ 
00 
o, rn0 
a) 
C> 00 
Z d 
ý= Z~ 0)0 Ä 
jö 
U 
N- 
o 
H 
2 
b Nv 
bA N Q w t12 
N 0o cý0 
4-4 
0 n 
-o 3 u, U -ý ,,, a ¢ .b M '° & UM ci NU 
N 0 Oki c~C 
Ü r. 
q 
ýn 
0 
"" 4 ÖÜ Ü .C 
Ü 
. 
C. V] N NÜ ý 
b ýC 'O 
Ü 'y .E OO 
° 
rn °u 
y0 
on 
vN 
aý 
v 
°n °ý ý ^ w c C7 
W 
o 
W ÖW U oW 
N °' ýD o 0 
O G1, 
oa 
-- v N of 
N vQHýý. y° `ýä 
C7 
ý 
oý CD o rn o Ö 
00 ,ý 
In 
0\ 
N 
00 
a\ 
(: Ch 1E c> 
CJ c> 
Ö N 
.2 
Ü 
CJ M 
g 
p Q C7 
r N 
0 
bA 0b o 
H 
oä 
ßö 
o ýý 
U 
- "CJ cj "ö 
rIj " y o"U .. - 
r. 
'- 1 0am 
Gn Z to 
r. 
."e "" 
p= 
CU m 
.2 'b 
5 4) 
.4 Üö 
vi 00 - C-1 Q 
C 
b 
't 'Ü "U 
00 
rn 0\ 
- 
ö ä 
O 
0N 
N 
! 
. 
00 
S 
As indicated before in Figure 2.4.1, there are many company and environment factors 
that affect financial disclosure. Regulations and disclosure users are major components 
in the disclosure environment. Haniffa and Cooke (2002: 317) argued that the factors 
which affect disclosure practices in the environment could be categorized into five 
groups: economy, capital markets, accounting and regulatory framework, enforcement 
mechanisms and culture. "Disclosure practices do not develop in a vacuum, but rather 
reflect the underlying environment influence that affect managers and companies in 
different countries" (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002: 317). In addition, the company's decision 
to provide or not to provide specific information is affected by a variety of factors 
(Akhtaruddin, 2005: 404). 
"The mix of communication sources and the quantity and quality of 
information disclosed are influenced by many factors that need to be 
examined in order thoroughly understand disclosure choices" (Archambault 
and Archambault 2003: 174). 
Financial disclosure is not only influenced by external factors which are separated from 
the company, but there are also factors related to the company itself (Al-Mulhem, 
1997: 44). Financial disclosure varies from company to company. Many studies have 
attempted to interpret this variation by observing specific variables which have an 
impact on the extent of disclosure (see Table 2.6.1). It is clear therefore that by 
identifying variables that are related with the extent of disclosure, measures to improve 
disclosure could be taken (Suwaidan, 1997: 113). 
"For example, if size was found to have a significant effect on the extent of 
disclosure, it might be argued that an appropriate action might be to 
require small companies to adopt a disclosure policy comparable to those of 
large firms " (Suwaidan, 1997.113). 
Moreover, Cooke (1989: 16) reported that the examination of the relationship between 
specific firm characteristics and the extent of disclosure will not only enhance our 
understanding of the reasons behind the variation of disclosure, but may also assist 
policy makers to adopt appropriate tools to alleviate the imperfections. 
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"For example, it might be found that the extent of disclosure by multiple 
listed companies is generally higher than other companies. If so, the 
regulatory authorities wish to analyse why this is the case and if foreign 
regulations is an important factor, it might decide to internalise such 
disclosure. If it is found that disclosure by unlisted companies is 
significantly lower than listed companies, the regulatory authorities might 
decide to improve on maximum level of acceptable disclosure" (Cooke, 
1989a: 16). 
Akhtaruddin (2005: 400) pointed out that several studies have explored the factors which 
affect the disclosure practices in developed countries, but little is known about this issue 
in developing countries. However, the major reasons for choosing the following 
company characteristics in this study are: (Owusu-Ansah, 1998: 610) 
1- They should be associated with the aggregate disclosure extent either on prior 
assumptions or theoretical arguments (e. g. agency theory, signalling theory). 
2- They should be measured easily for the purposes of statistical analysis. 
3- They could be employed to facilitate the sample classification into sub-samples 
without ambiguity. This attribute is related to categorical variables, such as industry 
type (manufacturing and services). 
4- The data are available for these characteristics. 
5- These characteristics should be related to socio-economic environment in Jordan. 
Therefore, the following discussion will explain the company characteristics used in this 
study and how these characteristics influence the extent of disclosure: t9 
19 The hypotheses of each variable will be discussed in the methodology chapter 
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2.6.1 Firm Size 
Size is considered to be a significant explanatory variable in disclosure practices of 
companies. Many researchers have found a positive relationship between size and the 
extent of disclosure (Cerf 1961; Singhvi 1968; Singhvi and Desai 1971; Buzby 1975; 
Stanga 1976; Firth 1979; McNally, Eng and Hasseldine 1982; Chow and Boren 1987; 
Al-Issa 1988; Wallace 1988; Cooke 1989a; Cooke 1989b; Tai, Au-Yeung, Kwok and 
Lau 1990; Cooke 1992; Malone, Fries and Jones 1993; Hossain, Tan and Adams 1994; 
Wallace, Naser and Mora 1994; Wallace and Naser 1995; Hossain, Perera and Rahman 
1995; Raffournier 1995; Zarzeski 1996; Al-Mulhem 1997; Inchausti 1997; Patton and 
Zelenka 1997; Suwaidan 1997; Naser 1998; Craig and Diga 1998; Owusu-Ansah, 1998; 
Abd-Elsalam 1999; Depoers 2000; Ho and Wong 2001; Robb, Single and Zarzeski 2001; 
Haniffa and Cooke 2002; Naser, Al-Khatib and Karbhari 2002; Al- Shiab 2003; Eng 
and Mak 2003; Ali, Ahmed and Henry 2004; Alsaeed, 2005; Akhtaruddin 2005; 
Anderson and Daoud 2005; Aksu and Kosedag 2006; Barako, Hancock and Izan 2006). 
Abd-Elsalam (1999: 43) suggested that size could be a proxy for a company's impact on 
some related factors. 
"It is a comprehensive variable which can proxy a number of corporate 
attributes such as competitive advantage, information productive costs and 
political costs. In other words, it is a reflection of agency theory (e. g. large 
number of shareholders and debt-holders), capital need theory (more likely 
to collect capital from outsiders) and political costs (in the public eye). " 
Several reasons have been given to interpret the effect of size on the extent of disclosure. 
First, the process of gathering, classifying, and disseminating information to the public 
is costly. Therefore, large firms have larger economies of scale to disclose information 
than small firms. 
"It is more likely that large firms will have the resources and expertise 
necessary for the production and publication of more sophisticated financial 
statements and therefore cause less disclosure non-compliance" (Ahmed and 
Nicholls, 1994: 65). 
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Second, the need for external funds and raising capital is an important impetus to 
disclose information. Agency theory explains this in terms of the separation of 
ownership and control in the company, conflict of interests between principals (owners) 
and agents (managers) is expected (Hossain, Perera and Rahman, 1995: 72). Jensen and 
Meckling (1976: 313) noted that agency costs increase due to the increase of outside 
capital. Thus, disclosure may be used to decrease agency costs and also reduce 
information asymmetry between the company and the providers of funds (Inchausti, 
1997: 53). Larger firms, according to agency theory; are expected to disclose more 
information than smaller firms due to the need for external funds and the tendency of 
larger firms to be listed on stock exchange and so the need to encourage the demand for 
their securities. 
"Since larger firms utilise for more external finance from the stock market 
for their operating and investment activities than their smaller counterparts, 
it is expected that they would find it beneficial to disclose more and comply 
with relevant regulations" (Ali, Ahmed and Henry, 2004: 188). 
Third, the complexity of the business structure and the diversity of products require a 
large volume of information in order to keep managers in control of operations and 
enable them to make decisions (Buzby, 1975: 18; Suwaidan, 1997: 115; Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2002: 327). Larger firms tend to expand their operations over many geographical 
areas. Consequently, it could be concluded that the relationship between firms' size and 
the level of disclosure is positive. 
"It is also suggested that large firms operate in a multi product business 
environment that requires the generation of several internal management 
reports for the purpose of achieving the overall organization goal" (Barako, 
Hancock and Izan, 2006: 113). 
Fourth, Hossain, Tan and Adams (1994: 336) indicated proprietary cost as an 
explanation for disclosure. They argued that proprietary costs are negatively associated 
with size; thus, smaller firms could face a risk if they disclose more information, 
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because larger firms could disclose the same information at lower cost. The competitive 
disadvantage for smaller firms compared with other larger firms in the same industry 
has been observed by many researchers (Singhvi, 1968: 32; Singhvi and Desai, 1971: 131; 
Buzby, 1975: 19; Stanga, 1976: 47; Cooke, 1989: 30, Malone, Fries and Jones, 1993: 253; 
Hossain, Tan and Adams, 1994: 337; Hossain, Perera and Rahman, 1995: 73; Al- 
Mulhem, 1997: 45; Patton and Zelenka, 1997: 610; Suwaidan, 1997: 115; Dumontier and 
Raffournier, 1998: 221; Naser, 1998: 97; Abd-Elsalam, 1999: 44; Naser, Al-Khatib and 
Karbhari, 2002: 128; Ali, Ahmed and Henry, 2004: 118; Akhtaruddin, 2005: 405; 
Anderson and Daoud, 2005: 14; Barako, Hancock and Izan, 2006: 113). 
Fifth, the magnitude of disclosure is correlated with demand for information by 
financial analysts and investors. Lang and Lundholm (1993: 251) stated that financial 
analysts needs information to enhance investors' confidence about the firm's value in 
the market, because non-disclosure may be interpreted as bad news. Indeed, large firms 
have a larger following of financial analysts than small ones and as explained before, 
the need for more information to be analysed by financial analysts is greater also. 
Finally, government and legal agencies may require a certain amount of information to 
be disclosed (mandatory disclosure). The pressure on larger companies is more than on 
smaller companies because larger companies are paid more attention by government 
agencies (i. e. in the public eye). Hence, political costs arise here and larger companies 
are more sensitive to political costs (Raffournier, 1995: 263). Consequently, larger firms 
will disclose more information, both mandatory and voluntary, to minimise those costs 
and allay public criticism or government intervention in their affairs, and also to 
enhance their public image in society through maximising welfare in society (Al- 
Mulhem, 1997: 44; Anderson and Daoud, 2005: 14). 
"For example, Deegan and Hallam (1997) render evidence consistent with 
the fact that larger firms issued value added statements voluntarily as an 
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indication that their employees were receiving a fair share. Another 
example is given by Wong who hypothesized that larger companies 
disclosed current costs data voluntarily to reduce political costs" 
(Suwaidan, 1997: 116). 
Firm size has been measured by different variables total assets, sales, number of 
shareholders and capital stock and net income. Cooke (1992: 232) argued that there is no 
theoretical reason to choose one variable as the appropriate one. Therefore, four 
measures were chosen for the purpose of this study: total assets, sales, capital stock and 
net income 
In summary, size is a major determinant of the extent of financial disclosure. There is a 
general consensus that size is positively associated with the level of disclosure. 
2.6.2 Leverage 
The level of financial disclosure could be affected by leverage, as measured by long 
term debt/equity. For instance, a high debt/equity ratio may enhance disclosure policy 
for managers and encourage them to disclose more information to meet interests of the 
lenders. Conversely, a low ratio could induce managers to orient their disclosure policy 
toward shareholders more than creditors (Malone, Fries and Jones, 1993: 251). 
Agency theory assumes that highly leveraged firms are more likely to transfer wealth 
from bondholders to shareholders. Therefore, the agency costs increase due to the 
increase of monitoring costs (Hossain, Perera and Rahman, 1995: 73; Abd-Elsalam, 
1999: 45). 
Accordingly, managers have incentives to disclose more information in their financial 
reports in order to reduce their costs and to avoid any creditors' claims. "Agency theory 
predicts that the level of voluntary disclosure increases as the gearing of the company 
grows to avoid agency costs" (Abd-Elsalam, 1999: 45). Moreover, Patton and Zelenka 
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(1997: 689) employed the leverage ratios as a proxy of the financial risk of the firm. 
Thus, a higher leverage ratio implies higher risk and greater expected disclosure. 
Contrary to this theory, a number of researchers did not find any relationship between 
leverage and the extent of disclosure (Chow and Boren 1987; Hossain, Tan and Adams 
1994; Raffournier 1995; Wallace and Naser 1995; Inchausti 1997; Patton and Zelenka 
1997; Craig and Diga 1998; Dumontier and Raffournier 1998; Abd-Elsalam 1999; 
Tower, Hancock and Taplin 1999; Ho and Wong 2001; Haniffa and Cooke 2002; All, 
Ahmed and Henry 2004; Alsaeed, 2005; Aksu and Kosedag 2006). However, other 
studies discovered a positive relationship (Al-Issa 1988; Malone, Fries and Jones 1993; 
Hossain, Perera and Rahman 1995; Naser 1998; Naser, Al-Khatib and Karbhari 2002; 
Barako, Hancock and Izan 2006). Moreover, other studies (Zarzeski 1996, El-Jazzar, 
Finn and Jacob 1999; Eng and Mak 2003) found a negative relationship between 
leverage and the extent of disclosure. They used a different ratio to measure leverage 
(total debt/total assets). Zarzeski (1996: 24) argued that companies with high debt ratios 
share more private information with their creditors. Hence, debtors would have direct 
access to information and there would be no need for detailed disclosure. However, 
Jaggi and Low (2000: 503) stated that this case is only valid if companies have private 
debt rather than public debt. If firms have a higher level of public debts, debt-holders 
will not be able to have a close relationship with companies. Therefore, detailed 
disclosure is required to ensure adherence to debt contracts. 
Nonetheless, Eng and Mak (2003: 341) pointed out that this inverse relationship between 
leverage and disclosure is consistent with debt being a tool for controlling the free cash 
flow problem. They (2003: 333) commented: 
"Increased leverage is expected to reduce disclosure because leverage 
helps control the free cash flow problem, and the agency costs of debt 
controlled through restrictive debt covenants in debt agreements rather than 
increased disclosure of information in annual reports ". 
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Two measures were used for leverage in this study: ratio of total debt (liabilities) to total 
assets and the ratio of long term debt to owners' equity. 
More testing of such a relationship is needed in order to interpret the effect of leverage 
or gearing ratio on the level of financial disclosure, without depending on the agency 
theory perspective only. 
2.6.3 Profitability 
The question which could arise here is: is a high level of earnings positively associated 
with the level of financial disclosure? 
When profitability ratios (e. g. rates of return and earnings margin) rise in the company, 
managers have two incentives to disclose more about the company. First, those ratios 
reflect the performance of the company and therefore, managers could justify the 
continuation of their position and compensation arrangements (as suggested by agency 
theory). "Managers are motivated to disclose more detailed information to support the 
continuance of their position and remuneration" (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002: 329). In 
addition, Singhvi and Desai (1971: 134) argued that a higher earnings margin ensures a 
better position for the company in the price competition. "When a corporation's 
earnings margin is above the average for the industry, the investing public is likely to 
have greater confidence in the corporation for its survival" (Singhvi and Desai, 
1971: 135). On the contrary, when the company has a low earnings margin, competitors 
find it a good opportunity to squeeze the company out of the market by reducing 
product prices. 
The second reason is related to the idea that higher profitability ratios implies good 
news to the market and owners could avoid the undervaluation of their shares; hence 
their company is differentiated from other companies in the market (in line with 
signalling theory). In contrast, when profitability ratios are low, managers may disclose 
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less information in order to avoid the negative effect on the firm's market value 
(Suwaidan, 1997: 121). However, Abd-Elsalam (1999: 46) argued that bad news may 
compel the company to disclose it in order to avoid legal liability and to maintain the 
reputation of the company. She stated (1999: 46) 
"Companies with bad news might choose to disclose it on time to reduce the 
risk of legal liability and severe share devaluation and loss of reputation. In 
other words, signalling theory might suggest two contradictory signs of the 
relationships between profitability and disclosure of information ". 
Inchausti (1997: 54) pointed out that, from a political perspective, large profits induce 
the company to disclose more information to justify the amount of profit. 
Moreover, companies may use earnings management as a mechanism to reduce the total 
risk, since earnings volatility is associated with total risk (Dumontier and Raffournier, 
1998: 224). Thus, compliance with disclosure requirements could be a signal of high- 
performance companies. 
In Sweden, Cooke (1989: 33) excluded this variable from his analysis of the relationship 
between disclosure and company's characteristics. He depended on the view of Moore 
and Buzby (1972: 5 83) who propose that profitability ratios (e. g. earnings margins, rates 
of return) are interrelated with asset size and number of shareholders. Therefore, it 
could be difficult to achieve association with financial disclosure. Cooke's postulation 
may be supported by some studies which did not find an association between 
profitability and disclosure level (Wallace 1988; Malone, Fries and Jones 1993; Wallace, 
Naser and Mora 1994; Al-Mulhem 1997; Inchausti 1997; Suwaidan 1997; Dumontier 
and Raffournier 1998; Tower, Hancock and Taplin 1999; Ho and Wong 2001; AI-Shiab 
2003; Eng and Mak 2003; Alsaeed, 2005; Barako, Hancock and Izan 2006), but other 
researchers found, as expected, a positive relationship (Singhvi 1968; Singhvi and Desai 
1971; Al-Issa 1988; Raffournier 1995; Patton and Zelenka 1997; Naser 1998; Haniffa 
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and Cooke 2002; Naser, Al-Khatib and Karbhari 2002; Ali, Ahmed and Henry 2004; 
Akhtaruddin 2005; Aksu and Kosedag 2006). However, Wallace and Naser (1995: 346) 
discovered a negative relationship between profitability and disclosure for Hong Kong 
companies. They argued that firms with lower profit (as bad news) may accept the 
provision of detailed disclosure as part of their responsibility to users of the annual 
reports. In addition, they pointed out that the relative inaction of high profit companies 
in disclosure terms, could be because they: 1- feel that users are satisfied with the high 
profits and hence they will not ask for additional disclosure, and 2- do not want to 
disclose additional information that will have to be continued in subsequent years. 
However, this negative relationship is inconsistent with the previous studies, as shown 
above, therefore more studies are needed in order to test the theoretical propositions. 
Three variables for profitability were used: rates of return (net income/net assets), 
earnings margin (net income divided by sales) and the return of equity (net 
income/owners' equity) 
2.6.4 Number of Shareholders 
This variable was used as a measure of firm size in investigating the association 
between disclosure and company factors in some studies (Wallace 1988; Cooke 1989a; 
Cooke 1989b; Cooke 1992). However, Wallace and Naser (1995: 323) argued that using 
number of shareholders as a proxy of firm size is not valid in all cases. For instance, a 
company could have more shareholders than another one which has more total assets or 
sales. "It is possible to find a company with 500 shareholders which is wealthier in 
terms of assets and market valuation than one with say 10000 shareholders" (Wallace 
and Naser, 1995: 323). 
It could be assumed that as the number of shareholders increases in the firm, the 
monitoring problem increases due to the potential conflict between shareholders and 
other parties in the firm (e. g. creditors). Shipper (1981: 86) argued that any monitoring 
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problem that arises due to an increase of shareholders could be solved by increasing 
financial disclosure. Suwaidan (1997: 116) expressed a similar view as a large number 
of shareholders make the company more important to the public. This leads to a call for 
more disclosure to alleviate the pressure of the market. In addition, companies with a 
large number of shareholders may disclose more information in order to reduce the 
excessive pressure from regulators in order to promote the marketability of their 
securities (Singhvi and Desai, 1971: 132). 
Suwaidan found a positive relationship between number of shareholders and the extent 
of disclosure, as did Singhvi (1968); Singhvi and Desai (1971); Malone, Fries and Jones 
(1993); and Anderson and Daoud (2005). Meanwhile, Naser, Al-Khatib and Karbhari 
(2002) did not find any relationship. The company's shareholders was the measurement 
for this variable. 
2.6.5 Listing Status 
Given the importance of size, listing status can also be a significant factor in 
interpreting the variation of financial disclosure. Some researchers discovered that listed 
companies disclose more information than non-listed ones (Singhvi and Desai 1971; 
Firth 1979; Cooke 1989; Malone, Fries and Jones 1993; Wallace, Naser and Mora 1994; 
Al-Mulhem 1997; Patton and Zelenka 1997; Abd-Elsalam 1999). Raffournier (1995: 263) 
indicated two reasons for this. First, stock market regulations require listed firms to 
adhere to specific disclosure requirements. Second, listed firms may disclose 
information voluntarily for funding purposes (e. g. selling new issues of shares); thus, 
they could attract more investors according to the quantity and the quality of voluntary 
disclosure. In addition, listed companies are expected to have more shareholders than 
non-listed. Therefore, information disclosure is a monitoring function to mitigate the 
conflict between the diverse parties in the company. 
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"Firms that are listed may well have economic ambitions that will require 
additional capital. This should lead firms to disclose more information to 
overcome the informational asymmetry that could lead to lower prices for 
their securities" (Patton and Zelenka 1997: 611). 
Furthermore, the evidence seems to indicate that multiple-listed corporations disclose 
more information than domestic-listed ones. Several studies showed a positive 
association between multinational company influence and disclosure level (Cooke, 
1989a, Cooke 1989b; Cooke 1992; Hossain, Tan and Adams 1994; Ahmed and Nicholls 
1994; Hossain, Perera and Rahman 1995; Inchausti 1997; Dumontier and Raffournier 
1998; El-Jazzar, Finn and Jacob 1999; Glaum and Street 2003; Anderson and Daoud 
2005; Collet and Hasky 2005). Corporations with multiple quotations comply with 
foreign regulations, besides their local regulations requirements. 
"Multiple listed corporations, raising capital in the international markets, 
will have a higher level of disclosure than purely domestically listed 
enterprises if the requirements of overseas stock markets are greater than 
those of their domestic exchanges" (Cooke, 1992: 232). 
In addition, the potential advantage of foreign listings which helps to obtain capital at 
lower cost encourages companies to disclose more information (Hope, 2003: 229). 
Moreover, Dumnotier and Raffournier (1998: 220) argued that multiple-listed companies 
may have more foreign users than domestic ones. Most of these users are not familiar 
with the national accounting standards and do not have access to information. Therefore, 
compliance with IASs could assure investors that financial statements are not 
misleading. In addition, enhanced disclosure will provide users with proper access to 
information. Furthermore, compliance with IASs may facilitate admission to foreign 
stock exchanges and exempt companies from compliance with local accounting 
standards. 
Shipper (1981: 86) proposed two kinds of linkage between voluntary disclosure and 
listing status. The first one is complementary; thus, voluntary disclosure will enable 
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managers to reduce the monitoring costs between the investors in the company. As a 
result, the level of disclosure will be greater for multi-listed firms, to meet the interests 
of investors in the company and its subsidiaries. Conversely, the second linkage is 
substitutive, when the effect of multi-listing status reflects the reputation of the 
company in more than one stock market. Hence, the managers reduce the agency costs 
and minimise the level of voluntary disclosure. Consequently, the substitutive 
perspective assumes that multi-listing will reduce the level of voluntary disclosure. 
Overall, as discussed before, research does not support the substitutive perspective. 
Although, Buzby (1975) found no relationship between listing status and financial 
disclosure, the majority of studies discovered a positive association. 
For the purpose of this study, the listing status variable can be represented by a dummy 
dichotomous variable of 1 if the company is listed in the ASE (listed in the first tier) and 
0 if the company is not listed in the ASE (listed in the second or the third tier). 
2.6.6 Industry Type 
One might expect that financial disclosure varies among different sectors in the 
economy. Type of business is a determinant variable in explaining the extent of 
disclosure between industries. Inchausti (1997: 56) proposed that industry, as well as 
listing status and auditor type, is a characteristic that affects the culture of financial 
reporting of companies (cultural factors). He argued that firms in one industry may 
disclose more information than required, so the evidence seems to indicate diverse 
disclosure policies across industries. Suwaidan (1997: 118) mentioned four reasons for 
variation in disclosure among the different sectors of business: 
a) The competitive effect on the companies: firms could be reluctant to disclose more 
information due to the costs which arise from revealing firm activities and systems to 
competitors. "The disclosure needs of firms may increase as the firm operates in a larger 
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number of industries to satisfy the information needs associated with a broader set of 
resources" (Archambault and Archambault 2003: 182). 
b) The domination effect: in certain industries, there may be some companies which 
dominate the market. Those companies may affect disclosure policies in other 
companies, as they are considered to be the leaders in the market and the other 
companies deem their disclosure policies the most appropriate ones. Cooke (1989b) 
argued that the existence of a dominant company with extensive voluntary disclosure 
leads to a "bandwagon" influence. 
c) The difference in accounting policies and techniques among companies in diverse 
industries maybe due to the adoption of different accounting systems in each industry, 
which creates different measurements of valuation and disclosure. 
d) The social responsibility effect: specific industries have greater social responsibility 
than others. For example, there is a greater concern about pollution in relation to 
manufacturing companies than trading ones. Thus, additional information may be 
included in the financial statements of manufacturing firms. 
In addition, market influence may induce a company to adopt the same disclosure 
policies as others from the same industry (Abd-Elsalam, 1999: 53). "If a company does 
not adopt the same corporate reporting strategy as others from the same activity, it could 
be interpreted by the market as "bad news"" (Abd-Elsalam, 1999: 53). 
Craig and Diga (1998: 259) argued that some industries such as banking, are subject to 
greater political pressure than others and hence they disseminate more information. In 
addition, diversified companies seem to have greater volume of information to disclose 
than undiversified companies. 
Different results have been found by testing the relationship between disclosure level 
and industry type. McNally, Eng and Hassledine (1982); Wallace (1988); Cooke 
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(1989a); Tai, Au-Yeung, Kwok and Lau (1990); Malone, Fries and Jones (1993); 
Wallace, Naser and Mora (1994); Al-Mulhem (1997); Inchausti (1997); Patton and 
Zelenka (1997); Naser (1998); Abd-Elsalam (1999); Tower, Hancock and Taplin (1999); 
Haniffa and Cooke (2002); Naser, Al-Khatib and Karbhari (2002); Eng and Mak (2003); 
Anderson and Daoud (2005); Alsaeed (2005); and Akhtaruddin (2005) found no 
association between disclosure level and business type. On the other hand, Stanga 
(1976: 49) concluded that the beverage industry had the lowest mean disclosure score 
among other industries such as metal manufacturing and chemicals. In addition, Cooke 
(1989b: 188) found that trading firms disclosed less voluntary information than other 
industry types. Moreover, Cooke (1992: 236) discovered that in Japan, manufacturing 
companies disclose more information than other types of companies. Wallace and Naser 
(1995: 343) concluded that conglomerate firms disclose less information than other 
companies in Hong Kong. Furthermore, in Jordan, Suwaidan (1997: 148) concluded that 
firms in service sectors disclose less information than firms in the financial or 
manufacturing sectors. Meanwhile, Al-Shiab (2003: 313) found that in the 
manufacturing sector, mining and building equipment companies were higher disclosing 
companies than others, except chemical companies. Collett and Harsky (2005: 194) 
discovered that companies in the resource industries (e. g. oil and metals) disclose more 
corporate governance information than other industry groups. 
An interesting result was found by Craig and Diga (1998: 268) in that despite the high 
political cost exposure, banks and utilities were found to be the lowest disclosing 
industry sectors. They interpreted this result as resulting from these kinds of sectors 
being highly regulated and hence they may use other channels for communicating (e. g. 
special reports to regulators). Therefore, this may reduce the need for making extensive 
disclosure. 
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In Jordan, the companies are grouped into four broad sectors: manufacturing, banking 
and finance, services and insurance. In this study, only the manufacturing and services 
sectors were selected. The bank and insurance sectors were excluded, since they are 
subject to specific disclosure requirements (e. g. IAS No. 30). Several studies followed 
such a step (e. g. Wallace 1988; Cooke 1989a; Al-Mulhem 1997). More discussion about 
this issue will come later in this chapter, in the discussion of sample selection. 
Therefore, the industry variable is coded as follows: 
IN I= one for manufacturing and zero if it does not belong to this group; 
IN2= one for services and zero otherwise 
Finally, examining this association may shed light on regulations and requirements 
which indicate particular disclosure strategies for corporations in a specific industry or 
type of business. 
2.6.7 Assets-in-Place 
The relationship between disclosure level and assets-in-place has not been investigated 
by many researchers (see Table 2.6.1). There who have tested it rely on the proposition 
of Myers (1977: 155) who suggested that a firm's value consisted of two major elements; 
the first is assets-in-place, which represents the firm's investment policy at the present 
time. This element depends on another one, which represents future investments and 
growth opportunities and is called assets yet to be acquired. He asserted that firms with 
a large proportion of assets-in-place have less opportunity for transferring wealth from 
debt holders to shareholders. This argument is covered in agency theory. The lenders' 
right in writing covenants restricts shareholders' use of those assets in debt agreements. 
So, under this proposition, the extent of disclosure will be inversely related to 
company's proportion of assets-in-place. 
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However, previous empirical studies do not support this proportion. Studies by Chow 
and Boren in Mexico (1987); Hossain, Tan and Adams in Malaysia (1994) and Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman in New Zealand (1995) and Ho and Wong in Hong Kong (2001) did 
not discover any association between disclosure level and assets-in-place. Furthermore, 
Haniffa and Cooke (2002) found a positive relationship between disclosure level and 
proportion of assets-in-place. They ascribed this unexpected result to the different 
approaches used to measure assets-in-place. Proportion of assets-in-place is computed 
by the ratio of book value fixed assets (net of depreciation) to the book value of total 
assets. 
The small number of studies and the contradictory results necessitate more studies in 
different countries. 
2.6.8 Ownership Structure 
Agency theory suggests that separation of ownership and control in a company leads to 
conflict of interests between the contracting parties (e. g. owners vs. managers). 
Managers (agents) are motivated to behave according to the interests of the owners 
(principals) in order to reduce monitoring costs which could harm managers' 
remuneration. In addition, Barako, Hancock and Izan (2006: 112) pointed out that due to 
the large ownership stake, institutional owners have a significant effect by monitoring 
the disclosure practices in the company. Thus, managers may disclose information 
voluntarily in order to meet the expectations of the large shareholders. For instance, 
Dumontier and Raffournier (1998: 222) commented, in regard to compliance with IASs: 
"Compliance with IAS may thus be either a monitoring activity imposed by 
shareholders or a bonding activity decided by managers in order to reduce 
agency costs ". 
Disseminating more information may be seen as an appropriate tool for minimizing 
costs. Haniffa and Cooke (2002: 328) stated that type of owners is an important variable 
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in interpreting the extent of disclosure. They stated, "disclosure will be greater for 
companies with diffuse ownership because it helps owners to monitor behaviour of 
management as predicted by agency theory" (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002: 328). 
Hossain, Tan and Adams (1994: 337) noted that disclosure is greater in widely held 
companies than closely held ones, because the separation of ownership and control is 
more likely in widely held firms. Hence, managers (agents) can act to maximize the 
interests of owners (principals) effectively. 
"Moreover, the management of firms with a wide dispersion of ownership 
would also be more inclined to make more financial disclosures to meet 
information needs of diverse group of investors" (Jaggi and Low, 
2000: 501) " 
This variable was measured by institutional ownership to total owners ratio. In Jordan, 
Suwaidan (1997) found that the institutional ownership ratio did not affect the extent of 
disclosure. He ascribed this to the fact that the majority of institutional shareholders in 
Jordanian companies have one or more representatives on the board of directors, so they 
may have private access to information. Therefore, annual reports may not be an 
important source of information. 
The findings related to this issue are mixed. While Hossain, Tan and Adams (1994), 
Haniffa and Cooke (2002) and Barako, Hancock and Izan (2006) discovered a positive 
association between ownership structure and disclosure level, Rafournier (1995); 
Suwaidan (1997); Naser (1998); Naser, Al-Khatib and Karbhari (2002); Eng and Mak 
(2003) and Anderson and Daoud (2005) did not find any such relationship. 
2.6.9 Liquidity 
Liquidity is defined as the extent to which an organization's short-term assets are liquid 
(capable of being turned into cash in a short period of time) in order to pay its debt 
(short-term liabilities) when they fall due without having to liquidate long-term assets 
(Oxford Dictionary of Accounting, 1999: 221). 
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Wallace and Naser (1995: 320) argued that liquidity is an essential factor in the 
evaluation of the company by interested parties such as investors, creditors and 
regulators, who are concerned about the going concern status of the company. Therefore, 
companies tend to disclose more information about their ability to meet obligations and 
about the fact that the company is a going concern, in order to allay the fears of 
investors and creditors. 
According to Abd-Elsalam (1999: 48), signalling theory supposes that firms with a high 
liquidity ratio tend to disclose more information in order to be differentiated from other 
companies with a lower liquidity ratio. Conversely, agency theory proposes that firms 
with a low percentage of liquidity disclose more information to reduce the conflict 
between shareholders and creditors (Abd-Elsalam, 1999: 48). 
Just as a contradiction exists between theories, so does it between empirical findings. 
For instance, Belkaoui and Kahl (1978, as cited in Abd-Elsalam, 1999: 48) discovered a 
positive relationship between liquidity ratio and disclosure for Canadian firms (this 
evidence supports signalling). On the contrary, Wallace, Naser and Mora (1994) and 
Naser, Al-Khatib and Karbhari (2002) supported the agency theory prospevtive, since 
they found Spanish firms with a low liquidity ratio showed more financial disclosure. 
However, Wallace and Naser (1995); Abd-Elsalam (1999); Alsaeed (2005); and Barako, 
Hancock and Izan (2006) did not support either of those theories, as they discovered no 
association between liquidity and financial disclosure. Liquidity is measured as the ratio 
of company's current assets to current liabilities. 
These contradictory results provide an incentive to test this particular association 
between liquidity and disclosure in order to see if any theory is supported by empirical 
findings. 
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2.6.10 Audit Firm Size 
Auditors, as an independent party, are a control element whose responsibility is to 
assure the reliability and the validity of financial statements (Porter, Simon and 
Hatherly, 2003: 11). 
Auditing may be used as an implement to alleviate the conflict between managers and 
shareholders and, consequently, reduce agency costs (Hossain, Tan and Adams, 
1994: 339; Wallace and Naser, 1995: 326; Naser, 1998: 94; Naser, Al-Khatib and 
Karbhari, 2002: 129; Ali, Ahmed and Henry, 2004: 189; Anderson and Daoud, 2005: 10; 
Barako, Hancock and Izan, 2006: 113). Ahmed and Nicholls (1994: 66) drew attention to 
the fact that size of audit firm can significantly affect the amount of information 
disclosed in financial statements. They asserted that larger audit firms (i. e. the Big-Four 
audit firms) are more likely to associate themselves with clients who provide better 
disclosure practices. "Large audit firms are less likely to be associated with clients 
which disclose lower levels of information in their annual reports" (Ali, Ahmed and 
Henry, 2004: 189). 
Therefore, larger audit firms could maintain their reputation by increasing the disclosure 
of their clients. In contrast, Malone, Fries and Jones (1993: 254) argued that smaller 
audit firms are more sensitive to their clients needs because of the risk related to losing 
them. Therefore, small audit firms are likely to require less disclosure than big audit 
firms. Other researchers expressed a similar view, that audit firms may use the amount 
of information disclosed by their clients as an indicator of their quality (Ahmed and 
Nicholls 1994; Al-Mulhem 1997; Inchausti 1997; Suwaidan 1997; Abd-Elsalam 1999). 
It is argued that larger audit firms are less dependent on individual clients, since they 
have a large number of clients and hence they are more likely than small audit firms on 
to affect the disclosure practices of the company. 
"Bigger, independent audit firms are less likely than smaller independent 
audit firms to depend on (or have a bonding relationship with) one or few 
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clients. The apparent lack of bonding with clients would enable big 
independent audit firms to demand greater detail of disclosure in the 
CARS20 of their clients " (Wallace and Naser, 1995: 326). 
Moreover, as regards compliance with IASs, Dumontier and Raffournier (1998: 225) 
argued that large audit firms have greater ability than small ones to apply IASs, since 
they have the experience and the economic resources (e. g. have developed their own 
checklists). 
Another point to note is that signalling theory suggests that selecting an external auditor 
can be used as a signal of firm value (Hossain, Perera and Rahman, 1995: 74). An 
example is given by Bar-Yosef and Livnat (1984) who illustrated that an entrepreneur 
might select one of the Big- Six audit firms as a signal to investors that high cash flow 
is expected. 
Mixed results have been found in examination of the effect of audit firm size on the 
extent of disclosure. A study by Firth (1979: 278) revealed no association between 
disclosure level and audit firm size. Firth (1979: 279) commented, 
"Auditing firms have to express an opinion as to whether companies have 
compiled with the minimum disclosure requirements of the Companies Acts 
and of the ASC s Statement of Accounting Practice, but beyond this there is 
no evidence that increased or decreased disclosure is associated with 
whether the auditing firm is from the Big8 or not ". 
Other researchers supported Firth's evidence (e. g. Singhvi 1968; McNally, Eng and 
Hasseldine 1982; Tai, Au-Yeung, Kwok and Lau 1990; Malone, Fries and Jones 1993; 
Hossain, Tan and Adams 1994; Wallace, Naser and Mora 1994; Hossain, Perera and 
Rahman 1995; Al-Mulhem 1997; Dumontier and Raffournier 1998; Naser 1998; Abd- 
Elsalam 1999; Ali, Ahmed and Henry 2004; Alsaeed 2005; Anderson and Daoud 2005; 
Barako, Hancock and Izan 2006). On the other hand, a number of studies supported the 
theoretical literature proposition (agency theory and signalling theory) that large audit 
20 CARS: Corporate annual reports 
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firms have a greater quantity of information disclosed by their clients than small ones 
(Singhvi and Desai 1971; Ahmed and Nicholls 1994; Raffournier 1995; Wallace and 
Naser 1995; Inchausti 1997; Patton and Zelenka 1997; Suwaidan 1997; Naser, Al- 
Khatib and Karbhari 2002; Al-Shiab 2003; Archambault, J. J and Archambault, M. E 
2003; Glaum and Street 2003). 
To measure this variable, the companies were classed into two categories: Companies 
whose accounts were audited by one of the Big Four audit firms, and companies whose 
accounts were not audited by one of the Big Four audit firms. A dummy variable was 
used, with the value 1 given for the company if it was from the first group and 0 if it 
was from the second one. This procedure was followed by many researchers (Singhvi 
1968; Singhvi and Desai 1971; Firth 1979; McNally, Eng and Hasseldine 1982; Tai, 
Au-Yeung Kwok and Lee 1990; Ahmed and Nicholls 1994; Hossain, Tan and Adams 
1994; Raffournier 1995; Husseim, Perera and Rahman 1995; Wallace and Naser 1995; 
Patton and Zelenka 1997; Dumontier and Raffournier 1998; Naser 1998; Abd Elsalam 
1999; Haniffa and Cooke 2002; Naser, Al-Khatib and Karbhari 2002; Glaum and Street 
2003). 
Owusu-Ansah (1998: 612) argued that the previous measurement could not be employed 
exactly in the case of Zimbabwe. Instead, he classified the audit firms into two groups 
depending on the concentration ratio, into Big Two (Large) and non-Big Two (small) 
audit firms. He (1998: 612) defined the concentration ratio as the level to which a market 
is dominated by a few suppliers. The market for auditing services in Zimbabwe 
provides such information. On the contrary, Ali, Ahmed and Henry (2004: 190) pointed 
out that five international audit firms are not represented well in South Asian countries, 
specifically in Pakistan and Bangladesh. Therefore, it is difficult to classify these firms 
into big or small. 
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In the case of Jordan, Suwaidan (1997: 150) divided the companies into two groups: 
companies audited by one of the Jordanian big six and companies audited by other 
auditing firms. In 1992,78.8% of companies were audited by the Jordanian Big Six and 
the remainder by other audit firms. Meanwhile, Al-Shiab (2003: 234) classified the 
companies into two groups: companies whose annual reports were audited by one of the 
top five international audit firms21 and those with other auditing arrangements. The 
percentage of the annual reports audited by the big five audit companies working in 
Jordan was: 32% in 1995.34% in 1996,32% in 1997,30% in 1998,34% in 1999 and 
30% in 2000. 
In this study, the measurement of audit firm size depends on the number of companies 
audited by each audit firm and its linkage with the biggest audit firms around the 
world. 22 The next table shows the number of Jordanian companies audited by Big 
Jordanian audit companies and Small ones (others) for the year 2003. 
Table 4.5.2.10.1: Number of companies audited by Big and Small audit firms 
Audit firm No. of companies audit by them % 
1- Allied Accountants (Ernst & Young) 24 19.83 
2- Arab Professional (Grant Thoronton) 21 17.36 
3- Saba & Co (Deloitte) 19 15.70 
4- Ibrahim Al-Abbasi & Co 14 11.51 
5- Ghsha & Co 11 9.09 
6- Arab Professional Group 6 4.96 
7- Talal Abu Gazaleh & Co 5 4.13 
8- Others (13 firms) 21 17.36 
Total 121 100 
21 The Big Five international audit firms were: Arthur Anderson, Deloitte & Touch, Ernst & Young, 
KPMG, Price Waterhouse Coopers 
22 Big Four Audit Firms are: Deloitte, KPMG, Price Waterhouse Coopers (PWC) and Ernst & Young 
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From the table above, the first three audit firms have professional connections with 
international CPA firms. Allied Accountants and Saba & Co have contacts with two of 
the Big Four audit firms (Ernst &Young and Deloitte), while Arab Professional is 
linked with another big international CPA firm (Grant Thornton). The other audit firms 
in Jordan are local and do not audit a large number of companies (as shown in Table 
4.5.2.10.1). Therefore, the first three audit firms in the table are considered to be "Big", 
because of their relationship with international audit firms and the large number of 
companies audited by them. 64 companies (53%) are audited by the Big Three 
Jordanian audit firms. The other 57 companies (47%) are audited by various several 
small local Jordanian audit firms. 
The same approach as Suwaidan's is used in this study. Audit firm size is represented 
by a dummy variable of 1 if the company is audited by one of the Jordanian Big Three 
and 0 otherwise. 
2.6.11 Listing age 
Haniffa and Cooke (2002: 330) tested the impact of length of time a company has been 
listed in a capital market and the extent of financial disclosure in a Malaysian context. 
Spero (1979: 15) argued that disclosure can be used to reduce uncertainty. 
"Higher disclosure levels should allow for better estimates of the possible 
effects that the resolution of future uncertainties will have on future 
operations. Disclosure is information and information should reduce 
uncertainty" (Spero, 1979: 15). 
Newly listed companies are expected to disseminate more information than old listed 
firms in order to reduce uncertainty about the risk of their operations and to raise the 
confidence of investors about their position. In addition, newly listed firms need more 
time to be familiar with the disclosure requirements of market regulations. Hence, they 
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may disclose information to highlight their compliance with requirements and their 
ability to satisfy the authorities of the market. 
It is reasonable to think that recently listed firms need to increase their capital at the 
lowest cost, compared to older companies, which depend more on internal funds 
(Haniffa and Cooke, 2002: 330). Disclosing more information is an appropriate tool for 
external funds. On the other hand, Akhtaruddin (2005: 405) stated that old companies 
have a higher level of disclosure than new ones, since they have the experience and 
resources and in order to enhance their reputation in the market. 
In this study, listing age is measured from the first date of listing the company in ASE 
to the financial year ending in 2002. 
This variable has been the subject of investigation by Haniffa and Cooke (2002); 
Alsaeed (2005); and Akhtaruddin (2005) only. These studies found no relationship 
between listing age and variation of disclosure. The deficiency of evidence in this area 
requires other studies to enhance our knowledge about disclosure level. 
2.6.12 Summary 
The second objective of this study is to investigate the association between aggregate 
disclosure and various characteristics of firms. Possible associations have been 
discussed in the light of diverse theories (i. e. agency theory, signalling theory and 
political theories). Those theories explain the trend of such a relationship (positive, 
negative or no relationship). Table 2.5.1 shows studies in both developed and 
developing countries, for different kinds of disclosure: aggregate disclosure, voluntary 
disclosure and mandatory disclosure. Given the evidence, it can be said that the most 
important variable in interpreting variation of disclosure is firm size. Other variables 
(such as listing status, leverage and size of audit firm) have provided contradictory 
results. For the purpose of this study, some of these characteristics were selected from 
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previous studies, specifically, firm size, leverage, profitability, number of shareholders, 
listing status, industry type, assets-in-place, ownership structure and audit firm size. 
Two variables, liquidity and listing age, have been examined in a few studies. The 
number of companies characteristics varied significantly among studies (see Table 
2.5.1). However, there is no generally accepted set of such characteristics (Al-Shiab, 
2003: 229). Therefore the researcher has selected these variables depending on these 
considerations: 
1- The theoretical arguments (e. g. agency theory and signalling theory arguments), 
which support the effect of such variables on the extent of disclosure. 
2- The previous empirical studies which explored these variables 
3- The availability and accessibility of the data related to these variables (i. e. feasibility 
of measuring these variables). 
4- The applicability of these variables to Jordanian companies. 
Finally, identifying the effect of variables on the extent of disclosure will enhance our 
knowledge about the reasons for variation. Regulators and policy makers can then 
develop new approaches to reduce variation and improve the quality and quantity of 
disclosure. 
"Regulations of the market for financial information, such as the Securities 
and Exchange Commission of the Financial Accounting Standard Boards, 
should be interested in any systemic differences in the extent of disclosure 
among firms in the same industry" (Malone, Fries and Jones, 1993: 250). 
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2.7 Compliance with Mandatory Disclosure: The Third Objective 
This objective is related to the changing extent of mandatory disclosure after new 
regulations have been released and the economic environment has been changed. 
Raffournier (1995: 261) argued that financial disclosure is being more and more 
regulated under the law and requirements of many developed countries (e. g. United 
States, United Kingdom, Germany and France); companies are required to disclose a 
larger set of information due to the various needs of users. On the other hand, regulation 
is less effective in developing countries and hence there is a lack of stringent 
enforcement of financial disclosure, which would enhance its level, in such countries 
(Ali, Ahmed and Henry, 2004: 183). 
Financial reporting regulations influence every party in society, as a matter of public 
interest. Management, shareholders, creditors, government and unions have to balance 
the benefits and costs of regulating disclosure (Wolk, Tearney and Dodd, 2001: 121). 
The major benefit from mandating disclosure is to protect users from the effect of any 
information being hidden by managers. Another advantage of mandatory disclosure is 
that investors rely on regulated information more than any other kind of information 
(Al-Mulhem, 1997: 54). The fairness and reliability of such information encourages 
companies to comply with requirements. 
"There is a general agreement that the managers of enterprises need to be 
induced by outside forces to produce financial statements that provide the 
information demand by users and that provide an objective basics for 
contracts with the enterprise" (Flower, 2002: 73). 
In addition, Taplin, Tower and Hancock (2002: 175) pointed out that enforcement is an 
essential mechanism to monitor compliance with accounting rules. Indeed, the high 
level of non-compliance requires a more effective regulatory system, specifically the 
imposition of sanctions for non-compliance. Hope (2003: 238) commented about the 
importance of an effective enforcement function as follows: 
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"Absent adequate enforcement, even the best accounting standards will be 
inconsequential. If nobody takes action when rules are breached, the rules 
remain requirements only on paper". 
Abd-Elsalam (1999: 30) indicated two types of costs for mandatory disclosure: costs of 
non-compliance and costs of compliance. Non-compliance costs arise from two sources: 
market pressure (pressure from shareholders and other users) and regulation pressure 
(government requirements and sanctions). Compliance costs consist of training 
programmes for applying and updating regulations and requirements and auditing costs 
in the firm. In developing countries, where market pressure is not as strong as in 
developed countries, non-compliance costs are less, compared with compliance costs for 
rarely traded firms (Abd-Elsalam, 1999: 31). Meanwhile, for frequently traded 
companies which face higher market pressure, non-compliance costs are greater than 
compliance costs (Abd-Elsalam, 1999: 31). However, it is reasonable to think that 
compliance with mandatory disclosure is related to an excess of benefits over costs. 
Wolk, Tearney and Dodd (2001: 121) argued that regulation costs are low because most 
of the information in financial statements is prepared as a by-product of the company's 
accounting systems. Therefore, regulating disclosure is expected to provide more 
benefits than costs and companies may comply with mandatory disclosure. 
Compliance with mandatory disclosure is a more important issue since the release of 
new regulations. The reason for that is to evaluate whether the new regulations have 
increased the degree of compliance or not. Walker and Mack (1998: 51) argued that the 
significance of regulation would be assessed by exploring its requirements and whether 
it led to changes in disclosure practices (standardized practices) had led to disclosing 
information which has not been available, or had eliminated practices which had been 
unacceptable. 
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In recent years, a few studies have been conducted in developing countries which deal 
with the degree of compliance to mandatory disclosure. 
In Saudi Arabia, Al-Mulhem (1997) investigated the level of compliance with new 
statutory requirements. Before 1986, disclosure requirements were limited in the Saudi 
environment and were mentioned in a small paragraph in the Company Act: 
"The Companies Law requires all corporations to disclose the important 
information to the users at the end of each fiscal year. The documents 
required are balance sheet, a profit and loss account, a summary of the 
directors' report and the auditor's report" (Article No. 89 of the Saudi 
Company Act). 
In 1986, a General Presentation and Disclosure Standard (GDPS) was prepared to 
ensure that companies apply a level of disclosure in their annual reports which provides 
relevant information for decision making. In addition, development in the accounting 
profession and the formation of the Saudi Organization for Certified Public Accountants 
are major factors leading to new regulations (Al-Mulhem, 1997: 182). Al-Mulhem 
(1997: 253) hypothesized that Saudi firms were fully complying with mandatory 
disclosure because of these new reforms. After testing the annual reports for 40 
corporations, he discovered that none of the Saudi companies examined were fully 
complying with mandatory disclosure (Al-Mulhem, 1997: 279). The compliance with 77 
items of the mandatory disclosure index for 31 firms varied between 70% and 90%. The 
overall non-compliance rate among companies was 21.42% (Al-Mulhem, 1997: 256). 
Al-Mulhem (1997: 259) reported that similar findings on non-compliance with all 
mandatory disclosure items had been obtained in other studies in developing countries 
(Wallace, Nigeria 1988; Tai, Au-Yeung, Kwok and Lau, Hong Kong 1990; Abayo, 
Tanzania 1992; Ahmed and Nicholls, Bangladesh 1994). 
Abd-Elsalam (1999: 30) argued that before 1991, the Egyptian Stock Exchange was not 
effective for investments and liquidity was absent in the market. Therefore, disclosure 
by listed firms was low. The situation changed after 1991. A new Capital Market Law 
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was issued in 1992 and the International Accounting Standards (IASs) were mandated 
in 1993 (Abd-Elsalam, 1999: 30). She examined the extent of compliance with the new 
regulations by using a sample of 20 matched pairs for two periods: before the new 
regulations (1991), and after the new regulations (1995). Three specific indices were 
developed to measure mandatory disclosure: Companies Act Index (CAI), Capital 
Market Law Index (CMLI) and International Accounting Standards Index (IASsI). The 
results demonstrated that mandatory disclosure (three indices) and partial mandatory 
disclosure (each index) of Egyptian Listed companies had increased significantly in 
1995 compared with 1991 (Abd-Elsalam, 1999: 253). Nevertheless, no company 
obtained 100% compliance with any index. Abd-Elsalam (1999: 254) concluded that the 
compliance level for Egyptian listed companies was higher than others in developing 
countries (CMLI was 84%, and IASs was 85% in 1995). For example, in Tanzania it 
was 53% (Abayo, 1992); in Hong Kong it was 78% (Tai, Au-Yeung, Kwok and Lau 
1990). 
Akhtaruddin's study (2005) explored the mandatory disclosure for 94 listed companies 
in Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) in 1999. He (2005: 415) found that the extent of 
mandatory disclosure was poor, with an average 43.53% (the non-compliance level was 
56.47%). The minimum score was 17.3% and the maximum was 72.5%, indicating that 
many companies in Bangladesh did not meet the regulations requirements. Akhtaruddin 
(2005: 415) stated that this average is better than Hossain and Taylor' s study (1998) 
which reported an average score of 29.33%, but it is less than the average score of 
Hossain's study (2000) which was 69.05%. 
"The lack-lustre disclosure performance by Bangladesh firms can be 
attributed to organizational structure, poor monitoring and lapse in 
enforcement by the regulatory body" (Akhtaruddin, 2005: 415). 
Akhtaruddin (2005: 416) recommended that in order to improve the disclosure level, an 
accounting board should be established in order to enforce the requirements of 
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regulations. In addition, an accounting court could be created to impose sanctions due to 
non-compliance with disclosure requirements. 
Owusu-Ansah and Yeoh (2005) examined the influence of Financial Reporting Act of 
1993 (FRA) on the level of compliance with mandatory disclosure for companies in 
New Zealand. Before the FRA was enacted, the Institute of Chartered Accountants of 
New Zealand (ICANZ) was responsible for ensuring that companies complied with the 
disclosure requirements. Despite the authority of ICANZ to impose sanctions on non- 
complied companies, it rarely applied these sanctions in practice. Therefore, the FRA 
was an essential tool to enhance the level of compliance with Financial Reporting 
Standards (FRSs) in New Zealand. 
Owusu-Ansah and Yeoh (2005: 95) employed a before and after research design in order 
to examine the effect of the new regulations. The study covered a four-year period: 
1992-1993 as a pre-FRA period and 1996-1997 as a post-FRA period. The sample was 
drawn by choosing 1992 as a base and then was selected for the other three years. The 
final sample consisted of 50 companies with 200 observations for the four years (100 
for the pre-FRA period and 100 for the post FRA period). Using different statistical 
tests, univariate paired t-test revealed that the compliance level for post FRA period 
(1996-1997) was higher than in the pre FRA period (1992-1993) (Owusu-Ansah and 
Yeoh, 2005: 106). In addition, multivariate analysis indicated that the enactment of the 
FRA was the reason for the improvement in the disclosure compliance of New Zealand 
companies. Moreover, sensitivy analysis explained that, after controlling the effects of 
other variables which are related to mandatory disclosure, the introduction of FRA was 
significant in improving the compliance level (Owusu-Ansah and Yeoh, 2005: 106). 
"In conclusion, this study provides evidence to suggest that coaporate 
compliance levels with FRSs improved during the post-FRA period, and the 
improvements appears to be the result of the stringent enforcement 
measures introduced by the FRA " (Owusu Ansah and Yeoh, 2005: 108). 
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Suwaidan's (1997) survey in Jordan was conducted before the release of the new 
regulations (Temporary Securities Law No. 23,1997) and the important changes in 
financial reporting standards. Suwaidan (1997: 226) explored the disclosure practices for 
102 Jordanian listed companies in Amman Financial Market (AFM). He concluded that 
the level of voluntary disclosure in Jordanian corporate annual reports was low. The 
majority of voluntary disclosure items (61 %) were disclosed by less than half the annual 
reports (Suwaidan, 1997: 226). He expressed that this could be due a lack of disclosure 
requirements (Suwaidan, 1997: 1). The Companies Act 1989 (the primary source of 
disclosure regulation in Jordan) requires companies to prepare comparative financial 
statements audited by external auditors. However, it does not explain the shape and the 
context of those statements (Suwaidan, 1997: 2). Therefore, Suwaidan (1997: 2) argued 
that most of the items in the annual reports were disclosed voluntarily. 
Al-Shiab (2003) examined the compliance with IASs of Jordanian industrial companies 
over the period 1995-2000. He constructed a checklist of 273 items containing questions 
for each IAS. In order to assess the impact of IASs, Al-Shiab (2003: 216) selected two 
periods: the pre mandatory action period (1995-1998) and the post mandatory action 
period (1998-2000). Mandatory enactment of IASs started in Jordan on 1st of September 
1998, pursuant to the regulations of Companies Act and the Securities Law No. 23 for 
the year 199723. Al-Shiab (2003: 216) pointed out that the reason for choosing more than 
one year was to provide a better picture of the level of compliance with IASs before and 
after mandating IASs. The findings of this study showed that the compliance with IASs 
was higher for the post mandatory action period (1998-2000) than the pre-mandatory 
action period (1995-1998). Nonetheless, Al-Shiab (2003: 280) discovered that there was 
a drift up (not a jump up as he expected) in the level of disclosure over the total period 
23 More information about these regulations and others will come later in Chapter Three 
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1995-2000. In addition, the overall disclosure for both periods (pre and post) was low 
because the regulatory system in Jordan was less effective. 
"The level of disclosure is quite low over not only pre but also post the 
mandatory action fro implementing the IAS suggesting that the government 
and the ASE systems regarding the financial reporting in Jordan are loose ". 
(Al-Shiab, 2003: 282). 
Following from the preceding debate, this research aims to explore the level of 
compliance with mandatory disclosure due to those new regulations. It was found in 
some studies that the level of mandatory disclosure has increased since the new 
regulations were introduced (Ahmed and Nicholls, Bangladesh 1994; Al-Mulhem, 
Saudi Arabia 1997; Abd-Elsalam, Egypt 1999; Al-Shiab, Jordan 2003). 
Ahmed and Nicholls (1994) and Al-Mulhem (1997) examined compliance with new 
requirements by testing annual reports for companies after introduction of the new 
regulations. They did not compare those annual reports with others before the 
implementation of the new regulations. The reason for that may be the proposition that 
the issue of obligatory standards aims to increase the level of disclosure. "It is assumed 
that a high level of compliance with mandatory regulations will exist among 
corporations because of these reforms" (Al-Mulhem, 1997: 182). 
In order to present a comprehensive picture about the extent of mandatory disclosure, In 
Egypt, Abd-Elsalam (1999) employed two samples for two periods. She compared the 
degree of compliance for both samples for two different periods: before the new 
regulations (1991) and after the new regulations (1995) (Abd-Elsalam, 1999: 149). In 
addition, Al-Shiab (2003) examined two periods for two samples: before the enactment 
of IASs (1995-1998) and after (1998-2000). 
This study adopts the second approach (Abd-Elsalam's and Al-Shiab's approach) to 
assess the degree of compliance with mandatory disclosure. The new enactment in 1997 
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(Temporary Securities Law, No. 23) and the developments of Jordanian Capital Market 
provide the underpinning for such research. Two periods will be examined: before the 
new regulations (before 1997) and after. The discussion about the approaches and 
measurement for compliance with mandatory disclosure in both periods will be 
explained in the methodology chapter. 
The linkage between compliance and mandatory disclosure could be more apparent if 
different users specify the difficulties of compliance and the causes of non compliance. 
In Hong Kong, Tai, Au-Yeung, Kwok and Lau (1990: 108) investigated the causes of 
non-compliance with disclosure requirements by performing an interview survey with 
company executives and auditors. They mentioned (1990: 111) five reasons for non- 
compliance with disclosure requirements in Hong Kong based on these interviews: 
1- Difficulty in interpreting the requirements and enactments. 
2- Lack of awareness about accounting and disclosure concepts. 
3- Shortcomings of staff qualifications. 
4- Management intention to improve the final position and the operation results to 
reflect good picture for the audience. 
5- Insufficient resources to follow the changes in disclosure requirements. 
2.6.1 Summary 
The measurement of non-compliance with disclosure requirements and identifying the 
causes of non-compliance are components of the third goal in this research. A change in 
the nature of the disclosure environment in Jordan has occurred since the release of new 
regulations and enactments in 1997 (e. g. The Temporary Securities Law, No. 23). 
Comparison between two periods (before 1997 and after) will be performed in order to 
identify the role and effectiveness of the new regulations in improving disclosure 
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quality (compliance with regulations). "It is anticipated that the disclosure will improve 
in subsequent years when the Capital Market Authority (CMA) imposes its supervisory 
role" (Abd-Elsalam, 1999: 255). 
Moreover, difficulties and causes of non-compliance need to be identified in order to 
present feedback for regulators about the effect of the new requirements. Regulators, 
auditors and financial analysts are the main parties for interview investigation. 
Furthermore, Inchausti (1997: 63) pointed out that it is essential to determine the 
influence of the regulations on the disclosure behaviour and not leave it only on the 
market function. Regulating accounting information is beneficial for users to satisfy 
their needs. 
The study will attempt to provide feedback to regulators in order to mandate the 
important items for decision making. Al-Mulhem (1997: 9) stated the importance of 
such a test 
"One aim of this research is to test the level of agreement between what 
corporations disclosed and what different type of users perceived to be 
important. The finding of this test could help standard setters in directing 
their priority to those important items which are not complied with by 
corporations. " 
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2.8 Developing a Disclosure Framework by Undertaking Interviews Survey (The 
Fourth Objective) 
The fourth objective of the study is to undertake interviews with relevant parties (i. e. 
regulators, auditors and financial analysts) in Jordan. The purpose of these interviews is 
to enhance our understanding about the disclosure issue in Jordan and to understand and 
explain the findings of the quantitative methods which were applied to achieve the first 
three objective of the study. The analysis of the interview results is summarized in the 
in the interview framework as shown in Figure 2.8.1 
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Figure 2.8.1: The Interview Framework 
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The interview framework covers more aspects of the disclosure issue in Jordan, but is 
less precise than the quantitative methods which were applied for achieving the first 
three objectives of the study. In general, the interview framework contains the following 
four categories and their sub-categories: 
1- Extent of disclosure: 
It includes three sub-categories: 
A- Aggregate disclosure: the reason for the increase in the aggregate disclosure level for 
Jordanian companies. 
B- Mandatory disclosure: the reason for the increase in the mandatory disclosure level 
with focusing on the compliance with DDAAS, IASs and DDAAS+IASs. 
C- Voluntary disclosure: its indicators and its relationship with mandatory disclosure. 
2- Content of disclosure: 
It contains two sub-categories: 
A- Sufficiency and timing: the usefulness of the annual reports for decision making, the 
appropriateness of its issuing time and the importance of other types of information (i. e. 
significant events reports). 
B- IASs: its importance in the law, whether the compliance with IASs is enough for 
Jordanian companies and the awareness of IASs among Jordanian companies. 
3- Relationship between disclosure extent and some variables: 
It includes two sub-categories: 
A- Relationship between disclosure extent and the companies' characteristics: 
explanation of why some variables (e. g. firm size, profitability) affect the extent of 
disclosure, and the notification of the effect of other variables (e. g. management vision) 
which may affect the level of disclosure for Jordanian companies. 
B- Relationship between disclosure and privatization: interpretation of the privatization 
influence on the disclosure extent. 
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4- Regulations and the role of regulators: 
It contains six sub-categories: 
A- Changing the regulations: reasons for changing disclosure requirements. 
B- Responsibility: the responsible parts on enforcing these requirements 
C- Penalties: the purpose, the importance and the effect of penalties on disclosure level. 
D- Understanding: the responsible parts on enhancing the understanding about 
regulations and the methods to achieve that. 
E- Unifying: the effect of combining the disclosure requirements in one disclosure law. 
F- Regulators: the effect, the role and the attributes of the major regulators in Jordan, 
JSC, ASE, JCPAI, IOSCO, on the disclosure issue in Jordan. 
The above framework and its components will be discussed in detail in Chapter Eight: 
The Interview analysis and results, where the construction of this framework and its 
linkage with the research objectives and the literature review will be shown. 
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2.9 Overall Summary 
This chapter has reviewed the theoretical aspect of disclosure (e. g. definitions, types and 
levels of disclosure) and the previous empirical studies which examined different issues 
related to financial disclosure. 
As regards the theoretical part, this chapter reviewed the main concepts, definitions, 
levels and types of disclosure (e. g. adequate, full and fair disclosure). In addition, 
mandatory and voluntary disclosures were discussed in detail, supported by relevant 
theories (e. g. agency theory and signalling theory). The relationship between mandatory 
and voluntary disclosure was explained in terms of the influence of mandatory 
requirements on the extent of voluntary disclosure (i. e. substitutes or complements). 
Moreover, this chapter discussed the elements of the disclosure environment focusing 
on the financial disclosure users (e. g. investors and creditors). 
Discussion about these theoretical aspects is beneficial for different users. Al-Mulhem 
(1997: 16) remarked: 
"It is believed that a discussion of the theoretical background helps in 
clarifying the importance of accounting disclosure as a mean of 
communicating financial and economic information. It also assists in 
getting more understanding of the scope of the disclosure problem under 
investigation " 
In regard to previous studies about disclosure, this chapter reviewed studies relevant to 
each objective of the present study. First, this chapter reviewed the single and 
multinational studies which evaluated the extent of aggregate, mandatory and voluntary 
disclosure in developed and developing countries. In addition, previous studies about 
the observance of mandatory requirements (i. e. IASs) in developed and developing 
countries were discussed. Furthermore, the analysis of financial disclosure could be 
disaggregated to each type of information (balance sheet information, income statement 
information). Studies which contained such analysis were discussed in this chapter, with 
an evaluation for the level of disclosure for each type of information in these studies. 
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Second, empirical studies were presented, which investigated the association between 
the company's characteristics and the aggregate, mandatory and voluntary disclosure 
(see Table 2.6.1). For each variable, the theoretical argument and the related studies 
which supported or did not support its relationship with disclosure were explained. The 
testing of such relationships will enhance our understanding about the variables which 
affect the extent of disclosure and will shed light on the question, why do some 
Jordanian companies disclose more aggregate information in their annual reports than 
others? 
Third, this chapter reported the mandatory disclosure studies which tested the level of 
compliance with disclosure requirements, particularly, studies which investigated 
whether the compliance level improved after the introduction of new regulation 
requirements. These studies tested the effect of these requirements for two periods: 
before and after the regulations. Therefore, the review provides a rationale for testing 
two periods in this study, as will be discussed in a later chapter. 
Fourth, this chapter overviewed the interview framework, which aimed to enhance our 
understanding about the disclosure issue in Jordan. The major components of this 
framework are explained in brief in with its sub-categories in Figure 2.8.1. Detailed 
discussion about this framework and the interview survey will come later, in Chapter 
Eight. 
This literature review provides a basis for the researcher to design the structure and the 
methods of this study. In addition, the findings from the previous studies will provide a 
structure of comparison, to the reliability and objectivity of this study. 
"Reviewing the literature helps informing a structure for the research and 
identifying the general conclusions drawn from the previous studies that 
could be related to the problem of this study. The analysis of previous 
studies helps also in indicating the different procedures and methodologies 
used to determine the appropriate research techniques to be employed in 
this study" (Al-Mulhem, 1997: 58). 
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Chapter Three 
Jordanian Regulatory Environment 
3.1 Introduction 
The focus of this chapter is on the relevant regulations which affect the financial 
reporting of Jordanian companies. The laws and regulations which were developed over 
the years and their impact on disclosure issues will be discussed, specifically the 
Securities Exchange regulations. In addition, International Accounting Standards (IASs) 
will be explained in detail: their objectives, harmonization, their relevance to 
International Organization of Securities Commission (IOSCO) and their relevance for 
the Jordanian environment, as a major mandatory resource of regulations. 
An overview about the Amman Financial Market (AFM), which contains three different 
parts: Amman Stock Exchange (ASE), Jordan Securities Commission (JSC) and 
Securities Depository Centre (SDC), will be presented. In addition, the accounting 
profession (Jordanian Association of Certified Public Accountant (JACPA)) and its role 
in financial reporting in Jordan will be discussed. 
Before discussing these issues, background about Jordan, its economy, the investment 
environment and the privatization programme will be given. The next sections will 
cover these aspects. 
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3.2 About Jordan 
3.2.1 Geography and Location: 
Strategically positioned at the convergence of Asia, Africa and Europe, Jordan's 92,300 
square kilometres (sq km) present a significant location (land: 91,971 sq km, water: 329 
sq km) 24 . As a Middle Eastern country, 
Jordan's borders are Syria in the north, Iraq in 
the north east, Saudi Arabia in the south east and the West Bank and Israel in the west 
(see the map in Figure 3.2.1.1). 
Figure 3.2.1.1: Map of Jordan 
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24 Source: CIA- The World Factbook- Jordan: http: // www. cia. eov. icia/12ublications/factbook/izoes/io. html 
[Accessed: 19/10/2006] 
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These boundaries form a total of 1635 km divided as follows: Iraq: 181 km, Israel: 238 
km, Saudi Arabia: 744 km. Syria: 375 km and West Bank: 97 km25. Thus, Jordan, as an 
Arab country, is considered to have a strategic location which shares the longest border 
with Israel and West Bank. 
Furthermore, there is diversity in the landscapes in Jordan. There is desert (Badia Plains) 
in the east near Saudi Arabia. Hills and mountains characterize the centre of Jordan. The 
Jordan River flows through the Great Rift Valley from Jordan's western boundary and 
terminates in the Dead Sea, is considered to be the lowest point on earth, 408 met below 
sea level. Meanwhile, the highest point is Mount Um Dami, 1854 high metres26 . Aqaba 
Port is a vital gateway to the Red Sea27. 
3.2.2 Population 
The population of Jordan was estimated at 5.90 million in July 2006. While males 
constitute about 52.43% of the population, females constitute 47.57%. The population 
of Jordan has increased dramatically over more than 50 years. The results of population 
census in 1952,1961,1979 and 1994 were 586,200; 900,800; 2,133,000; and 4,139,400 
respectively28. In the last five years, the population of Jordan increased from 5,182,000 
in 2001 to 5,907,000 in 2006, an increase of about 14%29. The next figure shows the 
population of Jordan from 1960 to 2005 
25 Source: CIA- The World Factbook- Jordan: http: // www. cia. og v. /cia/publications/factbook/goes/io. html 
[Accessed: 19/10/2006] 
26 The highest point was previously considered to be Jabal Ram (1734 m), but Mount Um Dami was 
recently discovered to be the highest point in Jordan. 
27 Source: CIA- The World Factbook- Jordan: http: // www. cia. og v, /cia/publications/factbook/goes/io. html 
[Accessed: 19/10/2006] 
28 Source: Statistical Yearbook, 2003, Department of Statistics, Jordan, Issue 54, Page 6 29 Sources: CIA- The World Factbook- Jordan: http: // 
www. cia. jzov. /cia/publications/factbook/p, oes/io. litmi [Accessed: 19/10/2006] 
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Figure 3.2.2.1: The approximate values of the population of Jordan from 1960- 
2005 
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The dramatic increase in the Jordanian population is due to immigrants from Palestine, 
Lebanon and Iraq, who leave their countries as a consequence of the conflicts in the 
regions. For example, Suwaidan (1997: 60) pointed out that 600,000 Jordanian passport 
holders returned to Jordan due to the Gulf crisis in 1990. In addition, the U. S 
Committee for Refugee and Immigrants (USCRI) reported that 609,500 immigrants 
moved to Jordan in 2006: 450,000 Iraqis, 158,200 Palestinians and 1300 of other 
nationalities 30. The large number of Iraqi refugees is due to the latest conflict in Iraq. 
The distribution of the estimated population by governorate and sex is shown in the 
next table. 
30 Source: U. S Committee for refugees and Immigrants. World Refugee Survey, 2006 
122 
Table 3.2.2.1: Estimated population of Jordan by governorate and sex, 2003 
Total 
Governorate Number Percentage (%) Males Females 
Amman (The Capital) 2,085,140 38.05 1,090,590 994,550 
Balga 359,485 6.56 188,020 171,465 
Zarqa 862,000 15.73 450,850 411,150 
Madaba 139,740 255 73,090 66,650 
Irbid 977,635 17.84 511,330 466,305 
Mafraq 252,625 4.61 132,130 120,495 
Jarash 161,115 2.94 84,270 76,845 
Ajlun 121,660 2.22 63,635 58,025 
Karak 220,295 4.02 115,220 105,075 
Tafiela 83,295 1.52 43,565 39,730 
Ma'an 106,860 1.95 55,890 50,970 
Aqaba 110,150 2.01 57,610 52,540 
Total 5,480,000 100.00 2,866,200 2,613,800 
Source: Statistical Yearbook, 2003, Department of Statistics, Jordan, Issue 54, Page 6 
The table shows that 38% of the population is concentrated in the Capital, Amman. 
Irbid, in the north, has 18% of the population and Zarqa has 16%. In the south, Aqaba 
has 2% of the population and Tafiela is the least populated governorate in Jordan, with 
1.55% of the population. 
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3.2.3 Language, Religion and Ethnic Groups 
Arabic is the official language, but English is widely spoken, especially in business and 
often understood among the upper and middle classes. Islam is the predominant religion; 
92% of the people are Sunni Muslims. Christians form 6% (the majority of these are 
Greek Orthodox, but some are Greek and Roman Catholics, Syrian Orthodox, Coptic 
Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox and Protestant denominations). The remaining 2% are 
several small Shi'a and Druze groups31. The ethnic groups are classified as: Arab 98%, 
Circassian 1% and Armenian 1%. 
3.2.4 State and Government 
Jordan is a constitutional hereditary monarchy, ruled since 1952 by His Majesty (HM) 
King Hussein. After the passing of his monarch in February in 1999, the King's eldest 
son, HM King Abdullah II, ascended the throne. The Prime Minister is appointed by the 
monarch, and there is a parliamentary form of government. 
In Jordan, there are three separate powers: 
1- Executive Power: which is vested in the Council of Ministers, which is appointed by 
the King, and which is accountable to a legislative power. 
2- Legislative Power: Bicameral National Assembly consists of: 
A- House of Notables (The Senate): 55 seats appointed by the monarch for a four-year 
term. 
B- House of Representatives (House of Deputies): 110 seats, six of which are for 
women, elected by popular to vote for four-year terms. The last election took place in 
June 2003 and the next is to be held in 2007. 
31 Source: CIA- The World Factbook- Jordan: http: // www. cia. og v. /cia/publications/factbook/goes/jo. html 
[Accessed: 19/10/2006] 
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3- The Juridical Power: consists of the Court of Cassation and Supreme Court (Court of 
Final Appeal). In addition, religious and personal courts are available for Muslims and 
Christians in Jordan (Suwaidan, 1997: 61). 
The legal system in Jordan is based on Islamic Law and French Codes whereas the 
administrative division is divided into twelve governorates: Amman (The Capital), 
Ajlun, Aqaba, Balga, Karak, Mafraq, Tafilah, Zarqa, Irbid, Jarash, Ma'an and Madaba. 
Figure 3.2.4.1 shows those governorates. 
Figure 3.2.4.1 Governorates in Jordan 
Source: Source: http: //en. wikipedia. org/wiki/Jordan [Accessed: 19/10/2006] 
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3.2.5 Historical Background 
Jordan is a part of the richly historical Fertile Crescent region. Around 2000 B. C, 
Semitic Amorites settled in the area called Canaan around the Jordan River32. Jordan 
has been invaded and settled by various groups, including Hittites, Egyptians, Israelites, 
Assyrians, Babylonians, Persians, Greek, Romans, Arab Muslims, Christian Crusaders, 
Mameluks, Ottoman Turks and finally the British. Suwaidan (1997: 60) reported that the 
land of Jordan was mentioned in Biblical times as the lands of Edom, Moab, Amman 
and Bashan. 
The present Jordan was created in the twentieth century, specifically after World War I, 
in 1918. Jordan was called Trans Jordan and was placed under British Mandate in 1921 
and ruled by Prince Abdullah I. The British Mandate expired in 1946 and on May 25 
Jordan became an independent kingdom called The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan 33 
This day (May 25) has become a national holiday and Jordan celebrates it every year as 
Independence Day. 
After the creation of Israel in 1948, Jordan included those portions of Palestine annexed 
by King Abdullah I. In 1950, unity between the two Banks (East and West) was realized. 
In June, 1967, the West Bank was occupied by Israel and the unity between the two 
Banks was broken. In 1988, the disengagement of the legal and administrative 
relationships between the West and East Bank was declared by HM King Hussein of 
Jordan (1953-1999) (Al-Shiab, 2003: 18). 
On 26 October, 1994, Jordan signed a peace treaty with Israel, ending about five 
decades of hostilities (Suwaidan, 1997: 62). Jordan has since sought to remain at peace 
with all of its neighbours. 
32 Source: U. S. Department of State: Bureau of New Eastern Affairs, October 2006: 
http: // www. state. goK/r/pa/eiibjzn/3464. htm [Accessed: 18/10/2006] 
33 Source: U. S. Department of State: Bureau of New Eastern Affairs, October 2006: 
http: // www. state. aov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3464. htm [Accessed: 18/10/2006] 
126 
HM King Abdullah II succeeded his father King Hussein following the latter's death in 
February 1999. HM King Abdullah II moved quickly to reaffirm Jordan's peace treaty 
with Israel and its relations with U. S. A. He has refocused the government's agenda on 
economic reform. The new King has undertaken his father's legacy of reform, 
committing his country to the goals of privatization, economic, liberalization, and 
modernisation of the law. Jordan's economy has been changed significantly in the era of 
HM King Abdullah II, as will be shown in the next section. 
3.3 Jordanian Economy 
Jordan is a small country with inadequate supplies of water and other natural resources 
such as oil. Suwaidan (1997: 62) argued that the Jordanian economy has negative and 
positive aspects. The negative aspects are: 
1- Limited natural resources 
2- Small domestic market 
3- Political conflict in the region for more than five decades (e. g. Iraq, Lebanon and 
West Bank conflicts) 
4- Dependence on foreign aid. 
Meanwhile, the positive aspects of Jordanian economy are: 
1- Highly developed human resources 
2- An efficient infrastructure 
3- A free-market policy 
4- An open-minded leadership. 
Jordan's major exports commodities are clothing, phosphates, fertilizers and potash, 
while the major imports commodities are crude oil, textile, fabrics, machinery and 
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transport equipment34. The primary export partners are USA (29.3%), Iraq (15.5%), 
India (8.5%) and Saudi Arabia (5.9%), while the primary import partners are Saudi 
Arabia (21.1%), China (8.1%), Germany (7.2%), USA (6.3%) and South Korea (4.1%). 
In 2005, the total exports were $ 4,226 billion, whereas the total imports were $ 8,681 
billion 35 
. 
Furthermore, Jordan depends on external sources for its energy requirements. Iraq was 
the major source of the crude oil during the 1990s. In 2003, oil was provided by some 
Gulf Cooperation Council member countries such as Saudi Arabia. In September 2006, 
Jordan agreed with Iraq to renew oil imports, to be implemented from the fourth quarter 
of 2006. In addition, natural gas imports reach Jordan from Egypt through a pipeline 
from the southern port city of Aqaba to northern Jordan 36 
Jordan's economic strategy succeeded during the Middle East oil boom of the 1970s. 
However, in the late 1980s, economic problems emerged as the worldwide plunge in oil 
prices persisted. Problems such as cessation of foreign aid, decline in remittances and 
reduction in the regional trade had negative effects on the Jordanian economy. "By 1989, 
the external public debt rose to JD 5409.4 million, a sum equivalent to 232.2% of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), and the inflation rate reached 25.8%" (Suwaidan, 1997: 62). 
One of the fundamental issues in the Jordanian economy is its large debt. In 1991, the 
debt was $9 billion, which is considered to be high in relation to the annual budget and 
income37. The government has adopted an economic reform programme to solve this 
problem. As a result, the debts dropped to $6 billion. In addition, the American 
34 Source: CIA- The World Factbook- Jordan: http: // www cia og v /cia/publications/factbook/goes/io html 
[Accessed: 19/10/2006] 
35 Source: CIA- The World Factbook- Jordan: http: // www cia. gov /cia/publications/factbook/zoes/io. html 
[Accessed: 19/10/2006] 
36 Source: U. S. Department of State: Bureau of New Eastern Affairs, October 2006: 
http: // www. state. Rov/r/i)a/ei/bRn/3464. htm [Accessed: 18/10/2006] 
37 Source: U. S. Department of State: Bureau of New Eastern Affairs, October 2006: 
http: // wNvw. state. goy/r/pa/ei/bgn/3464. htm [Accessed: 18/10/2006] 
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government cancelled debts of about JD 700 million in 1995, as a result of the peace 
process38. Moreover, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank have 
cooperated with Jordan on a seven-year plan in order to overcome the deficiencies in the 
economy, specifically the negative effect of the Gulf War in 1990 (Suwaidan, 1997: 62). 
Al-Shiab (2003: 25) gave an example of this negative effect as follows: 
"Absorbing up to 300,000 returnees from the Gulf countries accelerated unemployment 
and strained the government's ability to provide essential services". Thus, this plan 
aimed to encourage saving, investment and exports and to reduce consumption and 
inflation (Suwaidan, 1997: 63). 
Under the reign of HM King Abdullah II, since he assumed the throne in 1999, Jordan 
has undertaken a comprehensive programme of economic reform, supported by the IMF 
and the World Bank. The government has worked on liberalizing trade, securing 
membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2000, signing an Association 
Agreement with the EU in 2001 and securing the first bilateral Free Trade Agreement 
between the U. S. A and an Arab country in 2001. 
Since 2000, light manufacturing products exports (i. e. textiles and garments) 
manufactured in the Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZ), entered the U. S. A tariff and 
quota free. As a result, the economic growth has been improving. Exports to the U. S. A 
amounted to $ 6.9 million in 1997, when two-way trade was $ 395 million. This number 
has increased to reach $ 661 million in 2002 with two-way trade at $ 1.05 billion. 
Recently, Jordan exported $ 1.1 billion in 2005 and $ 574 million in the first six months 
of 2006 with two way trade at about $ 1.7 billion and $ 850 million in 2005 and the first 
six months of 2006 respectively39. 
38 Source: HM King Abdullah II Official Website: http//: www. kingabdullah. jo [Accessed: 20/10/2006] 39 Source: U. S. Department of State: Bureau of New Eastern Affairs, October 2006: 
http: // www. state. gov/r/na/ei/bgn/3464. htni [Access: 18/10/2006] 
129 
The Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the U. S. A, which started in December 2001, 
will take effect on all goods and services by 2010. This agreement undertakes more 
open markets in different sectors such as communications, construction, finance, health, 
transportation and services, as well as strict application of international standards in 
order to protect intellectual property. 
The above mentioned agreements with U. S. A, EU and the countries in the region have 
significant effects on the diversity of Jordan's economy. Jordan is moving from the 
traditional economic resources (i. e. exports of phosphates and potash, overseas 
remittances and foreign aid) to a more open market and private-sector development plan. 
In addition, information technology (IT) and tourism are other promising growth sectors. 
Aqabe Special Economic Zone (ASEZ), which is under a low tax regime, is considered 
to be a framework of private sector economic growth. 
The government's efforts to improve the economy have achieved significant results. 
Table 3.3.1 illustrates the main economic indicators during the period 2001-2005 
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Table 3.3.1: Main Economic Indicators during the period 2001-2005 (JD Million) 
Item 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Population 4,940,000 5,070,000 5,200,000 5,350,000 5,485,000 
Gross National Product (GNP) at 
current market prices 6491.1 6858.3 7287.5 8310.7 9334.2 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
at current market prices 6363.3 6778.5 7203.6 8164.0 9118.1 
Growth rate of GDP at constant 
market prices (%) 5.3 5.7 4.1 7.7 7.2 
40 
Gross National Disposable 
Income (GNDI) at current prices 7955.9 8408.8 9556.4 10609.2 11219.7 
Growth rate of GNDI at constant 
market prices (%) 3.3 5.6 10.6 5.4 1.5 
GDP per capital at current prices 1288 1337 1809 1534 1650 
Unemployment rate (%) 14.7 15.3 14.5 12.5 14.8 
Change in the consumer price 
index (%) (Inflation rate) 1.8 1.8 1.6 3.4 3.541 
Change in GDP deflator (%) 0.8 0.8 2.1 5.3 4.2 
Ratio of total consumption to 
GDP at current market prices (%) 104.0 100.9 101.3 N. A42 N. A 
Ratio of gross fixed investment to 
GDP at current market prices 19.4 19.0 20.6 N. A N. A 
Ratio of domestic saving to GDP 
at current market prices (%) -4.0 -0.9 -1.3 N. A N. A 
Average exchange rate against 1.410 1.410 1.410 1.410 1.410 
US dollar 
Sources: 1- Central Bank of Jordan, Annual Report, 2005 
2- Ministry of Planning and International Corporation, Main Economic Indicators 
40 The GDP growth rate for the first six months of 2006 was 6.4%, while the inflation rate for the first 
eight months was 6.3% (Source: Central Bank of Jordan, The Monetary and Economic Developments in 
Jordan, The research development monthly report, September, 2006). 
41 The inflation rate for the first eight months of 2006 was 6.3% ((Source: Central Bank of Jordan, The 
Monetary and Economic Developments in Jordan, The research development monthly report, September, 
2006). 
42 Not Available 
131 
The table above shows that the Jordanian economy has achieved a remarkable 
performance during the last five years (2001-2005). The GDP at current market prices 
increased from JD 6363 million in 2001 to JD 9118 million in 2005. In addition, the 
growth rate of GDP at constant market prices increased from 5.3% in 2001 to reach 
7.2% in 2005. Moreover, the growth of most economic sectors has led to the growth of 
GDP. Indeed, this growth was reflected in the per capita GDP in real terms, which grew 
by 4.6% in 2005, maintaining the same recorded real growth as 2004 (Central Bank of 
Jordan, Annual Report, 2005: 2). As regards the inflation rate, measured by the 
percentage change in the consumer price index, this rate has increased from 1.8% in 
2001 to reach 3.5% in 2005. However, this increase is still at a satisfactory level. In 
addition, the currency has been stable with an exchange rate fixed to the U. S dollar 
since 1995 at JD 0.708-0.710 to the dollar. 
In summary, Jordan has adopted comprehensive economic reforms in order to improve 
the economic performance. Setting up the appropriate legislative and legal environment 
for economic activity (as explained later in this chapter) will attract foreign and local 
investors. The establishing of a favourable investment environment is essential in order 
to improve the country's economic performance. The next section will highlight the 
investment environment in Jordan and recent achievements in regard to this issue. 
3.4 Jordan Investment Environment 
"Investing in Jordan is a powerful idea because the time for it has really 
come" (HM King Abdullah II). 
Jordan has made remarkable steps towards economic reforms and is facing the new 
trends of change and involvement in the global economy. Jordan is now a member of 
the WTO and enjoys partnership agreements with the USA, EU and other countries in 
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the economic, financial, political and social fields. Thus, Jordan's economy has become 
open to the world and this puts Jordan on the foreign investment map. 
The Investment Law of 2003 and Investment Promotion Law of 1995 established the 
Jordanian Investment Board (JIB) in 1996, as a governmental entity with both financial 
and administrative independence. Prior to that, investment instructions and procedures 
were conducted under the control of Ministry of Industry and Trade. The foundation of 
JIB has come as a result of the government's realisation of the importance of increasing 
foreign and local investments in Jordan in order to create new job opportunities and 
3 increase the national exports, and the need for the transfer of technology4 
"The JIB is responsible for marketing Jordan internationally, creating 
linkages between national and foreign companies through joint ventures, 
assisting investors at all stages of the investment cycle, and acting as a 
contact liaison between investors and other government bodies whose 
services are needed by the investor" (Al-Shiab, 2003: 52). 
Furthermore, the Investment Law offers attractive incentives for both foreign and local 
investors, for instance, freedom from customs and duties, tax holidays, tax income 
exemptions and unrestricted transfer of capital and profits44 
"In this regard, the regulation of non-Jordanian investment promotion 
removed any bias against foreign investment and discrimination in 
awarding incentives. Also, the regulation abolished the non-Jordanian 
ownership ceiling of 50% in any sector in the economy except for the 
sectors of retail and commercial services. Non-Jordanians are allowed to 
own up 100% in other sectors. It is worth noting that all restrictions on 
capital flows have been lifted. There are no limits or restrictions on 
repatriation of capital, earnings and salaries of foreign investment" 
(Jordan Securities Commission). 
As a result, the non-Jordanian investment in the capital market has increased 
significantly. Table 3.4.1 shows the non-Jordanian investment share in the capital 
market from 2000-2005. 
43 Source: Jordan Investment Board: http: //www. jordaninvestment. com [Accessed: 21/10/2006] as Source: Foreign Ministry, The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan : www. nifa. gov. jo (Accessed: 
21/10/2006) 
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Table 3.4.1: Non-Jordanian investment share in the capital market during the 
period 2000-2005 
Item 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Traded Value (US $ million) 472 943 1340 2616 5230.8 23277.6 
Non-Jordanian investment (%) 42 39 37 38.8 41.3 45.3 
Source: Ministry of Planning and International Corporation, Main Economic Indicators, 
2005. 
Moreover, the Investment Promotion Law has increased the number of projects in 
Jordan. The capital for these projects was JD 750 million in 2005, compared to JD 478 
million and JD 262 million in 2004 and 2003 respectively (Al-Khasib, Amman 
Chamber of Commerce). 
Jordan Securities Commission (JSC) aims to protect investors in a number of different 
ways, including the following15 : 
1- Issuance of capital market regulations in order to ensure that the market operates in a 
fair and orderly manner 
2- Disclosure and transparency in order to provide investors with the essential 
information for decision making. 
3- Licensing and regulating the essential financial services in the market. 
4- Regulating investment and mutual funds and supporting the foundation of such funds 
in order to provide small investors with different opportunities of investment and 
professional management. In addition, the benefit of these funds is that it provides the 
diversity of the investment and hence the risk of such investment will be minimized. 
5- Application of international standards in different activities in the market such as 
disclosure and trading and settlement. In addition, the application of international 
45 Source: Jordan Securities Commission: http: /hvww. jsc. gov. jo [Access: 22/10/2006] 
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accounting and auditing standards (i. e. DDAAS) by parties under the supervision of 
Jsc. 
6- Accrediting codes of conduct and ethics for the capital market institutions' staff. 
7- Encouraging public awareness and educational investment campaign in order to 
enhance the investment culture in the capital market. 
8- Continuous training for the staff in the JSC, the capital institutions and the certified 
financial professionals in order to improve their qualifications and enhance the 
efficiency in the market. 
9- Investigating complaints from local and foreign investors and taking serious actions 
such as imposing penalties if there are any violations of the regulations and laws. 
In addition, JSC has issued a comprehensive guide for foreign investors in order to 
provide a satisfactory understanding and explanation about the investment climate in 
Jordan. This guide is issued with technical assistance from Capital Market Partners 
Limited and Denton Wilde Spate and sponsored by the UK Department for International 
Development. 
The open economy market in Jordan has led to an access of different countries, which 
have signed investment agreements (see Table 3.4.2) in order to create a stable 
investment climate in Jordan. Such a creation is necessary in order to maximise the 
utilization of economic resources and to improve living standards. 
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Table 3.4.2: The 37 countries with which Jordan has signed bilateral investment 
agreements 
Country Date of Signature Date of Entry into Force 
Germany 15/7/1974 10/10/1977 
France 23/2/1978 18/10/1979 
Great Britain 10/10/1979 24/4/1980 
Romania 2/7/1992 16/3/1999 
Turkey 2/8/1993 21/10/2005 
Malaysia 2/10/1994 3/3/1995 
Tunisia 27/4/1995 23/11/1995 
Yemen 18/6/1995 28/1/1998 
Egypt 8/5/1996 11/4/1998 
Italy 21/7/1996 9/11/1999 
Algeria 1/8/1996 5/6/1997 
Indonesia 12/11/1996 9/2/1999 
Congo 23/6/2004 ---------- 
United States of America 2/7/1997 12/6/2003 
Czech Republic 20/9/1997 25/4/2001 
Poland 4/10/1997 14/10/1999 
Netherlands 17/11/1997 1/8/1998 
Morocco 16/6/1998 7/2/2000 
Croatia 10/10/1999 27/4/2000 
Spain 20/10/1999 13/12/2000 
Bahrain 8/2/2000 5/7/2000 
Sudan 30/3/2000 3/2/2001 
Austria 23/1/2001 25/11/2001 
Switzerland 25/2/2001 11/12/2001 
Kuwait 21/5/2001 19/3/2004 
Syria 8/10/2001 11/5/2002 
China 15/11/2001 -------- 
Bularia 7/8/2002 27/5/2003 
Lithuania 13/10/2002 5/5/2003 
Lebanon 31/10/2002 30/8/2003 
Belarus 16/12/2002 22/12/2005 
Singapore 16/5/2004 ------- 
Korea 24/7/2004 25/12/2004 
Thailand 15/12/2005 ------- 
Greece 21/12/2005 ------- 
Ukranie 30/11/2005 ------- 
Bosnia & Herze ovina 2/7/2006 ------- 
Re ublic of Finland 1/11/2006 ------- 
Source: Jordan Investment Board (JIB): www. jordaninvestment. com [Acessed: 
22/10/2006] 
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The previous agreements provide the following basic guarantees46: 
1- The better of national and most favoured nation treatment, subject to certain 
limitations. 
2- Expropriation only in accordance with international law and upon payment of 
adequate compensation. 
3- The right to transfer all funds related to an investment without delay and using the 
market rate of exchange. 
4- Prohibition of performance specifications such as local content requirements or 
export quotas. 
5- The right of investor to submit investment disputes with the hosting country's 
government to international arbitration. 
6- The right to engage senior management personnel, regardless of nationality 
Moreover, similar agreements have been signed with Finland, Libya, Latvia, Malta, 
Belgium, Yugoslavia, Qatar, Oman, Bosnia and Herzegovina, United Arab Emirates, 
Slovakia, South Africa and India. 
The above-mentioned agreements have encouraged foreign investment in Jordan. Such 
investments will have a positive effect on the economic growth and will open the 
Jordanian market to the world. However, the challenge of the government is to motivate 
the private sector in Jordan in order to participate and support economic growth. 
Suwaidan (1997: 63) pointed out that such a contribution is reflected in the five year 
economic development plan (1993-1997). This plan aimed to increase the role of the 
private sector and to limit the government's role. Al-Shiab (2003: 58) also commented 
on this issue, as follows: 
"This falls within the government focus redistributing roles that serve to 
give the private sector a leading role in the economic activity, leaving the 
46 Source: Jordan Investment Board: http: //www. iordaninvestment. com [Accessed: 23/10/2006] 
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government to lend to all its main duties like planning policies, supervision 
and organization, development of social services, and protecting the 
environment among others ". 
Therefore, the next discussion will highlight the privatization programme in Jordan and 
the development in this field. 
3.5 Privatization in Jordan 
"This Program ranks as one, if not the most successful program in the 
Middle East Region " (The World Bank Group) 
The privatization programme in Jordan is an organized methodology supported by a 
strong political will that aims to create an appropriate environment for economic 
reforms. Privatization in Jordan was regulated under the control of Executive 
Privatization Unit (EPU), which was established in 1996 as a governmental office with 
the Prime Ministry. On July 2000, Privatization Law No. 25 was issued in order to 
provide the legal and institutional framework of the privatization programme. The 
Executive Privatization Commission (EPC) came into existence in 2000, as the actual 
successor of EPU. EPC is the body responsible for formulating privatization policy, 
identifying candidate enterprises and measures for privatization. In addition, EPC is 
currently the government's arm in implementing the privatization programme47. 
The government has adopted the privatization strategy in order to achieve specific goals 
as follows48: 
1- Raising efficiency and productivity in a competitive manner. 
2- Increasing private investment in infrastructure. 
3- Developing domestic capital market and consolidating public finance. 
4- Attracting local and foreign investments 
5- Alleviating the debt burden on the treasury. 
47 Source: The Executive Privatization Commission: lhttp: //www. epc. gov. io [Accessed: 27/10/2006] 48 Source: The Executive Privatization Commission: http: //www. epc. gov. jo [Accessed: 27/10/2006] 
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The World Bank Group (WBG) has been assisting privatization in Jordan since 1995 in 
collaboration with United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and 
other development partners. The main challenge of this privatization programme is to 
reduce poverty and create job opportunities. At present, WBG manages a substantial 
trust fund for USAID that supports the Jordan privatization programme. The WBG has 
been actively supporting the Jordanian government through the EPC in crafting a 
privatization strategy, designing an institutional framework for implementing this 
programme and supporting its implementation. 
The government in Jordan has adopted a multi track privatization approach in order to 
avoid the risk incurred when only one method is applied. Each transaction has its own 
specificity and particularity and hence one of the following approaches is applied49: 
1- Total or Partial Sale: An asset sale is the transfer of ownership (whole or part) of 
government assets, commercial-type enterprise, or functions to the private sector. In 
general, the government has no role in the financial support, management, or oversight 
of a sold asset. However, if the asset is sold in an industry with monopolistic 
characteristics, the government may regulate certain aspects of the business. There are 
many examples of this method in Jordan, e. g. direct sale to investors and strategic 
partners, e. g. Jordan Cement Factories, Jordan Telecommunications, RJ Duty Free Shop. 
2- Concessions: The government grants a concession agreement with specific terms for 
a certain period of time to the private sector to build a particular enterprise, exploit and 
operate it pursuant to the concession. 
3- Lease Contracts: Under this contract the Government remains to be the sole owner of 
the enterprise but the private sector will operate it for its own benefit for a certain fee, 
for example, Aqaba Railway and Ma'in Spa Complex. 
49 Source: The Executive Privatization Commission: http: //wwvw. epc. gov. jo [Accessed: 27/10/2006] 
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4- Management Contract: The operation of a facility is contracted out to a private 
company, while the government retains the ownership of the entity. An example of 
management contract in Jordan is the Water Authority of Jordan. 
5- Private Infrastructure Development and Operation: 
A- Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT): The private sector designs, finances, builds, and 
operates the facility over the life of the contract, at the end of which ownership reverts 
to the government. 
B- Build-Transfer-Operate (BTO): The private sector designs, finances and builds the 
facility then transfers it to the government while retaining the right to operate it for a 
specific period of time. 
C- Build-Own-Operate (BOO): The private sector designs, finances and builds the 
facility, retains ownership and operates it. 
D- Build-Operate-Own-Transfer (BOOT): The private sector builds the project, owns it 
for a specific period, operates it, and then relinquishes it to the public sector. 
Proceeds of the privatization programme to date amount to more than $ 1300 million 
and over $1 billion has been attracted in investments associated with privatization, 
particularly in telecom, water, transport and other privatized sectors50. The first major 
step toward privatization was privatizing the Telecommunication Corporation which 
was transformed into a public shareholding company in 2000. To date, 66 transactions 
in the privatization programme have been completed51. Examples of these transactions 
are shown in Table 3.5.1 
so Source: The Executive Privatization Commission: http: //www. epc. jo [Accessed: 27/10/2006] 51 Source: The Executive Privatization Commission: http: // vww. epc. jo [Accessed: 27/10/2006] 
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Table 3.5.1: Privatization Transactions in Jordan52 
Number Transaction Privatization Type of Privatization Buyer/Tenant/Operat 
Year or 
1 Jordan Cement 1998 100% of total shares sold Lafarge (French 
Factories (JSE) company) 
Public Transport Ten years concession 
2 Corporation (PTC) 1998 agreement Three local operators 
French/ Jordanian 
consortium/Sueze 
Five-year performance Lyonnaise Des 
3 Water Authority of 1999 based management Euaa/Arabtech 
Jordan agreement Jardaneh and 
Montgomery Watson 
French/local 
4 Ma'in Spa Complex 2000 30 years leasing and consortium Accor and 
investment agreement local investor 
France Telecom/ 
5 Jordan 2000 100% of total shares sold Arab Bank 
Telecommunication consortium/ Social 
Company (JTC) Security Corporation 
6 Airport Duty Free 2000 Sale and concession Aldeasa (Spanish 
Shops agreement for 16 years company) 
Sale agreement of the sale 
7 Jordan Company for 2000 of the industrial complex of Local investor 
Wood processing and the company under 
Production liquidation 
Divestiture of the 
8 Jordan Investment 2000 government's shares in 55 
Corporation companies yielding around 
$ 163 million 
80% sale of total shares 
Aircraft Catering sold, 20% retained with Alpha (British 
9 Centre 2001 Royal Jordanian Airline company) 
Company 
American-French 
consortium Sueze 
10 Assamra Water 2002 Build-Operate-Transfer Environment, Ondeo, 
Treatment Plant (BOT) Ondeo/Degremont 
Inc. and Morganti 
Group. 
52 Source: The Executive Privatization Commission: http: //www. epc. gov. io [Accessed: 27/10/2006] 
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11 Jordan National 2002 59% of total shares sold Assalam Shipping 
Shipping Company Company 
Jordan International 
12 Royal Jordanian Air 2003 100% of total shares sold Real Estate and 
Academy Tourists Investment 
Company 
26% of its shares sold 
(equivalent to around 50% 
13 Arab Potash Company 2003 of the government's Canadian PCS 
(APC) ownership in the company) 
Two-years management 
contract and a Memorandum 
of Understanding stipulating 
the conditions of a Joint AP Moller Finance 
14 Container Terminal 2004 Venture for 25 years SA (Danish company) 
(CT) following the completion of 
the two-years agreement 
was signed 
15 Jordan Express Tourism 2004 8.33% of its shares sold Local investor 
Transport (JETT) 
Jordan Aircraft 80% of its shares sold, 20% 
16 Maintenance Company 2005 were allocated to Royal Abraaj Capital 
(JORAMCO) Jordanian Airline Company 
17 Agricultural Marketing 2005 JD 8.9 million of shares Local investor 
and Processing value was sold 
Company (AMPCO) 
Jordan Phosphate 37% of its shares sold, 3% Brunei Investment 
18 Mines Company 2006 of its shares allocated to the Agency 
(JPMC) Jordan Armed Forces funds 
and JPMC employees, to be 
sold at a preferential price 
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Moreover, other transactions are ongoing in different sectors in Jordan, for example, in 
air transport (i. e. Royal Jordanian Airlines Company, Jordan Air Motive Limited 
Company); Electricity (i. e. Central Electricity Generation Company, Electricity 
Distribution Company, Irbid District Company); postal services (i. e. Jordan Post 
Company) and supply services (i. e. Jordan General Silos & Supply Company). Other 
potential future candidates for privatization are the three airports in Jordan: Queen Alia 
Airport, Marka Airport and Aqaba Airport. 
The previous discussion highlights the recent development in Jordan's economy. 
Investment and privatization have become essential elements of Jordan's economy, to 
create Jordan as an open market. The Jordanian government, under the direction of HM 
King Abdullah II, has continued its efforts to restructure liberalize and increase the 
openness of the economy. In addition, attracting new investors to Jordan requires a 
stable and developing regulatory environment in order to protect these investments. The 
government's success in increasing investments and developing the privatization 
programme depends heavily on the legal framework of regulations and laws. Indeed, 
these regulations are considered to be the underpinning of any development in the 
economic sectors in Jordan. Al-Shiab (2003: 60) argued that the Jordanian government 
and institutions such as ASE have started developing their regulations in order to 
establish a stable economic strategy. In addition, these regulations should be updated in 
line with international standards in order to keep the Jordan regulatory environment 
abreast of all developments. Therefore, the next section will discuss the effect of 
regulations on financial reporting and disclosure in Jordan. 
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3.6 Effect of Regulations on Financial Disclosure 
3.6.1 The Companies Act 
The 1964 Companies Act is considered to be the first legislation regarding companies in 
Jordan. Before that, establishment and registration of companies were addressed by the 
Civil Law and Othman Commercial Law, which was replaced by the registration of 
Jordanian Companies Act in 1927 (Suwaidan, 1997: 66). 
The Companies Act No. 12 of 1964 includes general disclosure requirements, which are 
the responsibility of the Board of Directors (BOD): 
1- Article 115: A- Preparation of balance sheet and profit and loss account within the 
first three months of the financial year, audited by a certified public auditor. 
B- Filing copies of the above documents with the Companies Controller (CC), the AFM 
and the auditor of the company. 
2- Article 117: Publishing the above statements in a newspaper within two months of 
the general meeting. 
3- Article 170: Ensuring by the auditors that the balance sheet and profit and loss 
account reflects the true situation of the company, and that these documents and other 
company's accounts and records are prepared in accordance with generally accepted 
accounting principles (GAAP) 
Moreover, this Act defined two types of companies (Article 8): partnership and limited 
shareholding companies: private and public. 
It could be noticed that this Act did not mention any specific disclosure requirements as 
regards the content of financial statements. However, this Act is considered to be the 
first one to address disclosure requirements and require conformity to GAAP (although 
not defined). Several amendments were entered to the Act, in 1966,1967,1972,1973, 
1976 and 1978 (Al-Shiab, 2003: 78). 
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Economic development (as shown in Section 3.3 in this Chapter) and the increase in the 
number of companies forced the regulators to revise the Companies Act 1964. The 
several amendments of this Act and economic growth led to a newer version of the 
Companies Act in 1989. 
The Companies Act No. 1 for the year 1989 was more comprehensive than the 
Companies Act 1964. It provided different types of companies such as partnership, 
limited partnership, private limited, partnership limited by shares and public 
shareholding (Article 6). Shareholding companies must issue shares to the public 
according to the provision of this law. Therefore "Compared to other types of 
companies, public shareholding companies are of greater economic significance and as 
a sequence subject to more stringent disclosure requirements" (Suwaidan, 1997: 79). 
This Act covered different issues related to public shareholding companies. It included 
ten sections (Articles 90-219) explaining the essential issues of public shareholding 
companies, for example, formation of public shareholding companies, capital 
requirements and disclosure requirements. In addition, the law contains a section 
(Articles 220-231) illustrating the responsibility of the auditors, particularly towards the 
disclosure requirements. Therefore, the concern of this study is the disclosure 
requirements imposed by the law. These requirements are mentioned as follows: 
1- Article 168: The BOD of every public shareholding company must prepare, within 
the first three months of the end of the financial year, the following documents which 
together constitute the company's annual reports: 
A- The balance sheet and the profit and loss account for the current, with comparative 
figures for the previous year 
B- The directors' report 
C- The auditor's report. 
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In addition, the board is required to file copies of the above documents with the CC and 
AFM at least 21 days before the annual general meeting to publish the balance sheet, the 
profit and loss account and the auditor's report. Copies shall be sent to the Income Tax 
Department and the auditors (Article 169). 
2- Article 170: The BOD of the company have to file with the CC and AFM a half 
yearly report showing the financial position of the company and the results of 
operations for the interim period signed by the Board's Chairman. 
3- Article 172: The documents in Article 168 (A, B and C) shall be presented to the 
shareholders' annual general meeting, and at least 14 days before the meeting, a copy of 
the annual report must be sent to each shareholder, accompanied by invitation to the 
annual general meeting. 
4- Article 199: The auditor's report must be presented and discussed at the 
shareholder's annual general meeting. 
5- Article 220: Every public shareholding company is obliged to appoint an auditor. 
6- Article 221: The main responsibility of the auditor is to report to shareholders on the 
company's accounts. 
7- Article 223: The auditor must address the following in his report: 
A- Whether he or she has obtained all the information and explanation necessary to 
perform the audit in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards. 
B- Whether the company's account and financial records are adequate and necessary for 
performing his or her duty in a satisfactory manner. 
C- Whether the balance sheet, profit and loss account and the statement of resources and 
application of funds present fairly the company's financial position and comply with 
generally accepted accounting principles. 
D- Whether the financial matters cited by the directors in their report are in agreement 
with the company's records. 
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E- Whether there have been any violations by the company and its directors of the 
provisions of the Act, or the company's articles of association, and the extent to which 
the violation had an impact on the company's financial position and the results of its 
operations. 
F- Any other information or remarks which the auditor considers importance for the 
company's shareholders to know which are not covered by the above. 
8- Article 225: The auditor should be independent from the company and its directors. 
Therefore, an auditor who is partner or an employee of any director should not be 
appointed. 
The criticism of this law is that it did not include any provisions as regards consolidated 
financial statements. "In practice, companies, which maintain branches, prepare and 
present a combined balance sheet and a combined profit and loss account. All-inter 
branch transactions are eliminated in the accounts" (Al-Shiab, 2003: 81). In addition, 
although public shareholding companies should prepare comparative audited financial 
statements, there are no legal requirements as to the format and content of these 
statements (Suwaidan, 1997: 72). For example, the Companies Act 1989 did not provide 
any regulations as regards inventory and depreciation valuation (Al-Shiab, 2003: 82). 
Therefore, the Companies Act 1989 was limited in its scope and general in its content. 
The latest improvements in Jordan during the 1990s and the open-economy have 
attracted different investments to Jordan. Moreover, the free open market economy, the 
investments encouraging policy and the privatization strategy required a new regulation 
to manage, organize and create a stable regulatory environment in Jordan. Thus, a new 
Companies Act became essential. The Companies Act No. 22 of for the year 1997 was 
enacted with other regulations (e. g. Investment Promotion Law 1995, Securities Law 
No. 23 for the year 1997) in order to deal with the deficiencies of the previous Laws. 
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The Companies Act 1997 introduced the following disclosure requirements: 
1- Article 140: A- The BOD of the public shareholding companies shall, within a 
maximum of three months from the end of the company's fiscal year, prepare the 
following accounts and statements to be presented to the annual general meeting: 
- the annual balance sheet of the company and its profit and loss account, cash flows 
statements and notes compared with those of the last year's accounts, all duly certified 
by the company's auditor. 
- The BOD annual report on the company's activities and performance and forecasts of 
activities for the following year. 
B- The BOD is required to file copies of the above documents to the CC at least 21 days 
before the general meeting. 
2- Article 141: The BOD is required, within three days of the annual general meeting to 
publish in a daily newspaper the balance sheet, the profit and loss account along with 
the auditor's report. 
3- Article 142: The BOD of public shareholding companies have to file with the CC and 
AFM a half yearly report showing the financial position and the results of the operations 
for the company, signed by the Board's Chairman, within two months of its handing 
over to him. 
4- Article 143: The BOD of the public shareholding company shall annually place in the 
company's head office at the disposal of the shareholders, at least three days prior to the 
meeting of the company's annual general meeting a detailed report including the 
following statements copies shall be sent to the CC: 
A- The amounts received from the company during the fiscal year by the Chairman and 
each of the members of the BOD, in the form of wages, fees, salaries, allowances, 
remuneration and others. 
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B- Any benefits that the Chairman and the members of the BOD enjoy such as free 
housing, cars and other benefits. 
C- Amounts that have been paid to the Chairman and members of the BOD during the 
fiscal year such as travel and transport allowances in and outside Jordan. 
D- Donations paid by the company during the fiscal year in details and parties who 
received them. 
5- Article 144: The documents in Article 140 shall be presented to the shareholders 
annual general meeting, and a copy of the annual report shall be sent to each 
shareholder at least 14 days before this meeting, accompanied by an invitation to this 
meeting. 
6- Article 145: The BOD of the public shareholding company shall announce the 
company's annual general meeting date in at least two local newspapers within a 
maximum fourteen days prior to the date provided that the meeting shall be held within 
the four months following the end of the company's fiscal year. 
7- Article 171: Every public shareholding company is obliged to appoint an auditor who 
has to report to the shareholders on the company's accounts. Moreover, the auditor's 
report must be presented and discussed at the shareholders' annual general meeting 
along with the company's accounts. 
8- Article 184: Every public shareholding company shall organize its accounts and keep 
its registers and books in accordance with "generally accepted accounting principles ". 
9- Article 185: The fiscal year of the public shareholding company shall start on the first 
of January of each year and shall end on the thirty first of December of the same year, 
unless otherwise provided for in the company's memorandum of association. 
10- Article 195: the auditor shall address the following in his report: 
A- The company keeps proper books of account, registers and documents maintained in 
accordance with "generally accepted accounting principles and adopted in Jordan by 
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competent professional bodies". These accounts and statements shall show clearly that 
the financial position of the company (balance sheet) and the results of its operations 
(profit and loss account) are in conformity with the records and books. 
B- The audit procedures and steps carried out by the auditor for the company's account 
are, in his view, considered a sufficient and reasonable basis to express his point of view 
regarding the company's financial position, operation results and cash flows in 
accordance with internationally recognized audit principles. 
C- The financial statements included in the annual report addressed in the general 
meeting are in compliance with the company's records and registers. 
D- Any violation of the provision of this Law or the company's memorandum of 
association, that have taken place during the year in question and which have had a 
material effect on the results of the company's operations and its financial status. In 
addition, whether any of these violations still exist within the limits of the information 
available to him (the auditor). 
11- Article 197: The auditor must be independent from the company and its directors. 
Therefore, an auditor who is a partner to any member of a company BOD, a member of 
its BOD, or works permanently in any technical, administrative or consultancy work 
should not be appointed for auditing the company's accounts. 
12- Article 203: The company's auditor and his employees shall not be permitted to 
speculate in the shares of a company whose accounts he audits, whether such a 
speculation is direct or indirect. Otherwise, the auditor shall be penalised by dismissal 
from his job as an auditor of the company and shall be requested to compensate for any 
damages he has caused by this speculation. 
It should be noted that Companies Act No. 22 for the year 1997 has covered significant 
issue, which were not been covered before, such as the disclosure requirements for 
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foreign companies and consolidated statements. As regards foreign companies, the Act 
requires them to comply with the following disclosure requirements: 
1- Article 243: A- Sending to the CC, within three months of the end of the financial 
year, a copy of the balance sheet and the profit and loss account relating to its activities 
in Jordan, audited by a Jordanian auditor. 
B- Publishing the previous statements in at least two daily local newspapers, within 
sixty days of presenting these statements to the CC. 
As regards consolidated statements, Article 208 requires the holding company, at the 
end of the financial year, to prepare a consolidated balance sheet and a consolidated 
income statement with all supplementary information in accordance with IASs. 
Al-Shiab (2003: 86) argued that Companies Act No. 22 for the year 1997 did not give a 
specific definition of GAAP, in accordance with which companies are required to 
prepare their financial statements (Article 184). However, Article 195 requires 
companies to keep proper books of accounts, registers, and documents maintained in 
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, adopted in Jordan by 
professional bodies. Al-Shiab (2003: 86) pointed out that this is an indirect way of 
mentioning the IASs, since these standards were advised in 1990 to be adopted by the 
professional bodies (i. e. JACPA). 
Finally, the revision of the Companies Act is still on-going. The revision has included 
some amendments in 2002 in order to establish a new Companies Act (The Companies 
Act for the year 2006), which will be effective in the near future. Such an Act is 
essential in order to cope with the recent dramatic developments in Jordan economy, 
specifically in AFM, as will shown later in the chapter. 
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3.6.2 The Income Tax Law 
The Income Tax Law was published in Jordan for the first time in 1933. This law made 
salaries and wages in public and private sectors subject to taxation. The Income Tax 
Department (ITD) was established in 1951 by the introduction of the Temporary 
Income Tax Law No. 50 for 1951. ITD is a separate governmental institution 
responsible for legislation on taxation for persons and companies. This Law was 
amended in 1964 and 1975. 
The Income Tax Law No. 57 for 1985 has different exemptions and incentives, which 
companies could apply. The disclosure requirements according to this law were not 
many. Indeed, the Tax Law affects the disclosure requirements by determining the 
revenues and expenses of the income tax. According to the Income Tax Law No-51 of 
1985, the most important issues which could affect the financial reporting in Jordan are 
depreciation, bad debts and inventory pricing methods. The following discussion will 
illustrate how these issues affect the disclosure requirements in Jordan: 
1- Article 9-J: Depreciation; the tax payer must prepare the determined depreciation and 
submit it in a special form to the ITD. This depreciation includes all equipment, 
machinery and furniture the tax payer used for the production of income. The provisions 
of the Tax Law allow deduction on depreciation but it should be computed on the basis 
of the straight line method. In some cases, where the depreciation is considered to be 
extraordinary, as a result of additional work, the assessing officer of the ITD may apply 
percentage rates on the depreciation deduction. These percentages should not exceed 
double those percentages determined by the Law (the rates determined by the Law for 
industrial building range from 2% for the depreciation of store building to 25% for other 
industrial building companies). In addition, the following matters should be considered 
when making the deductions for depreciation: 
A- Land is not allowed to be depreciated. 
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B- The information as to the assets, on which deduction on depreciation is allowed, is 
issued under the instructions of ITD. 
C- Total depreciation changes must not exceed the original cost. 
D- If the gross income is less than depreciation in any year, the amount of depreciation 
not covered by income may be carried forward to the next year or to the following years. 
Al-Shiab (2003: 88) pointed out that the Law did not mention whether companies could 
use different depreciation methods in their reporting practices. "Given that, the 
company must use the rates stated by the Tax Law in filing its income return" (Al-Shiab, 
2003: 88). 
2- Article 9-g: Bad Debts; the write-off method is the only acceptable method of dealing 
with bad debts. Hence, bad debts are deductable when they actually incur and 
establishing a provision for uncollectible accounts is not acceptable for the ITD. In 
addition, subsequent recoveries of previously written-off debts must be included in the 
taxable income in the year they are collected. However, in certain cases where the 
nature of the business requires the company to establish provisions for bad debts (e. g. 
insurance companies which establish provision for the current danger), the ITD accepts 
this provision as an expense for the period. 
3- Inventory pricing methods: companies can use any generally accepted methods such 
as FIFO, LIFO, WA and Specific Identification. The Law just mentions that inventories 
should be valued at the lower of cost or market price. 
Furthermore, the Tax Law requires public shareholding companies to keep the 
following documents for tax purposes (Suwaidan, 1997: 78): 
1- A journal; 
2- A book of letter copies which include all the documents, vouchers and 
correspondences; 
3- The balance sheet and the inventory book; 
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4- Any essential books which are required by the nature of the work. 
Suwaidan (1997: 78) and Al-Shiab (2003: 89) argued that the requirements of Income 
Tax Law 1985 complement the requirements of the Companies Act 1997. Al-Shiab 
(2003: 89) remarked "While the Companies Act No. 22 of 1997 does not provide any 
regulation for depreciation and inventory valuation, it seems that companies use the 
regulations provided by the Income Tax Law concerning these matters". 
However, Al-Shiab (2003: 90) pointed out that the Income Tax Law had very limited 
requirements as regards asset valuation methods and income measurement. 
In summary, the ITD is working on developing the Income Tax Law to cope with the 
recent economic changes in Jordan. The amendments to this Law in 2001,2005 and 
2006 aimed to provide the underpinning for establishing a new Tax Law. However, it 
seems that the impact of the' Income Tax Law is limited as regards the disclosure 
requirements of public shareholding companies, as explained above. 
3.6.3 The Audit Law 
The first Audit Law was issued in Jordan in 1961. This law identified all the 
requirements in order to have the licence for practising the auditing profession. 
However, these requirements were loosely regulated, since the law did not require 
professional examination or stringent academic qualifications (Suwaidan, 1997: 73). 
The enactment of the Audit Law No. 32 for 1985 was essential in order to manage the 
audit profession in Jordan. Before 1985, the audit profession in Jordan was organized by 
a governmental institution, the Audit Bureau (AB), which was concerned with the 
government financial matters (Al-Shiab, 2003: 100). 
According to the Audit Law of 1985, two important institutions were established: 
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A- The Council of the Auditing Profession (CAP), which is responsible in licensing and 
classifying auditors. 
B- Jordanian Association of Certified Public Accountants (JACPA), which was formed 
in 1987. The purpose of the JACPA is to improve the audit profession in Jordan through 
developing the technical and scientific level of the profession and working on 
cooperation among its members. More details about JACPA will come later in this 
chapter. 
Article 22 of the Law mentioned that the auditor should not practise any kind of work 
which contradicts the nature of the audit of company accounts, such as being a member 
of the BOD or in the management of any advisory office. 
Moreover, the auditor should take into consideration the following matters, while 
auditing (Article 21): 
1- Observing all the accounts, the records and the financial statements of the company 
who audit it, and asking for any essential information which is beneficial for his mission. 
2- Ensuring that the accounts and statements present a true and fair view of the financial 
position and results of operations of the company under examination. In addition, he 
should ensure that these statements are prepared in accordance with GAAP. 
3- Preparing his report about the company under his examination following the 
international auditing standards and ensuring that all information and explanation, to the 
best of his knowledge, are available for rendering an opinion. Moreover, he should state 
whether or not there has been violation of the Laws, which has had an effect on the 
financial statements. 
In 2003, Audit Law No. 73 came into effect. This Law was issued in order to improve 
the audit profession in Jordan and to ensure that IASs and international auditing 
standards are applied in Jordan. In addition, this Law has enhanced the role of certified 
accountants in order to develop their academic and professional standard. 
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The CAP according to this Law consists of thirteen members. The major responsibility 
of the CAP in this Law is to ensure that IASs and international auditing standards are 
applied by auditors. In addition, the CAP is responsible for licensing auditors and 
professional institutes of certified public accountants. Furthermore, the CAP forms 
various committees which assist the CAP in their responsibilities and duties. 
Moreover, the new Audit Law has extended the role of JACPA. While the Audit Law 
1985 contained a few articles (Articles 38-40), with regard to JACPA, the new Law 
contains many articles (Articles 7-20) in order to strengthen the importance of JACPA, 
as will be discussed later in this chapter. 
Based upon the Law (Articles 31-31), a public shareholding company must appoint a 
Certified Public Accountant (CPA) to audit its accounts. The company shall inform the 
JACPA of this CPA within 30 days of his appointment. In addition, it is not allowed to 
select the same CPA for more than four years successively, unless the CAP accepts that. 
To sum up, the previous discussion shows some of the regulations (e. g. Companies Act, 
Taxes Law and Audit Law), which could affect the disclosure level in Jordan. Indeed, 
the influence of the Income Taxes Law and the Audit Law is limited, while there is 
some effect of the Companies Act on the financial reporting for Jordanian shareholding 
companies. However, the most influential regulations which affect the disclosure 
requirements in Jordan are the Securities Exchange Law (SEL) and IASs. The next 
discussion will explore the effect of SEL, its formation and its role in regards the 
financial disclosure in Jordan. 
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3.6.4 The Securities Exchange Law (SEL): 
SEL requires companies, whose shares are traded in the stock exchange, to disclose 
adequate information to the public in order to protect investors and enable them to take 
the appropriate decisions (Al-Issa, 1988: 49). "Companies whose securities are traded on 
the stock exchange must make prompt and adequate public disclosure of material 
developments in their affairs" (Al-Issa 1988: 49). 
The first law in Jordan concerning the financial market was in 1976. AFM Law No. 31 
for the year 1976 was the basis of establishment of the AFM in Jordan, which started 
operation in 1978 (Article Three). Al-Shiab (2003: 91) commented about this 
establishment as follows: 
"It is a government-mandated vehicle for both the regulation and 
institutionalisation of the securities market in Jordan. It has been given the 
appropriate power to promote the development of the securities market, to 
regulate the activities of member firms dealing in securities market as 
underwriters, brokers and investment advisors, and to regulate the trading 
market ". 
According to Suwaidan (1997: 87), the disclosure requirements of AFM Law of 1976 
were limited as follows: 
1- Article 29: Every listed company should supply the market with any information and 
statistics necessary, particularly the following: 
A- Copies of company's articles and memorandum of association; 
B- List of the names of directors or and a specimen of signature for those who are 
authorised to sign on behalf of the company; 
C- The balance sheet and final accounts for the preceding year signed by a licensed 
auditor; 
D- A copy of the company's registration certificate; 
E- A record of the shareholders' names; 
F- Any other information the management committee consider essential. 
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2- Article 33: Every public shareholding company wishing to offer shares to the public 
must prepare a prospectus on a special form, supplied by AFM, including all 
information deemed necessary to investors. 
3- Article 34: Every listed company should inform the market of any information which 
could have an effect on stock prices, as soon as the information is available. In addition, 
AFM has the right to disclose such information via any means. 
4- Article 36: General Director and/or any member of the BOD is required to supply 
AFM with a statement showing the number of shares he/she owns in the company 
within one month of his appointment. Moreover, he/she is required to provide the 
market of any change in his/her ownership within ten days of the change. 
5- Article 39: Each listed company shall keep records including the names of 
shareholders, the number of their shares, the transfers of shares and any details that are 
essential for AFM. 
Therefore, it could be noticed that the requirements of the AFM Law of 1976 were 
general and were only concerned with shareholders and investors (Al-Shiab, 2003: 93). 
"In fact, there is no mention of any specific disclosure requirements that 
listed companies must make available in their published reports or even the 
standards to which these reports should conform " (Suwaidan, 1997: 88). 
The AFM Law of 1976 was amended by the AFM Law No 1 1990. According to this 
Law, AFM was managed by a committee appointed by the Council of Ministers on 
recommendation by the Minister of Finance and included eight members 
The disclosure requirements of this Law were similar to those in the AFM Law 1976. 
The only difference was that the AFM management committee, according to the Law, 
was able to establish a price ceiling in either direction of the stock opening price (Al- 
Shiab, 2003: 96). Before 1989, the price ceiling was 10% and it was reduced to 5% in 
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1990. "The purpose of establishing a price ceiling is to keep speculation movement in 
market prices under control" (Al-Shiab, 2003: 96). Nevertheless, this Law was in 
general terms and did not specify and require information to be disclosed. 
The enactment of the Temporary Securities Law No. 23 for the year 1997 was a 
landmark. Indeed, it was a qualitative leap and a turning point for the Jordanian capital 
market. The major purpose of this enactment is to restructure and regulate the Jordanian 
capital market and to achieve transparency in the market in line with international 
standards53. There are two main features of this law: 
1- The establishment of Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) in 1999, as a replacement for 
AFM. This restructuring leads to the separation of supervisory and legislative role from 
the executive role. In addition, three independent entities were established, according to 
this law, instead of AFM: ASE, the Securities Deposity Centre (SDC), which plays the 
executive role, and Jordan Securities Commission (JSC) which plays the supervisory 
and legislative role. More details about these entities will come later in this chapter. 
2- Directives of Disclosure and Auditing and Accounting Standards (DDAAS): the 
purposes of DDAAS are54: 
A- To provide investors with essential information for decision taking. 
B- To maintain fair dealing in securities 
C- To enhance the trust of investors and savers. 
D- To achieve transparency in the market in line with international standards. 
In addition, another major feature of DDAAS is its significant role in determining IASs 
as the basis of preparation of the financial statements for Jordanian public shareholding 
53 Source: Amman Stock Exchange: http// www. ase. com. io [Accessed 28/10/2006] 54 Source: Jordan Securities Commission: http// www. jsc. gov. io [Accessed: 29/10/2006] 
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companies. Indeed, IASs were applied in Jordan from 1998 under the Securities Law 
No 23 for 1997. Article (24), Chapter Six of this Law states: 
A) All entities subject to the Commission's monitoring shall apply International Accounting 
Standards issued by the International Accounting Standards Committee. 
B) If there is a conflict between the standards referred to in Paragraph (A) of this Article and 
legislation in force in the Kingdom, the national Legislation shall supersede. 
The Entities subject to the Commission's monitoring shall disclose such along with its impact 
on the financial lists. 
More discussion about IASs and its relevance to this study will come later in this 
Chapter. 
The general features of the DDAAS are as follows55: 
1- The specifications of reports and information required from public shareholding 
companies must be disclosed and filed with the JSC for the purpose of enhancing 
transparency. 
2- International auditing and accounting standards must be applied by the parties under 
the supervision of the JSC. 
3- Criteria are provided to be adhered to by the individual auditors of the accounts of 
parties under the supervision of the JSC. 
4- Public shareholding companies are obliged to announce the preliminary results of 
their operations within 45 days after the end of the financial year. 
5- Companies shall submit their annual reports to the JSC and announce yearly 
statements within a period not exceeding three months after the end of their financial 
year. 
6- Companies shall announce their half yearly statements within a period not exceeding 
one month after the end of mid-year. 
ss Source: Jordan Securities Commission: http// www. isc. gov. jo [Accessed: 29/10/2006] 
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7- Any material information shall be announced immediately and the JSC shall be 
informed. 
8- Insiders are obliged to submit to the JSC material information related to their 
dealings. In addition, they are obliged to inform the JSC of any securities issued by the 
company held by them or their relatives. Moreover, any person who holds or controls 
5% or more of any securities for one issuing company, shall inform the JSC in writing 
within one week of such holding and inform it of any change thereof. 
DDAAS came into effect on Ist September 1998. It was issued by the Board of 
Commissioners of the Securities Commission and its major concern is with disclosure 
requirements. It contains eight chapters: 
Chapter One: Disclosure upon listing (Articles 3 and 4). 
Chapter Two: Disclosure of periodical financial statements (Articles 5-9). 
Chapter three: Disclosure of significant matters and important events (Articles 10-13). 
Chapter Four: Disclosure relating to financial brokerage companies (Articles 14-20). 
Chapter Five: Dealing in securities by insiders (Articles 21-23). 
Chapter Six: Accounting Standards (Articles 24-25). 
Chapter Seven: Requirements for the auditors of entities subject to the Commission's 
monitoring (Articles 26-34). 
Chapter Eight: General provisions (Articles 35-37). 
The first three chapters of the DDAAS are the major sources of disclosure requirements 
for Jordanian shareholding companies, particularly Chapter Two. Therefore, as regards 
this study, DDAAS beside IASs (Chapter Six) were the basis of constructing the 
disclosure index, as will be explained in Chapter Four of this study (Methodology). 
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The majority of disclosure requirements are mentioned in Chapter Two, Disclosure of 
financial statements, as follows: 
1- Article 5: A- Any issuing company shall, within no more than 45 days of the end of 
its fiscal year, declare its announcement of results upon primary revision of such by its 
auditor and shall provide the Commissions with copies thereof. 
B) The primary results referred to in paragraph (A) of this Article shall at a minimum 
include the following: 
1- Net revenues. 
2- Expected net profit prior to tax. 
3- Designated income tax for the expected profits. 
4- Minority rights in the profits. 
5- Net profit of the company's shareholders after deducting the designated tax and the 
minority rights. 
6- Comparative figures with the preceding fiscal year of items (1-5) above. 
7- Summary of the company's actions results during the fiscal year. 
2- Article 6: The Board of Directors of the issuing company shall prepare and provide 
the Commission with the company's annual report within a period not exceeding three 
months as of the end of its fiscal year. Such report shall include the following: 
a) The Chairman's speech. 
b) The Board of Director's report which shall include the following: 
1- Description of any governmental protection or privileges the company or any of its 
products enjoys pursuant to laws and regulations or otherwise with reference to the 
period such is applied thereto. A description of any patents or concessions that were 
granted to the company. 
2- Description of any decisions adopted by the government, international organizations 
or otherwise which has material effect on the company's operations, products or 
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competitive ability, and shall disclose the extent to which the company abides with the 
international quality standards. 
3- The company's accomplishments substantiated with figures, and a description of 
significant events that the company encountered during the fiscal year. 
4- The competitive status of the company within the sector of its activities, its main 
markets, its share in the domestic market and in foreign markets if possible. 
5- Degree of dependence on specific providers and/or main customers (whether 
domestic or abroad), where such constitutes 10% or more of aggregate purchases and/or 
sales or revenues respectively. 
6- The financial effect of transactions of a non-repetitive nature which occurred during 
the fiscal year, which are not included in the company's main activity. 
7- Time chain of incurred profits or losses, distributed profits, the shareholder's net 
equity and the prices of securities issued by the company, for a period of no less than 
five years or where the company has not completed five years since its establishment, 
from the date of its establishment, with a graphical illustration thereof whenever 
feasible. 
8- Analysis of the company's financial status and results of its actions during the fiscal 
year. 
9- Significant future developments including any expansions or new projects, and the 
company's future plan for at least one coming year, and the expectations of the board of 
directors of the results of the company's actions. 
10- Amount of auditing fees for the company and the affiliates thereof, and amount of 
any fees for other services received by and/or due to the auditor. 
11- Description of the company's main activities, their geographical locations, volume 
of capital investment and the number of employees in each activity. 
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12- Description of affiliated companies, nature of their work and fields of their 
activities. 
13- Names of the members of the board of directors, and names and titles of senior 
executive managers and a resume of each. 
14- Number of securities issued by the company, and securities owned by any member 
of the board of directors and senior executive manager and their relatives, and 
companies controlled by any of them, compared with the preceding year. 
15- Privileges and bonuses that the Chairman and members of the board of directors and 
senior executive managers enjoy during the fiscal year, including all amounts received 
by them as wages, fees, salaries, bonuses and others, and amounts paid to them as travel 
and transportation expenses inside and outside the Kingdom. 
16- Donations and grants made by the company during the fiscal year, detailed 
according to the entities receiving such. 
17- Names of senior shareholders of shares issued by the company and the number of 
shares owned by each of them where such ownership amounts to 5% or more, compared 
with the preceding year. 
18- Organizational structure of the issuing company, its appointing policy, number of 
employees, their qualification categories and turn-over ratio, and rehabilitation and 
training programmes for the company's employees. 
19- Contracts, projects and commitments concluded by the issuing company with the 
Chairman or Members of the Board of Directors, the Director General, any employee of 
the company or their relatives. 
20- The Company's contribution in serving the environment and the local society. 
C) The company's annual financial statements audited by its auditors, compared with 
the preceding year, which shall include the following: 
1- The balance sheet. 
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2- Profits and losses account. 
3- Cash-flow list. 
4- Changes in the shareholders' equity. 
5- Explanations of the financial statements. 
D) The company's auditor's report on the company's annual financial statements 
including a statement that auditing procedures have been conducted according to 
accounting standards stipulated pursuant to these instructions. 
E) 1- A declaration from the company's board of directors that, according to the board's 
knowledge and beliefs, there had been no significant matters affecting the continuity of 
the company during the following fiscal year. 
2- A declaration from the company's board of directors of its responsibility for 
preparing the financial statements and for providing an effective control system in the 
company. 
Article 7: Any issuing company shall, within a period not exceeding three months as of 
the end of its fiscal year, announce its annual statements after approving them from its 
board of directors, and upon issuance of the auditors' report, prior to distributing such to 
the shareholders, provided the announcement shall also including a simple summary of 
the board of director's report, and the full text of the auditors report. 
Article 8: A- The board of directors of the issuing company shall prepare a semi-annual 
report compared with the same period of the preceding fiscal year, and shall announce 
such report within a period not exceeding one month as of the end of such period 
provide the Commission of copies thereof. 
B) The report referred to in Paragraph (A) of this Article shall include the following: 
1- The balance sheet. 
2- Profits and losses account. 
3- Changes in the shareholders' equity. 
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4- Cash-flow list. 
5- Necessary explanations. 
6- The company's auditors' report including a statement that auditing procedures have 
been conducted according to accounting standards stipulated pursuant to these 
Instructions. 
7- Summary report on the result of the activities during the set period in comparison 
with the future plan that has been already established. 
Article 9: Any public shareholding company that changes its fiscal year shall prepare 
the financial statements specified hereunder which shall cover the transitional period 
starting from the end of the preceding fiscal year and ending at the beginning of the new 
fiscal year. The company shall announce such statements and provide the Commission 
with copies thereof no later than 45 days from the end of the transitional period, 
provided that such statements are audited by the company's auditors: 
1- The balance sheet. 
2- Profits and losses account during the transitional period. 
3- Cash-flow list. 
4- Changes in the shareholders' equity. 
5- Explanations of the financial statements. 
6- The company's auditors' report for the transitional period 
In addition, some disclosure requirements were mentioned in Chapters One and Three 
as illustrated in Table 3.6.4.1 
166 
b 
O 
Z 
kw cu 
Q 
G 
Fy 
u4 
C 
r ö 
C) p" o U 
L) A 
o 
'cy 
aCi 
,b 
aý 
rte; 
0 0 
irr" 
Q 
sý, 
- U 
q 
N 
o 
U 
n 
C :1 
GO 
Ö 
"ý 
Cl) 
. 
Ur 
p, 
u2 
a 
4-i 
0 
tý. 
02 
ä 
U 
'32 
ö 
O 
0 
E 
0 
'Ü 
4" 
on C 
N 
"ý 
E 
Cl) 
O 
ý. 
b 
N 
y 
to 
3 
. 
92 
O 
"s 
Ü 
a 
h4 
M 
0 
rn 
f3ý 
"E 
aý 
'Tý 
N 
Ü 
cý 
cC 
y 
. r. 
.j 
U 
ý 
"0 
,b 
u 
' 
E 
'3 
-2 
ö 
n. 
ice. 
4ý 
N 
bA 
: 
- 
2 
j 
1Uý. 
ö 
ý, 
Cl') 
cu 
o 
N 
o 
ä 
4 
E 
U 
3 
¢ 
0 
L. 
N 
O 
uj y 
U 
. O'er O 
_r 
U 
" 
cu 
0 
N 
0 
i'°' 
ID 
Q 
ý' 
9 
>:, 
tu 
ý. L 
p 
C) 
0 
0 
; 
oÄ 
C 
üý 
U 
y 
O 
U 
U 
0 
caa 
0 
'ý 
+=' 
CC 
ý, U 
E 
tu 
N 
Ci 
ö 
U 
A 
4- 
0 
c 
Z 
C 
Z 
E 
aC 
¢' 
0 
"CI 
CCC 
q 
Cq 
4 
' 
0 
y 
'rn 
e 
- 
w 
cu 
+=r 
U 
o 
4 
-C 
3 
e 
ö 
ö 
U 
ö 
,ä 
5 
U 
C 
y 
zi 
OUJ 
4.4 
0 
4. 
U 
Oý" 
. mob 
ý 
o U 
U 
4.1 
.ä 
gi 
äi 
y 
M 
t2 
0 
° 
°' 
ä 
Ei 
Z 
9 
'ý 
Q 
rA ti. 
0 
O 
O 
Gn 
ä 
=r 
N 
0 
.ý 
- 
YVJ 
"ö 
tý4 
O 
Gei 
C) 
Ü 
C) 
a1 
a a. 
Ü 
.O 
rn 
`O' 4 
y 
O 
Z 
%. 
tu 
0 
U 
y 
Q 
e 
ca a 
d 
0 
ä 
a 
4) 
2 
N 
The previous disclosure requirements listed in Chapters One, Two and Three were 
incorporated in the disclosure index in Chapter Four of this study (Section 4.5.1). These 
requirements are the major sources (besides IASs) for mandatory disclosure 
requirements in Jordan, which Jordanian shareholding companies shall comply with 
according to the Securities Law No. 23 for 1997. 
It is reasonable to think that the Securities Law no. 23 for 1997 was the first regulation 
which specified the disclosure requirements in the annual reports. In addition, the Law 
was the major vehicle of imposing IASs for Jordanian shareholding companies. 
Therefore, this Law is considered to be the first vehicle of mandatory disclosure in 
Jordan, since disclosure requirements under DDAAS and IASs were mandated by this 
Law. Before 1997, disclosure practices in Jordan were voluntary in nature, due to the 
lack of regulations and the unregulated nature of the AFM (Suwaidan, 1997: 2). 
Recently, the Securities Law No. 76 2002 was issued and amended the previous Law. 
DDAAS under this Law came to effect on 1/3/2004, and the Law required companies to 
comply with them. The DDAAS under this Law were similar to those in Securities Law 
of 199756. The new Law included new instructions as additions or adjustments of the 
previous ones, as follows57: 
1- The Chairman and any member of the BOD shall notify the Securities Commission 
in writing of any 1% increase in acquisition within a week of such occurrence (Article 
13). However, Article 22 of the Securities Law 1997 required that the Chairman and any 
56 For the purpose of this study, the DDAAS under the Securities Law No 23 for the year 1997 were 
applied, since the DDAAS under the Securities Law No 76 for the year 2002 came into effect on 1/3/2004. The researcher has selected the latest annual reports when conducting his empirical work which they were 
the annual reports of 2003. Hence, the researcher could not apply the DDAAS of 2002 since they were 
not on effect on that time. However, the DDAAS in both Securities Law were similar and the differences between both Laws were limited. 57 Source: Al-Raai Newspaper, Monday, March 15,2004, Issue 12229, Page 15 
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member of the BOD shall inform the Securities Commission of this procedure in 
writing before its occurrence and not within one week. 
2- The new Law indicated, precisely, the persons in the company who shall be insiders 
ex officio (Article 23): 
A- The Chairman of the BOD of the company. 
B- The members of the BOD. 
C- The Chief Executive Officer. 
D- The Financial Manager. 
E- The Internal Auditor. 
F- Relatives of the above mentioned persons. 
G- The natural person representing any juridical person occupying such a position shall 
be considered an insider. 
These insiders were not mentioned in the previous law and the reason for mentioning 
them is that these insiders have access to information before others, and they should not 
use this information for their benefit. "There should be continuous control on the 
insiders in order to make them comply with the Law" (Al-Saket, Chairman of JSC)58. 
However, there are many similarities between both laws as regards disclosure 
requirements. The DDAAS are similar in both Laws. In addition, IASs were mentioned 
in the new law and all shareholding companies should comply with it. 
Article 14 of the Securities Law No. 76 of the year 2002 indicated: 
"The International Accounting Standards are hereby adopted, whereby all the parties 
subject to the Commission's control shall prepare their financial statements consistently 
therewith". 
58 Source: Al-Raai Newspaper, Monday, March 15,2004, Issue 12229, Page 15 
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The only significant difference between both laws is related to the Audit Committee 
(AC). The new law has extended the tasks and authorities of the AC. Each BOD shall 
form an AC of three non-executive Board members, who are natural persons, and shall 
designate one of them as Chairman of the Committee. In addition, they shall notify the 
Commission thereof and any changes thereto with the statement of cause (Articles 15- 
A). The AC tasks are the following: 
1- Discussing the matters related to the nomination of the external auditor; ensuring the 
auditor's fulfilment of the Commission's conditions and his independence; and 
examining the extent to which the auditors other activities may affect such 
independence. 
2- Discussing the auditor's work, including his comments, suggestions and reservations, 
and the management's response thereto and submitting recommendations thereabout to 
the Board of Directors. 
3- Reviewing the Company's correspondence with the external auditor, evaluating their 
contents, and providing comments and recommendations. 
4- Observing the Company's compliance with the Securities Law, and the Regulations, 
Instructions and decisions issued pursuant thereto. 
5- Examining the periodical reports prior to their presentation to the Board of Directors 
and submitting recommendations thereabout which shall address specifically: 
A- Changes in the accounting policies. 
B- Changes in the Company's accounts as a result of the auditing operations or of the 
auditor's suggestions. 
6- Examining the auditor's work plan and ensuring that the Company is providing the 
auditor with all required facilities for his work. 
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7- Examining and evaluating the internal control procedures, and reviewing the external 
auditor's assessment of such procedures, and the internal control reports, particularly 
those related to any violations found by the internal auditor. 
8- Making recommendations to the Board of Directors related to the internal audit 
procedures and the work of the internal auditor. 
9- Ensuring that there are no conflicts of interest arising from the Company's 
transactions, contracts or projects with the parties concerned. 
10- Any other matters as decided by the Board of Directors. 
In addition, the AC has the following authorities (Article 15-E): 
1- Requesting any information from the Company's employees, whereby the employees 
shall cooperate by providing such information fully and accurately. 
2- Seeking legal, financial, administrative or technical advice from any external 
consultant. 
3- Summoning any employee in the Company, to obtain any further explanations, if 
necessary. 
4- Summoning the external auditor if it deems necessary to discuss any matter related to 
his work at the company. The committee may also require the auditor to provide a 
written clarification or opinion. 
5- Recommending to the BOD the nomination of an external auditor to be elected by the 
General Assembly. 
6- Nomination of an internal auditor for the company to appoint. 
171 
To sum up, it could be argued that Securities Law in Jordan has been developed 
significantly. The first Law in 1976 failed to specify disclosure requirements and the 
nature of its articles were general. "In this sense, the AFM at that time could be 
described as an unregulated market in which listed companies were not subject to any 
stringent disclosure requirements" (Al-Shiab, 2003: 99). 
In addition, the AFM Law in 1990 did not impose any disclosure requirements on 
companies. "Moreover, the Law did not differentiate between the process of the 
exchange of securities and the process of controlling and regulating the market" (Al- 
Shiab, 2003: 99). 
The Securities Law No. 23 1997 is considered to be the first market law which imposed 
disclosure requirements (i. e. DDAAS) on Jordanian shareholding companies. The law is 
considered to be a fundamental advanced step towards developing the regulatory 
environment of AFM. In addition, the law imposed IASs and the international auditing 
standards for all Jordanian shareholding companies. Furthermore, the Securities Law 
No. 76 for the year 2002 has extended the Securities Law 1997, as regards the AC's 
tasks and authorities. However, the difference between both Laws, 1997 and 2002, was 
limited as regards the disclosure requirements (i. e. DDAAS) and both of them have 
adopted IASs. 
The previous discussion has presented the influence of the most important regulations, 
particularly the Securities Laws, on disclosure behaviour in Jordan. In order to enhance 
our understanding about the effect of the regulatory system on disclosure, it is necessary 
to discuss the regulatory bodies (regulators), particularly AFM (ASE, JSC and SDC) 
and JACPA. The next discussions will overview this issue. 
172 
3.7 The Influence of Regulatory Bodies on Disclosure in Jordan: 
3.7.1 Amman Financial Market (AFM): 
Jordan started to engage in trading in the early thirties of the 20th Century. The Arab 
Bank was the first public shareholding company to be established in Jordan in 1930, 
followed by Jordan Tobacco and Cigarettes in 1931, Jordan Electric Power in 1938 and 
Jordan Cement Factories in 195159. Trading used to take place via a number of 
brokerage firms on the unregulated market, until Law No. 31 1976 was promulgated and 
set up the AFM. Hence, the AFM is considered to be a public financial institution with 
legal, administrative and financial independences from the state. The operations of 
AFM started on January 1 1978. 
The AFM Law No. 31 of 1976 indicated the following objectives of AFM (Article 4): 
1- To encourage savings and investment in securities to serve the needs of the national 
economy. 
2- To regulate the process of issuance and dealing in securities in order to ensure the 
soundness, ease and speed of transactions, and to protect small savers. 
3- To collect, classify, analyse and disseminate important data and statistics to achieve 
AFM objectives. 
The Jordanian government has adopted a comprehensive capital market reforming 
policy. It aims to increase the role of the private sector, to expand and diversified the 
national economy and to improve regulations of the securities market to reach 
international standards. The most important features of this policy are: 
1- Institutional changes in the capital market (ASE, JSC and SDC). 
2- Use of international electronic trading 
3- Settlement and clearance systems. 
4- Elimination of obstacles to investment. 
59 Source: Amman Stock Exchange: www. ase. com. io [Accessed 30/10/2006] 
173 
5- Strengthening the capital market supervision to reach optimum transparency and safe 
trading in securities. 
The AFM started with 51 listed companies, with a market capitalisation of JD 286 
million and trading volume of JD 9.7 million in 1978. In 2005, the number of 
companies reached 201 (212 up to November 2006), the market capitalisation reached 
JD 26.7 billion with a trading volume of JD 16.9 billion6o 
One of the fundamental changes in Jordanian capital markets was the restructuring 
effort, the purpose of which was to separate the supervisory and legislative role from the 
executive role. Thus, three new institutions were established to replace AFM, as is 
shown next. 
3.7.1.1 Amman Stock Exchange (ASE): 
The ASE was established on March 11,1999 as a result of the restructuring and 
privatization process. The ASE is considered to be a private non-profit institution, with 
legal and financial independence. The major tasks of ASE are61: 
1- Providing enterprises with means of raising capital by listing on the exchange. 
2- Encouraging an active market in listed securities based on the effective determination 
of prices and fair and transparent trading. 
3- Providing modem and effective facilities and equipment for trading and recording of 
trades and publication of prices. 
4- Monitoring and regulating market trading, coordination with the JSC as necessary to 
ensure compliance with the Law and fair market and investor protection. 
60 Source: Amman Stock Exchange: www. ase. com. io [Accessed 30/10/2006] 
61 Source: Amman Stock Exchange: www. ase. com. io [Accessed 30/10/2006] 
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5- Setting out and enforcing a professional code of ethics among its member directors 
and staff. 
6- Ensuring the provision of timely and accurate information of issues to the market and 
disseminating market information to the public. 
The management of the ASE is organised by the Instructions of Administrative Internal 
By-Law, issued by Virtue of Article (65) of Securities Law No 76 of 2002. According 
to Article 3 of these Instructions, the ASE organisational structure should be composed 
of the following: 
1- Board of Directors. 
2- Chief Executive Officer (CEO). 
3- Deputy CEO. 
4- Head and staff of departments and sections. 
The ASE's organisation structure is presented in the following figure. 
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Figure 3.7.1.1.1: ASE Organization Structure 
External 
Auditor 
External 
Legal 
Consultant 
General Assembly 
Board of Directors 
Chief Executive Officer 
Deputy Chief Executive 
Officer 
.3 
Legal 
Department 
Administration 
and Finance 
Department 
Surveillance 
and 
Inspection 
Department 
Listing and 
Operations 
Department 
Internal 
Auditing 
Bureau 
Awareness 
and Public 
Relation 
Bureau 
Research and 
International 
Relations 
Department 
IT and 
Communication 
Department 
Source: Amman Stock Exchange, Administrative internal By-Law issued by Virtue of 
Article (65) of the Securities Law No 76 for 2002. 
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The ASE BOD consists of seven members62: 
1- Two members representing banks licensed to act as brokers and brokers owned by 
banks or their affiliates. 
2- Two members representing brokers other than the above. 
3- Three members from the private sector who are experts in legal, financial and 
economic issues and who are appointed by the JSC Board of Commissioners. 
Furthermore, Article (4) of the Administrative Internal By-Law instructions illustrated 
the structure of ASE as follows: 
A- Listing and Operations Department: this department shall undertake the following 
tasks: 
1-It prepares the essential requirements, documentation and forms for ASE membership, 
and ensures respect of applicable legislations by the membership. 
2- It examines listing applications submitted to the ASE. 
3- It follows up on the implementation of the applicable listing instructions by security 
issuers listed on the ASE. 
4- It manages and oversees trading sessions, monitors executed operations, inspects 
trading systems, proposes appropriate solutions to trading problems, prepares trading 
bulletins and reports and makes sure that they reach the related parties. In addition, it 
trains trading system operators and conducts the necessary tests to license them to 
operate. 
B- Surveillance and Inspection Department: it shall undertake the following tasks: 
1- It surveys trading operations executed on the ASE to ensure their compliance with 
applicable legislations. 
62 Source: Amman Stock Exchange, Administrative Internal By-Law issued by Virtue of Article 65 of the 
Securities Law No 76 2002, (Article 17-B) 
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2- It inspects ASE members and registers to ensure their compliance with regulations 
and instructions issued by ASE. 
3- It ensures ASE members' compliance with financial solvency standards as per the 
instructions issued in this respect. 
4- It receives and examines investor complaints. 
C- Legal Department: It shall undertake the following tasks: 
1- It gives legal advice to all departments in relation to all outgoing and incoming 
correspondence and from ASE departments. 
2- It reviews all contracts and agreements concluded by the ASE. 
3- It participates in drafting instructions and regulations related to the ASE. 
4- It executes court decisions passed with regard to securities. 
5- It follows up on any cases brought by or against the ASE and coordinates with the 
ASE external legal consultant in this respect. 
D- Research and International Relations Department: it shall undertake the following 
tasks: 
1- It undertakes all economic and financial studies and research, and collects 
information and documentation from the different departments. 
2- It prepares ASE official and circular bulletins and computer indexes. 
3- It supervises the data bank and its users and the ASE website. 
4- It organizes conferences, seminars, and marketing and public awareness campaigns, 
arranges visits and regulates ASE relations with relevant Arab, regional and 
international institutions. 
E- IT Department: it shall undertake the following tasks: 
1- It is in change of information systems and controls and updates procedures for the 
protection and maintenance of systems, software and hardware. 
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2- It follows up on department requirements in terms of software and hardware, 
undertakes programming and analysis, and trains personnel. 
3- It is in charge of linkage with the software of the relevant institutions. 
4- It manages projects and networks. 
F- Administrative and Finance Department: it shall undertake the following tasks: 
1- It is in charge of personnel affairs and training. 
2- It performs financial and accounting tasks and prepares financial reports. 
3- It purchases, oversees, secure and conduct maintenance over supplies needed by ASE. 
4- It follows up on the ASE's public relations. 
The significant development in ASE could be noticed in two major aspects: the 
legislative structure and the trading system. 
As regards the legislative structure, the following points summarize the development in 
this aspect63: 
1- Highest level of regulations which ensure transparency: ASE has issued regulations 
which ensure that it attains its objectives and in compliance with international standards. 
The Securities Law 2002 gives an example of this regulation, which also aims to keep 
pace with the global market and to secure efficiency transparency and investor 
protection. 
2- Internal By-Law: it contains provisions governing the composition of the General 
Assembly and BOD, the Executive Managers, member commitments, inspection, 
investigation and the inspection of disciplinary measures on breaching members. 
3- Listing Rules: it includes listing requirements, transfer between markets, delisting 
and suspension, listing requirements for bonds and investment units, the listing of 
63 Source: Amman Stock Exchange: www. ase. com. io [Accessed 30/10/2006] 
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Jordanian securities on non-Jordanian securities exchanges and the listing of non- 
Jordanian securities on the ASE. 
4- Trading rules: it includes the procedures for trading securities on the ASE through 
the electronic trading system (ETS), a Code of Ethics for ASE members and other 
regulatory issues related to electronic trading. 
5- Financial Brokers' Guarantee Fund Directives: these Directives established a 
Guarantee Fund for financial brokers in order to compensate for any cash deficit on the 
part of buying brokers or any shortage in securities sold on the part of selling brokers, as 
a result of the trading securities in the ASE. 
6- Disclosure Regulations: these regulations identify the information which ASE should 
disclose and the information which should be considered to be confidential and should 
not be disclosed. 
7- Dispute Resolution: the By-Law Instructions include a clear definite mechanism for 
dispute resolution amongst ASE members (financial brokerage firms) and between 
members and their clients. 
As regards the trading system in ASE, the French Electronic Trading System NSC-Unix 
Hardware started its operation in ASE on March 26,200064. The ASE has shifted from 
the manual system to Electronic Trading System (ETS) as a major improvement in ASE. 
This step has enabled financial brokers to execute their transactions of buying and 
selling via a highly advanced and efficient ETS. Thus, ETS offers a very easy, flexible 
and safe mechanism operating on a continuous auction bias. Moreover, the ETS 
provides a user-friendly way to enter, change, cancel, access and execute orders. It 
supports monitoring in the market either on-line or at predetermined times. 
64 Source: Amman Stock Exchange: w«nv. ase. com. io [Accessed 30/10/2006] 
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Trading in ASE took place on two markets from July, 200465, the First Market and the 
Second Market. ASE issued Listing Securities Directives (LSD), issued by the Virtue of 
the provisions of Article 72 of the Securities Law No 76 for 2002 in order to manage the 
listing requirements in both markets. The markets are dividing according to liquidity 
and company profit criteria. Article 5 of the LSD states that companies which file for 
listing of their shares on the Second Market must provide the ASE with the following 
statements and information: 
1- A report issued by the company's BOD that includes the following: 
A- Summary about the company's foundation and its major objectives, as well as its 
relationship with other companies, whether it is mother, subsidiary or affiliated (if any). 
B- A description of the securities issued by the company and those that the company 
wishes to have listed. 
C- The BOD's evaluation, supported with figures and statistics, of the company's 
performance, the level at which it stands and accomplishments achieved, for 
comparison against the set plan of action. 
D- Significant occurrences to the company or those impacting it between the date of its 
establishment and the date of submission of the listing request. 
E- The names of the large owners of securities issued by the company and the number 
of securities owned by each one of them where such constitutes 5% or more of the 
issued securities. 
F- The company's future plan for the next three years 
65 Before July 2004, trading in ASE took place in three markets. The first two markets were for listed 
companies, while the third market was for unlisted companies. However, the unlisted companies were 
few (25 companies) and they were new companies which do not have a high level of disclosure. In 
addition, their trading volume did not exceed 1% of the whole trading volume of ASE. Therefore, the 
third market was merged with the second market and ASE consisted of two markets: the First and Second 
Markets. However, the time of conducting the empirical work of this study was in 2003 and hence the old 
classification (three market tiers) was applied, since the new classification (two markets) was not applied 
at that time. (Source: Al-Raai Newspaper, Monday, June 28,2004, Issue 12334, Page 34). 
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G- Names of the members of its BOD, and names and positions of the top executive 
personnel, any securities owned by any of them or any of their relatives, and the 
membership of any of them in BOD of other companies. 
H- A list of the names of the company's shareholders, the number of shares owned by 
each of them, and the percentage of non-Jordanian shareholding in the company. 
2- The company's Articles of Association, Charter and Prospectus (if any). 
3- The company's annual report for the last fiscal year (if any), which includes the 
BOD's report, the company's financial statements and the auditor's report. 
4- Transitory financial statements reviewed by the company's auditor covering the 
period from the end of the fiscal year preceding the date of the listing application till the 
end of the last quarter preceding the date of the listing application (if any). 
5- Any other information that the ASE deems necessary to take its listing decision. 
In addition, Article 7 of the LSD indicated that companies' shares are transferred from 
the Second Market to the First Market if the following conditions are fulfilled: 
1- The shares must have been listed for a full year on the Second Market. 
2- The company's net shareholders' equity must not be less than 100% of the paid-in 
capital. 
3- The company must have made net pre-tax profits for at least two fiscal years out of 
the last three years preceding the transfer of listing. 
4- The company's free float66 to the subscribed shares ratio by the end of the fiscal year 
must not be less than: 
66Free Float is the number of company shares that are available for trading. For the purposes of these 
Directives, the following shares shall not be deemed available for trading: 
1- Shares owned by the company Board of directors members or their relatives. 
2- Shares owned by the Mother, Subsidiary or Affiliate Companies. 
3- Shares owned by shareholders who own 5% or more of the Company capital. 
4- Shares owned by governments and public institutions. 
5- Shares owned by the same company (treasury shares). 
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A- 5% if its paid-in capital is 50 million Jordan Diners or more. 
B- 10% if its paid-in capital is less than 50 million Jordan Diners. 
5- The number of company shareholders must not be less than 100 by the end of its 
fiscal year. 
6- The minimum days of trading in the company shares must not be less than 20% of 
overall trading days over the last twelve months, and at least 10% of the Free Float 
shares must have been traded in during the same period. 
Moreover, Article 8 of LSD identified the cases when the company shares are 
transferred from the First Market to the Second Market as follows: 
1- Decrease of the net shareholder's equity to less than 75% of the paid in- capital. 
2- Losses on the company's accounts in the last three fiscal years. 
3- The company's Free Float ratio shares drops to less than the minimum set in Article 
7 (4) of LSD by the end of its fiscal year. 
4- The number of company's shareholders drops to less than 75% by the end of its fiscal 
year. 
5- The number of company's trading days over the last twelve months drop to less the 
minimum set in Article 7 (6) of LSD. 
6- The percentage of traded Free Float drops during the last twelve months to less than 
the minimum set in Article 7 (6) of LSD by the end of its fiscal year. 
The listed companies in the ASE used to be classified into four sectors: banking, 
insurance, services and industrial (Al-Shiab, 2003: 63). From July, 2005, the ASE has 
adopted a new sectoral classification for the listed companies, which is applied within 
the international standards67. Based on this classification, companies listed in the ASE 
67 Source: News Letter, Monthly Newsletter issued by Amman Stock Exchange, July 2005, Issue No 70 
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have been classified into three major sectors: the financial sector, the services sector and 
the industrial sector. The financial sector consists of four sub-sectors: banking, 
insurance, financial services and real estate. The services sector includes eight sub- 
sectors: energy and utilities, education, telecommunication, healthcare, commercial 
services, media, and transportation and hotel & tourism. The industry sector consists of 
eleven sub-sectors: pharmaceutical and medical industries, chemical industries, paper 
and cardboard industries, printing and packaging, food and beverages, tobacco and 
cigarettes, mining and extractive industries, engineering and construction industries, 
electrical industries, glass and ceramic industries and finally, the textile, leather & 
clothing industries68. 
The benefit of this new classification is that it shows clearly the nature and objective of 
the company, which will give investors easy access to information for purposes of 
company financial analysis. In addition, it will highlight the relative importance of each 
sector and hence provide a tool for evaluation of the company's performance in 
comparison with similar companies in the same sector. 
Finally, the significant achievements in ASE could be reflected in numbers. The 
following tables show the developments in ASE from its establishment in 1978 till 2005. 
68 Source: News Letter, Monthly Newsletter issued by Amman Stock Exchange, July 2005, Issue No 70 
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As seen from the tables above, the number of listed companies has increased 
significantly from 57 companies in 1978 to 201 in 2005 (252% change). In addition, the 
market has experienced a remarkable increase in trading volume and market 
capitalization during the period 1978-2005. Indeed, this increase was fundamental in the 
last five years. The trading volume increased from JD 669 million in 2001 to JD 16871 
million in 2005 (242% increase), while the market capitalization rose from JD 4478 
million in 2001 to reach JD 26667 million in 2005 (4955 increase). The ratio of market 
capitalization to GDP was 75.7%, 80.45,116.85,184.7% and 326.6% for the years 
2001-2005. 
Furthermore, significant development in ASE started in 2003 (the year of data collected 
in this study), since the major improvements in the regulatory environment occurred in 
that year, specifically after the issuance of the Securities Laws 1997 and 2002. "The 
JSC has enhanced transparency by requiring companies to disclose the information and 
the significant matters in order to protect the investors" (Al-Khasib, 2004)70. In 2003, 
the performance of ASE reached the highest level, since its establishment. The trading 
volume increased by 95% compared to 2002. in addition, the number of traded shares in 
2003 rose by 119% compared to 2002, and the number of executed transactions was 
783.1 thousand compared to 446.4 thousand in 2002, representing an increase of 75.4%. 
Market capitalization increased by 54.6% to JD 7772.8 million compared to JD 50.29 
million by 200271. 
The significant developments in ASE continued in 2004 and 2005. The trading volume 
was JD 16871 million for 2005, compared with JD 3793 million for 2004 (an increase 
of about 344.7%). In addition, the number of shares traded increased by about 93% 
from 1338.7 million in 2004 to reach 2581.7 million in 2005, whereas the number of 
70 Source: Amman Chamber of Commerce, Studies and Training Development: The Economic Annual 
Report for the year 2003 in comparison to 2002, Al-Khasib, May, 2004 
71 Source: Amman Stock Exchange: Fifth Annual Report, 2003 
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executed transactions was 2392.5 thousand in 2005 compared to 1178.2 thousand in 
2004 (an increase of 103%). 72 
Moreover, as a result of the increase in the number of listed companies, listed shares 
and share prices, the market capitalization for the ASE by the end of 2005 went up by 
104.6% (26667.1 million compared to 13033.8 million by the end of 2004), 
representing 326.6% of the GDP. 
As for non-Jordanian investment, during 2005, the non-Jordanian net investment rose 
by JD 413 million compared to an increase of JD 69 million in 2004, making the non- 
Jordanian ownership 45% of the total market value of ASE. Thus, ASE is one of the 
largest stock markets in the region that permits foreign investment. The ASE currently 
has 590,000 shareholders 49% of the shares are held by Jordanian corporate and 
individual investors, foreign investors account for 45% of share ownership and the 
government through the Jordan Investment Corporation holds 6%73 
In summary, ASE has experienced fundamental improvements in its performance and 
achievements in the last three years (2003,2004 and 2005). These improvements in the 
ASE could be due the following factors as Al-Horani (Chairman of Directors in ASE) 
explained74: 
"The expected performance of the ASE was the result of several factors, 
legislative, structure and technical developments in the Jordanian capital 
market had the biggest impact in supporting and strengthening the market's 
activity. In addition, the positive performance of the Jordanian economy's 
macro economic indicators, related to economic growth rates and positive 
expectations for the national economy's performance, also contributed to 
strengthening the market's performance. Moreover, the exceptional 
performance of the public shareholding companies in 2005, whose profits 
increased by 1035 by the end of the third quarter of 2005, as well as the 
flow ofArab and foreign investments and the continued close monitoring by 
72 Sources: Amman Stock Exchange: Sixth Annual Report, 2004 
Amman Stock Exchange: Seventh Annual Report, 2005 
73 Source: Amman Stock Exchange: www. ase. com. io [Accessed 30/10/2006] 
74 Source: Amman Stock Exchange: Seventh Annual Report, 2005, Chairman's Statement 
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capital market institutions that was accompanied by increasing disclosure 
and transparency, all led to exceptionally positive results at the ASE". 
ASE is supervised by a separate entity, JSC, which has the legislative and regulatory 
role in AFM. More details about this entity are explained next. 
3.7.1.2 Jordan Securities Commission (JSC) 
The purpose of this entity is to supervise the issuance and dealing in information related 
to all activities and operations of securities, issuers, insider trading and major 
shareholding. JSC has a legal personality with financial and administrative autonomy, 
and is linked directly to the Prime Minister. The JSC's objectives are summarized in the 
following (Article 8-A in the Securities Law of 2002): 
1- Protecting investors in securities. 
2- Regulating and developing the capital market to ensure fairness, efficiency and 
transparency. 
3- Protecting the capital market from the risks that might face it. 
Paragraph B of the same article mentioned the responsibilities and authorities assigned 
to the JSC to achieve the previous objectives: 
1- Regulating and monitoring the issuance of securities and dealing therein. 
2- Ensuring full and accurate disclosure by issuers of material information necessary to 
investors and relevant to the public issuance. 
3- Regulating and monitoring disclosure including the periodic reports prepared by 
issuers. 
4- Regulating licensing and registration, and monitoring the activities of licensed and 
registered persons in the capital market. 
5- Regulating and monitoring the Stock Exchange and trading markets in securities. 
6- Regulating and monitoring the Securities Depository Centre (SDC). 
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7- Regulating mutual funds and investment companies. 
JSC has a Board of Commissioners (BOC), which undertakes the administrative and 
supervision of JSC. BOC is composed of five full-time commissioners including the 
Chairman and Deputy Chairman. They are appointed by the Council of Ministers and 
must be designated by a Royal Decree (Article 10 of the Securities Law 2002). 
The law prohibits each member from engaging in any other profession or job in both the 
private and public sector. In addition, it obliges them to declare in writing immediately 
upon appointment any securities owned by themselves and their families. 
JSC has twelve departments and administrative units divided as follows 75 
1- Issuance and Disclosure Department: it is in charge of issuance and registration of 
securities, disclosure of parties under supervision of the Commission, in addition, to 
ensure of application of the accredited accounting and auditing standards, and revision 
of financial statements of securities issuers76. 
2- Capital Market Monitoring Department: its role is to monitor trading and operations 
in the capital market in order to ensure sound dealing in securities and monitor and 
inspect the operations in both the Stock Exchange and the Depository Centre. 
3- Licensing and Inspection Department: it is responsible for licensing financial services 
companies and certified financial professional affairs. In addition, it inspects their 
business operations and ensures their compliance with the regulations of JSC. Moreover, 
it cooperates with parties in order to develop the activities of financial services 
companies and certified financial professionals. 
75 Source: Jordan Securities Commission: http//www. jsc. gov. jo/managcment. asp [Access 02/11/2006] 
76 This department is relevant to this study, since it is related to the disclosure issue in Jordan. Hence, the 
researcher conducted a successful interview with the Head of this department, Dr. Abd-Alraouf Rababaa. 
Details and results of this and other interviews are explained in Chapter Eight. 
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4- Legal Affairs and Enforcement Department: it investigates violation of the Securities 
Law and related regulations. In addition, it follows up with the enforcement of legal 
procedures against offenders, as well as providing legal consultation. 
5- Research and International Affairs Department: it is concerned with research affairs 
through providing all required statistics, data and information about AFM and the 
Jordanian economy and all related local and international developments. In addition, it 
follows up the developments in finance and economics in local and international 
environment. Furthermore, it follows up various regulations in other capital markets. 
This department should provide all essential recommendations and pursue JSC relations 
with various international organizations and institutions on all levels, national, Arab and 
international. 
6- Information Technology Department: it is in charge of information systems and 
related technical affairs. In addition, it is responsible for modernization of these systems 
in line with the technological developments in a manner that enables the JSC to achieve 
its objectives. 
7- Administrative and Financial Affairs Department: it is concerned with the 
supervision of all administrative affairs in JSC. In addition, it is responsible for 
preparing and monitoring all financial matters in conformity with the applicable 
regulations. 
8- Internal Auditing Department: it ensures that the instructions and procedures 
followed by JSC's departments comply with the regulations and systems. 
9- Human Resources and Development Department: it is responsible for organizing the 
technical and professional affairs of its staff. It continually monitors the upgrade of 
staffs efficiency by virtue of legislation and instructions. In addition, it evaluates the 
department's performance and prepares studies and recommendations to improve it. 
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10- Web Content Management Office: it is responsible for managing the content and 
structure of the website, including the framework and navigation, creation, editing and 
publishing process. Moreover, it ensures updating continuously in order to provide 
efficient and transparent information. 
11- Information Bureau: its role is to build a database in JSC by documenting the 
procedures about outputs of all the Commission's departments. Thus, top management 
could use this database for decision making. 
12- Communication and Media Department: it has many functions as follows: 
A- Organizing conferences, seminars, and workshops locally and internationally. 
B- Arranging public awareness campaigns in order to enhance the investment culture in 
Jordan. 
C- Holding annual and periodic press conferences and regular meetings with the press 
in order to provide them with the relevance and essential information. 
D- Cooperation with an affiliated special unit about receiving notes and complaints 
from investors and others in the capital market. 
JSC continues its mission in different aspects: reforming and developing legislation and 
regulations, emphasising disclosure and transparency, enhancing Jordan's investment 
culture, encouraging and protecting investors and most importantly enforcing the rule- 
of-law. 
The Securities Law 2002 requires JSC to regulate the capital market to ensure fair 
trading and transparency. Various regulations and instructions have been issued under 
the supervision of JSC. For example, the DDAAS, which came into effect in March, 
2004, aims to set out the disclosure requirements which Jordanian shareholding 
companies must comply with. In addition, it imposes the IASs and the international 
auditing standards, which auditors shall follow. 
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Recently, in 2005, the Instructions for Licensing and Registration of Financial Services 
were issued in order to enhance investors' protection, to evaluate financial services 
standards, and to enhance the capability of financial services companies endure any risk 
they might face. Moreover, new Instructions for Issuance and Registration of Securities 
were issued where a distinction was made between "public offering" and "public 
issuance". In addition, these Instructions required companies to hire a licensed issuances 
manager in order to prepare the required prospectus, which should include the latest 
periodic reports. 
Other examples of regulations and instructions under the supervision of the JSC are: 
Mutual Fund Instructions, Regulations for Securities Commissions Fees, Margin 
Finance Instructions Custodian Licensing and Instructions of Criteria for Solvency of 
Brokerage Companies operating in the Stock Exchange77. 
The supervision role of JSC aims to protect investors and to ensure the compliance with 
laws and regulations. In this context, the JSC continues to monitor parties subject to 
supervision in order to ensure their compliance with the law and regulations. Thus, JSC 
has taken appropriate legal actions against violators. For instance, 455 violations were 
recorded in 2005,347 of which were rectified by the violating parties who complied 
with the legal requirements. The remaining violations are being followed up by the 
relevant department in the JSC. The JSC does not impose fines for the purpose of 
raising revenue, but as a corrective and preventive measure in order to ensure the 
compliance of all parties with the provisions of the law and regulations. Furthermore, 
the JSC is considered to be one of the few regulatory bodies in the Arab World which 
publish all details of violations, the violating parties and how violations were handled. 
77 Source: Jordan Securities Commission, Annual Report, 2005 
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It is worth mentioning that JSC has joined the International Organization of Securities 
Commission (IOSCO) in 200278. IOSCO is an international organisation comprising 
capital market supervision and regulating institutions for all parts of the world79. Since 
2002, the JSC has been Deputy Chairman of the Emerging Markets Committee (EMC) 
of the IOSCO, a member of the EMC's Advisory Board and a member in the IOSCO 
Executive Commute. Jordan, represented by the JSC, held the IOSCO annual 
conference in May 2004, as the first Arab country to organize this important 
international event. 120 countries and more than 500 persons, representing different 
stock exchanges, regulators and organizations have participated. This conference was 
held under the patronage of HM King Abdullah II. Several issues were discussed in the 
conference, such as: the legislatives and regulations, the information exchange among 
the members of IOSCO, the controlling and monitoring process by imposing IASs and 
the international auditing standards. The conference included special working groups 
for the most important issues related to the capital market80. 
Furthermore, the JSC was selected as a member of the special task force formed for the 
purpose of laying down the basis for the establishment of an Islamic capital market. The 
JSC continues to strengthen its cooperation and exchange information and expertise 
with Arab and international organizations, including the Union of Arab Stock Exchange 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and agreements were signed by Bahrain, 
Kuwait, Malaysia and Egypt. There are draft agreements and MOUs to be signed in 
future with Oman, Poland, Ukraine, China and Pakistan. In addition, the JSC signed a 
78 Source: Jordan Securities Commission, Annual Report, 2002 
79 More details about IOSCO is explained later in this Chapter 
80 Sources: Jordan Securities Commission, Annual Report, 2002 
Jordan Securities Commission, Annual Report, 2003 
Jordan Securities Commission, Annual Report, 2004 
Jordan Securities Commission, Annual Report, 2005 
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MOU with the Romanian Securities Commission in 2005, aiming mainly to reinforce 
cooperation, exchange legislative, technical information and expertise81. 
Finally, the JSC will continue its efforts to upgrade the capital market in Jordan to 
international standards. In addition, JSC is performing its supervisory role in order to 
enhance investors' confidence in Jordan. The future plan of JSC could be summarized 
in the following purposes82: 
1- Enhancing the JSC's regulatory and supervisory roles: the JSC will work on updating 
the capital market regulations and enhancing surveillance and enforcement of the law to 
ensure compliance of parties under the supervision of the JSC, and penalizing violators 
to deter wrongdoing. 
2- Establishing the Jordan Financial Centre: the JSC has already taken the necessary 
measures for the establishment of the Jordan Financial Centre. This centre is intended to 
be a distinguished regional financial centre that reflects the progress, modernization and 
development in the capital market. A Committee was formed by the Council of 
Ministers to start working on the establishment of the Centre, which will contain all the 
facilities, equipment and communications networks essential in accordance with 
international standards. In addition, the Centre will house financial institutions in the 
market. 
3- Establishing a training institute in the capital market: in order to raise the efficiency 
and qualifications of professionals in the capital market, JSC has started working with a 
number of international organizations (i. e. United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID), Achievement of Market Friendly Initiatives and Results 
Program (AMIR), National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD)) to establish a 
81 Jordan Securities Commission, Annual Report, 2005 
82 Jordan Securities Commission, Annual Report, 2005 
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specialized training centre for capital market institutions affiliated with similar 
academic institutions. Moreover, the centre is planned to offer its services on the local 
and regional levels, and grant accredited professional certificates. 
4- Preparing a code of corporate governance for listed companies: The JSC, in 
cooperation with a number of international institutions (i. e. NASD) has started working 
on the preparation of corporate governance code for listed companies on the ASE. The 
final draft, which was completed during the first quarter of 2006, will be distributed to 
the parties concerned to solicit their comments and feedback. 
5- Enhancing public awareness and the culture of investment in securities: the JSC will 
continue its efforts to enhance awareness and investment culture through different 
means, such as bulletins, seminars, conferences and media. In addition, the JSC will 
continue to conduct educational seminars and meetings with various civilian and 
military institutions. 
6- Promoting Jordans' capital market and attracting foreign investment: the JSC 
prepared a comprehensive programme for 2006 for promoting the capital market of 
Jordan on the Arab and international levels. The programme will include participation 
in a number of international exhibitions and road shows to present investment 
incentives in the Jordanian capital market and its modern legal and organizational 
framework. 
7- Enhancing disclosure and transparency in the market: the JSC will pursue the 
compliance of listed companies with disclosure requirements. In addition, JSC will 
impose penalties on violators in order to ensure the supremacy of the law and to 
enhance disclosure culture in the market. Moreover, electronic filing systems will be 
implemented in order to enable companies of providing the JSC with disclosure 
requirements and information electronically. 
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8- Developing electronic systems and programmes: the major priorities of the JSC is 
updating and developing the electronic systems and programmes at the capital market, 
in order to enhance the ability to perform its supervisory role more efficiently. In 
addition, the JSC will upgrade its website and provide electronic services through the 
internet. Moreover, the JSC department will be equipped with essential software and 
electronic systems. Furthermore, a world class surveillance system will be introduced 
with the assistance of the European Union, in order to enhance the JSCs' supervisory 
role. This system will enable the monitoring department to monitor trading at the ASE 
on a real- time basis and detect any suspicious transactions. 
3.7.1.3 The Securities Depository Centre (SDC) 
The SDC was established in May 10,1999, as a non-profit legal entity with financial 
and administrative autonomy, and managed by the private sector. The SDC was 
founded to perform the following functions (Article 77-A of the Securities Law 2002): 
1- Register, safe keep and transfer ownership of securities. 
2- Deposit securities. 
3- Clear and settle securities 
The SDC is considered to be one of the most important institutions in AFM, as it holds 
the ownership register of all issued shares. In addition, the SDC has been recognized by 
the Association of National Numbering Agencies (ANNA) and the JSC as the sole 
numbering agency in Jordan for the assignment of International Security Identification 
Number (ISIN). All share books at the SDC are numbered according to the ISIN 
numbering scheme83. 
The SDCs' major objectives are: 
83 Source: Securities Depository Centre: http// www. sdc. com. jo [Accessed 05/11/2006] 
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1- Enhancing the investors' confidence in securities and enabling them to follow-up 
their investments in securities with ease by establishing a central registry to safe-keep 
the ownership of securities. 
2- Reducing risks related to settlement of trading transactions executed through the 
market by implementing By-Laws Instructions and Procedures that are fair, safe and 
fast. 
The SDC is managed by the BOD and a full-time Chief Executive. The BOD consists of 
seven members, five of them elected by the General Assembly of the SDC and the 
others two appointed by the JSC. The Chief Executive Officer is appointed by the BOD 
and must not be engaged in any other activities or be a partner, shareholder, or 
representative of any licensed person. In addition, membership in the SDC is mandatory 
for the following entities (Article 82-A of the Securities Law 2002): 
1- Public shareholding companies (banks, insurance companies, service companies and 
industrial companies). 
2- Public issuers. 
3- Legal person licensed as financial brokers or dealers. 
4- Custodians. 
5- Any other entity determined by the DOB. 
The management of the SDC has identified specific departments and divisions 
dedicated to ensure that the SDC implements internationally-accepted practices and 
procedures. The organization structure of the SDC is shown in Figure 3.7.1.3.1. 
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Figure 3.7.1.3.1: SDC Organization Structure 
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The developments of SDC was accomplished in different stages. For the past twenty 
years, all the shareholders information were registered manually by information 
prepared by brokers or by sources of public shareholding companies, which obtained 
this information from the shareholders directly. Thus, the information and data in the 
registers contained errors and mistakes. The different stages of the SDCs' development 
are summarized as follows: 
Stage One: Organization and Strategy 
In this stage, the legal framework of the SDC was set up and the SDC personnel were 
recruited and the SDC was established in May, 1999. 
Stage Two: Database and Shareholders 
All the information and data related to issuers was transferred to the SDC database and 
the investor numbers (SDC No. according to ISIN) were identified during this stage. In 
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addition, the SDC started to issue electronic deals in order to enhance the reliability and 
authenticity of shareholders' registers maintained by the issuers. Thus, an electronic 
database was established in the SDC and continuously updated during this stage. 
Stage Three: Shareholder Authentication and Central Registry 
SDC required issuers to provide copies of shareholders' registers, which were subject to 
an inspection and cleansing process. This process, which started in February 2002, 
developed the SDCs' relationships with all shareholders' information. This process is a 
continual one in order to ensure the highest level of data accuracy. 
Stage Four: Clearing and Settlement (as a transitional phase) 
Clearing and settlement systems started in July 2002, as a transitional step towards 
complete implementation of Delivery-Versus-Payment (DVP). This stage aims to 
accelerate the process of validating shareholders' register information (the previous 
stage) in order to ensure the highest level of accuracy in shareholder asset transfers. 
Indeed, all trades executed at the ASE were delivered for clearing to SDC and matched 
to SDC's shareholders' registers in order to ensure that: 
1- Shareholder does exist. 
2- Shareholder information (including shares held) is authentic and complete. 
3- Shareholder position contains sufficient, available shares to settle the trade. 
4- Pledges and/or liens against shareholder position will not prevent trade settlement. 
Moreover, clearing and settlement system enhanced the level of risk management in the 
Jordanian capital market. 
Stage Five: Central Depository and Implementation of Delivery-Versus-Payment 
This stage followed the process of receiving shareholders' registers and came after the 
cleansing and inspection process. In this stage, the SDC fulfilled the measures for 
transferring these registers as of 31/12/2004, in accordance with the decision of JSC 
BOC and the SDC BOD. This stage includes two other stages. In the first one, public 
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shareholding companies were provided with copies of their shareholders' registers and 
were required to check and audit these registers. In the second stage, the companies 
were provided with the final registers of 31/12/2004 including the deposited and non- 
deposited registers. Only authenticated shareholders, whose information matched the 
database of SDC, were deposited at the SDC. 
The shareholders' register was divided into two types: 
1- The deposited registers, under the jurisdiction of the SDC; these registers are 
considered to be legal proof of the ownership of deposited securities. 
2- Non-deposited registers, under the jurisdiction of the public shareholding company, 
where companies have to fulfil the measures for depositing the non-deposited securities 
by providing the SDC with the essential information. 
The next table presents the number of shareholders, the number of issued shares and the 
market or nominal value of the 232 deposited and non-deposited shareholders' registers 
submitted to the SDC. 
Table 3.7.1.3.1: Number of shareholders, shares, market or nominal value of the 
deposited and non-deposited shareholders' register84 
Item Deposited 
Percentage 
Deposited Non-Deposited Total 
No. of shareholders 72.03% 660,081 256,281 916,362 
No. of issued shares 96.69% 4,831,378,720 165,376,511 4,996,755,231 
Market or nominal value 22,374,791,153.72 1,393,135,180.93 23,767,926,934.65 
* The figures are as per October, 31,2006 
84 Source: Securities Depository Centre: http// www. sdc. com. jo [Accessed 05/11/2006] 
202 
The SDC started to implement the final stage of the clearing and settlement process in 
January 2005, on the basis of Delivery-Versus-Payment (DVD). This principle is an 
essential international standard applied in the capital market, where delivery of sold 
securities is against payment of funds. Financial settlements between brokers are 
conducted through the SDC by many transfers from the broker's accounts to the SDC 
settlement account at the settlement bank (The Central Bank of Jordan was selected as 
the settlement bank). Accordingly, the SDC transfers these funds to the brokers who 
should receive funds. 
Stage Six: Corporate Action and Market Support Services 
In this stage, the SDC presents different services to securities owners, issuers, brokers 
and custodians, for instance, mark-to-market services, portfolio, valuation, market 
activity analysis and transaction statement services. 
The SDC's future plans include new services and features such as services to investors 
in securities, bonds and corporate bonds, an archiving system, securities' borrowing and 
lending and link to the trading system. 
3.7.2: Jordanian Association of Certified Public Accountants (JACPA) 
JACPA was established in 1985 according to the Audit Law No32 for the year 1985 
(Article 18-A). The major objectives of the JACPA as mentioned in Article 18-A were: 
1- Developing the proficiency level, independence and competence of its members. 
2- Observing the profession's code of ethics and enhancing the accounting awareness 
among its members by training and publishing accounting and auditing standards. 
3- Developing the accounting and auditing standards that could best meet the needs of 
the country. 
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The JACPA came into effect in 1987 (Suwaidan, 1997: 78). Before that, the Audit 
Bureau (AB) was the only organization which was responsible for the auditing 
profession in Jordan. 
"The AB is a governmental body and was originally established to supervise 
the financial matters of the government. However, the AB is still responsible 
for administering the examination required for entry into the public 
accounting profession" (Suwaidan, 1997: 78). 
Al-Shiab (2003: 105) argued that JACPA did not develop any national standards or 
define GAAP. However, the JACPA adopted IASs in 1989, but did not have the power 
to impose them on shareholding companies or its members until 1997"when Companies 
Act No. 22 of 1997 and Securities Law No. 23 of 1997 gave consideration, authority and 
more power to JACPA" (Al-Shiab, 2003: 105). 
Moreover, the DDAAS of the Securities Law 1997 indicated the following rules for 
JACPA to apply: 
1- Any auditor of any company controlled by JSC should be a member of JACPA 
(Article 27-B). 
2- Auditors should comply with the professional standards published by JACPA 
(Article 28-B), and enhance their qualifications and technical skills through continuous 
courses organized by JACPA or other institutes licensed by JACPA (Article 28-C). 
3- JACPA shall, in consideration with JSC, set forth the procedures essential to 
implement the provisions of Article 28 (Article 29). 
4- JACPA shall, annually and within the first month of each year, provide the JSC with 
a list of the names of the auditors who meet the required conditions and any 
amendments which might be made (Article 30). 
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The JACPA's role was developed significantly through the enactment of the Audit Law 
No 73 of the year 2003. According to this Law, the JACPA has a legal personality, with 
financial and administrative autonomy (Article 7-A). In addition, the JACPA has the 
following responsibilities: 
1- Publishing the principles of accounting and auditing by issuing periodicals, books 
and holding seminars, conferences and training courses. 
2- Cooperation with universities and the educational institutes in order to enhance 
accounting awareness. 
3- Cooperation with similar Arab and international professional and scientific 
associations and bodies in the field of accounting and auditing, and performing 
international activities and exchange of information. 
4- Cooperation with regulators (such as JSC) in order to develop the regulations related 
to accounting and auditing. 
JACPA is managed by a BOD which contains nine members (including the president of 
JACPA) (Article 16). The financial resources of the JACPA are various, for instance, 
registration fees, training courses fees, donations, subscriptions to the JACPA magazine 
and a percentage of the income of each audit company in Jordan, indicated by the Law 
(Article 39). However, the financial resources of the JACPA are still very limited. 
The researcher has conducted two interviews concerning the influence of JACPA on the 
disclosure level in Jordan. The interviewees have explained the role, responsibilities, 
effect and the difficulties which the JACPA face. More discussion about this issue is 
provided in the chapter on the interviews and their analysis (Chapter Eight). 
In summary, the JACPA has developed its authority and functions through the 
regulations. The adoption of international accounting and auditing standards is the 
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major responsibility of JACPA. IASs were applied in Jordan in 1998 after the 
introduction of the Securities Law 1997. The application of such standards will enhance 
the credibility of financial statements for the investors. 
"No doubt, the application of IAS will make for the preparation of 
dependable and trusty financial statements which are reliable and 
comparable to international standards and will make a difference to 
international investors" (AI-Shiab, 2003: 108). 
Furthermore, there are two major vehicles for mandatory disclosure in Jordan: the 
Securities Law 1997 (DDAAS), and IASs. As the Securities Law 1997 was discussed 
earlier in this chapter. The next discussion will explain the other vehicle for the 
mandatory disclosure: IASs. 
3.8 International Accounting Standards (IASs) 
International Accounting Standards (IASs) were developed under the construction of 
the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC). Street and Gray (2001: 9) 
pointed out that the IASC, renamed the International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB), was restructured in 2001 as an underpinning vehicle for setting, developing and 
globalising IASs. IASC was established in June 1973 by a general agreement among 
nine countries: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Holland, Japan, Mexico, the UK 
(and Republic of Ireland) and the USA (Kapaya, 2000: 14). 
The IASB's objectives are: 85 
a- To develop, in the public interest, a single set of high quality, understandable and 
enforceable global accounting standards that require high quality, transparent and 
comparable information in financial statements and other financial reporting to help 
85 IASC, "International Financial Reporting Standards 2003", 2003, IASCF Publications Department, 
London, P-2 
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participants in the various capital markets and other users of the information to make 
economic decisions; 
b- To promote the use and rigorous application of those standards; and 
c- To work actively with national standard-setters to bring about convergence of 
national accounting standards and International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) 
to high quality solutions. 
The IASB consists of four groups86: 
1- Trustees: a group of nineteen individuals responsible for fund raising, approval of the 
board's budgeting, ensuring the IASB's effectiveness, constitutional changes and 
selecting the other members of the IASB groups. 
2- The Board: should include fourteen members appointed by the Trustees, selected for 
their high degree of technical expertise. The Board's major task is setting accounting 
standards. 
3-International Financial Reporting Interpretations Committee (IFRIC): comprises 
twelve voting members appointed by Trustees. They are responsible for interpreting the 
standards and providing guidance on financial reporting issues. The guidance covers 
two issues: mature issues, unsatisfactory practice within the scope of existing standards, 
and emerging issues, new topics which are related to existing standards but which were 
not considered when the standards were being developed. 
4- Standards Advisory Council (SAC): comprises thirty or more members. The Council 
consults other groups and members to give advice to the Board and Trustees. 
Street, Gray and Bryant (1999: 12) argued that the IASC emerged simultaneously with 
the international development of the stock capital markets and investments. They 
mentioned five advantages for IASs as follows: 
86 IASC, "International Financial Reporting Standards 2003", 2003, IASCF Publications Department, 
London, C-2 - C-12 
207 
1) Lowering cost of capital and the risk worldwide. 
2) Reducing the costs of multiple reporting. 
3) Providing a better understanding of companies' performance across countries by 
eliminating the confusion arising from different practices and measure of companies' 
financial position. 
4) Promoting international financial investments in the capital markets. 
5) Better allocation of savings worldwide. 
Murphy (2000: 472) reported that the members of the IASC believe that financial 
statements' quality and the degree of comparability will be improved by adopting IASs. 
Harmonization of accounting standards has increased rapidly in line with economic 
globalization. "Harmonization is a process involving movement away from total 
diversity towards a state of harmony which may include total uniformity" (Emmanuel 
and Gray, 1996: 270). Harmonization (standardization) 87 is an essential process to 
decrease accounting diversity. Murphy (2000: 472) pointed out that harmonization 
emerges as more firms choose to prepare their financial statements using the same 
accounting practice. Grove and Bazley (1993: 110) argued that harmonization efforts by 
the IASC should be directed towards improving the efficiency of international financial 
markets, and "not just standardisation international accounting principles for the sake of 
standardisation". 
Weber (1992: 40), in his theoretical modelling of accounting harmonization, pointed out 
that harmonization of accounting standards is beneficial to the world economy by the 
following mechanisms: 
87 The difference between harmonization and standardization depends on their relative flexibility or 
strictness when applying to accounting regulation and practice. Harmonization is considered to imply 
consensus of a more flexible approach (compared to standardization), with state harmony acceptance 
which maybe considered short of total uniformity. Meanwhile, standardization involves a more strict 
approach resulting ultimately in a state of uniformity (Emmanuel and Gray, 1996: 270). 
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"By facilitating international transactions and minimizing exchange costs 
by providing increasingly "perfect" information; by standardizing 
information to world-wide economic policy makers; by improving financial 
markets information; and by improving government accountability. 
International investment decisions and financial based-management 
decisions are then made with less risk. " 
It is argued that IASs are not appropriate for all countries (developed and developing 
countries). Kapaya (2000: 17) argued that the IASC was not designed (structurally or 
operationally) as an effective tool to improve the accounting measurements and 
practices among developing countries. Indeed, the major users have traditionally been 
the developed countries. He (2000: 16) claimed that the IASC framework does not 
present any salient role for developing countries. As mentioned earlier in discussion of 
the IASC groups, the Board consists of 14 members with the highest levels of technical 
expertise. "Cynics would probably argue that this is a code or excuse for exclusivity, 
and a pre-emptive measure against any possible calls for a more democratic and 
representative IASC" (Kapaya, 2000: 16). Moreover, the trustees shall be selected 
according to the following criteria88: six trustees from North America, six from Europe, 
four from Asia Pacific and three trustees appointed from any area, subject to 
establishing overall geographical balance. As Kapaya (2000: 16) commented: "some 
balance! " Another point to note is that the Asia Pacific region (the most populous 
region in the world) would have only four members (out of 14) of the IASB structure 
(Kapaya, 2000: 16). Two members from Japan and Australia would almost certainly be 
included; the other two members would be selected from other Asian Pacific countries: 
e. g. China, Singapore, Malaysia, India and New Zealand. "Quite conspicuously, African, 
Latin American, Caribbean, Middle Eastern and former Eastern Block countries, by all 
accounts the most "enthusiastic adopters" of IASs, thus far, are not mentioned at all" 
(Kapaya, 2000: 17). 
88 IASC, "International Financial Reporting Standards 2003", 2003, IASCF Publications Department, 
London, C-3 
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The IASs's relevance to the developing countries has become a controversial issue. 
Chamisa (2000: 21) argued that there are some limitations and dangers when making a 
general conclusion about the (ir) relevance of the IASs for these countries. He reported 
that some limitations arise from the fact that developing countries are an amorphous and 
heterogeneous group. There are many different aspects among developing countries: 
First, different geographical locations (in Africa, Asia, Latin America, etc. ). Second, 
different historical development and economic philosophies, for example, Mozambique 
as a colonized country and Portugal as an imperial one; in addition, economies which 
focus on capital (capitalistic) such as Malaysia, and economies which are motivated by 
community (communistic), for instance China. Third, developing countries differ in 
economic development stages. For instance, Hong Kong and Singapore are considered 
as rapidly industrialising countries, Kuwait is rich in natural resources, while Tanzania 
is a poor country. 
Chamisa (2000: 271 cited from Briston 1978) identified four criteria which enable us to 
decide the relevance (or irrelevance) of the IASs to any developing country: 1) the 
accounting needs of the country; 2) the relative size of the public or private sector; 3) 
the existence of a capital market and 4) the underlying environment. He (2000: 280) 
concluded that overall, IASs are not appropriate for communistic developing countries 
where there are no capital markets or private sector. On the other hand, IASs are 
relevant to capitalizing developing countries (e. g. Zimbabwe), where the private sector 
role is predominant and capital markets exist. Chamisa (2000: 280) expressed a similar 
view to Kapaya (2000: 27) that the IASC Board should be reorganized to include more 
members from developing countries. Chamisa (2000: 280) commented that 
"Developed countries with accounting bodies involved in the standard- 
setting process have largely ignored the IASC standards, while developing 
countries with accounting bodies marginalized in the setting of IASs largely 
observe them. This is likely to intensirypressure on the IASC (than has been 
the case hitherto) to increase the number of developing countries 
represented on the IASC board and in Steering Committee" 
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(Underlining added for emphasis) 
Al-Shiab (2003: 112) argued that IASs cannot be applied in developing countries for two 
reasons: 1) IASs are based upon developed countries' experience which is totally 
different from that of developing countries. 2) There are many problems in the 
accounting field in developing countries, beside the lack of relevant standards, for 
instance, weak management and poor control systems in business enterprises, lack of 
accounting knowledge for primary users of accounting information and shortcomings in 
education and research. 
However, the trend towards adopting IASs has increased rapidly in developing 
countries. It can be noticed that many developing countries are encouraged to adopt 
IASs and many of them have adopted IASs (Kapaya, 2000: 20). The IASC, International 
Monetary Fund (IMC), the Organization of Economic Coordination and Development 
(OECD), the International Organization of Securities Commission (IOSCO) and World 
Bank are some major vehicles which promote the adoption of IASs among developing 
countries. Kapaya (2000: 20) pointed out that many developing countries do not have the 
financial resources, the knowledge and the effective regulations to formulate their own 
standards. Thus, it is cheaper and easier for them to adopt IASs rather than to develop 
their own national standards. 
"Adoption of IAS by accounting bodies in developing countries would 
reduce the expense of creating domestic accounting standards. Countries 
with relatively high inflation might be able to reduce "indexing" and other 
poor polices such as periodic, government-mandated revaluation of long 
term assets with the adoption of international accounting standards" 
(Weber, 1992: 41). 
The adoption of IASs in developing countries should not be identical for each standard. 
Chamisa (2000: 272) pointed out that the primary objective of adopting IASs in 
developing countries is not to achieve international accounting harmonization, but to 
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meet their demand for appropriate accounting standards. This illustrates why some IASs 
are not adopted and some are amended. 
Harmonization by developing countries is, however, encouraged as long as there is no 
conflict between IASs and national needs, laws and regulations (Chamisa, 2000: 272). 
Given the evidence, Doumontier and Raffournier (1998: 216) pointed out that IASs are 
deemed to be a major reference for formulating and developing new standards. Some 
developing countries (newly industrialized or newly capitalistic) have adopted IASs 
with few or no amendments for their domestic standards. Examples include Nigeria, 
Malaysia and Singapore. 
The significant reliance on foreign capital funds is a salient phenomenon in developing 
countries. Chamisa (2000: 272) indicated three sources of foreign capital funds in 
developing countries: a) government-to-government aid programmes; b) international 
organization loans from international institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF; 
c) multinational enterprises (MNEs) which include foreign investments and may 
establish subsidiaries or joint ventures. Sources b and c are essential sources of foreign 
capital in many developing countries, for example, Zimbabwe (Chamisa, 2000: 273). 
"35 percent of the total cumulative gross fixed capital formation for the plan period 
1991-1995 is foreign and 81 percent of the foreign capital is through channels (b) and 
(c)". (Zimbabwe Government 1991, cited in Chamisa, 2000: 273). In fact, foreign 
investment is favourable nowadays in developing countries because of 1) the debt 
burden and 2) the collateral benefits from such an investment, such as transfer of 
technology and managerial skills, the existence of new external markets and the 
favourable effect of such investment on the balance of payments (Chamisa, 2000: 273). 
To narrow the harmonization gap, regional cooperation is an appropriate mechanism 
which enhances the harmonization among regional countries. The African Accounting 
Council (AAC), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the North 
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American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the European Union (EU) are 
examples of regional cooperation (Hora, Tondkar and Adhikari, 1997: 4). The objectives 
of regional co-operation include: a) more free flows of goods, labour and capital; b) 
removal or reduction of trade barriers; c) harmonization of reporting requirements 
among regional countries' stock exchanges (Hora, Tondkar and Adhikari, 1997: 4). 
Hora, Tondkar and Adhikari (1997: 4) argued that among developing countries, AAC 
and ASEAN are good examples of regional countries' efforts to harmonize accounting 
standards among their members. The AAC was set up in 1979 with the aim of 
attempting harmonization among African countries. However, the authors pointed out 
that no significant progress was achieved in this respect. They ascribed the reason to the 
dominant effect of the public sector in these countries, which has little influence on 
accounting regulation. In addition, the lack of technical staff and infrequency of 
meetings among their members are some obstacles to achieving the main goal of 
harmonization (Hora, Tondkar and Adhikari, 1997: 4). 
On the other hand, ASEAN is a regional group which aims to create an economic union 
with a Free Trade Area (Hora, Tondkar and Adhikari, 1997: 4). ASEAN was established 
in 1967 and consists of seven countries: Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. The ASEAN Federation of Accountants (AFA) is an 
independent organization within ASEAN that supports harmonization of accounting 
standards among the members. AFA has encouraged the regional bodies in developing 
accounting education and training for accountants in ASEAN in order to familiarize 
them with IASs. This had a fundamental effect on national-standard-setting in most 
ASEAN countries (Hora, Tondkar and Adhikari, 1997: 4). 
In developed countries, the European Union (EU) has made the most distinct progress 
in harmonizing accounting and disclosure standards among its members (Hora, Tondkar 
213 
and Adhikari, 1997: 5; Taylor and Jones, 1999: 560). The European Commission issues 
accounting directives to enable each member country to employ flexible tools of 
standardization, along with national standards. Taylor and Jones (1999: 560) argued that 
the EU supports IASC in many ways: to provide non-voting representatives to 
participate in IASC Board discussions; the EU is a member of the IASC Consultative 
Group and helps IASC Board members in agenda projects, priorities and technical 
issues. Moreover, the European Commission has required all EU listed companies to 
prepare their consolidated financial statements according to IASs by 2005 (Street and 
Gray, 2001: 6). 
In fact, in some EU countries (e. g. France and Germany), the law allows multinational 
companies to use IAS for preparing their consolidated or group financial statements. In 
Germany, particularly, companies can apply IASs or US GAAP to satisfy the national 
requirements (Taylor and Jones, 1999: 560). 
Hora, Tondkar and Adhikari (1997: 5) explained the effective role of the EU in the 
harmonization process compared to other regional bodies as follows: 
"What distinguishes the successful EU harmonization effort from efforts 
from other regional organizations is the EU's ability to issue directives 
which are binding on member states. Pronouncements of other regional 
bodies are only recommendations. Additionally, the EU accounting 
harmonization effort is part of the encompassing EU economic integration 
programme. Therefore, it is doubtful that the success of the EU accounting 
harmonization programme, as it relates to the capital markets, can be 
duplicated by other regional groups in the near future. " 
In order to clarify the relationship between the IASC and the International Organization 
of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), the following discussion will highlight the 
coherent relationship between the two organizations. 
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3.8.1 The Relationship between IASs and IOSCO 
There is a consensus among researchers (Hora, Tondkar and Adhikari 1997; Taylor and 
Jones 1999; Chamisa 2000; Kapaya 2000; Street and Bryant 2000; Street and Gray 2001) 
that the co-operation between IASC and IOSCO has become more distinct in the capital 
markets. 
IOSCO was established in 1974 as a linking body between North and South American 
Securities regulators (Hora, Tondkar and Adhikari, 1997: 6). 
"The IOSCO general goal is to have securities regulators in member 
countries require that financial statements prepared by companies 
attempting to raise capital in those countries be in accordance with or 
reconciled to international accounting standards" (Grove and 
Bazley, 1993: 26). 
In 1984, IOSCO became an international private sector organization which aims to 
improve the regulation of stock capital markets around the world. In 1988, an agreement 
between IASC and IOSCO was set up to enable companies to be listed in any foreign 
exchange market on the basis of financial statements adopting IASs (Street, Gray and 
Bryant, 1999: 12). Thus, IASC issued Comparability of Financial Statements in 
Exposure Draft (ED) 32 in 1989. The goal of this Draft was to eliminate most of the 
accounting methods in order to enhance the credibility of IASs among the international 
capital markets (Street, Gray and Bryant, 1999: 12). 
In 1993, IOSCO accepted a list of 15 standards used by cross-border listings companies 
(Hora, Tondkar and Adhikari, 1997: 7). For instance, as regards cash flow statements 
(IAS7), IOSCO endorsed companies using the IASs to meet the requirements of foreign 
regulators for cash flow statements. Table 3.8.1.1 shows the IASs which were accepted 
by IOSCO in 1993. 
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Table 3.8.1.1: The IASs which were accepted by IOSCO in 1993. 
IAS 
NO 
Title of IAS 
2 Inventories 
7 Cash flow statements 
8 Net profit or loss for the period, fundamental errors and changes in accounting policies 
11 Construction 
16 Property, plant and equipment 
18 Revenue 
20 Accounting for government grants and disclosure of government assistance 
21 Effects of changes in foreign exchange rates 
22 Business combinations 
23 Borrowing costs 
24 Related party disclosures 
27 Consolidated financial statements and accounting for investments in subsidiaries 
28 Accounting for investment in associates 
29 Financial reporting in hyperinflationary economics 
31 Financial reporting of interests in joint ventures 
Source: Hora Tondkar and Adhikari, 1997 (pp11-12) 
Hora, Tondkar and Adhikari (1997: 7) pointed out that IOSCO and IASC agreed on a 
work programme in 1995 which led to international accounting standards representing a 
comprehensive core set of standards. The IOSCO's Technical Committee recommended 
endorsement of IASs to facilitate cross-border capital raising and listings purposes in all 
global markets. The adoption of such standards was to be completed in December 1998 
(Taylor and Jones, 1999: 560). IOSCO's Technical Committee has started to assess the 
quality of core standards in order to decide whether foreign issuers' adoption of IASs as 
an alternative to domestic standards is appropriate (Street and Bryant, 2000: 306). 
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"Upon complete of its analysis, the TOSCO Working Group will make a 
recommendation to the IOSCO Technical Committee. The Technical 
Committee will then decide whether to recommend that members of TOSCO 
permit foreign issuers to use IASs in lieu of national standards for cross- 
border offering and listing purposes " (Street and Bryant, 2000: 306). 
IOSCO has supported IASC by claiming that IASC is the main organization which is 
responsible to formulate and harmonize IASs. "The IASC is perhaps the only 
organization to claim prime responsibility for promoting international accounting 
harmonization or standardization on a world-wide basis" (Emenyonu and Gray 
1996: 271). IOSCO - as a group of stock exchange regulators around the world- has the 
ability to enforce accounting requirements among its members (Kapaya, 2000: 4). Hence, 
IASC has depended on IOSCO to support the adoption of domestic accounting 
standards that conforms to IASs. "The endorsement and continued support of IASc by 
IOSCO has been a major boost to the efforts of IASC to improve existing IASs and 
develop new IASs" (Hora, Tondkar and Adhikari, 1997: 6). IOSCO is playing a major 
role in making IASs effective by encouraging its member stock exchanges to recognize 
IASs and by advising IASC on the probable acceptability of standards (Hora, Tondkar 
and Adhikari, 1997: 6). 
Taylor and Jones (1999: 560) argued that IASs are not guaranteed to be approved by 
IOSCO. Moreover, they pointed out that there should be unanimous agreement among 
IOSCO for this approval. Therefore, if the Securities Exchange Committee (SEC) does 
not accept the standards, IOSCO will not have the ability to endorse them. SEC has 
indicated three key factors that must be accomplished for acceptance of IASs (Taylor 
and Jones, 1999: 560; Street and Bryant, 2000: 306): 
1- A core set of standards: IASs should comprise a core set of standards that constitute a 
comprehensive generally accepted basis of accounting. 
2- Comparability and transparency: the standards must be of high quality and result in 
comparability, transparency and full disclosure. 
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3- Rigorous interpretation and application: IASs should be interpreted and applied 
precisely. 
In 2000, the Technical Committee of IOSCO gave approval to 30 IASs to be applied by 
multi-national companies. Nonetheless, recent changes in some core standards (e. g. 
those related to development costs and goodwill) may not be acceptable to all IOSCO 
members. Therefore, it could be difficult to obtain unanimous agreement (Taylor and 
Jones, 1999: 560). 
3.8.2 Relevance of the IASs to Jordan 
IASs has become important for Jordanian companies after the significant changes in 
Jordanian economy. Al-Shiab (2003: 114) argues that open trade agreements such as the 
free trade agreement with EU and USA required a more professional accounting system 
in Jordan. He pointed out that IASs should be adopted by Jordanian companies for two 
reasons: 1- the accountancy profession (e. g. JACPA) is still incapable of developing 
domestic standards within a reasonable period. 2- Jordan is one of the IASC developing 
country members, which since 1988 have experienced fundamental changes in 
economic strategy and policies. Moreover, IASs implies understandable and high 
quality standards which help users of financial statements in Jordan to take their 
decisions properly. Hence, IASs adoption is one of the most essential requirements for 
responding to changes in capital markets and trade. 
Jordan-as a developing country- has not been able to develop its national standards due 
to the lack of experience and deficiencies in regulations (Suwaidan, 1997: 79; Al-Shiab, 
2003: 113). Companies Act No. 22 for 1997 mentioned that shareholding companies 
must prepare their financial statements in accordance with GAAP. However, the Law 
did not define GAAP. Moreover, the Jordanian Association of Certified Public 
Accountants (JACPA)-the only certified accounting institute in Jordan-has not 
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formulated any domestic standards or defined GAAP (Suwaidan, 1997: 79). 
Nevertheless, JACPA advised the adoption of IASs in 1990. However, JACPA did not 
have the legal power to compel any company among its members to follow IASs (Al- 
Shiab, 2003: 114). International Accounting Standards were applied in Jordan from 1998 
under The Securities Law No. (23), for the year 1997. Article (24), Chapter Six of this 
Law states: 
A) All entities subject to the Commission's monitoring shall apply International 
Accounting Standards issued by the International Accounting Standards Committee. 
B) If there is a conflict between the standards referred to in Paragraph (A) of this 
Article and legislation in force in the Kingdom, the national Legislation shall supersede. 
The Entities subject to the Commission's monitoring shall disclose such along with its 
impact on the financial lists. 
Suwaidan (1997: 79) argued that the formulation of domestic standards in Jordan was 
not supported by the JACPA. Such a notion was discussed during his interview with 
Naser Saba- the chairman of the JACPA who stated: 
"Setting national standards will isolate us from the rest of the world and 
complicate matters. Consequently, we must use IAS with a little adaptation 
to suit the needs of economic projects in Jordan. It would discourage 
foreigners from considering investing in the country" (Suwaidan, 199 7: 79). 
Given the evidence for the significant changes in the Jordanian economy, it can be said 
that 2003 was an extraordinary year for the Amman Stock Exchange, particularly, and 
for the Jordanian economy, generally. The ASE has achieved extraordinary levels of 
indicators which are considered to be the highest since the establishment of the Amman 
Financial Market in 197889. The volume of trading in stocks has increased significantly 
to reach 2.68 billion US$ for 2003, a 90% increase over the year 2002, when the volume 
89 Al-Raai Newspaper, issue 12169, January 13,2004, p15, Jordan. 
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of dealing in stocks reached 1.41 billion US$. In addition, the market value for the 
stocks rose to 11 billion US$ in 2003 compared to 7 billion US$ in 2002, an increase of 
57.6%. The intrinsic feature of these indicators is the market capitalization to Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) ratio of 116.8% for 2003. This ratio is one of the highest ratios 
in the world, which reflects the significant contribution of the ASE in the national 
economy. 90 
The Chairman of ASE, Mohammed Al Horani, attributed these superior results to the 
following factors91: 
1- the legislative and technical developments in ASE; 
2- the significant improvements in the transparency and the control of the capital 
markets, specifically, the issuing of the new Securities Law No. 67 for the year 2002; 
3- the effective role of Jordanian Securities Commission(JSC) in enhancing the control 
of ASE, disseminating information for investors, disclosing the fundamental events 
which affect stock prices and imposing stringent fines on companies which do not 
adhere to the regulations. 
3.9 Summary 
This chapter has overviewed the developments in the Jordanian economic environment, 
specifically the regulatory environment. The chapter started by exploring different 
issues about Jordan environment such as: geography and location, population, language 
and religion, state and government and history background. 
Then, the chapter moved to discuss the Jordanian economy and its positive and negative 
aspects. The economy has developed significantly, under the reign of HM King 
Abdullah II, from 1999 when Jordan has undertook a comprehensive programme of 
90 Al-Raai Newspaper, issue 12169, January 13,2004, p15, Jordan. 91 Al-Raai Newspaper, issue 12169, January 13,2004, p15, Jordan. 
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economic reform, supported by the IMF and the World Bank. This programme has 
opened Jordan to the world and various agreements with USA and EU have been signed 
in order to develop the Jordanian economy. In addition, the investment environment in 
Jordan has been developed through the Investment Law of 2003, which established JIB. 
JIB's role is to market the Jordan environment internationally and hence attract more 
investments to Jordan. Moreover, the incentives for investments in Jordan have attracted 
a variety of investors and hence Jordan has signed a number of investment agreements 
with different countries as shown in Table 3.4.2. 
Furthermore, the privatization programme was discussed in this chapter. The objectives 
of this programme and the privatization transactions (Table 3.5.1) are shown in this 
chapter. 
After that, the chapter linked the previous achievements in Jordans' economy to the 
requirements of a stable regulatory environment. Thus, regulations which affect the 
disclosure requirements in Jordan were explained. The 1964 Companies Act is 
considered to be the first legislation regarding companies in Jordan. The Companies Act 
1964 and 1989 did not mention any specific requirements regards disclosure of financial 
statements. The Companies Act 1997 covered a range of different issues related to 
disclosure requirements, specifically requiring that financial statements should be 
prepared according to IASs. However, it did not mention which items Jordanian 
shareholding companies should disclose and hence the disclosure requirements were 
still limited by this Law. 
The Income Tax Law mentioned limited disclosure requirements, specifically as regards 
asset valuation methods and income measurement. Similarly, the Audit Law had limited 
effect on the disclosure requirements in Jordan. However, the Audit Law 2003 set out 
the role of JACPA and its authorities as regards imposing IASs and auditing standards. 
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The Securities Law 1997 was a turning point and qualitative leap for the Jordanian 
capital market. The most important features of this Law were: 
1- The establishment of ASE. 
2- DDAAS, which is considered to be, beside IASs, the vehicle of disclosure 
requirements in Jordan. 
3- The adoption of IASs in 1998. 
Thus, it could be said that the Securities Law 1997 was the first source for mandatory 
disclosure in Jordan by imposing disclosure requirements (DDAAS and IASs). 
Furthermore, the Securities Law 2002 has similar disclosure requirements to those laid 
down in 1997. A few amendments were made in the new Law, such as identifying the 
insiders who have access to the information before others in the company. 
In addition, the new Law has extended the tasks and authorities of the Audit Committee 
(AC). However, there are no major differences, as regards the disclosure requirements, 
between the Securities Law 1997 and the Securities Law 2002. 
Then, the chapter illustrated the impact of the regulatory bodies in Jordan on disclosure 
level. The development of AFM and its separation into three parts: ASE, JSC and SDC, 
were explained in detail. 
A variety of issues were discussed related to ASE: its establishment, its objectives, its 
management and organization structure, its development (i. e. legislative structure and 
the trading system) and the significant achievements of ASE as shown in Tables 
3.7.1.1.1 and 3.7.1.1.2. 
AS regards JSC, the regulatory body of AFM, its objectives and its organization 
structure were explained. In addition, the role of JSC in issuing different laws (e. g. 
DDAAS, the Instructions for Licensing and Registration of Financial Services, Mutual 
Fund Investments, Regulations for Securities Commissions Fees and Margin Finance 
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Instructions) was discussed. It was shown that JSC plays a significant supervisory role 
by observing violations and ensuring that companies comply with the regulations. 
The relationship between JSC and IOSCO and finally the future plans for JSC were 
discussed. 
Moving to SDC, the objectives, the organization structure, the development and stages 
of achievements and the future plans are different issues related to SDC, explained in 
this chapter. 
The role of JACPA was discussed in this chapter. The Securities Law 1997 and the 
Securities Law 2002 have extended the role and responsibility of JACPA. In addition, 
these regulations indicated the JACPA objectives, its responsibilities and authorities, its 
organizational structure, and its financial resources. 
Finally, the chapter discussed the other vehicle of the mandatory disclosure in Jordan, 
IASs. The developments of IASC, the IASB objectives, the IASB groups, IASs 
adoption in developed and developing countries, harmonization, the relationship 
between IASC and IOSCO and the relevance of IASs to Jordan environment, are all 
major aspects discussed in this chapter. 
It should be noted that the regulatory environment in Jordan was discussed in depth, 
during the researcher's interviews with regulators, auditors and financial analysts. The 
role of regulatory bodies such as JSC, ASE and JACPA is therefore explained further in 
the interview analysis, as are IASs and their effect on the level of disclosure. Chapter 
Eight of this study will discuss such issues. 
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Chapter Four 
Research Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter will present the major research methods and methodology which will be 
followed in achieving the research objectives discussed in Chapter Two. Quantitative 
and qualitative methods will be discussed and the triangulation (mixed methods) 
approach will be identified as the one used in this study. Collis and Hussey (2003: 55) 
defined methodology as a comprehensive approach which starts from developing the 
theoretical framework and ends with collection and analysis of data. 
Moreover, the research hypotheses will be presented concerning the association 
between aggregate disclosure (the dependent variable) and a number of company 
characteristics (the independent variables). In addition, the approach used in order to 
measure the degree of compliance with mandatory disclosure will be described. The 
interview approach will be discussed and finally, the sample selection and the collection 
of information will be described. 
4.2 Quantitative and Qualitative Methodology 
Quantitative research is concerned with numbers and shows how the variables are 
organized, measured and analysed (Punch, 1998: 59). On the other hand, qualitative 
research is concerned with words, coding and categorizing the main themes in order to 
construct generalizations or theories (Punch, 1998: 61). Neuman (2006: 149) pointed out 
that quantitative researchers adopt a deductive approach, which involves a well-planned 
approach to the research design, measurement and sampling before collecting and 
analysing the data. In contrast, qualitative researchers adopt an inductive approach, 
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characterized by concern for the richness, texture and feeling of the data in order to 
construct generalizations or theories from these data (Neuman, 2006: 149). 
Therefore, there are fundamental philosophical differences between quantitative and 
qualitative research. One of the differences between the two approaches is related to the 
nature of the data (Neuman, 2006: 151). Quantitative data are hard and formed in 
numbers and differ from the soft data, which is in the form of words, impressions, 
symbols and photos, in qualitative data. 
Another difference is related to the sample size. In quantitative research, samples are 
larger than in qualitative research and generalization through sampling to the sampling 
frame and population is essential in quantitative research (Punch, 1998: 242). In 
qualitative research, theoretical generalization is used. 
Another important difference is related to the type of the problem presented in the 
research (Creswell, 2003: 74). In quantitative research, the research problem is 
addressed in terms of factors which affect the results and enable the researcher to 
identify the variables which explain the problem. "Researchers sometimes advance 
theory to test, and they will incorporate substantial reviews of the literature to identify 
research questions that need to be answered" (Creswell, 2003: 76). Meanwhile, the 
research problem in qualitative research is described by exploring a concept or 
phenomenon, about which relevant variables and theories are often unknown (Creswell, 
2003: 75). 
Neuman (2006: 151) argued that both types of research adopt different assumptions 
about social science. Quantitative researchers depend on the positivistic approach, 
which indicates following an apparent linear research path under the reconstructed logic 
of research. In addition, hypotheses and variables are identified in quantitative research. 
"Quantitative researchers emphasize precisely measuring variables and testing 
hypotheses that are linked to general causal explanations" (Neuman, 2006: 151). On the 
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other hand, qualitative researchers depend on interpretive or critical social sciences, 
where the research follows a largely non-linear path using practical logic and 
emphasises cases and contexts (Neuman, 2006: 151). 
Finally, the design and analysis of both types of research are different. Quantitative 
research has well developed methods of analysis (Punch, 1998: 242). These methods are 
more formalized, more unidimensional and less variable than qualitative methods. Thus, 
this type of research is more replicable than qualitative methods (Punch, 1998: 242). On 
the other hand, qualitative research structure is less rigid than quantitative research and 
the methods are less formalized. In addition, qualitative research has more dimensions 
than quantitative research. "They are also more-multi dimensional, more diverse and 
less replicable. It therefore has greater flexibility" (Punch, 1998: 243). 
The debate concerning quantitative versus qualitative methods has been a significant 
topic in social science fields for some time (Kvale, 1996: 68). Neuman (2006: 177) 
argues that the distinction between the two methods is overdrawn and expresses a rigid 
dichotomy. Supporters of one method often pre judge the other approach according to 
the assumptions and standards of their own approach. However in Neuman's (2006: 177) 
view the prudent researcher analyses and appreciates each style on its own terms and 
identifies the strengths and weakness of each approach. Neuman (2006: 177) commented, 
"The ultimate goal of developing a better understanding and explanation of the social 
world comes from an appreciation of what each has to offer". 
Indeed, Kvale (1996: 69) argued that the whole research process indicates an interaction 
between quantitative and qualitative methods. For example, in research into the impact 
of television, both types of research could be used in order to predict the effect of 
television series. Linguistic and narrative analyses of the plot (qualitative methods) and 
statistical analysis of viewer frequency (quantitative methods) could be employed 
(Kvale, 1996: 69). 
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Therefore, it could be concluded that one method is not sufficient for the whole research 
process. 
"We can not find out everything we might want to know using only one 
approach, and we can often increase the scope, depth and power of 
research by combining the two approaches" (Punch, 1998: 243). 
It should be noted that the decision to choose qualitative or quantitative methods or both 
depends on the researcher's assumptions and objectives (Collis and Hussey, 2003: 60). 
In this research, the first, second and third objectives are related to disclosure practice, 
its relationship with company characteristics and the effect of regulations on the 
disclosure level in Jordan. Thus, quantitative methods are employed in order to achieve 
these objectives. The fourth objective of the study is related to over viewing the related 
parties' (i. e. regulators, auditors and financial analysts) perspectives concerning the 
quantitative results and their views about disclosure issue in Jordan. Hence, qualitative 
methods (interviews) are employed. 
Before discussing the research assumptions and objectives and their linkage with the 
research methodology in detail, the researcher will discuss the triangulation approach 
(mixed methodology) in the following section. 
4.3 Triangulation (Mixed Methodology): 
Morse (1991: 120) defined methodological triangulation as "the use of at least two 
methods, usually qualitative and quantitative, to address the same research problem". 
The first use of methodological triangulation is connected with the validity of 
measurement in structured quantitative data (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003: 43). 
Triangulation can be used to overcome the possible bias and deficiencies of a single- 
method approach (Collis and Hussey, 2003: 78). The value of triangulation arises from 
the ability to provide a comprehensive and fuller picture of the research problem 
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(Mason, 2006: 10). Moreover, triangulation could improve the research methods in order 
to explore new aspects of the study. 
"Mixing methods therefore offers enormous potential for exploring new 
dimensions of experience in social life, and intersections between these. It 
can encourage researchers to see differently, or think `outside the box', if 
they are willing to approach research problems with an innovative and 
creative palette of methods of data generation" (Mason, 2006: 13). 
Jick (1979: 610) argued that triangulation has vital strengths. It supports productive 
research, as qualitative and quantitative methods are enhanced by being used at the 
same time in a complementary way (Jick, 1979: 610). On the other hand, triangulation 
has some weaknesses. Replication is a difficult task and even impossible in mixed 
methodology (Jick, 1979: 609). In addition, the research must be carefully designed in 
order to apply triangulation. Indeed, "if the research is not clearly focused theoretically 
or conceptually, all the methods in the world will not produce a satisfactory outcome" 
(Jick, 1979: 609). 
Thus, one could argue whether both methods (qualitative and quantitative) should be 
viewed as equally relevant to the research problem or whether one method could be 
stronger or more appropriate than the other in a particular context. This requires 
justification, or the objective of triangulation will be inappropriate (Jick, 1979: 609). 
In this research, the quantitative method is the primary method of research, since it 
achieves the first three objectives of the study, enabling data to be collected and 
analysed, and conclusions drawn in order to compare the results with previous research. 
Qualitative methods (interviews) are employed in order to provide a more 
comprehensive perspective and understanding about the research problem. "Even if you 
have adopted a positivistic approach, you may have collected qualitative data in order to 
provide richness and give insight to the numerical data" (Collis and Hussey, 2003: 254). 
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Moreover, Miles and Huberman (1994: 41) commented on the role of qualitative data on 
helping the quantitative side as follows 
"During analysis they can help by validating, interpreting, classifying and 
illustrating quantitative findings, as well as through strengthening and 
revising theory ". 
The justifications for using a mixed approach in this study will be discussed further in 
the next section. 
Mixing quantitative and qualitative methods (methodological triangulation) provides a 
fuller and more comprehensive picture about the study (Neuman, 2006: 150). This type 
of triangulation will be used in this study. The next section will explain the various 
designs of methodological triangulation. 
4.4 Triangulation Designs 
There are two designs of triangulation: simultaneous and sequential triangulation 
(Morse, 1991: 120). Simultaneous triangulation involves using quantitative and 
qualitative methods at the same time (or in parallel). The interaction between the dataset 
in both methods during the data collection is limited. However, the results complement 
one another at the end of study (Morse, 1991: 120). 
Alternatively, sequential triangulation is employing one method (quantitative or 
qualitative) first, and then the other later. 
"The results of one method are essential for planning the next method. The 
qualitative method is completed before the quantitative method is 
implemented or vice versa" (Morse, 1991: 120). 
The key issue in methodological triangulation is the theoretical drive. The theoretical 
drive could be inductive (for discovery) or deductive (for testing) (Tashakkori and 
Teddlie, 2003: 196). In the inductive theoretical drive, the researcher is discovering the 
nature and the characteristics of the research problem, and theories are developed from 
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the research. Hence, the primary research design is qualitative. On the other hand, in the 
deductive theoretical drive, the researcher is testing theories or hypotheses in order to 
determine relationships or make comparisons. Thus, the primary research design is 
quantitative (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2003: 196). Furthermore, Morse (1991: 120) 
pointed out that the first step in triangulation is to determine whether the problem is 
mainly quantitative or qualitative. 
In this study, the primary research problem is quantitative, since the framework of the 
study is built from the literature on disclosure literature. In addition, the aggregate 
disclosure is measured using a quantitative scale, a disclosure index. Moreover, 
different hypotheses will be developed in order to test the relationship between 
aggregate disclosure and company characteristics. Statistical tests will be used in order 
to examine the major research problem. 
"If a research problem is primarily quantitative.... the researcher can 
locate substantial and relevant literature on the topic, create a theoretical 
framework, and identify testable hypothesis. In this case, the research 
design is comparative or correlational or experimental or quasi- 
experimental" (Morse, 1991: 120) 
Four designs of methodological triangulation could be employed according to the 
theoretical drive (inductive or deductive). The next table illustrates these designs. 
Table 4.4.1: Methodological Triangulation Designs 
Approach Type Purpose 
QUAL + quan Simultaneous Enrich description of sample 
QUAL -+ quan Sequential 
Test emerging Ho; determine distribution 
of phenomena in population 
QUAN + qual. Simultaneous 
To describe part of phenomena that can not 
be quantified 
QUAN--> qual. Sequential To examine unexpected results 
Source: Morse (1991: 122) 
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1- QUAL + quan (inductive simultaneous): when a qualitative method is used 
simultaneously with quantitative method in inductive theoretical design, qualitative 
methods are used to develop theory and quantitative methods complement this theory. 
(Morse, 1991: 121). Tashakkori and Teddlie (2003: 202) argued that this design is used 
when some part of the phenomenon can be measured and this measurement supports the 
qualitative description. 
2- QUAL -+ quan (inductive sequential): this design employs qualitative and 
quantitative methods sequentially in inductive theoretical design. The phenomenon is 
developed using a qualitative foundation, and then the quantitative data is used to assist 
the interpretation of qualitative results (Creswell, 2003: 215). 
3- QUAN + qual (deductive simultaneous): a deductive theoretical design is carried out 
using both quantitative and qualitative methods simultaneously. In this design, a 
theoretical framework is constructed and quantitative methods are employed. 
Qualitative methods could be used as complementary methods (Morse, 1991: 121). 
4- QUAN -> qual (deductive sequential): this deductive design uses quantitative 
methods first, followed by qualitative methods. "When following the completion of the 
quantitative step, a qualitative method is used to examine outliers or to explore 
unexpected findings" (Morse, 1991: 121). 
The fourth design (QUAN -> qual (deductive sequential)) is employed in this study. 
The design is referred to as a sequential explanatory design (Creswell, 2003: 215; 
Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2003: 227). This design is depicted in the following chart: 
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Figure 4.4.1: Sequential explanatory design flowchart 
QUAN qual 
QUAN data collection -> QUAN data analysis -* Qual data collection -+ Qual data analysis 
-* Interpretation of entire analysis 
Source: Creswell, 2003: 213 
The sequential explanatory design is the most straightforward of the designs (Creswell, 
2003: 215). In summary, it involves collecting and analysing quantitative data then 
collecting and analysing qualitative data. Both methods are integrated when interpreting 
the results of the study (Creswell, 2003: 215). The major aim of this design is to employ 
qualitative methods as an assistant tool to the quantitative methods, while explaining the 
results. 
"The purpose of sequential explanatory design typically is to use qualitative 
results to assist in explaining and interpreting the findings of a primary 
quantitative study. It can be especially useful when unexpected results arise 
from a quantitative study. In this case, the qualitative data collection that 
follows can be used to examine these surprising results in more details" 
(Creswell, 2003: 215). 
The main strengths of this design arise from its simplicity and clarity. It is 
straightforward and easy to interpret, the steps to follow are clear, with separate stages 
and finally the design feature is simple to describe and report (Creswell, 2003: 215). 
Moreover, Tashakkori and Teddlie (2003: 227) pointed out that the straightforward 
framework of this design could be suitable for predominantly quantitative researchers as 
it can provide an effective introduction to qualitative research methods to researchers 
for who are unfamiliar with these methods. 
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A sequential explanatory design is employed in this study. Quantitative data collection 
and analysis will be used first to measure the disclosure level, analyse the relationship 
between disclosure and company characteristics and compare between disclosure level 
before and after the imposition of significant regulation. Thus, quantitative methods are 
used by constructing a disclosure index, developing and testing hypotheses and using 
the SPSS statistical computer program in order to present and interpret results. After 
that, qualitative data collection and analysis will be used. Interviews with different 
related parties (regulators, auditors and financial analysts) will be analysed using a 
general analytical approach. The results of these interviews will enhance and explain the 
findings of the quantitative approach. Therefore, the sequential explanatory design will 
provide a comprehensive understanding concerning disclosure issue in Jordan. 
This is the first time -as far as the researcher is aware- that this kind of design has been 
used for disclosure studies in Jordan. The issue of disclosure was discussed in Jordan in 
previous research (e. g. Al-Issa, 1988, Suwaidan, 1997 and Al-Shiab, 2003) but none of 
these studies combined both quantitative and qualitative methods. The focus was on 
quantitative methods and interviews were not used in these studies. Hence, this study 
will provide deeper understanding of the disclosure issue in Jordan. 
Accordingly, the first part of this design, which is the primary part, is related to the 
quantitative methods used. These methods are explained in the following discussion. 
4.5 Quantitative Methods 
This section is divided into: 1- The disclosure index which includes selecting, scoring 
and weighting the items. 2- The independent variables. 3- Compliance with mandatory 
disclosure. 4- Statistical techniques. 5- Sources of information, population and sampling. 
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4.5.1 The Disclosure Index: 
"Disclosure indices are an oft applied method in accounting research, 
particularly in studies of annual reports, being used to provide a single- 
figure summary indicator either of the entire contents of reports of 
comparable organization or of particular aspects of interest covered by 
such reports (e. g. voluntary disclosure and environmental disclosure) " 
(Cog and Dixon, 2004: 79). 
Hope (2003: 227) stated that the term disclosure refers to any piece of information 
released by a particular company. Financial disclosure is a complex concept that cannot 
be measured directly. Suwaidan (1997: 94) reported that different users depend on 
various source of information for decision making. Therefore, the importance of 
disclosure is not the same for each type of user. 
"Extent of financial disclosure is more a concept, subject to different 
interpretations, than it is a measurable variable. Differing interpretations 
would include differing sources of financial disclosure. Further, even if 
there existed a consensus of opinion as to the source of financial disclosure, 
the means by which to measure the extent thereof would vary. Because 
extent of financial disclosure cannot be directly measured, another measure 
served as a proxy" (Malone, Fries and Jones, 1993: 58). 
Hossain, Perera and Rahman (1995: 76) pointed out that an index of disclosure can be 
used as a proxy to highlight the extent of information disclosed by firms. The disclosure 
index is an appropriate tool to explore the nature (quality) and the extent (quantity) of 
disclosure. Marston and Shrives (1991: 195) stated that a disclosure index has various 
functions and purposes. It could be used to determine the extent of disclosure among 
different companies. In addition, it could be used to show the compliance with 
regulations (mandatory and voluntary) or it can be employed to measure the level of 
voluntary disclosure. Moreover, an index can include both mandatory and voluntary 
items, according to the purpose of the study. 
For the purpose of this study, a disclosure index was developed based upon prior 
research to test the relationship between the aggregate disclosure and company 
234 
characteristics. In this section, five steps will be discussed: selecting the items (the 
disclosure list), the relevance of IASs to the disclosure index, the disclosure items in the 
index, scoring and weighting the items and reliability and validity of the disclosure 
index. 
4.5.1.1 Disclosure Items 
There is a consensus that the number of possible disclosure items is very large. Wallace 
and Naser (1995: 328) showed that the disclosure index checklist items have varied from 
one researcher to another. Annual reports contain various information: quantitative and 
qualitative, financial and non-financial. The determining factor in selecting the number 
of items is the groups of users of the disclosure (Wallace, 1988: 353) For instance, 
financial analysts are interested in such information related to stock prices and earnings. 
Meanwhile, managers' concern may be more focused on profitability and company 
performance. Some researchers have constructed disclosure indexes based on the needs 
of a certain user group, for example, financial analysts (Buzby 1975; Chow and Boren 
1987; Malone, Fries and Jones 1993). 
Other researchers, since their studies were not directed to a specific user group, 
developed their disclosure index to enable a variety of user groups to take decisions 
(e. g. Al-Issa 1988; Hossain, Tan and Adams 1994; Hossain, Perera and Rahman 1995; 
Al-Mulhem 1997; Suwaidan 1997; Abd-Elsalam 1999; Haniffa and Cooke 2002). 
Since this study is not directed to a specific user group, an unweighted index is 
considered to be preferable (see next section). In addition, the information desired by all 
user groups may not be possible to identify, since each group has different needs of 
information. Hence, a scoring sheet of all possible items was developed. 
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The aggregate disclosure index includes two primary sources of information, mandatory 
and voluntary disclosure items. Such a comprehensive index was constructed based on 
the following: 
1- The items required by regulations and enactments in Jordan, specifically those 
mentioned in The Directives of Disclosure and Auditing and Accounting Standards No 
(1) for 1998 which were published in the Official Gazette on 16`h April 1998, and 
came into effect on 1" September 1998. In addition, the Company Act, 1989; the Audit 
Law, 1985; the Tax Law, 1985; the Temporary Securities Law No. 23,1997 and Stock 
Exchange requirements and International Accounting Standards (IASs). 
2- A review of disclosure literature to identify items relevant to this study (Buzby 1975; 
Firth 1979; Chow and Boren 1987; Wallace 1988; Cooke 1989; Tie, Au-Yeung, Kwok 
and Lau 1990; Cooke 1992; Adhikari and Tondkar 1992; Hossain, Tan and Adams 1994; 
Ahmed and Nicholls 1994; Wallace, Naser and Mora 1994; Raffournier 1995; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995; Botosan 1997; Inchausti 1997; Owusu-Ansah 1998; Abd- 
Elsalam 1999; Depoers 2000; Chau and Gray 2001; Robb, Single and Zarkeski 2001; 
Haniffa and Cooke 2002; Botosan and Plumlee 2002; Hail 2002; Kees and Cooke 
2002; Hope 2003; Naser and Nuseibeh 2003; Khanna, Palepu and Srinvasan 2004; 
Yang and Chow 2004), with a focus on the studies which investigated financial 
disclosure in Jordan (Al-Issa 1988; Suwaidan 1997; Al-Shiab 2003). 
3- Items included in the annual reports issued by Jordanian companies listed in the 
Amman Financial Market (AFM) which contain, besides the financial statements, 
various quantitative and qualitative information. 
Marston and Shrives (1991: 203) pointed out that using an existing index has a benefit as 
a direct comparison with previous studies can be made. They also stated: 
236 
The index developed for this study drew on the recent annual reports for Jordanian 
corporations listed in Amman Stock Exchange. Al-Issa (1988) and Suwaidan's (1997) 
indices encompassed voluntary information, since they claimed that the nature of 
disclosure was voluntary, due to the lack of regulations. However, those studies were 
conducted before changes in the Jordanian economic and regulatory environment. The 
government policies have changed to increase the role of the private sector in long-term 
development. Furthermore, the new regulations were expected to improve the quality 
and the quantity of disclosure, compared with the low levels reported in previous 
research in Jordan (Al-Issa 1988 and Suwaidan 1997). 
Al-Shiab (2003) explored the nature of disclosure in compliance with International 
Accounting Standards (IASs) in the annual reports for Jordanian industrial corporations 
over the period 1995-2002. He discovered the compliance with IASs was higher for the 
post- action period (1998-2000) than the pre- action period (1995-1998). He ascribed 
this result to macroeconomic factors which could affect the extent of disclosure in 
compliance with IASs. However, he described this change as a drift upwards, rather 
than the expected jump. "Overall, the extent of disclosure is quite low over not only pre 
but also post the mandatory action, of adopting the IAS" (Al-Shiab, 2003: 381). 
Therefore disclosure in Jordan today is not only voluntary; mandatory disclosure has 
become more significant. It should be noted that Al-Issa, Suwaidan and Al-Shiab's 
indices were major sources used for constructing the index used in this study, since they 
provide a variety of information about Jordanian corporations. In addition, this study 
focuses on the aggregate disclosure in Jordan (voluntary and mandatory), while 
Suwaidan's and Al-Issa's studies explored the nature of voluntary disclosure in Jordan 
and the scope of Al-Shiab study's was the mandatory disclosure related to adoption of 
IASs. 
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There are two major vehicles for mandatory disclosure in Jordan: The Securities Law 
No. 23 for the year 1997, and IASs. Both vehicles were discussed in detail in Chapter 
Three. The next section will discuss and highlight the relevance of the IASs for the 
disclosure index in this study. 
4.5.1.2 The relevance of the IASs for the disclosure index: 
In Egypt, Abd-Elsalam's index (1999,295-309) was constructed based on the 
requirements of three major regulations: The Companies Act, The Capital Market Law 
and International Accounting Standards. The list of items was divided into nine-sub lists. 
She (1997: 4) focused on testing the extent of disclosure after adopting new regulations 
(such as IASs) in Egypt. Therefore, the nature of her study was focused solely towards 
mandatory disclosure. 
In Jordan, Al-Shiab's index was constructed based on the requirements of IASs for the 
period between 1995-2000 (Al-Shiab, 2003: 198). He tested the compliance with IASs 
for Jordanian Industrial Companies (JIS). For the purpose of developing his index, he 
analysed the IASs which are relevant to JIC for six years. Eighteen applicable standards 
were considered for the first three years and 21 for the last three years. 
Therefore, both studies, Abd-Elsalam's (1999) and Al-Shiab's (2003), focused on 
compliance with IASs by companies. Thus, these studies can be considered to be 
mandatory disclosure studies. However, Abd-Elsalam's study was more comprehensive, 
since it covered all the regulations with which listed companies must comply. These 
regulations are: The Companies Act (CA), The Capital Market Law (CML) and IASs 
(Abd-Elsalam, 1999: 134). In contrast, Al-Shiab's study was concerned with exploring 
the extent of disclosure in compliance with all related and relevant IASs. Moreover, the 
construction of indexes in the two studies was different. Abd-Elsalam (1999: 138) 
employed nine sub-indices which covered the entire contents of the annual reports: 
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financial statements, explanatory notes and the board of directors reports. The overall 
mandatory disclosure list included 241 items (Abd-Elsalam, 1999: 13 8). 
On the other hand, Al-Shiab's index was developed by creating questions for each 
standard separately (Al-Shiab, 2003: 211). He did not divide his disclosure list into sub- 
groups as did Abd-Elsalam. Indeed, the scope of his study was to examine compliance 
with IASs disclosure requirements. Therefore, any other source for mandatory 
disclosure in Jordan (e. g. SEC Law No. 23,1997) was excluded. 
This study is differentiated from both the previous studies (Abd-Elsalam 1999, Egypt; 
Al-Shiab 2003, Jordan) by testing the extent of aggregate disclosure (mandatory and 
voluntary) in Jordan. Although Al-Shiab's study highlighted compliance with IASs for 
the years 1995-2000, the IASs have been mandatory in Jordan since the year 199892. 
Thus, before 1998, compliance with IASs by Jordanian companies was voluntary, 
because there was no legislation to compel such compliance. In addition, Al-Shiab 
(2003: 381) concluded that the overall disclosure was low for both periods (pre and post 
mandatory action). In this regard, Al-Shiab (2003: 306) supported Ahmed and Nicholls' 
(1994: 62) view, that there are incentives for voluntary disclosure in developing 
countries and many companies will not comply with mandatory requirements, due to the 
lack of enforcement and the inadequacy of the regulatory framework. Therefore, this 
study will explore the extent of voluntary and mandatory disclosure in Jordan, as it was 
reported that the level of mandatory disclosure was low at the time of Al-Shiab's study. 
In addition, Al-Shiab's focus was on compliance with IASs, which is only part of 
mandatory disclosure requirements in Jordan, while this study is concerned with all the 
mandatory requirements in Jordan (basically JSC requirements and IASs). In general, 
this study is an attempt to provide a comprehensive view of the extent of aggregate 
92 Securities Law No. 23,1997, Article 24, Chapter Six 
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disclosure (voluntary and mandatory) in Jordan. Moreover, as regards compliance with 
mandatory disclosure, the study will examine the extent of mandatory disclosure before 
and after the new requirements (e. g. SEC Law No. 23,1997) for two periods: 1996 and 
2003. 
In this study, the disclosure index covered both mandatory and voluntary items. For 
mandatory items, IASs for the year 2003 and SEC Law No-23 for the year 1997 were 
the main sources. In addition, Al-Shiab's index (2003) and Abd-Elsalam's index (1999), 
which covered IASs, were used to support the mandatory index. Other regulations in 
Jordan which include compulsory disclosure were used. Both voluntary and mandatory 
items are supported by previous studies (as shown in the study's index). 
It should be noted, regarding construction of the disclosure index, that a pilot test of a 
sample of the annual reports for the year 2003 for Jordanian companies was conducted. 
Suwaidan (1997: 102) established a preliminary index composed of 86 items of 
information. He tested a sample of 31 Jordanian annual reports for 1992 and 1993 to 
ensure the relevance of his index. 
"This step also served the purpose of refining the index and determining the 
potential difficulties involved in the applicability and suitability of certain 
items to companies operating in different sectors of the economy 
(manufacturing, service, insurance and banks) " (Suwaidan, 1997: 101). 
The final list of Suwaidan's index contained 75 items that covered various types of 
information. 
Another reason for the importance of the pilot survey is related to the mandatory items, 
specifically IASs items. Many IASs relate to accounting practices which are uncommon 
among Jordanian companies, due to the nature of their activities and their accounting 
systems. In addition, some regulations are inconsistent with these standards. For 
example, IAS 26: Accounting and Reporting by Retirement benefit plans is not applied 
by Jordanian companies since accountants are not familiar with this standard and there 
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is a lack of regulations about this issue. A similar situation exists in relation to many 
standards, since Jordan is a developing country and the accounting systems and 
regulations are not as sophisticated as in developed countries (e. g. United States, United 
Kingdom). 
Therefore, Al- Shiab (2003: 199) excluded the following IASs from his study: 
1- IAS 22 and IAS 30 because they are related to consolidated financial statements and 
financial institutions, which were considered outside the scope of his study. 
2- Parts of IAS 7 and IAS 21 which cover consolidated financial statements and were 
considered not relevant. 
3- Parts of IAS 12 and IAS 32 which are related to deferred tax and hedging, which 
were also excluded because of their irrelevance. 
4- The following standards: IAS 14, reporting and financial information by segment; 
IAS 15, accounting responses to changing prices; IAS 17, accounting for leases; IAS 24, 
related party disclosure; IAS 26, accounting and reporting for retirement benefit plans; 
IAS 27, consolidated financial statements and accounting for investment in subsidiaries; 
IAS 28, accounting for investment in associates; IAS 29, financial reporting in 
hyperinflationary economics; IAS 31, financial reporting in joint ventures; and IAS 34, 
interim financial reporting, were not included because they do not apply to JIC. 
Abd-Elsalam (1999: 135) did not include any of the following IASs since they were not 
relevant for the following reasons: 
1- JAS 1 and IAS 13: disclosure requirements duplicated in other IASs. 
2- IAS 14 and IAS 15: considerable discretion given to companies in application. 
3- JAS 17, IAS 20, IAS 22, IAS 26, IAS 27, IAS 29, IAS 30 and IAS 31: not common 
accounting practices in the companies surveyed. 
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In this study, the researcher has constructed the disclosure index following the methods 
used by previous researchers (e. g. Cooke 1989a; Suwaidan 1997; Al-Mulhem 1997; 
Abd-Elsalam 1999 and Al-Shiab 2003) in developing such an index (i. e. exploring the 
previous empirical studies, reviewing annual reports and relevant regulations and 
conducting a pilot study). 
Appendix 4.5.1.2.1 indicates the applicability of IASs with respect to the selected 
sample, (discussed later in this Chapter), industrial and service companies. Each IAS is 
classed as applicable, partly applicable or not applicable for the purposes of this study. 
It can be noted from Appendix 4.5.1.2.1 that not all IASs are applicable in Jordan. The 
major reason for this is that these standards were developed under developed countries' 
experience and knowledge, which is different from that of developing countries, such as 
Jordan (Al-Shiab, 2003: 112). In addition, the accounting systems and the relevant 
regulations are not as well-organized in developing countries as in developed countries. 
In Jordan, companies are not familiar with some standards, e. g. JASs: 14,17,26 and 31. 
The accounting systems are not as sophisticated as in developed countries (e. g. the 
United States and United Kingdom). Therefore, these standards cannot be applied in 
this study, since they are irrelevant to the Jordanian environment. Other standards, IASs: 
15,29,30,34 and 41 are also outside the scope of this study because they can be 
applied only in particular circumstances. For example, IAS 15 and IAS 29 are 
concerned with price shape accounting, which is not applicable in Jordan, since the 
inflation rate did not exceed 10% for the period 1991-2000 (Al-Shiab, 2003: 205), and it 
was less than 3% for the period 2001-2003 93 . Furthermore, some standards are 
appropriate for a specific field or sector, such as IAS 30 which focuses on banks and 
93 Jordanian Department of Statistics: wvww. dos. gov. jo [Accessed: 25/08/2006] 
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financial institutions. This standard is beyond the scope of this study, since the focus in 
this study is upon manufacturing and service companies. 
Standards which are partly applicable in this study are: IASs 12,19,22,27,28 and 39. 
These are applied in Jordan but with some issues excluded. For instance, IAS 12, which 
deals with income taxes, is not completely applicable in Jordan, since the Tax Law No 
25 for the year 2001 sets out the accounting requirements imposed on companies for tax 
purposes. A similar situation applies to IAS 19, as The Jordanian Labour Law for the 
year 1996 and The Social Guarantee Corporation Law No. 19 for the year 2001 
governing accounting for employee benefit plans. 
Thus, 19 standards were applicable in Jordan for the year 2003. It is reasonable to 
expect that these standards were applicable in general terms, not necessarily in full for 
each standard. The reason for this is that some activities are not common among 
Jordanian companies, since these companies are not classified as big companies, in the 
same sense as American or British companies. In addition, IASs have been adopted in 
Jordan for only five years before data was collected in 2003 (since 1998)94. This period 
is considered to be relatively short one for full adoption of all applicable standards, 
since accountants in Jordan require more time to be fully conversant with such 
standards. Al-Shiab (2003: 385) recommended that in order to increase the degree of 
compliance with IASs in Jordan, the accounting profession (such as JACPA) should 
enhance its monitoring and enforcement role, especially as there is support in law for 
mandating these standards. He stated (2003: 386): 
"To improve the extent of disclosure in compliance with IAS, moreover, the 
Amman Stock Exchange and JACPA should strengthen its continuing 
professional educational courses on new development. It should also 
compile a checklist incorporating all the disclosure requirements applicable 
in compliance with IAS The checklist should be updated periodically and 
whenever new disclosure requirements are promulgated by the IASB ". 
94 According to Securities Law No. 23 for the year 1997, Chapter Six, Article 24 
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In summary, the following table shows the number of IASs which are applicable, partly 
applicable and not applicable in this study. 
Table 4.5.1.2.4: IASs related to this study 
Applicable IASs 
(Standard No. ) 
Partly applicable IASs 
(Standard No. 
Not applicable IASs 
1 12 14 
2 19 15 
7 22 17 
8 27 26 
10 28 29 
11 39 30 
16 41 31 
18 34 
20 
21 
23 
24 
32 
33 
35 
36 
37 
38 
40 
19 6 9 
4.5.1.3 The Disclosure Items in the Index 
The number of items in disclosure indices varies from 14 (Wallace, Naser and Mora 
1994) to 273 (Al-Shiab 2003). The list in this study is composed of 331 items of 
information, the largest index currently employed. The list is divided into nine groups: 
general information; balance sheet information; income statement information; cash 
flow and change in equity statements, other statements supplementary information and 
notes; financial history information; ratios and other analysis; projected and 
management information; and market based information. 
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Appendix 4.5.1.3.1 shows these items distributed according to the above categories. The 
nature of disclosure, mandatory or voluntary, and support from previous studies and the 
regulations (for mandatory items only: The Securities Law No. 23 for the year 1997 
determines two sources: Directives of Disclosure and Auditing and Accounting 
Standards (DDAAS) and International Accounting Standards (IASs) are also indicated. 
The number of mandatory and voluntary items in each of the nine groups is shown in 
Table 4.5.1.3.2 
Table 4.5.1.3.2: Mandatory and voluntary items in the groups of the index 
Mandatory items Voluntary items Total 
Group NO % from part NO % from NO % from 
total part total total 
Group (1) General information 27 87.1% 4 12.9% 31 9.6% 
Group (2) Balance sheet 46 97.9% 1 2.1% 47 14.6% 
information 
Group (3) Income statement 23 95.8% 1 4.2% 24 7.4% 
information 
Group (4) Cash flow and 18 100% - - 18 5.6% 
changes in equity statements 
Group (5) Other statements, 
supplementary information and 156 99.4% 1 0.6% 157 46.1% 
notes 
Group (6) Financial history 1 14.3% 6 85.7% 7 2.1% 
information 
Group (7) Ratios and other 3 15.8% 16 84.2% 19 5.9% 
analysis 
Group (8) Projected and 1 5.9% 16 94.1% 17 5.3% 
management information 
Group (9) Market based 3 27.3% 8 72.7% 11 3.4% 
information 
Total 278 84.0% 53 16.0% 331 100% 
As can be seen from Table 4.5.1.3.2, mandatory items constitute 84% of the aggregate 
items. Voluntary items constitute 16%. In previous studies, the number of mandatory 
and voluntary disclosure items has varied, as shown in Table 4.5.1.3.3. 
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Table 4.5.1.3.3: Mandatory and voluntary items in previous disclosure studies 
Study 
Mandatory items Voluntary items Total 
No % No % No % 
Cooke, 1989a 77 34% 147 66% 224 100% 
Cooke, 1992 86 54% 79 46% 165 100% 
Al-Mulhem, 1997 77 47% 86 53% 163 100% 
Inchausti, 1997 30 60% 20 40% 50 100% 
The new regulations in Jordan, specifically applying International Accounting 
Standards (Article 24, The Securities Law No. 23 for the year 1997) and the major 
changes of Amman Financial Market (AFM) are the main reasons for the increased 
number of mandatory items and the decreased number of voluntary items in the 
aggregate index. Inchausti (1997: 46) reported a similar situation in Spain, arguing that 
the impact of the new regulations introduced in 1989 had improved the quality of 
annual reports since items that were previously voluntary had been made mandatory. He 
commented (1997: 49): 
"When 1989 accounts were prepared, the Law 19/1989 was still not in force, 
and the only rules for preparing annual accounts for quoted companies 
were those established by the Stock Exchange. However, for 1990 accounts, 
this Law was compulsofy. Although the General Accounting Plan was 
published in December 1990, it did not apply that year. For 1991 accounts, 
both pieces of legislation were compulsory. " 
Inchausti's index included fifty items; 30 items were compulsory and the others were 
voluntary. He added (1997: 49), "Thus in 1989,14 items of the disclosure index (28%) 
were compulsory, and in 1991 this figure increased to 30 items (60%)". 
In this study, the majority of mandatory items are in the first five groups (see Table 
4.5.1.3.2): General information (87.1%), Balance sheet information (97.9%), Income 
statement information (95.8%), Cash flow and changes in equity statements (100%), 
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other statements, supplementary information and notes (99.4%). The reason for this 
could be ascribed to the nature of International Accounting Standards, which are 
concerned with the information in the financial statements and their notes. 
The information in other groups is mainly voluntary and depends on the company's 
disclosure/ policies. Hence, the disclosure of such information is voluntary and varies 
among companies. 
The information in the index is varied in nature. General information and management 
and projected information contain mostly qualitative information. Descriptive data on 
the company's activities, strategies, plans, directors, managements, products and 
productivity are the main issues in these groups. However, some information is 
quantitative, especially related to projected information, such as cash flow forecasts. 
Other information is qualitative and quantitative (e. g. forecasts of sales and profits). 
Balance sheet, income statement cash flow and changes in equity information is 
quantitative by nature and explanatory notes about this information are given in the 
supplementary information which interprets these figures (qualitative information). 
The other groups, financial history information, ratios and other analysis, and market 
based information, comprise quantitative data in the form of figures and charts about the 
company and its relationship with the market. 
4.5.1.4 Scoring and Weighting the Items 
After establishing the disclosure index, it was necessary to decide whether or not there 
was a need to assign weights to the items by constructing a scoring sheet. Two 
approaches have been used in previous studies: the weighted and unweighted approach 
(dichotomous approach: an item is given 1 if disclosed and 0 if not disclosed) (see Table 
4.5.1.4.1). 
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Table 4.5.1.4.1: Weighted and unweighted approaches in previous studies 
Study Year Weighted approach Unweighted approach 
Buzby 1975 The weighted approach by 144 financial 
_ 
analysts 
Firth 1979 The weighted approach by 46 financial _ analysts 
Chow and 1987 The weighted approach by 106 loan _ Boren officers in 16 Banks. 
The unweighted approach 
( dichotomous approach: an 
Wallace 1988 
_ 
item scores one if it is 
disclosed and zero if it is 
not disclosed 
_ 
The unweighted approach 
Cooke 1989a dichotomous approach) 
_ 
The unweighted approach 
Cooke 1989b dichotomous approach) 
The unweighted approach 
Cooke 1992 
_ 
( dichotomous approach) 
Malone, Fries 1993 The weighted approach by 115 financial _ and Jones analysts 
Ahmed and 1994 The unweighted approach 
Nicholls _ dichotomous approach) 
ossain, Tan and 1994 The unweighted approach 
Adams _ (dichotomous approach) 
Raffournier 1995 The unweighted approach 
_ dichotomous approach) 
Hossain, Perera 
and 1995 The unweighted approach 
Rahmau _ dichotomous approach) 
Wallace and 1994 The unweighted approach 
Naser _ dichotomous approach) 
Inchausti 1997 The unweighted approach 
_ ( dichotomous approach) 
Naser 1998 The unweighted approach 
_ ( dichotomous approach) 
Owusu-Ansah 1998 The unweighted approach 
_ dichotomous approach) 
Abd-Elsalam 1999 The unweighted approach 
_ ( dichotomous approach 
Depoers 2000 The unweighted approach 
_ dichotomous approach) 
Street and Bryant 2000 The unweighted approach 
_ dichotomous approach) 
Ho and Wong 2001 The unweighted approach 
_ (dichotomous approach) 
Ferguson, Lam 2002 The unweighted approach 
and Lee ( dichotomous approach) 
Haniffa and 2002 The unweighted approach 
Cooke _ ( dichotomous approach) 
Naser, Al-Khatib 2002 The unweighted approach 
and Karbhari _ ( dichotomous approach) 
Al-Shiab 2003 The unweighted approach 
_ ( dichotomous approach ) 
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From the above table, the majority of previous researchers have employed the 
unweighted approach to assess the extent of disclosure. Regarding the weighted 
approach, Buzby (1975: 21) developed a questionnaire of items and sent it to 144 
financial analysts to determine the importance of each item using a scale of 0 to 4 (0 is 
assigned if the item is not necessary and 4 is assigned if the item is essential). His 
approach in weighting the items was to total the integer values assigned to each item 
and then divide by the total by the number of respondents for this item. 
Firth (1979: 275) weighted his items by sending the list of items to 46 financial analysts 
and asking them to weight the importance of each item using a five point scale (1 where 
the item is unimportant, 2 where the item is slightly important, 3 where the item is 
moderately important, 4 where the item is important and 5 where the item is very 
important). If the item was disclosed, then the weighted score of importance was 
calculated; if the item was not disclosed, then the company's score was zero (Firth, 
1979: 277). 
Malone, Fries and Jones (1993: 258) conducted a survey in the oil and gas sector in the 
United States. A questionnaire of 129 items was constructed and was sent to 115 
financial analysts to evaluate the importance of each item. A scale of 0-2 was used; 0 is 
the score if the item is not important, 1 if the item is of moderate importance and 2 if the 
item has a high level of importance. The mean weight was established and used if the 
particular disclosure was appropriate (Malone, Jones and Fries; 193: 260). Consequently, 
" the measure of extent of disclosure as used in this analysis, represents a firm's total 
actual disclosure score as a percentage of that firm's total possible disclosure score" 
(Malone, Jones and Fries; 1993: 260). 
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Suwaidan (1997: 111) mentioned three criticisms of the weighted approach: 
1- The weights were assigned by respondents and the context of taking decisions was 
not specified. Thus, those weights may not represent the importance of the items in 
actual decision-making. 
2- It is not objective, since some respondents tend to assign high weights to those items 
not currently disclosed by firms. 
3- Assigning the importance of each item may be misleading, because the importance of 
the item differs from company to company, industry to industry, country to country and 
time period to time period. Abd-Elsalam (1999: 152) has expressed a similar view. 
Another point to note is that the previous research (e. g. Buzby 1975 and Firth 1979) was 
directed to a specific user group, financial analysts, in order to provide them with 
appropriate information for decision-making. Wallace and Naser (1995: 331) argued that 
weights assigned by one or two user-groups indicate their perspectives, but they are 
only a proportion of financial reporting users. Thus, 
"Because as the human information processing literature (e. g. Libby 1981, 
pp 40-43) suggests, the revealed perceptions of respondents to opinion 
surveys do not often represent what the respondents actually do, it is 
possible to argue that weights derived from opinion pools may not mirror 
reality" (Wallace and Naser, 1995: 331). 
Also, Malone, Fries and Jones' (1993) research was conducted in a specific sector and 
they admitted that 
"Because of the special nature of the present study, only financial analysts 
who specialised in the analysis of oil and gas producing firms were 
sampled " (Malone, Fries and Jones; 1993: 258), 
Overall, the main justification for employing the weighted approach in the previous 
studies was the limited number of items in the disclosure index (e. g. 39 items in 
Buzby's study, 1975; 48 items in Firth's study, 1979; 24 items in Chow and Boren's 
study, 1987). In contrast, later studies which used the unweighted approach expanded 
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the disclosure lists with considerably more items (e. g. Wallace, 1988 (185 items); 
Cooke, 1989a (114 items); Cooke, 1992 (165 items); Suwaidan, 1997 (75 items); Abd- 
Elsalam, 1999 (247 items)). Hence, it was less practical and less necessary to use a 
weighted approach. 
The unweighted approach is used in this study for the following reasons: 
First, the focus of this research is directed to all user groups and not to a specific one. 
Cooke (1989a: 197) considered the unweighted approach to be an appropriate tool in 
disclosure studies. He commented: 
"Clearly one class of user will attach different weights to an item of 
disclosure than another class of user. However, the focus of this research is 
not on particular user group but rather than all users of corporate annual 
reports. An approach which tried to encapsulate the subjective weights of a 
multitude of user groups would be unwieldy, and probably futile. Thus, the 
approach here is in effect to assume that the subjective weights of user 
groups will average each other out" (Cooke, 1989a: 1997). 
Other researchers supported Cooke's proposition (Marston and Shrives 1991; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995; Owusu-Ansah 1998; Abd-Elsalam 1999; Ferguson, Lam and 
Lee 2002). 
The second reason is based on the proposition that if there is a large number of items in 
the index, both approaches would give the same results. "Prior studies exploring both 
weighted and unweighted scores report substantially identical results across methods" 
(Ferguson, Lam and Lee, 2002: 135). For example, Chow and Boren (1987: 538) found, 
using a list of 24 voluntary items, that applying the weighted or unweighted approach 
did not affect the results significantly. Indeed, they discovered a positive significant 
correlation between the weighted and unweighted index (r = 0.99, p<0.0001). 
Third, the findings of previous research in terms of the relationship between financial 
disclosure and some company characteristics showed similar results using weighted and 
unweighted indices. Robbis and Austin (1986) discovered that factors which were found 
to be associated with the unweighted index, were also associated with the weighted 
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index. Moreover, Chow and Boren (1987: 538) concluded that there was a high level of 
correlation between both indices (weighted and unweighted). 
This study adopts a disclosure model based upon the unweighted approach. A 
dichotomous method is applied in which an item scores one if it is disclosed and zero if 
it is not disclosed. This approach has been employed in several previous studies (see 
Table 4.5.1.4.1). Thus, the total disclosure (mandatory and voluntary) (TD) score for a 
company is additive: 
n2 
. TD= 
l 
a1 i=1 
Where 
1 if the item is disclosed 
a- 
0 if the item is not disclosed 
The major assumption of this model is that each item of the disclosure index is equally 
important. This assumption is based on the fact that this study is not focused on a 
particular user group, but is intended to reflect the needs of a variety of user groups. 
The main problem which emerges here is that each item is not necessarily relevant to all 
companies. Raffournier (1995: 269) argued that some items are not disclosed by the 
company because they are not relevant to its operation. He said (1995: 269): 
"For example, it is nonsense for a pure domestic utility to break down its 
sales by geographical area. In the same way, a firm without financial leases 
will generally consider it has no need to mention anything about leasing". 
To solve this problem, it has been assumed that if a certain item is not mentioned in the 
annual report, it can be considered as not applicable. Cooke (1989: 197) noted that if an 
item (e. g. contingent liabilities) is not mentioned in the annual report of the company, 
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this means that this item is not relevant to that company in that year. On the other hand, 
if an item of the index was disclosed (for instance, leased assets) but without disclosing 
the amount, then the score of disclosure (a; ) would be zero. In order to reduce 
subjectivity, Cooke (1989a: 197) recommended that the entire annual report should be 
reviewed first to identify whether the item was applicable or not. 
In Al-Issa's (1988: 79) study, if the item was mentioned in previous studies and also was 
disclosed by at least one Jordanian firm, then it was included in the index; otherwise it 
was excluded. Owusu-Ansah (1998: 609) alleviated the subjectivity problem by 
adopting two procedures. First, he compared the figures of each item between two years, 
since the law required each public firm to disclose comparative figures for each item. 
Second, he reviewed the entire annual report twice for each company in the sample. 
"The first reading was just before each sampled annual report was scored 
to familiarities me with the circumstances of each company and to enable 
me to form an opinion as to whether an undisclosed item was, in fact, 
inapplicable to that company. The second reading, which was after an 
annual report had been scored, ensured that the scoring was consistent and 
any mistake rectified before the scores were totalled" (Owusu Ansah, 
1998: 610). 
In this research, a reading of the whole corporate annual report was undertaken. It could 
thus be inferred which items were relevant to the company and a company would not be 
penalised for non-disclosure if an item was considered to be irrelevant to its activities. 
The last step in applying the disclosure index was to calculate the overall index. The 
overall disclosure index was calculated by dividing the actual scores awarded by the 
maximum possible scores (M) appropriate for the company. Therefore, the disclosure 
index (Ij) for each firm was calculated as follows: 
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Ij = TD/nj 
where nj = number of items applicable to a company 
0 >Ij>1 
4.5.1.5: Reliability and Validity of the Disclosure Index: 
Reliability refers to the possibility of achieving similar results between two researchers 
if they employed the same index to measure financial disclosure (Marston and Shrives, 
1991: 197). Suwaidan (1997: 95) argued that because the information measured by the 
index is extracted from annual reports, there is no obstacle to repetition. However, some 
problems arise when such an index is applied by many researchers. For example, 
scoring the index and treatment of non disclosed items are major issues related to the 
reliability of the index. Such problems were discussed in the section which considered 
scoring and weighting the items together with the reasons for using the unweighted 
approach. In addition, the following steps were applied in order to improve the 
reliability of the disclosure index: 
1- Reading the annual reports twice as advocated by Owusu-Ansah's (1998: 616). The 
aim of the first reading was to familiarize the researcher with the company's activities 
and nature of the business. Hence, a judgement could be made whether the items were 
applicable to the company. The second reading was conducted after calculating the 
index score of the company. The aim of the second reading was to review the whole 
annual report in order to ensure the consistency of scoring and to avoid any mistakes 
before the score was finalized. 
2- The scoring sheet was reviewed by two Jordanian accountants, a member of the 
University of Hull staff from the Accounting and Finance Department, with expertise in 
IASs, and the researcher's first supervisor. The two Jordanian accountants performed 
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work for one of the Big Four audit firms (Saba & Co, who perform work for Deloitte). 
As a result of this revision, nine items95 were added to the disclosure index. 
3- The item is considered to be applicable for the company if it is appropriate to its 
activities. As regards mandatory items, whether the item is applicable or not can be 
judged from the regulations (i. e. The Securities Law No. 23 of 1997). However, there are 
some mandatory items (i. e. some IASs, see Chapter Three, part 3.8.2) which are not 
appropriate to the company's activities and hence these items are not applicable. As 
regards voluntary items, it is difficult to judge whether an item is applicable or not, 
since each company has the opportunity to disclose what it considers appropriate. 
Therefore, to reduce the subjectivity of these items, the researcher depended on the 
previous studies (as shown in the disclosure index) and voluntary items were considered 
appropriate unless they were not suitable for the company's activities. 
4- A pilot study was carried out after developing the disclosure index in accordance 
with the previous steps. 
"This step also served the purpose of refining the index and determining the 
potential difficulties involved in the applicability and suitability of certain 
items to companies operating in different sectors of the economy" 
(Suwaidan, 1997.101). 
Fifteen reports were selected and analysed in order to ensure that all essential disclosure 
items were covered in the disclosure index and to ensure the applicability of the items. 
Figure 4.5.1.5.1 summarizes the above-listed steps to improve the reliability of the 
disclosure index. 
95Policy of write off, amortization, and impairment of intangible assets was added. Moreover, IAS 41, 
Agriculture was judged to be applicable in Jordan, since some companies apply it and the disclosure 
index was accordingly amended by the addition of 8 items related to this standard. 
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Figure 4.5.1.5.1: Steps followed to improve reliability of the disclosure index 
Step One 
Reading the annual 
reports twice 
First reading: to become familiar 
with company's activities and to 
judge whether the item is 
applicable or not. 
Step Two 
Calculating the index score Second reading: to ensure 
consistency of the score and 
to avoid any mistakes before 
finalizing the score 
Review of the score 
sheet by four 
individuals 
Two members in the Accounting and 
Finance Department in the University 
of Hull: 
The Researcher's supervisor and a 
member of staff with expertise in IASs 
Step Three 
Applicability of 
mandatory and 
voluntary items 
Mandatory items were applicable if 
they were mentioned in the 
regulations (i. e. Securities Law, 
1997) 
Two Jordanian accountants, 
working for one of the Big Four 
audit firms (Saba & Co, who 
perform work for Deloitte). 
Voluntary items were applicable if 
they were mentioned in previous 
studies unless they are not suitable for 
the company's activities 
Step Four Pilot study: 15 annual reports 
were reviewed to ensure that all 
essential items were covered in 
the index. 
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The validity of a disclosure index is concerned with whether the researcher has achieved 
the purpose of his/her examination. In other words, the index can be considered to be 
valid if it expresses what the researcher intended (Marston and Shrives, 1991: 198). 
Four types of validity are applicable to this study (Neumann, 2006: 192-193): 
1- Face validity: considers whether the disclosure index measures the extent of 
disclosure for Jordanian companies. The disclosure index in this study is a proxy which 
can determine the extent of disclosure among different companies. This kind of validity 
will be shown later when measuring the extent of disclosure for Jordanian companies in 
Chapter Five. 
2- Content validity: considers whether the disclosure index capture all the aspects of 
disclosure in this study? In particular, this type of validity is related to the following 
questions: can the disclosure index be used to show the disclosure practices for 
Jordanian companies? Can the disclosure index be used to show compliance with 
regulations? Can the disclosure index be employed to indicate the level of compliance 
with IASs, DDAAS and IASs + DDAAS? The answers to these questions will be given 
in the next chapters of the study, particularly, Chapters Five and Seven. 
3- Criterion validity: considers whether the disclosure index used some standards or 
criterion to measure the disclosure extent accurately. There are two subtypes of this kind 
of validity: 
A- Concurrent validity: considers whether the disclosure index agrees with pre-existing 
indices, since the construction of the index items in this study depended on the items 
used in previous studies, as shown in Appendix 4.5.1.3.1. 
B- Predictive validity: considers whether the disclosure index can predict future aspects 
related to disclosure issues in Jordan. This means that the disclosure index can be 
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utilized by future studies in order to investigate different disclosure issues, such as the 
possible relationship between the extent of disclosure and the cost of capital. 
4- Construct validity: considers whether the disclosure index in this study is aggregate 
and it contains both indices: mandatory and voluntary. In addition, the disclosure index 
is divided into nine categories of disclosure (e. g. balance sheet, income statement, etc. ). 
Construct validity is judged in this study by testing the relationship between aggregate 
disclosure and its components: mandatory and voluntary, and category indices (e. g. 
balance sheet index, income statement index). The following discussion will explain 
this kind of validity. 
Hail (2002: 756) argued that it is difficult to evaluate the financial reporting process 
because it depends strongly on a person's subjective perception. He applied two criteria 
in order to assess the validity of his disclosure index (DISC): 1) testing the relationship 
between the overall company disclosure and three partial company disclosure scores: 
DISCI, the partial company disclosure score for background and non-financial 
information, DISC2, for trend analysis and management discussion and analysis, and 
DISCS for risk value based and projected information; 2) testing the association 
between the extent of overall disclosure and the company's characteristics. 
Using Pearson correlation analysis, to capture these issues, Hail (2002: 756) found: 
1) A positive relationship between the overall disclosure and its three components 
(DISC1, DISC2 and DISC3). This result, although each index may reflect different 
aspects of disclosure, reveals that overall disclosure is still well represented by the three 
indices. 
2) He discovered a positive relationship between the overall disclosure and the 
following variables: the number of analysts following a specific firm, market value of 
outstanding equity, profitability, listing status and audit firm size. No significant 
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association was found between overall disclosure and leverage. Accordingly, Hail 
(2002: 758) concluded that the validity of his index was supported by the above analysis. 
Marston and Shrives (1991: 198) argued that the validity of a disclosure index can not be 
accepted without question(s). Thus, in this research, the validity of the disclosure index 
implies the ability to measure the different variables and to achieve the research goals. 
First, is there is a relationship between aggregate disclosure and its two components: 
mandatory and voluntary disclosure and between aggregate disclosure and each 
category of disclosure (e. g. balance sheet items index, income statement items index) 
(adopting Hail's perspective)? 
To answer this question, the correlation between aggregate disclosure (AD) and its 
components, mandatory disclosure (MD) and voluntary disclosure (VD) was assessed 
using Pearson correlation analysis96 as seen in Table 4.5.1.5.1. 
Table 4.5.1.5.1: Pearson correlation results for Aggregate disclosure and its 
components Mandatory disclosure and Voluntary disclosure 
MD VD 
Pearson Correlation 0.868 0.835 
Aggregate Sig (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 
disclosure No. of companies 121 121 
The results of the table above show that there is a highly significant positive 
relationship between AD and each of MD and VD (the significance value is less than 
0.01). Both MD and VD are strongly associated with AD (their values are 0.868 and 
0.835 respectively). Moreover, the relationship between MD and VD is significant and 
96 Pearson correlation analysis (parametric test) was used here, since the normality assumption was met 
using the Kolmogrov-Smirnov test of normality (the significance value was more than 5% for AD, MD 
and VD). However, Kendall's tau and Spearman's correlation analysis (non-parametric tests) were used 
to test the association between AD and each partial index of information (e. g. balance sheet index, income 
statement index). The reason for using non-parametric tests here was because some indices of information 
were not normally distributed (the significance value was less than 5%). More discussion about the 
normality assumption and parametric and non-parametric tests will come later in this chapter. 
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positive, but lower (0.467) than the above relationship. These relationships support 
Hail's (2002: 756) view that "the three categories may capture different aspects of 
disclosure. Nonetheless, they are still well represented by the firm's grand total". 
Second, the correlation between AD and each category of information was assessed 
using non-parametric tests (Kendall's tau and Spearman's rank correlation analysis). 
Table 4.5.1.5.2 shows these relationships. 
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The table shows that the relationship between the AD and each category index of 
information is highly significant and positive (the significance value is less than 0.01 in 
all 18 cases). Therefore, it can be concluded that although each category index 
highlights different aspects of disclosure, these indices are well-presented by the total 
disclosure of the company. The validity of the disclosure index is generally supported 
by the above analysis. The ability of the index to capture the relationship between AD 
and company characteristics (Objective Two) and to reflect the changes in mandatory 
disclosure (Objective Three) will enhance its validity. Chapters Six and Seven will shed 
light on these issues. 
In summary, the researcher followed the procedures identified in prior studies in order 
to ensure the reliability and validity of the disclosure index used. However, construction 
of the disclosure index and assigning scores implies subjective judgment and a personal 
perspective on the part of the researcher (Marston and Shrives, 1991: 207). This is due to 
the inherently subjective nature of disclosure. 
Marston and Shrives (1991: 208) summarized this subjective nature as follows: 
"In the social sciences many common research tools attract some 
controversy and disagreement. Measuring company information disclosure 
can not be carried out in a precise scientific way. Researcher subjectivity 
can not be completely removed, nor is it reasonable to expect that it can be. 
The value of the resulting disclosure scores and their subsequent use in 
testing hypotheses can not, therefore, be viewed uncritically. The efforts of 
the researcher to minimize subjectivity and design a more objective index 
are of relevance here ". 
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4.5.2 The Independent Variables Hypotheses 
To accomplish the second objective of the research, it was necessary to measure the 
explanatory variables and determine whether there was any relationship between these 
variables and the extent of the financial disclosure, as discussed in Chapter Two. In 
addition, Chapter Two discussed that firm specific characteristics may influence the 
level of disclosure according to the theoretical arguments such as agency theory, 
signalling theory, cost-benefit theory and political theory. The next discussion will show 
, the 
hypotheses which were tested for each variable 
4.5.2.1 Firm Size 
HI: There is a significant positive association between total assets and the extent of 
aggregate disclosure. 
H2: There is a significant positive association between sales and the extent of aggregate 
disclosure. 
H3: There is a significant positive association between capital stock and the extent of 
aggregate disclosure. 
H4: There is a significant positive association between net income and the extent of 
aggregate disclosure. 
4.5.2.2 Leverage 
H5: The extent of aggregate disclosure is positively related to total debt/total assets 
ratio. 
H6: The extent of aggregate disclosure is positively related to long term debt/owners' 
equity ratio. 
4.5.2.3 Profitability 
H7: There is a significant positive association between rates of return and the extent of 
aggregate disclosure. 
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H8: There is a significant positive association between earnings margin and the extent 
of aggregate disclosure. 
H9: There is a significant positive association between returns of equity and the extent 
of aggregate disclosure. 
4.5.2.4 Number of Shareholders 
H10: There is a significant positive association between the number of shareholders 
and the extent of aggregate disclosure. 
4.5.2.5 Listing Status 
HI 1: The extent of aggregate disclosure is greater for companies listed in the first tier 
in the ASE than companies listed in the second or the third tier in the ASE. 
4.5.2.6 Industry Type: 
H12: There is a significant association between the industry type and the extent of 
aggregate disclosure. 
4.5.2.7 Assets-in-Place 
H13: There is a negative association between assets-in-place and the extent of 
aggregate disclosure. 
4.5.2.8 Ownership Structure 
H14: There is a significant negative association between the ratio of institutional 
ownership and the extent of aggregate disclosure. 
4.5.2.9 Liquidity 
H15: There is a significant association between the liquidity and the extent of 
aggregate disclosure 
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4.5.2.10 Audit Firm Size 
H16: There is a significant positive association between a company being audited by a 
Jordanian Big Three firm and the extent of aggregate disclosure. 
4.5.2.11 Listing Age 
H] 7: There is a significant association between listing age of the companies and the 
extent of aggregate disclosure. 
Table 4.5.2.1 shows the proxies used for independent variables and the expected signs 
of the association, with the extent of aggregate disclosure for each hypothesis. 
Table 4.5.2.1: Independent Variables Proxies 
Hypothesis Expected sign Proxies 
H1: total assets 
Firm size + H2: sales 
H3: capital stock 
H4: net income 
H5: total debt to total asset ratio 
Leverage + H6: long term debt to owners' equity ratio 
H7: rate of return 
Profitability + H8: earnings margin 
H9: return of equity 
Number of + H10: the company's shareholders 
shareholders 
H11: dummy variable (1) for listed in the ASE and (0) 
Listing status + otherwise. 
H12: dummy variable (IN1) for manufacturing 
Industry type companies and zero otherwise, (1N2) for services 
companies and zero otherwise. 
H13: the ratio of book value of fixed assets ( net 
Assets-in-place - of depreciation) to the book value of total assets. 
Ownership structure - H14: institutional ownership to total owners ratio 
H15: the ratio of company's current assets to the 
Liquidity + or - current liabilities 
H16: dummy variable (1) for Jordanian big three 
Audit firm size + and (0) otherwise 
Listing age + H17: actual length of listing in the ASE 
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4.5.3 Compliance with Mandatory Regulations 
The mandatory index was employed in order to measure compliance with the new 
regulations. This index is the set of mandatory items included in the aggregate index 
(see Appendix 4.5.1.3.1). It consists of 278 items of information. The same procedures 
which were used to measure the extent of aggregate disclosure were adopted here. The 
dichotomous approach was used for scoring the index: 1 point was given for the item if 
disclosed and 0 point is given for the item if not disclosed. Second, the unweighted 
approach was employed; since the focus of this study is on the different types of users 
and the number of items is large (278 items). 97 The main justification for using this 
approach is to measure the extent of mandatory disclosure and the quantity of 
information disclosed, instead of measuring the importance of such disclosure. 
"To avoid subjectivity in judging that one item was more important than 
another, the study relied on unweighted score approach, which gives the 
same importance to all disclosure items because the research questions 
were concerned with the level of disclosure rather than the importance of 
disclosure " (A bd-Elsalam, 1999: 152). 
The mandatory disclosure (MD) score for a company was calculated as follows: 
278 
MD= L., ji/m; 
Where 
r1 if the item is disclosed 
0 if the item is not disclosed 
mm = number of items applicable to a company 
97 For more information about the weighted and unweighted approaches, see part 4.5.1.4 scoring and 
weighting the items. 
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Street and Bryant (2000: 315) argued that a review of the entire annual reports could 
reduce the possibility that companies would be penalised for not disclosing non 
applicable items. 
As discussed in the literature review, in section 2.7, in order to test the effect of the new 
regulations on compliance, 60 companies were selected as a matched sample and the 
annual reports for both years 1996 and 2003 were collected (before and after the new 
regulations, 1997). The selection of these two periods was based on the release of new 
regulations (Temporary Securities Law, No. 23,1997) and the development of the 
Jordanian capital market started in 1997. Hence, it is reasonable to assure that 
examining the sample in two periods will provide a comprehensive picture of the impact 
of the new enactments. Similarly, Naser and Nuseibeh (2003: 42) examined the extent of 
disclosure for Saudi Corporations by comparing the quality of information before and 
after the creation of the Saudi Organisation of Certified Public Accountants (SOCPA). 
For this purpose, they employed a matched sample before and after the regulations. 
They stated 
"Comparing the extent of corporate disclosure within two periods would 
enable its to examine possible changes in the extent of disclosure and the 
impact, if any, of SOCPA on such disclosures. Annual reports of 40 out of 
64 companies were collected for the year 1991/1992 and 52 out of 79 
companies for the year 1998/1999" (Maser and Nuseibeh, 2003: 48). 
4.5.4 Statistical Techniques 
Different approaches were used by many researchers in order to examine the association 
between the extent of disclosure and other company's characteristics, as shown in Table 
4.5.4.1 
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The table above indicates the different statistical techniques which were used to test the 
relationship between the extent of disclosure and the company's characteristics. Wallace, 
Naser and Mora (1994: 47) argued that there is no theoretically correct approach for 
explaining the relationship between the dependent variable (extent of disclosure) and 
the independent variables (company's characteristics). 
Al-Mulhem (1997: 200) pointed out that the earlier studies (e. g. Singhvi and Desai 1971, 
Buzby 1975, Stanga 1976, Belkaoui 1978) employed matched-pair statistical analysis as 
a major statistical technique procedure. However, he also identified that most of the 
recent studies, starting with Chow and Wong-Boren (1987) have used multiple 
regression analysis. The studies in Table 4.5.4.1 support Al-Mulhem's claim that the 
majority of recent studies use multiple regression techniques. Some studies used 
standard multiple regression (Ordinary Least Square method). These include: Hossain, 
Tan and Adams, 1994; Hossain, Perera and Rahmadn, 1995; Raffoumier, 1995; Al- 
Mulhem, 1997; Patton and Zelenka, 1997; Suwaidan, 1997; Craig and Diga, 1998; 
Owusu and Ansah, 1998; Depoers, 2000; Ho and Wong, 2001; Ferguson, Lam and Lee, 
2002; Ali, Ahmed and Henry, 2004; Akhtaruddin, 2005. Other studies (Cooke, 1989a; 
Cooke, 1992; Malone, Fries and Jones, 1993; Inchausti, 1997) used stepwise regression 
analysis. Moreover, some researchers (Ahmed and Nicholls, 1994; Wallace and Nasser, 
1995; Al-Shiab, 2003) employed both regression techniques, standard and stepwise. 
In summary, various regression techniques have been used in disclosure studies. 
Certain key assumptions need to be met in order to apply each technique. The 
techniques used in this study, and the required assumptions, will be discussed later in 
this chapter. 
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4.5.4.1 Parametric versus Non-parametric Tests 
Field (2005: 63) defines a parametric test as "one that required data from one of the large 
catalogue of distributions that statisticians have described and for data to be parametric 
certain assumptions must be true". Parametric tests are more powerful than non- 
parametric tests (Collis and Hussey, 2003: 196). However, parametric tests can only be 
applied on populations which have normally-distributed data (Collis and Hussey, 
2003: 196). Other assumptions (i. e. homogeneity of variance, interval data and 
independence) also should be met in order to apply parametric tests (Field, 2005: 64). 
However, as Field (2005: 65) pointed out, the normality assumption is the most 
important. 
For non-parametric tests, no assumption is required to be made about the distribution of 
the data (this why they are sometimes called distribution free tests). Therefore, they can 
be applied on data which are not normally distributed (Kanji, 1999: 3). 
Pallant (2001: 255) pointed out that the major disadvantage of non-parametric tests is 
that they tend to be less sensitive than parametric ones, since they may not be able to 
detect differences between groups that actually do exist. "However, because they are 
less discriminating, the results are correspondingly less reliable" (Collis and Hussey, 
2003: 196). Non- parametric tests can be used when the data are measured on nominal 
and ordinal scales and they are appropriate for small samples (Pallant, 2001: 255). 
Suwaidan (1997: 124) argued that whether to use parametric or non-parametric tests is a 
potential dilemma in statistical analysis. The major decision between using parametric 
or non-parametric tests depends on the assumptions of parametric tests, specifically the 
assumption of normal distribution. However, a review of the studies in Table 4.5.4.1 
revealed that many researchers (Firth, 1979; Cooke, 1989a; Hossain, Tan and Adams, 
1994; Suwaidan, 1997; Craig and Diga, 1998; Abd-Elsalam, 1999; Camffermann and 
Cooke, 2002; Al-Shiab, 2003; Akhtaruddin, 2005) used both parametric and non- 
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parametric tests. The advantage of applying both techniques is to minimize the 
possibility of incorrectly rejecting the null hypothesis (Cooke, 1989a: 198). In addition, 
non-parametric tests can be used to check the results of parametric tests (Al-Shiab: 
2003: 289). Both techniques provide almost similar results if the sample is big enough 
(Suwaidan, 1997: 125). 
4.5.4.2 Univariate Analysis 
Univariate analysis is used to assess the relationship between the extent of disclosure 
and each independent variable. For continuous variables (i. e. firm size, leverage, 
profitability, number of shareholders, assets in place, ownership structure, liquidity and 
listing age), correlation coefficients were used. Pearson product-moment correlation 
(parametric test) was used when the normality assumption was satisfied, whereas 
Kendall's tau and Spearman rank correlation (non-parametric tests) were used if the 
assumption of normality was violated. 
T-test (parametric) and Mann Whitney U-test (non-parametric) were used to examine 
the impact of the three categorical variables (listing status, industry type and audit firm 
size) on the disclosure level. For further analysis, one way analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) test (parametric) and Kruskall Wallis (non-parametric) were employed for 
variables which contain more than two groups (listing status groups), in order to 
illustrate the effect of each variable on the extent of disclosure. 
4.5.4.3 Multivariate Analysis 
Regression analysis is a statistical method used to assess the relationship between a 
number of independent variables and one dependent variable (Tabachnick and Fidell, 
2001: 111). In disclosure studies, Haniffa and Cooke (2002: 334) commented, 
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"Multiple regression is used to assess the extent to which variability in the 
extent of voluntary disclosure is explained by the various corporate 
governance, cultural and firm-specific characteristics ". 
In univariate analysis, the correlation coefficient assesses the strength of the relationship 
between two variables, but it does not tell us how much of the variance of the dependent 
variable will be explained by several independent variables (Sekaran, 1992: 268). In 
addition, Patton and Zelenka (1997: 615) argued that univariate analysis could 
overestimate the significant overall explanatory power of independent variables. Thus, 
multiple regression is used. 
Howitt and Crammer (2005: 317) pointed out two major purposes of multiple regression: 
1- To determine the minimum number of predictors required to predict a criterion. In 
other words, what are the independent variables which can best explain the variation of 
the dependent variable? 
2- To indicate whether specific predictors are still significant and related to the criterion, 
when other predictors are controlled or held constant. 
Chapter Six will report the outcome of the univariate analysis between each explanatory 
variable and aggregate disclosure. In addition, it will present the contribution of each 
variable in interpreting the aggregate disclosure variation using multiple regression 
analysis. 
4.5.4.4 Matched Pair Analysis 
This technique was used to test the difference in the AD, MD and VD in the two periods 
of study: 1996 and 2003. Matched samples were employed in order to determine the 
influence of the regulations on the extent of disclosure. The matched pairs t-test 
(parametric) and the Wilcoxon signed rank test (non-parametric) were used to compare 
the means (signed ranks) for both samples. Those samples and tests are discussed in 
Chapter Seven. 
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4.5.5 Source of Information, Population and Sample 
Annual reports are considered to be the most important source of information for 
decision making. Hossain, Tan and Adams (1994: 340) argued that annual reports are 
the most essential source of information for users, specifically shareholders and 
investors. Abd-Elsalam (1999: 132) and Al-Mulhem (1997: 210) support this view. 
In Jordan, Suwaidan (1997: 100) pointed out that due to the scarcity of sources of 
information, annual reports are the most important. In addition, Abu-Nassar and 
Rutherford (1996: 81) investigated the importance of information sources in Jordan 
according to the perspectives of five user groups (individual investors, institutional 
investors, stock brokers, bank loan officers and academics). The majority of those user 
groups considered the annual reports to be the most important source of information. 
In this study, annual reports for the accounting period 2003 were examined in order to 
measure the extent of disclosure (aggregate, mandatory and voluntary) for Jordanian 
corporations. 
Generally, the annual reports for Jordanian companies contain the following items: 98 
1- The Chairman's speech 
2- Board of Directors' report 
3- Auditors' report 
4- The company's annual financial statements which include: 
- The balance sheet 
- Profits and losses account (income statement) 
- Cash flow statement 
- Changes in shareholders' equity 
- Explanation of the financial statement 
98 Source: Jordan Securities Commission, http: //www. jsc. gov. jo [Accessed: 26/10/2006] 
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As indicated in the first chapter, the extent of aggregate disclosure for Jordanian annual 
reports is the major concern of this study. Aggregate disclosure is divided into two 
components: mandatory and voluntary. Mandatory disclosure is derived from two 
sources of regulations: DDAAS and IASs. DDAAS are the main regulation for the 
following items in the annual reports: the chairman's speech, the Board of Directors' 
report and the auditors' report. IASs are the main regulations for the company's 
financial statements (e. g. balance sheet, income statement) supplementary information 
and notes. Some mandatory items, as will be explained later, are regulated by both 
sources of regulations, DDAAS and IASs. Voluntary items are found in different parts 
of the annual reports. 
Another secondary source of information that could be used is Amman Financial 
Market publications and data. Suwaidan (1997: 100) claimed that the contents of these 
publications are extracted from the annual reports and the timeliness criterion is not met 
by these publications. However, the major improvements in AFM, particularly the move 
from traditional methods of recording and disseminating information to electronic 
systems, will overcome the timeliness problem and will provide a variety of information 
rather than just the annual reports. 99 
As noted in Chapter Threeloo, Amman Stock Exchange comprises three tiers. The first 
and the intermediary tiers are for listed companies, while the third tier is for unlisted 
companies. The Jordanian Shareholding Guide for the year 2003 contains all companies 
(listed and unlisted) on the ASE. According to DDAAS, under Securities Law No. 23 for 
the year 1997, Jordanian shareholding companies shall prepare and provide AFM with 
the company's annual report within a period not exceeding three months from the end 
99 For more information about the electrical systems and the major improvements in Amman Stock 
Exchange, see w«nv. jsc. gov. io [Accessed: 30/09/2006] 100 See part 3.7.11 Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) 
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of its first year 101 In addition, the Companies Act 1997, requires shareholding 
companies to publish their annual reports within three months of the end of the year102 
Suwaidan (1997: 128) tested the extent of disclosure for 118 listed companies in AFM in 
1992. He then confined his study to 102 companies. 
"The failure to obtain the remaining 16 companies was due to the following: 
1- Eight companies were established in 1992 and thus were excluded from the 
study due to inadequacy of information. 
2- Three companies were suspended from the market in 1992 because of 
merger and reorganizing activities. Therefore, annual reports for these 
companies were not available. 
3- Five companies either did not publish their annual reports or their reports 
contained incomplete information " (Suwaidan, 1997: 179). 
However, Suwaidan's study was conducted before the new regulations (1997). 
Therefore, the focus of his study was on voluntary disclosure where his index would be 
equally applicable to all four sectors in the AFM: banks, insurance, services and 
industries. 
Al- Shiab (2003: 217) selected a sample of 50 industrial companies for the period 1995- 
2002 in order to measure the compliance of Jordanian corporations to IASs. He focused 
on the industry sector only, since it was considered to be the major sector in terms of 
GDP. He also excluded the financial and insurance sectors because they are subject to 
specific legal requirements. In addition, unlisted companies were not included since 
their annual reports were not available. 
In this study, the industrial and services sectors were chosen, since banks and insurance 
companies are subject to separate disclosure requirements (e. g. IAS No. 30). In addition, 
the special nature of the operations of the latter two sectors makes comparison of their 
accounts with those of other sectors inappropriate (Cooke, 1989b: 181; Wallace, Naser 
and More, 1997: 43). Many studies excluded banks and insurance companies because of 
their specific requirements and consequent comparability problems. Examples of these 
101 Article 6, Directives of Disclosure and Auditing and Accounting Standards 102 Article 140, Companies Act, 1997 
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studies are: Choi 1973; McNally, Eng and Hasseldine 1982; Wallace 1988; Cooke 1989a; 
Cooke 1989b; Wallace, Naser and Mora 1994; Wallace and Naser 1995; Al-Mulhem 
1997; Inchausti 1997; Owusu-Ansah 1998; Abd-Elsalam 1999; Depoers 2000; Gelb 
2000; Abd-Elsalam and Weetman 2002; Ferguson, Lam and Lee 2002; Singleton and 
Globerman 2002; Al-Shiab 2003; Makhija and Patton 2004. 
The annual reports for the year 2003 for the entire population of companies in the ASE 
were examined. One year was chosen (i. e. cross-sectional analysis) because disclosure 
policies for companies tend to remain constant over the time. Therefore, like Botosan 
(1997: 327) and Alsaeed (2005: 315), I have limited my analysis to one year. An 
alternative approach would have been to sample more than one year like Al-Shiab's 
(2003) study, but this would result in smaller sample size for each year due to the time 
constraints and reduced availability of data. Moreover, restricting to one year enabled 
more than one sector (industrial and services) to be included, unlike Al-Shiab's (2003) 
study which covered the annual reports for 50 industrial companies only, during the 
period 1995-2000. 
Furthermore, this study focused on the determinants (companies' characteristics) of 
financial disclosure rather than the financial consequences of disclosure. Financial 
consequences imply a change in disclosure policies over time. Helay and Palepu 
(2001: 429) reported some examples of these consequences which affect the extent of 
disclosure in capital markets, such as the effect on cost of capital and the effect on the 
stock liquidity in the capital market. This study did not explore financial consequences 
in Jordan, since this would require a longer period (more than one year) and would 
require focusing more on these consequences than the determinants of disclosure in 
Jordan. However, exploring the determinants of financial disclosure level in Jordan is 
still essential (specifically after the new regulations) in order to identify the reasons for 
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variation in disclosure among companies. "Accounting research on the determinants of 
disclosure practices and other accounting choices based on company's characteristics is 
a very extensive field" (Lopez and Rodrigues, 2007: 27). 
The calendar year 2003 was chosen since it was the most recent year which ensured 
reasonable access to the annual reports of the companies. The difficulty of access to the 
annual reports of previous years and the lack of information related to these annual 
reports caused the researcher to confine the study to this year. 
Several previous studies explored the relationship between the disclosure and the 
companies characteristics for one year (cross-sectional). Examples of these studies are 
shown in Table 4.5.5.1. 
Table 4.5.5.1: Cross-sectional studies about disclosure 
Study Country Year Sample size 
Chow and Boren, 1987 Mexico 1982 52 
Cooke, 1989a Sweden 1985 90 
Ahmed and Nicholls, 1994 Bangladesh 1988 63 
Hossain, Tan and Adams, 1994 Malaysia 1991 67 
Wallace, Naser and Mora, 1994 Spain 1991 50 
Raffournier, 1995 Switzerland 1991 161 
Hossain, Perera and Rahman, 1995 New Zealand 1991 55 
Al-Mulhem, 1997 Saudi Arabia 1994 67 
Patton and Zelenka, 1997 Czech Republic 1993 50 
Suwaidan, 1997 Jordan 1993 102 
Depoers, 2000 France 1995 102 
Haniffa and Cooke, 2002 Malaysia 1995 167 
Ferguson, Law and Lee, 2002 Hong Kong 1996 142 
Naser, Al-Khatib and Karbhari, 2002 Jordan 1999 84 
Akhtaruddin, 2005 Bangladesh 1999 94 
Aksu and Kosedag, 2006 Turkey 2003 52 
Ghazali and Weetman, 2006 Malaysia 2001 87 
This study, 2007 Jordan 2003 121 
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There is a list of 164 industrial and services companies in the Jordanian Shareholding 
Companies Guide for the year 2003. Nineteen companies were excluded from the 164 
companies listed in Jordanian Shareholding Companies Guide for the year 2003, due the 
following reasons: 
1- Sixteen companies were under liquidation and suspended from the market in 2003. 
Therefore, their annual reports were not available. 
2- The accounting year for three companies (Alfa, Al-Ithad Schools and Al-Zay 
companies) was not at the end of the calendar year, whereas the majority of Jordanian 
companies use the calendar year as their accounting year. Thus, the annual reports of 
these three companies would not be comparable with those of other companies. 
Accordingly, 145 companies were left as the final population. Personal visits were made 
to the ASE in order to obtain the annual reports for these companies. Ninety-seven 
annual reports were collected from the ASE library following several visits, since not all 
these annual reports could be obtained in the first visit. Several personal visits were 
made to the other companies to collect the remaining annual reports, which were not 
available in the ASE library. Another 24 annual reports were gathered from these visits. 
As a result, the final sample contained 121 annual reports for both services and 
industrial companies, for the year 2003. The remaining 24 companies could not be 
included in the sample for the following reasons 103: 
1- Eleven companies' reports contained incomplete information, particularly the 
chairman's report. 
2- Thirteen companies did not publish their annual reports or the annual reports were 
not available for the year 2003. 
103 This is particular problem of using the population rather than sampling. By selecting the entire 
population to be included in the study, some companies annual reports would not be available for 
different reasons. One of the reasons is that these companies could have financial problems and would not 
provide the annual reports for users (e. g. under liquidation). However, the recent regulations (i. e. The 
Securities Law 2002) were more stringent and required companies to provide their annual reports on time. 
Hence, the number of companies which could represent the entire population will be increased. 
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Thus, 121 copies of the annual reports were used to fulfil the first objective of this study. 
This sample represents 83% of the 145 Jordanian companies listed on the ASE for the 
year 2003, included in the research population104 The following table illustrates the 
distribution of the sample in both sectors: services and industry, according to ASE tiers. 
Table 4.5.5.2: Sample of Jordanian companies in both sectors and different tiers 
for the year 2003 
Total 
Sector First Tier Second Tier Third Tier Unlisted No % 
Services 19 20 10 6 55 45.45 
Industry 31 29 4 2 66 54.55 
No 50 49 14 8 121 
Total % 41.32 40.50 11.57 6.61 100 
104 It could be inferred that the sample in this study is a census of the companies, since the researcher took 
into consideration all the annual reports of the 145 companies, but 24 were excluded as shown above and 
hence the population = the sample = the census 
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4.6 Qualitative Methods: 
This section discusses the interviews used in this study. The definition of interviews, 
types of interviews and interviews as a qualitative research method will be explained. 
Holland (2005: 249) pointed out that there have been few studies which have used 
interviews in order to interpret disclosure behaviour and to develop a comprehensive 
model of corporate disclosure. 
4.6.1 Interviews: 
Interviews are one of the most powerful methods, which can be used to understand 
human beings and the meanings they attach to their behaviour (Denzin and Lincoln, 
1998: 47). Punch (1998: 174) pointed out that interviews are the main data collection 
methods in qualitative research. He commented (1998: 174) 
"It is a very good way of accessing people's perceptions, meanings, 
definitions of situations and constructions of reality. It is also one of the 
most powerful ways we have of understanding others ". 
Qualitative interviewing is a method of discovering people's views about different 
issues in their life (Rubin and Rubin, 1995: 1). Qualitative interviews enable the 
researcher to realize the experiences and to reconstruct the events. It can also facilitate 
intellectual and emotional understanding across time, class, race, sex and geographical 
divisions (Rubin and Rubin, 1995: 1). 
Qualitative interviewing is different from ordinary conversation in many important 
ways (Rubin and Rubin, 1995: 2). One of the significant differences is that qualitative 
interviews are methods of research which explore the thoughts, feelings and experiences 
of others. Then, the researcher uses such information for analysis and shares the 
findings with others. Another difference is that in qualitative interviews, the researcher 
guides the interviews; he asks a limited number of questions and requests the 
interviewee to discuss the topic raised. In addition, the researcher encourages the 
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interviewee to share and reflect on his experience, feelings and thoughts in detail (Rubin 
and Rubin, 1995: 2). 
The next discussion will explain the two main types of qualitative interview structure. 
4.6.2 Qualitative Interview Structure: 
Interviews could be categorized according to their structure into two main groups: 
4.6.2.1 Structured Interviews 
In this kind of interview, the researcher prepares the questions and requires the 
interviewee to respond with pre-set response categories (Punch, 1998: 176). The 
variation of response is restricted, except where open-ended questions are sometimes 
used (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998: 52). In addition, the researcher controls the 
interviewees' response by asking the questions in a standardized and straightforward 
manner. Thus, there is little flexibility in the way of asking and answering in structured 
interviews (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998: 52). Moreover, the researcher's role in this kind 
of interviews is neutral and should not influence the respondent's opinion. Therefore, 
structured interviews emphasise rational rather than emotional responses (Punch, 
1998: 176). 
4.6.2.2 Unstructured Interviews 
Unstructured interviews aim to explore the behaviour, feelings, thoughts and experience 
of the respondents without imposing prior questions, which could limit the field of 
inquiry (Punch, 1998: 178). The traditional type of unstructured interviews is the non- 
standardized, open-ended, in-depth interview, and it is sometimes called the 
ethnographic interview. The flexibility of this kind of interview enables the researcher 
to discuss a variety of issues. Thus, "the unstructured interview is a powerful research 
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tool, widely used in social research and other fields, and capable of producing rich and 
valuable data" (Punch, 1998: 178). 
Ritchie and Lewis (2003: 141) presented five key features of in-depth interviews 
(unstructured interviews), which distinguish them from other types of interviews (i. e. 
structured interviews). The first key feature is that the structure of in-depth interviews 
is flexible. The researcher has some idea about the topic and he is guided by a general 
list of headings. However, the structure is flexible enough to allow the interviewee to 
discuss any issues or topics, which could occur spontaneously (Ritchie and Lewis, 
2003: 141). 
` The second key feature is that in-depth interviews are an interaction between the 
researcher and the interviewee. The researcher will interact in such a way as to 
encourage the interviewee to answer and express his/her responses comfortably (Ritchie 
and Lewis, 2003: 141). 
The third key feature is related to the in-depth interview techniques. Ritchie and Lewis 
(2003: 141) remarked 
"The interview will use follow-up questions to obtain a deeper and fuller 
understanding of the participant's meaning. The in-depth format also 
permits the researcher to explore filly all the factors that underpin 
participants' answers, feelings, opinions and beliefs". 
Fourthly, the in-depth interview, at some stage, will lead to new knowledge. The extent 
to which this could occur varies according to the research questions. The interviewees 
could be directed to explore new ideas, which they have not explored before. Hence, 
they could present suggestions and solutions for problems raised during the interview 
(Ritchie and Lewis, 2003: 142). 
Finally, in-depth interviews are always conducted face-to-face. It is difficult to conduct 
them over the telephone because these kinds of interviews require flexibility and 
interaction, and a physical encounter is essential to achieve these requirements. 
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It should be noted that interviews could also be semi structured (the degree of structure 
is more than in unstructured interviews, but less than in structured interviews). In this 
kind of interview, the researcher has some specific information about the topic. He 
introduces the topic, and then guides the interviewee by asking specific questions 
(Rubin and Rubin, 1995: 5). Kvale (1996: 124) describes semi structured interviews as 
follows: 
"It has a sequence of themes to be covered, as well as suggested questions. 
Yet at the same time there is an openness to changes of sequence and forms 
of question order to follow up the answers and the stories told by the 
subjects ". 
Finally, whatever the structure of interviews, the researcher's role should be directive 
and interactive in order to obtain more relevant information. Easterby-Smith, Thorpe 
and Lowe (2002: 88) argued that simply letting the interviewee talk freely without 
interruption or intervention will not achieve a clear picture of their views. Indeed, it will 
confuse both the researcher and the interviewee. Therefore, the researcher should be 
clear about the exact topics of their interest. 
4.6.3 Qualitative Data Analysis: 
Qualitative data analysis is different from quantitative data analysis. Qualitative 
researchers rarely depend on statistics in their analysis (Neuman, 2006: 457). Instead, the 
analysis process involves making sense out of text and image data. 
"It involves preparing the data for analysis, conducting different analysis, 
moving deeper and deeper into understanding the data, representing the 
data, and making an interpretation of the larger meaning of the data " 
(Creswell, 2003: 190). 
Coffey and Atkinson (1996: 108) argued that analysis in qualitative research is not a 
matter of classifying, categorizing, coding or collecting data. Rather, it is about the 
representation or reconstruction of phenomena in social life. The complexity and 
richness of these phenomena require different methods of observing and analysing them 
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(Punch, 1998: 199). Thus, various perspectives and views could be taken towards 
qualitative data analysis. "There is variety in techniques because there are different 
questions to be addressed and different versions of social reality that can be elaborated" 
(Coffey and Atkinson, 1996: 14). 
The major challenge in qualitative data analysis is that there is no single accepted 
approach which can be used in qualitative research (Punch, 1998: 199; Collis and 
Hussey, 2003: 253; Neuman, 2006: 457). Indeed, the analysis methods depend on the 
purpose of the research. However, these methods should be systematic, disciplined and 
able to be seen and described (Punch, 1998: 200). Moreover, these methods could be 
assessed according to their ability to lead to conclusions: 
"A key question in assessing a piece of research is: how did the researcher 
get to those conclusions from these data? If there is no answer to that 
question- if the method of analysis can not be described and scrutinized- it 
is difficult to Imow what confidence to have in the findings put forward" 
(Punch, 1998: 200). 
In recent years, several researchers have explored different approaches to qualitative 
data analysis (e. g. Miles and Huberman, 1994; Rubin and Rubin, 1995; Mason, 1996; 
Punch, 1998; Silverman, 2002; Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe, 2002; Collis and 
Hussey, 2003; Creswell, 2003; Ritchie and Lewis, 2003; Neuman, 2006). 
These approaches vary in their procedures and steps. Some researchers (i. e. Miles and 
Huberman, 1994; Rubin and Rubin, 1995; Mason, 1996; Creswell, 2003) used general 
procedures and steps of analysis, focusing on key features in analysis of qualitative data, 
such as coding and memoing. Other researchers (i. e. Punch, 1998; Easterby-Smith, 
Thorpe and Lowe, 2002; Collis and Hussey, 2003; Neuman, 2006) identified specific 
methods of qualitative data analysis, for instance, content analysis and grounded theory. 
It is difficult to explain all the methods in qualitative research, since they are various 
and complex. In addition, the qualitative methods are not the primary methods in this 
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research study. Its major role is to support the quantitative data analysis in order to 
provide a more complete understanding about the research problems addressed. 
Therefore, the researcher will introduce some important issues related to qualitative data 
analysis (e. g. coding). In addition, the approach that was adopted in this research will be 
explained. 
4.6.3.1 Coding 
There are different meanings of coding in qualitative research. On the one hand, coding 
is the starting process of data analysis and the foundation for what comes later in this 
analysis (Punch, 1998: 204). On the other hand, coding is analysis. Miles and Huberman 
(1994: 56) presented a comprehensive definition of this term: 
"Codes are tags or labels for assigning units of meaning to the descriptive 
inferential information complied during a study. Codes usually are attached 
to "chunks" of varying size- words, phrase, sentences, or whole paragraphs, 
connected or unconnected to a specific setting. They can take the form of 
straightforward category labels or a more complex one (e. g. a metaphor) ". 
As regards interviews, 
"Coding is the process of grouping interviewees' responses into categories 
that bring together the similar ideas, concepts, or themes you have 
discovered, or steps or stages in a process " (Rubin and Rubin, 1995: 238). 
From the previous definitions, coding is the process of analysis and it is also an integral 
part of data analysis. Both meanings are correct, since coding starts the analysis and 
moves on to the different levels of analysis (Punch, 1998: 204). Neuman (2006: 461) 
suggests that codes should have five parts: 
1- A one-to three-word label or name. 
2- A definition with a main characteristic. 
3- A "flag" description of how to recognize the code in the data. 
4- Any exclusions or qualification. 
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5- An example. 
Coding is an essential process in analysing qualitative data. "Coding qualitative data 
enables the researcher to recognize and recontextualize data, allowing a fresh view of 
what is there" (Coffey and Atkinson, 1996: 45). Indeed, coding serves a number of 
functions in qualitative data analysis. It can be an index for data and used as a basis for 
storing and retrieving this data (Punch, 1998: 204). In addition, the preliminary coding 
permits more advanced coding, by summarizing data, pulling themes and ideas together 
and identifying patterns and concepts (Punch, 1995: 204). Thus, preliminary coding is 
the first part of analysis and the part which allows more advanced coding of data. 
"Advanced coding is the same activity-labelling and categorizing-applied at higher 
levels of abstraction with the data" (Punch, 1998: 205). 
Neuman (2006: 460) pointed out that coding involves two simultaneous activities, the 
first of which is mechanical data reduction. This activity requires hard work from the 
researcher in order to reduce large amounts of data into a smaller volume of manageable 
data. This activity occurs at the beginning and it continues throughout the analysis. The 
objective of data reduction is to reduce the data without losing significant information 
(Punch, 1998: 203). In addition, "in qualitative analysis, an additional important 
component of not losing information is not to strip the data from their context" (Punch, 
1998: 203). 
The second activity is analytic categorization: after managing the data, the researcher 
can organize, link and pull out the main themes. The researcher could display the data in 
different ways (e. g. graphs, charts, networks), and this will enable further analysis 
(Punch, 1998: 204). 
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Moreover, three kinds of coding (these kinds are the basic features of coding in 
grounded theory analysis as will be discussed later in this chapter) are used in the 
different stages of analysis (Neuman, 2006: 460): 
1- Open coding: it occurs in the first stage of analysis whereas the researcher indicates 
the themes and assigns codes for these themes in order to condense the mass of data into 
categories. 
2- Axial coding: the second stage of coding, where the researcher organizes the codes, 
creates linkage among themes and identifies the key concepts axis in data analysis. In 
addition, new codes could emerge during this stage of the research and the researcher 
should be aware of that. 
3- Selective coding: this is the last stage, which enables the researcher to scan and 
examine the previous codes and themes. Then the researcher selects the themes, ideas, 
concepts and the codes which interpret the qualitative data and make comparisons and 
constructs. This stage provides the underpinning core for generalizations and 
conclusions. 
In summary, coding is the heart of qualitative data analysis. It starts the analysis and 
ends the analysis. 
"Coding is the concrete activity of labelling data, which gets the data 
analysis under way, and which continues throughout the analysis. Initial 
coding will typically be descriptive and of low inference, whereas later 
coding will integrate data by using higher order concepts" (Punch, 
1998: 206). 
Another technique in qualitative data analysis is memoing. The following section will 
discuss this issue. 
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4.6.3.2 Memoing 
Memoing is a continuous process in qualitative data analysis. It starts at the beginning 
of analysis -like coding- and it continues till the end of analysis (Punch, 1998: 206). 
According to Glaser (1978: 83-84; cited in Miles and Huberman, 1994: 72): 
"A memo is the theorizing write-up of ideas about codes and their 
relationships as they strike the analyst with coding..... it can be a sentence, 
a paragraph or a few pages... it exhausts the analyst's momentary ideation 
based on data with perhaps a little conceptual elaboration ". 
Neuman (2006: 464) argued that memoing is an inherent process for qualitative 
researchers. They always write notes during analysis about their data and their 
approaches. Moreover, they organize these notes on files (e. g. methodological issues 
file, diagrams file) (Neuman, 2006: 464). Memoing is useful because 
"Memos can also go well beyond codes and their relationships to any 
aspect of the study personal, methodological and substantive. They are one 
of the most useful and powerful sense-making tools at hand" (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994: 72). 
Memos could be substantive, theoretical, methodological or personal, covering many 
issues in the study (Punch, 1998: 206). If the memos are theoretical and substantive, they 
will provide deeper understanding about conceptual ideas than coding. For instance, 
they can suggest new patterns or elaborate methods of identifying concepts (Punch, 
1998: 206). The key feature of substantive and theoretical memos is that they capture 
new concepts and ideas and are not describing the data. Hence, they develop the 
analysis from the empirical to the conceptual level in order to develop propositions 
(Punch, 1998: 206) 
"Memoing links coding with the developing of propositions. It is important 
in qualitative analysis to balance discipline with creativity, and it is in 
memoing where creativity comes in " (Punch, 1998: 207). 
A more advanced technique in memoing is the analytic memo. This kind of memo 
discusses the researcher's thoughts and the ideas about the coding process (Neuman, 
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2006: 464). In addition, it contains the researcher's reflections on the data and the 
researcher uses it to move forward to the data and the coding (Neuman, 2006: 465). The 
main benefit of analytic memos is that they could be the basis for analysing qualitative 
data: "in fact, rewritten sections from good-quality analytic memos can become sections 
of the final report" (Neuman, 2006: 465). 
In summary, coding and memoing form the major underpinnings of qualitative data 
analysis from beginning to end. The next discussion will overview briefly the different 
approaches of qualitative data analysis. 
4.6.3.3 Qualitative Data Analysis Approaches: 
Compared with quantitative data analysis, there are no clear approved approaches which 
could be used for analysing qualitative data (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003: 200). However, 
the previous techniques (coding and memoing) are general ones and employed within 
more specific approaches in qualitative data analysis. 
Qualitative data analysis approaches are more diverse and less standardized than 
quantitative data analysis. In addition, the researcher could use one or more approach in 
order to apply his analysis. Mahoney (1999: 1193) argued that qualitative data lack a 
specific methodological strategy. Thus, it is difficult for readers to realize and 
appreciate the arguments of qualitative researchers. He (1999: 1191) remarked, "Since 
each methodological strategy and combination carries its own strengths and limitations, 
no one approach is inherently better than the rest". 
The researcher can not overview all the approaches here, since there are too many and 
some of them are not relevant to the nature of this study (e. g. narrative analysis). 
However, some approaches, for example content analysis and grounded theory, which 
have been explained by some researchers (i. e. Punch, 1998; Silverman, 2001; Easterby- 
294 
Smith, Thorpe and Lowe, 2002; Collis and Hussey, 2003) will be discussed briefly in 
this study. In addition, the approach which was used in this study will be discussed in 
detail. 
Content analysis is the method of converting texts and documents to numerical 
variables in order to apply quantitative analysis on those variables (i. e. frequencies) 
(Collis and Hussey, 2003: 255). This approach is an accepted one in the mass 
communication field (Silverman, 2001: 123). "Content analysis is often used for 
analysing newspapers and advertisements" (Collis and Hussey, 2003: 256). 
The main advantage of this approach is that it is not expensive and access to public 
documents is easy (Collis and Hussey, 2003: 257). In addition, the researcher can choose 
any time to conduct his analysis and this method is usually acceptable as regards 
reliability and validity (Collis and Hussey, 2003: 257). 
However, this method has some disadvantages and criticisms. "The theoretical basis of 
this method is unclear and its conclusions can often be trite" (Silverman, 2001: 123). In 
addition, content analysis may omit a large amount of data in the early stages to record 
only the words or phrases which are of interest to the researcher. However, the data that 
was omitted could be important to understand the phenomenon of the study at a deeper 
level (Collis and Hussey, 2003: 258). 
Content analysis was not used in this research. The researcher intended to explore the 
perspectives of different parties using non-quantifying methods, whereas "Content 
analysis can be useful to the researcher who has collected qualitative data and wishes to 
convert it into quantitative data" (Collis and Hussey, 2003: 258). The researcher applied 
quantitative approaches in his study to achieve the first three objectives of the study. 
Thus, a more qualitative approach was very useful to provide a comprehensive 
understanding about the results of the study. The researcher was interested in analysing 
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all the data of the interviews, and concerned to avoid omission of a large amount of the 
data, which could affect the richness of the interviews. Content analysis does not have 
this advantage, since it discards a large amount of data and it focuses on words or 
phrases which interest the researcher. 
As regards grounded theory, it has been argued that grounded theory is not theory at all. 
Rather, it is an approach or a strategy (Punch, 1998: 163). Punch (1998: 163) defined 
grounded theory as follows: 
"Grounded theory is best defined as a research strategy whose purpose is to 
generate theory from data. `Grounded' means that the theory will be 
generated on the basis of data; the theory will therefore be grounded in data. 
`Theory' means that the objective of collecting and analysing the research 
data is to generate theory. The essential idea in grounded theory is that 
theory will be developed inductively from the data. " 
Thus, the major purpose of grounded theory is to discover a theory from the data. 
Grounded theory analysis is done in three major stages (Punch, 1998: 210). The first 
stage is to identify conceptual categories in the data. The second stage is to find 
linkages and relationships among these categories. The final stage is a higher level of 
conceptualizing these relationships, where the theory emerges (Punch, 1998: 210). 
As regards disclosure studies, grounded theory was used as an approach for 
investigating disclosure behaviour in some studies (e. g. Gibbins, Richardson and 
Waterhouse, 1990; Holland and Stoner, 1996; Holland, 2005). Gibbins, Richardson and 
Waterhouse (1990) were pioneers in exploring grounded theory to understand the 
drivers and components of corporate disclosure behaviour. They conducted twenty 
interviews in order to: 1) develop a vocabulary of variables which explain disclosure 
processes and 2) identify the relationships among these variables. 
"The use of a grounded theory method helps to ensure that the variables 
and relations developed describe the experiences of those who make 
disclosure decisions" (Gibbins, Richardson and Waterhouse, 1990: 122). 
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Moreover, Holland (2005: 264) applied a grounded theory approach for 100 large UK 
FTSE (Financial Times Stock Exchange) companies. The study explained the disclosure 
choices, the story of value creation and intangible managerial optimism and 
opportunism, benchmarking and of continuous corporate interaction with stock and 
information markets (Holland, 2005: 249). 
Grounded theory analysis was not used in this study, as the main proposition of 
grounded theory is that it is to be applied where there is no theoretical framework for 
the study. "It is widely employed and can be very helpful in analysing qualitative data 
where there is no preconceived theoretical framework" (Collis and Hussey, 2003: 272). 
However, this study has a theoretical framework concerning the disclosure issue. The 
literature review has provided a sufficient basic for this framework. In addition, the 
objective of grounded theory is to discover and develop a theory from the data. This 
objective is quite different from the researcher's objective in applying qualitative 
methods in his research, namely, to support and enhance understanding about the 
disclosure issue. Theories supporting disclosure already exist, and there was no 
intention to develop a new theory about disclosure in this study. 
With regards qualitative data analysis using computer programs, quantitative 
researchers have been using computers in their analysis for four decades, while 
qualitative researchers have moved to computers only in the past ten years or so 
(Neuman, 2006: 484). Coffey and Atkinson (1996: 166) argued that the decision to use 
the appropriate software depends on appreciation of the data being analysed and the 
analytic purchase on the data which the researcher is able to obtain. 
There are three packages which are common in the market these days: Ethnograph, 
NUD*IST and Atlas-ti (Silverman, 2000: 166-168; Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe, 
2002: 128-129). Ethnograph requires data to be entered using a word processor. Codes 
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are assigned and recorded into memoranda to enable the construction of a conceptual 
framework (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe, 2002: 128). 
The NUD*IST package was developed by Apple Macintosh and then developed on the 
PCs windows version. It is more advanced than Ethnograph. It can store the memoranda 
while the data are interacted and the memoranda to be searched along with the rest of 
the data in the file (system closure process). 
The Atlas-ti package is more sophisticated and was explicitly developed to enable the 
grounded theory application. 
Ritchie and Lewis (2003: 207) pointed out that the researcher should find the appropriate 
package which suits his analysis process, rather than allowing the specific structure of 
software to indicate how the researcher analyses the data. T 
In this study, computer software programs were not used to analyse the interview data. 
The main reason for this is that number of interviews was not large enough (five 
interviews) to apply specific software. In this regard, Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe 
(2002: 129) commented: 
"If however the data set is relatively small (say fewer than 20 interviews) 
then it may be that the investment of time, money and energy will not be 
justified. These relatively small data sets may still be best understood and 
analyzed through the older methods of multi-coloured highlighting pens and 
close reading on screen or paper. ". 
Moreover, there is no computer software, which can perform the appropriate data 
analysis (Coffey and Atkinson, 1996: 187). The critical thinking and the deep 
understanding about the data comes from the researcher, not the computer software. 
Therefore, the researcher defines by himself the analysis strategies and methods which 
can be most appropriate (Coffey and Atkinson, 1996: 187). 
Finally, the availability of computer qualitative software is difficult, since it is costly 
and depends on the number of users. Thus the researcher applied other approaches of 
analysis rather than computer software, as will be shown below. 
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4.6.3.4 The Interview Data Analysis Approach (General Analytical procedures) 
The qualitative approach used in this study is general analytical procedures, which can 
be used as a method in qualitative research (Collis and Hussey, 2003: 263). The data 
collection methods in qualitative research produce a large volume of material which can 
be managed and controlled by specific procedures and steps. The procedures involved 
in this approach are illustrated in Figure 4.6.3.4.1 
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Figure 4.6.3.4.1: General analytical procedure for qualitative data 
1. Convert any rough field notes you have made into some form of written record which you 
and your supervisors will still be able to understand in later months. When writing your field 
notes you may wish to add your own thoughts and reflections. This will be the start of your 
tentative analysis. You should distinguish your interpretations and speculation from your factual 
field notes. 
2. Ensure that any material you have collected from interviews, observations or original 
documents is properly referenced. The reference should indicate who was involved, the date and 
time, the context, the circumstances leading to the data collection and the possible implications 
for the research. You may find it useful to record your references on a pro forma summary sheet, 
which you can then keep in an indexed system for erase or retrieval. 
3. Start coding the data as early as possible. This will involve allocating a specific code to each 
variable, concept or theme that you wish to identify. The code may be allocated to a specific 
word or to a phrase and the use of exemplars is helpful in applying the code and explaining its 
significance in your thesis. The code will allow you to store the data, retrieve it and reorganize it 
in a variety of ways. You will find it easier if you start with as many codes as your feel 
necessary and later collapse them into a smaller number. 
4. When data is coded, you can start grouping the codes into smaller categories according to 
patterns or themes which emerge. This is not a mechanical task, but will require some 
considerable effort and thought. If you are not using a strong theoretical framework, do not 
attempt to impose categories, but allow them to emerge from the data. Compare new data as it is 
collected with your existing codes and categories, and modify them as required. 
5. At various stages write summaries of your findings at that point. The discipline of putting 
your thoughts on paper will help with your analysis and highlight any deficiencies to be 
remedied. 
6. Use your summaries to construct generalisations with which you can confront existing 
theories or use to construct a new theory. 
7. Continue the process until you are satisfied that the generalisations arising from your data are 
sufficiently robust to stand the analysis of existing theories or the construction of a new theory. 
Source: Collis and Hussey, 2003: 264 
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The reason for adopting such an approach in this study is that it provides systemic 
procedures the researcher can follow to manage, analyse and generate the results from 
qualitative data. These procedures are clear and easy to follow. Moreover, Ritchie and 
Lewis (2003: 205) argued that qualitative researchers prefer to use categories and groups 
in order to discuss conceptual themes and make comparisons between them. 
"They prefer instead to see categories as ways of grouping, displaying and 
discussing data thematically such that comparisons between conceptual 
content can be made or further lines of enquiry pursued " (Ritchie and Lewis, 
2003: 205). 
Cresswell (2003: 191-195) pointed out generic steps similar to those in the general 
analytical approach specified by Collis and Hussey (2003: 264). Cresswell (2003: 206) 
summarises these steps in the following paragraph: 
"More generic steps include organizing and preparing the data, an initial 
reading through the information, coding the data, developing from the 
codes a description and thematic analysis, and representing the findings in 
tables, graphs, and figures. It also involves interpreting the data in the light 
ofpersonal lessons learned, comparing the findings with past literature and 
theory, raising questions and/or advancing an agenda for reform. " 
The main challenge in analysing qualitative data is how to reduce the large amount of 
data collected and how to construct a frame for this data, which could be used in 
analysis and findings (Collis and Hussey, 2003: 279). However, "few studies describe 
the methods adopted to analyse qualitative data sufficiently explicitly to provide a 
comprehensive guide" (Collis and Hussey, 2003: 279). 
Moreover, the focus in qualitative data is on data collection methods and findings, more 
than the analysis procedure. Collis and Hussey (2003: 280) remarked: 
"No matter how good the systems and procedures you adopt are, the quality 
of your analysis will depend on the quality of the data you have collected 
and your interpretations ". 
The researcher applied the steps of general analytical procedures in order to analyse the 
results of interviews data collected. The linkage between the interview analysis and the 
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steps of this approach will be explained in Chapter Eight, which will contain the 
interview information, the interview questions and the interview results. 
4.7 Summary 
This chapter has presented the research techniques and methods that were applied to 
achieve the research objectives. Quantitative and qualitative methods have been 
discussed and triangulation designs have been explained. The choice of sequential 
explanatory triangulation design has been explained noting, that this is the first time -as 
far as the researcher is aware- that such a design has been used in Jordan in exploring 
the issue of disclosure. 
As regards quantitative methods, the construction of a comprehensive disclosure index 
has been described and the selection, weighting and scoring of items for the index has 
been discussed. Aggregate, mandatory and voluntary indices were employed to achieve 
the first objective of the study related on describing the disclosure practices in Jordan. 
Meanwhile, aggregate and mandatory indices were used respectively for the purposes of 
the second and third goals of the study. 
The aggregate index consists of two groups: a mandatory index which contains 278 
items and a voluntary index which includes 53 items. In addition, the aggregate index 
encompasses nine groups of information and it includes quantitative and qualitative 
information. The reliability and validity of this index have been discussed. 
Hypotheses about independent variables were formulated in this chapter, in order to 
examine the relationship between the extent of aggregate disclosure and these 
explanatory variables for the year 2003. 
Moreover, the statistical techniques which were employed in this study have been 
highlighted generally. Detailed discussion of these techniques will be provided in the 
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following chapters. The final section in the discussion of quantitative methods described 
the sources of information, population and sample of this study. 
As regards qualitative methods, different types of interviews (i. e. structured and 
unstructured interviews) were discussed and compared. Coding and memoing were 
explained as major issues in interview data analysis. 
Different approaches (e. g. content analysis, grounded theory) to qualitative (interview) 
data analysis have been presented briefly, with their advantages and disadvantages. The 
interview data analysis employed in this study (general analytical procedures) was 
outlined as shown in Figure 4.6.3.4.1. More discussion about the interviews analysis 
and results will be contained in Chapter Eight. 
Finally, the next chapters (Chapters Five, Six, Seven and Eight) will report the results of 
the application of the research methods explained in this chapter. The evaluation of 
disclosure practices, disclosure impact, disclosure compliance and discussion of 
disclosure behaviour in Jordan will be presented in the next chapters of the study. 
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Chapter Five 
Aggregate Disclosure and its Relationship with Company 
Characteristics in the Jordanian Environment 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter deals with the first objective of the study, which was to evaluate the extent 
of aggregate, mandatory and voluntary disclosure practices for Jordanian companies 
listed on the ASE. Comprehensive descriptive statistics will be presented in order to 
evaluate the extent of AD, MD (DDAAS and IASs) and VD for Jordanian companies. 
This evaluation will be conducted for each company in the sample and for each item in 
the index. In addition, the extent of disclosure will be assessed for each group of 
information in the annual reports (e. g. balance sheet information, income statement 
information). Moreover, a detailed discussion for each IAS applicable in Jordan will be 
presented in order to determine the important IASs practices in Jordan. 
5.2 Descriptive Results of Companies' Disclosure Practices 
The extent of aggregate disclosure was explored for 121 companies using the aggregate 
disclosure index. The aggregate index includes 331 items of which 278 are mandatory 
and 53 are voluntary, divided into nine groups. A checklist comprising aggregate items 
was applied for each annual report in order to determine the extent of disclosure for 
each company. Wallace (1988: 355) argued that the disclosure index is a measure which 
can be used to compare the level of financial reporting among companies. He (1988: 355) 
stated 
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"It refers to the relative level of disclosure by a company and is the ratio of 
actual scores awarded to a company for the contents of its CAR'05 and the 
scores which that company is expected to earn. " 
The unweighted approach was adopted in this study in order to score the disclosure 
index. According to this approach, not all items were applicable for each company. 
Therefore, if a particular item was not disclosed by a company because it was 
inapplicable, the company would not be penalized for that 106. The aggregate disclosure 
(AD) was calculated as a ratio, by dividing the actual scores awarded by the maximum 
possible scores (M) appropriate for the company. The same approach was used to assign 
scores for both mandatory and voluntary indices. Mandatory disclosure (MD) was 
calculated by dividing the actual mandatory scores by the total possible mandatory 
scores (TMD) appropriate for the company. Voluntary disclosure (VD) was computed 
by dividing the actual voluntary scores by the total possible voluntary scores (TVD) 
appropriate for the company. Those three indices, AD, MD and VD represent the 
dependent variables for this study. AD was used to achieve the first objective, while AD 
and MD were used for the purpose of the second and third objectives respectively. For 
each company, the extent of disclosure (AD, MD and VD) varies as a percentage from 
0% if the company did not disclose any item to 100% if the company disclosed all the 
applicable items. Table 5.2.1 displays the descriptive statistics of the three indices: AD, 
MD and VD. 
Table 5.2.1: The descriptive statistics of the three indices: AD, MD and VD 
Disclosure 
Index 
No. of 
items 
Mean 
(%) 
Standard 
Deviation % 
Maximum 
% 
Minimum 
(0/0) 
Range 
(0/0) 
AD 331 69.30 6.79 85.58 47.93 37.65 
MD 278 83.12 5.63 93.75 63.87 29.88 
VD 53 34.51 12.24 70.59 5.88 64.71 
105 CAR refers to corporate annual report 106 See Chapter three part 3.2.3 for more details about this approach 
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As seen from the table, the average level of aggregate disclosure was 69%. In other 
words, 69% of the 331 items of aggregate disclosure were disclosed by the 121 
companies studied. This percentage exceeds those revealed by the previous studies of 
disclosure in Jordan, as shown in Table 5.2.2. 
In addition, the aggregate disclosure index varied among companies and ranged from a 
low of 48% (Inma Investment and Financial Facilities Company) to a high of 86% 
(Jordan Telecom). This range differs from those in the previous studies in Jordan, as 
shown in Table 5.2.2. 
Table 5.2.2: The extent of disclosure level and range in previous studies in Jordan 
Range 
Study Year Level of Disclosure (%) Minimum (%) Maximum (%) 
Al-Issa 1988 44 10 77 
Suwaidan 1997 39 16 65 
1995 45 27 64 
1996 46 26 64 
Al-Shiab 1997 47 28 68 
1998 51 33 75 
1999 54 33 90 
2000 56 16 91 
These results show the disclosure level (69%) has increased compared with other 
Jordanian studies. This study tested the extent of aggregate disclosure (mandatory and 
voluntary) in Jordan. Al-Issa's (1988) and Suwaidan's (1997) studies explored the level 
of disclosure in Jordan before the new regulations (before SEC Law No. 23 for the year 
1997). Therefore, the nature of their disclosure was voluntary. 
Suwaidan (1997: 231) pointed out that the level of voluntary disclosure for Jordanian 
companies was low. He (1997: 232) suggested strengthening the regulatory reporting 
system in order to increase the level of disclosure. 
" The fact that the legal disclosure requirements in Jordan are few and at 
best expressed in general terms allows companies to have a great deal of 
freedom over their reporting policies" (Suwaidan, 199 7: 232). 
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Meanwhile, Al-Shiab's study examined the compliance with IASs for two periods: the 
mandatory action period (1995-1998) and post mandatory action period (1998-2000). 
Although he found that the compliance with IASs was higher for the post-period than 
the pre-period, he discovered that there was a drift up (not a jump up as expected) in the 
level of disclosure over the period 1995-2000. In addition, Al-Shiab (2003: 381) 
concluded that the overall disclosure was low for both periods (pre and post mandatory 
action). In this regard, Al-Shiab supported Ahmed and Nicholls' (1994: 62) view, that 
there are incentives for voluntary disclosure in developing countries when companies do 
not comply with mandatory requirements. 
This study is the most comprehensive study of mandatory and voluntary disclosure in 
Jordan to date. Furthermore, Al-Shiab's study focused on compliance with IASs, which 
is only part of mandatory disclosure requirements in Jordan. This study explored all 
mandatory requirements in Jordan (basically JSC requirements and IASs). SEC 
requirements are an important source of disclosure requirements, which improve the 
level of disclosure in developing countries. Craig and Diga (1998: 251) argued that SEC 
regulations are often a significant source of disclosure requirements. "They determine 
company listing criteria, impose continuing reporting obligations and mandate specific 
items of disclosure" (Craig and Diga, 1998: 25 1). 
In addition, a reasonable explanation for the higher average of disclosure level in this 
study could be the large number of items which the index included. As indicated in 
Appendix 4.5.1.3.1, the disclosure index was composed of 331 items of information, 
compared to 31 for Al-Issa (1988), 75 for Suwaidan (1997) and 273 for Al-Shiab's 
(2003). In addition, each item was supported by previous studies and the regulations 
(for mandatory items only) are indicated. 
An analysis of the mandatory disclosure index (MD) revealed that the disclosure level 
varied from 64% to 94%. On average, a company disclosed 83% of the 278 mandatory 
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items included in the index. Moreover, the extent of disclosure according to the 
regulations, DDAAS and IASs, is shown in Table 5.2.3. 
Table 5.2.3: Extent of mandatory disclosure according to DDAAS, IASs and 
DDAAS+IASs 
Disclosure No. of Mean of Standard Maximum Minimum 
Regulation items disclosure 
(%) 
Deviation 
(%) 
% Frequencies % Frequencies 
DDAAS 25 82.92 14.51 100 11 20.83 1 
IASs 239 82.32 5.60 92.71 1 67.42 1 
DDAAS+IASs 
(both) 14 91.18 12.72 100 66 50 1 
The table shows that the maximum mean of disclosure for items mandated in both 
DDAAS+IASs regulations was 91%. A company disclosed, on average, 91% of 
DDAAS+IASs regulation items (14 items), which exceeds the average disclosure 
percentage for each regulation, 83% for DDAAS and 82% for IASs. It is interesting to 
note that none of the Jordanian companies disclosed all IASs items, whereas 11 and 66 
companies disclosed all DDAAS items and all DDAAS+IASs items, respectively. The 
maximum percentage of compliance with IASs was 93%, which is approximately 
similar to Al-Shiab's (2003: 279) results concerning compliance with IASs for Jordanian 
companies after lASs were applied in 1998 (90% for 1999 and 91% for 2000). 
What can be inferred from the previous analysis, is that the level of mandatory 
disclosure has increased for Jordanian companies by 2003, since the mean was 83%, 
compared to Al-Shiab's findings (2003: 279) for 1999 and 2000 (54% and 56% 
respectively). This difference could be ascribed to the fact that this study covers all 
mandatory disclosure requirements in Jordan (DDAAS and IASs), while Al-Shiab 
focused on IASs only. Further analysis revealed that Jordanian companies comply with 
items mandated in both regulations (DDAAS+IASs) more than those in any one of these 
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regulations. Thus, Jordanian companies have responded to the new regulations 
positively and the regulations have had an effect in enhancing the disclosure level for 
Jordanian corporations. "This might give an indication that the mandatory action played 
a vital role in increasing the level of disclosure regarding the IAS" (Al-Shiab, 2003: 381). 
Owusu-Ansa and Yeoh (2005: 92) argued that companies comply with mandatory 
disclosure if the regulation system is effective and has adequate enforcement 
mechanisms, and sanctions for non compliance. They suggested (2005: 108), 
"Corporate compliance with regulatory disclosure requirements could be 
improved with stringent enforcement mechanisms such as legal backing of 
financial accounting standards ". 
The extent of voluntary disclosure, as can seen from Table 5.2.1, varies within the range 
of 6% to 71%. This range did not vary significantly from other voluntary disclosure 
studies: Al-Isla in 1988 (10-77%) and Suwaidan in 1997 (16-65%). In addition, 34% of 
the 53 voluntary items in this study was disclosed by all Jordanian companies. This ratio 
is slightly lower than the voluntary disclosure average level in Al-Issa (1988) and 
Suwaidan (1997) (44% and 39% respectively). 
Thus, an interesting point to note is that there are incentives for voluntary disclosure in 
Jordan, though the compliance with mandatory disclosure has increased significantly. 
Watson, Shrives and Marston (2003: 289) argued that companies still disclose voluntary 
items although mandatory requirements are increased. The motivation for such a 
disclosure has been discussed by Dye (1985: 546,1986: 353) who considered the effect 
of mandatory requirements on voluntary disclosure. This effect depends on whether 
mandatory and voluntary disclosures are substitutes or complements. If they are 
substitutes, more disclosure requirements will reduce voluntary disclosure (Dye, 
1985: 546), but if they are complements, more mandatory disclosure may increase the 
level of voluntary disclosure. Naser and Nuseibeh (2003: 57) supported this perspective, 
since they found a positive association between mandatory and voluntary disclosure 
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(r = 0.53, p<. 000). Therefore, the relationship between mandatory and voluntary 
disclosure is not independent. 107 
"Predictions about voluntary disclosure are not independent of the 
reporting requirements, and the effect of accounting requirements on 
voluntary disclosure is ambiguous: it is not necessarily the case that 
companies required to disclose more voluntarily disclosure less and vice- 
versa" (Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995: 48) 
It should be noted that the previous voluntary disclosure studies in Jordan were 
conducted before the new regulations. Therefore, the type of disclosure was voluntary 
since there was no regulatory enactment for disclosure practices. Many of the voluntary 
items that were in the previous studies have become mandatory through the new 
regulations in 1998, as will be discussed later in Chapter Seven Part 7.7. 
Table 5.2.4 shows the extent of aggregate, mandatory and voluntary disclosure for each 
of the 121 Jordanian companies, in descending order. 
107 The relationship between mandatory and voluntary disclosure was discussed in details in Chapter Two, 
Section 2.3.1.3 
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Table 5.2.4: Extent of aggregate, mandatory and voluntary disclosure for 
Jordanian companies 
Rank Company Name Type of 
Company 
Aggregate 
Disclosure 
(°/U) 
Mandatory 
Disclosure 
(%) 
Voluntary 
Disclosure 
(%) 
1 Jordan Telecom Services Services 85.58 90.24 70.59 
2 Jordan Phosphate Mines Industry 84.54 92.86 60.38 
3 Arab Potash Industry Industry 83.82 89.54 66.67 
4 Jordan Electric Power Services 82.59 86.67 70.59 
5 Jordanian Petroleum Industry 80.42 89.78 55.77 
6 Jordan Loan Guarantee Corporation Services 80.23 86.51 64.71 
7 Jordan Investment Trust Services 79.68 88.32 56.00 
8 Dar AI-Dawa Development and 
Investment 
Industry 78.95 93.48 40.38 
9 Jordan Steel Industry 78.84 89.87 50.00 
10 Jordan Press Foundation Al-Raai Services 78.38 84.21 63.46 
11 International Tobacco & Cigarettes Industry 77.83 86.75 51.92 
12 Jordan Cement Factories Industry 77.45 89.47 42.31 
13 Arabian Steel Pipes Manufacturing Industry 77.13 91.11 41.51 
14 National Electric Power Co. Services 76.96 83.12 58.00 
15 Jordan Central Services 76.88 88.44 44.23 
16 Jordan Mortgage Refinance Services 76.83 90.35 46.00 
17 Jordan Paper & Cardboard Factories Industry 76.50 90.84 40.38 
18 Middle East Pharm. and Chemical Ind. & 
Medical Appliances 
Industry 75.84 89.68 42.31 
19 Al-Ahlia Commercial Centres Services 75.58 90.76 41.51 
20 Specialized Investment Compounds Services 75.56 83.91 47.06 
20 Al-Bilad Medical Services Services 75.56 86.82 47.06 
22 Central Electricity Generating (CEGCO) Services 75.51 85.03 46.94 
22 General Investment Industry 75.51 90.28 34.62 
24 Jordan Rockwool Industries Industry 75.29 87.10 46.00 
25 The Arab Chemical Detergents Industry Industry 74.73 89.55 36.54 
25 National Steel Industries Industry 74.73 84.96 49.06 
27 Ready Mix Concrete and Construction 
Supplies 
Industry 74.32 91.60 30.77 
28 Petra Tourism Transport Services 73.94 86.13 41.18 
29 The Arab Pharmactical Manufacturing Industry 73.58 90.00 30.19 
30 Jordan Dairy Industry 73.54 88.32 34.62 
31 The Public Mining Industry 73.50 90.48 26.42 
32 Arab Centre For Pharmaceutical and 
Chemical Industries 
Industry 73.48 89.15 34.62 
33 Jordan Industrial Resources Industry 73.33 93.75 23.08 
34 Jordanian Pipes Manufacturin Industry 73.18 88.19 36.54 
35 Jordan Wood Industries JWICO Industry 73.03 87.30 38.46 
36 Jordan Press and Publishing (Al-Dustour) Services 72.88 86.40 40.38 
37 Pearl Sanitary Paper Converting Industry 72.83 89.34 33.33 
38 Middle East Complex for Eng. 
Electronics and Heavy Industries EC) 
Industry 72.68 84.31 38.46 
39 Advances Pharmacetical Industries Industry 72.58 85.19 39.22 
40 Al-Ekbal Printing and Packaging Industry 72.53 85.38 40.38 
41 Jordan Express Transport Services 72.31 87.41 30.77 
42 United Textile Group Industry 72.25 89.29 25.49 
43 United Financial Investments Services 72.16 79.20 54.90 
44 Jordan Tannin Industry 72.09 85.95 39.22 
45 National Poul (Watania) Industry 72.04 84.33 40.38 
46 Jordan National Shipping Lines Services 71.86 88.44 25.00 
47 Jordan Vegetable Oil Industries industry 71.67 88.28 30.77 
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48 Union Advanced Industries Industry 71.58 86.26 34.62 
48 Arab International for Education and 
Investment 
Services 71.58 84.89 35.29 
50 Jordan International Trading Centre 
(JITCO) 
Services 71.51 85.94 35.29 
50 National Aluminium Industries Industry 71.51 88.98 28.85 
52 International Petro Chemicals Industries Industry 71.27 83.08 41.18 
53 Jordan Specialized Investments Services 71.04 82.71 40.00 
54 The Industrial, Commercial and 
Agricultural (ICA)/Al-Entag 
Industry 70.79 89.76 23.53 
55 Zara Investment Holding Services 70.53 82.05 35.29 
56 National Chlorine Industries Industry 70.43 85.07 32.69 
57 Jordan Ceramic Industries (JOCECA) Industry 70.27 81.06 43.40 
58 Jordan Poultry Processing and Marketing Industry 70.11 83.33 36.54 
59 Irbid District Electricity Services 70.05 80.15 43.14 
60 National Petroleum Company Industry 69.54 84.43 34.62 
61 Jordan New Cable Industry 69.27 81.89 38.46 
61 Jordan Industries and Match (JIMCO) Industry 69.27 86.61 26.92 
63 The Jordan Worsted Mills Industry 69.19 85.71 26.92 
64 Rum Alaaddin Industries Industry 69.01 82.26 34.04 
65 Al-Tan eeb Construction Manufacturing Industry 68.89 79.84 41.18 
66 Century Investment Group Services 68.87 78.26 39.22 
67 Natri Dar Industry 68.79 84.43 31.37 
68 The Union Tobacco & Cigarette 
Industries 
Industry 68.62 83.82 28.85 
69 Jordan Hotels and Tourism Services 68.51 80.92 36.00 
70 Arab Electrical Industries Industry 68.42 79.14 39.22 
71 Arab Aluminium Industry/ARAL Industry 68.28 79.85 38.46 
72 Universal Chemical Industries Industry 68.00 83.74 30.77 
73 Electricity Distribution Services 67.89 77.14 42.00 
74 International Ceramic Industries Industry 67.78 78.91 40.38 
75 Arab International Food Factories Industry 67.65 82.50 32.00 
76 Arab Engineering Industries Industry 67.61 76.80 45.10 
77 Real Estate Development (REXIO) Services 67.44 82.64 31.37 
78 AI-Dawl a for Hotels & Malls Services 67.25 81.97 30.61 
79 Jordan Chemical Industries Industry 67.21 83.97 25.00 
80 Arab International Hotels Services 66.85 81.10 31.37 
81 Al-Shay Investment Projects (Holding) Services 66.67 80.60 30.77 
82 Union Investment Corporation Services 66.29 81.45 29.41 
83 Jordan Himmeh Mineral Services 65.84 83.78 26.00 
84 Real Estate Investment (AKARKO) Services 65.76 80.45 27.45 
85 Al-Zarka Education & Investing Services 65.71 81.30 28.85 
86 Mediterranean Tourism Investment Services 65.56 81.54 24.00 
86 Jordan Sulpha Chemicals Industry 65.56 78.29 33.33 
88 Vehicles Owners Federation Services 65.27 82.91 24.00 
89 Al-Janoub Filters Manufacturing Industry 65.24 82.46 26.00 
89 Jordan Trade Facilities Services 65.24 79.82 32.00 
91 Jordan Projects for Tourism 
Development 
Services 64.94 80.16 25.00 
91 National Textile and Plastic Industries Industry 64.94 80.49 27.45 
93 Jordanian Duty Free Shops Services 64.71 77.94 29.41 
94 Batelco Jordan Services 64.64 80.77 23.53 
95 Modern Food Industries & Vegetable Oil Industry 64.61 81.89 21.57 
96 Union Land Development Corporation Services 64.60 84.55 21.57 
97 United Arab Investors Services 64.40 80.00 21.57 
98 International Silica Industries Industry 64.38 80.73 29.41 
99 Amana for Agricultural and Industrial 
Investment 
Industry 63.69 80.47 21.57 
100 Union Chemical and Vegetable Oil 
Industries 
Industry 62.86 76.61 29.41 
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101 Trust International Transport Services 62.64 72.13 40.38 
102 National Portfolio Securities Services 62.28 77.78 26.00 
103 Arab East Investment Services 62.22 75.97 27.45 
104 International for Optical & Hearing Aid 
Industries (AICO) 
Industry 61.99 77.50 25.94 
105 Falcon for Investing and Financial 
Services 
Services 61.88 79.23 17.65 
106 The United Middle East & Commodore 
Hotels 
Services 61.49 78.86 19.61 
106 Jordan International Industries Industry 61.49 82.11 11.76 
108 National Cable and Wire Manufacturing 
(Cableco) 
Industry 60.69 77.87 19.61 
109 Al-Tajamouat for Catering & Housing 
Co. 
Services 60.47 75.21 25.49 
110 International for Medical Investments 
Co. 
Industry 60.00 76.42 21.15 
111 Woollen Industries Industry 59.89 76.74 18.87 
112 The Unified for Organizing Land 
Transport 
Services 59.88 74.38 25.49 
113 Al-Amin for Investments Services 59.34 74.81 19.61 
114 Arab Real Estate Development Services 59.26 74.77 25.49 
115 Travertine Industry 58.58 74.79 20.00 
116 Al-Salam Investment Services 58.38 80.00 14.29 
117 Specialized Trading & Investment Services 57.63 73.81 17.65 
118 Machinery Equipment Renting & 
Maintenance 
Services 57.54 74.02 17.31 
119 Jordanian Job Opportunities Services 57.24 68.27 33.33 
120 Arab Paper Converting & Trading Industry 47.95 65.83 5.88 
121 Inma Investment & Financial Advances Services 47.93 63.87 10.00 
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As shown in the table above, Jordan Telecom disclosed more aggregate information 
(85.58%) than other companies, whereas Al-Inma Investment & Financial Facilities was 
the lowest aggregate disclosing company (47.93%). 
As regards the extent of mandatory disclosure, the highest score for compliance with 
this was 94%, by Al-Mward Industrial Jordanian Company. This company ranked 
thirty-first in aggregate disclosure (73%). This low ranking in aggregate disclosure level 
for the number one mandatory disclosing company is due to the low score for the extent 
of voluntary disclosure, 23%. On the other hand, Al-Inma Investment & Financial 
Facilities Company, which had the lowest aggregate disclosure score, had also the 
lowest mandatory disclosure score (64%). 
As regards the extent of voluntary disclosure, Jordan Telecom, the highest aggregate 
disclosing company, disclosed also more voluntary information than any other company 
(71%). Meanwhile, the lowest score for voluntary disclosure was 6%, for the Arab 
Paper Converting & Trading Company. 
Table 5.2.5 illustrates the distribution of the three indices among the companies 
according to the number of companies which scored below and above a specific level of 
disclosure. 
Table 5.2.5: Distribution of the three indices among companies 
Aggregate Disclosure Mandatory Disclosure Voluntary Disclosure 
Index Score 
(%) 
No. of 
Companies % 
No. of 
Companies % 
No. of 
Companies % 
More than 80 6 4.96 89 73.55 - - 
70-80 53 43.80 29 23.97 2 1.65 
60-70 50 41.32 3 2.48 4 3.30 
50-60 10 8.26 - - 6 4.96 
Less than 50 2 1.65 - - 109 90.00 
Total 121 100 121 100 121 100 
The table shows that 119 companies out of 121 (98%) had an aggregate disclosure level 
more than 50%. This percentage exceeds significantly the percentages in Suwaidan 
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(1997), 9%, and Al-Issa (1988), 45%. Moreover, disclosure in the majority of Jordanian 
companies (103 companies) fell between 60-80%. In addition, 73% of the sample 
companies had more than 80% mandatory disclosure, whereas 90% of these companies 
had less than 50% voluntary disclosure. Three companies scored 60-70% for mandatory 
disclosure and four companies scored the same percentage for voluntary disclosure. 
It is clear, therefore, that the extent of disclosure varies among Jordanian companies. 
This variation differs in terms of type of disclosure, aggregate, mandatory or voluntary. 
In order to explain the extent of this variation, some variables will be examined (e. g. 
size, leverage, profitability) in order to show their relationship with this variation. 
Further discussion will be presented later in this chapter. 
5.3 Contents of the Annual Reports 
Appendix 5.3.1 shows the extent of disclosure for each item in the index. The extent of 
disclosure is calculated by dividing the number of companies disclosing this item (the 
numerator) by the number of companies to which the item is applicable (the 
denominator). Each item is classified as mandatory or voluntary. For mandatory items, 
the relevant regulations (DDAAS, IASs or both of them) that support this item are 
shown. 
The results that can be drawn from Appendix 5.3.1 are summarized as follows: 
1- Sixty four items (19%) were disclosed by 100% of Jordanian companies, while only 
seven items (2%) were not disclosed by any Jordanian companies. These items will be 
highlighted in the next section, when analysing the extent of disclosure for each group 
in the index. The distribution of these items according to the nine groups in the index is 
presented in Table 5.3.2. 
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As can seen in the table, 63 items (98%), which were disclosed by 100% of the 
companies are mandatory, whereas only one item (2%) (information on major industry 
trends) is voluntary. However, the majority of non-disclosed items (71%) are mandatory 
also, while 29% of these items are voluntary. 
2- One hundred and eight items (33%) were disclosed by more than 95% of Jordanian 
companies. Meanwhile, 27 items (8%) were disclosed by less than 10% of these 
companies. 
3- Less than 50% of Jordanian companies disclosed 19% (64 items) of the items. 
Twenty seven (42%) of these items are mandatory, while 37 (58%) items are voluntary. 
4- Eighteen items (5%) were disclosed once by Jordanian companies. 
5- For mandatory items, none of the DDAAS+IASs items were disclosed by less than 
50% of Jordanian companies. In addition, five items (out of 14) from DDAAS+IASs 
items were disclosed by 100% of Jordanian companies. 
Overall, the scope of Jordanian companies' disclosure in the annual reports varies. An 
analysis of the items in each group will highlight the importance of each group in 
explaining the extent of total disclosure. 
"The reader is encouraged to make an item-by-item examination of the 
exhibit to get some indication of the approximate importance to analysts of 
the various information items. In addition, the reader can determine the 
extent of disclosure of the various items in the annual reports" (Stange, 
1976: 47). 
Moreover, Suwaidan (1997: 136) pointed out that such an analysis (item by item 
analysis) provides an alternative tool to evaluate the disclosure practices among 
companies. The next section will discuss the extent of disclosure among the groups of 
information which constitute the disclosure index. 
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5.4 Specific Disclosure Practices 
The aggregate disclosure index was disaggregated into nine indices (Table 5.4.1) to 
reflect the level of disclosure for the following groups: general information; balance 
sheet; income statement; cash flow and changes in equity statements; other statements, 
supplementary information and notes; financial history, ratios and other analysis, 
projected and management information, and market based information. 
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The table above shows that the group mean of disclosure varies from a minimum of 
31 % for market based information, to a maximum of 94% for "cash flow and changes in 
equity statements". Moreover, the standard deviation which indicates the level of 
variation for the extent of disclosure ranges from 6% for "cash flow and changes in 
equity statements", to 21% for "financial history information". Detailed analysis for 
each group is presented next, based on Tables 5.3.1 and 5.4.1. 
5.4.1 General Information 
The information in this group includes, basically, the chairman's statement and the 
directors' report. Seventeen items in this group (55%) scored a disclosure level over 
90%, while three items (10%) obtained a disclose score less than 60%. The mean of 
disclosure was 85%, with a range from 45% for the disclosure of the "company's 
commitment to international quality standards", to 100% for the following items : 
description of business nature and the company's activities and subsidiaries, 
information on major industry trends, currency of the financial statements, period 
covered by the financial statements, and the name of the parent enterprise and the 
ultimate parent enterprise of the group. 
This group consists of twenty seven mandatory items and four voluntary items. The 
next table illustrates the mean disclosure for these items. 
Table 5.4.1.1: Extent of aggregate, mandatory and voluntary General Information 
disclosure 
General Information Disclosure Mean (%) Standard Deviation (%) 
General Information aggregate disclosure 85.41 12.90 
General Information mandatory disclosure 85.37 13.87 
General Information voluntary disclosure 85.95 15.77 
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It is interesting to note that the voluntary disclosure mean was slightly higher (86%) 
than the aggregate and mandatory disclosure means for the General Information group. 
Moreover, "information on major industry trends" (a voluntary item) was disclosed by 
all the companies in the sample. Thus, Jordanian companies have incentives to disclose 
general voluntary information, since this group contains many qualitative information 
items, such as: "brief history of the company" and "general outlook of the economy", 
which enables the companies to provide various voluntary information. Mandatory 
General Information items were divided into three parts: DDAAS General Information 
items, IASs General Information items and DDAAS+IASs General Information items. 
The number of items in each group was 16,5 and 6 respectively. None of the DDAAS 
General Information items had a full disclosure level (100%). Meanwhile, three items of 
IASs ("currency of the financial statements", "period covered by the financial 
statements", and "the name of parent enterprise and the ultimate parent enterprise of the 
group") scored 100% for extent of disclosure. Hence, the regulations may focus on IASs 
in order to improve the extent of disclosure of general information. 
5.4.2 Balance Sheet 
Balance sheet information was heavily disclosed in Jordanian annual reports, since 
these items had a high disclosure mean (91%). In addition, the standard deviation (7%) 
shows a small variation among the items in the group. All the items in this group are 
mandatory except one item, "provisions for marketable securities". This item scored the 
lowest level of disclosure (within market value of marketable securities item (30%)). 
Eleven mandatory items were disclosed by all Jordanian companies to which they were 
applicable: cash and cash equivalents, cost of marketable securities, total carrying 
amount of inventory, PPE carried at its cost (gross value) less any accumulated 
depreciation, held-to maturity investment measured at amortized cost and those that do 
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not have a fixed maturity measured at cost, total value of intangible assets, taxes 
payable, the amount of contingencies and commitments, total amount of owners' equity, 
number of shares held in treasury and shares in the enterprise held by the enterprise 
itself or by subsidiaries or associates of the enterprise. 
What can be inferred is that IASs have had a significant effect in increasing the 
disclosure level in the balance sheet. Nine of the fully-disclosed items are required by 
IASs whereas one item (the "amount of contingencies and commitments") is required 
by both DDAAS+IASs. The last item, treasury shares, which is not common accounting 
disclosure practice in Jordan (only three companies disclosed this item, as it was 
applicable for them), is required by DDAAS only. 
Thirty one items in the group (66%) had a disclosure level more than 90%, while only 
two items (4%) had a disclosure level less than 50%. 
IASs form the major base for balance sheet information. Standards No. 1,2,12,16,22, 
32 form the major components of this information. IAS 1, "presentation of financial 
statements", is the principal standard in this group, since 32 items (out of 47) in the 
balance sheet are related to this standard. This standard aims to provide the basis for a 
general view of the financial statement in order to compare it with those of previous 
periods and other enterprises. 108 "To meet this objective, financial statements provide 
information about the enterprise's: a) assets b) liabilities c) equity d) income and 
expenses, including gains and losses; and cash flow"109. The items in the balance sheet 
group were divided into three categories: 25 assets information, 11 liabilities 
information and 11 owners' equity information. 
108 IAS 1, Objectives, IASC, "International Financial Reporting Standards 2003", 2003, IASCF 
Publications Department, London, p 1-6 
109 IAS 1, Purpose of financial statements, IASC, "International Financial Reporting Standards 2003", 
2003, IASCF Publications Department, London, p 1-7 
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It is worth mentioning that many balance sheet items (e. g. "prepaid expenses", "taxes 
payable", "the number of shares authorized for each class of shares capital") were 
disclosed mostly in supplementary information and notes. IAS 1 par. 66 mentions the 
minimum items that should be displayed in the face of the balance sheet. 110 However, 
this standard did not provide guidance regarding the format or the order in which this 
information should be presented. In addition, this information is varied and can be 
modified to adopt to the company's nature and activities. "' Therefore, Jordanian 
companies' major concern was to disclose such items, more than to disclose them 
specifically on the face of the balance sheet or as supplementary information. Similarly, 
the concern of this research is with whether Jordanian companies disclose such items or 
not, rather than where it is disclosed. 
5.4.3 Income Statement 
The level of disclosure in this group was similar to that found in the balance sheet. The 
mean disclosure was 90% with a low standard deviation of 8%. Items such as "net 
revenues", "total amounts of operating expenses", and "net profit or loss" were 
disclosed by all Jordanian companies to which they were applicable. 
"Extraordinary gains or losses" were not common in Jordan, as they were applicable 
and disclosed by only two companies. In addition, four companies disclosed "gains and 
losses of discontinued operation" (this item was applicable for them only). Two of these 
companies displayed them on the face of income statement, and the other two displayed 
them in supplementary information and notes. 
110 IAS 1, par. 66, IASC, "International Financial Reporting Standards 2003", 2003, IASCF Publications 
Department, London, p 1-24 
111 IAS 1, par. 68 and 69, IASC, "International Financial Reporting Standards 2003", 2003, IASCF 
Publications Department, London, p 1-25 
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On the other hand, two items only had a disclosure score less than 70%, "interest 
revenue" (58%), and "breakdown of operating expenses into selling, administrative and 
general"(62%). None of the income statement information had a disclosure level less 
than 60%. 
Additionally, 80% of companies disclosed "gross profit (or loss)", while "net profit or 
loss" was disclosed by all companies. The reason could be that "net profit or loss" is 
mandated by more regulations (i. e. DDAAS+IASs) than gross profit (IASs only). 
Moreover, five items are required by DDAAS+IASs regulations. Three of them, "net 
revenues", "net profit or loss" and "nature and amount of each extraordinary item", had 
a disclosure level of 100%. The other two items, "income tax expense" and "minority 
rights in the profit" items had 97% and 94% level of disclosure respectively. 
The only voluntary item in the income statement, "transfers to capital reserves", had a 
high disclosure score of 98%. 
Finally, some items, for instance, "dividends revenue" and "earnings per share", were 
disclosed variously in the face of income statement or elsewhere (i. e. supplementary 
information and notes). IAS 1 par. 75 mentioned the minimum items which should be 
disclosed in the face of the income statement 112. Moreover, income statement 
information (like balance sheet information) is varied and IASs provides alternative 
13 formats for displaying such items' Overall, Jordanian companies reflect a high level 
of disclosure for income statement information. Both IASs and DDAAS have a major 
effect on increasing disclosure level. 
1! 2 IAS 1, par. 75, IASC, "International Financial Reporting Standards 2003", 2003, IASCF Publications 
Department, London, p 1-28 
113 For further information, see IAS 1, par. 77-84, IASC, "International Financial Reporting Standards 
2003", 2003, IASCF Publications Department, London, pp 1-29,1-30 
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5.4.4 Cash flow and Changes in Equity Statements 
Jordanian companies disclosed information related to this group more than the other 
groups in the index, since the mean disclosure for this group (94%) was higher than for 
the other eight groups. In addition, the variation, as shown by the standard deviation, 
was 6%, lower than for the other groups. The mandating of these items by IASs and 
DDAAS could be the possible reason for this high level of disclosure, as noticed also in 
other statements (balance sheet and income statement). In addition, the Companies Act 
No. 22 for the year 1997, Article 40, requires companies to prepare: balance sheet, 
income statement, cash flow statement, supplementary information and notes, and 
chairman's report. Thus, increased mandatory requirements affect the level of disclosure 
positively, as evident in Table 5.4.1. 
This group of information was divided into two sections: cash flow information (12 
items) and changes in equity statement information (6 items). All the items in both 
sections are mandatory. 
All companies presented "cash flow statements as an integral part of their financial 
statements", but two companies (out of 121) failed to present "a statement of changes 
on owners' equity". The presentation of these two statements is mandated by 
IASs+DDAAS. Other items, are required by IASs only, were disclosed by all 
companies (cash flow information only): reporting cash flow classified by operating, 
investing and financial activities; cash flow from operating activities should be reported 
using either the direct method or the indirect method; reporting major classes of gross 
cash receipts and gross cash payments arising from investing and financing activities 
separately, the effect of exchange rate changes on cash and cash equivalents held or due 
in foreign currency should be presented separately from cash flows from operating, 
investing and financing activities; the aggregate cash flow arising from acquisition and 
from disposals of subsidiaries or other business units should be presented separately and 
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classified as investing activities; and the financial statements should include a 
reconciliation of the amount of cash flow statement with the equivalent items reported 
on the balance sheet. 
On the other hand, less than 60% of Jordanian companies disclosed these two items : 
"cash flow from interests and dividends received and paid should be disclosed 
separately", and "cash flow arising from taxes on income should be separated disclosed 
and should be classified as cash flow from operating activities unless they can be 
specifically identified with financing activities". 
Turning to changes in owners' equity items, none of the items scored a full disclosure 
level (100%). The lowest level of disclosure for those items was related to "the 
cumulative effect of changes on accounting policy and correction of fundamental errors 
item" (71%). However, 99% of Jordanian companies displayed "net profit or loss for 
the period in the changes in equity statement", and also prepared a "reconciliation 
between the carrying amount of each class of equity capital at the beginning and the end 
of the period". 
In general, the compliance with requirements related to the information in this group 
plays a significant role in increasing the level of disclosure for both statements: cash 
flow and changes in owners' equity statements. 
5.4.5 Other Statements, Supplementary Information and Notes 
This group was the largest group, as it contained 47% of all disclosure index items (157 
items out of 331). 71% of information in this group was disclosed by the sample 
companies, with a range from 41% to 86%. All, but one, of the items are mandatory and 
required by IASs only. The voluntary item is "market value of inventory". The 
information in this group varies from company to company according to its nature and 
activities. However, the review of annual reports revealed that this information could be 
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divided into three major categories: first, general notes about the company, such as date 
of incorporation, company status and company's goals and main activities. Second, 
significant accounting policies adopted by Jordanian companies, for example, inventory 
method, depreciation and revenue recognition. Third, supplementary notes, which 
provide more details about the main numbers of the financial statements, as a 
breakdown of these numbers. The latter was the largest in this group and it interpreted 
the main items in financial statements enhanced by numbers. Examples of these notes 
were: breakdown of receivables, breakdown of inventories, breakdown of PPE and 
breakdown of expenses. 
To explain the disclosure practices related to this group, one can notice that twenty five 
IASs constitute the structure of this group. However, analysis of these standards was not 
only to illustrate the level of compliance with each particular standard, but also to 
introduce the disclosure practices included in this standard. Thus, the following 
discussion aims to obtain a greater level of understanding about disclosure practices for 
Jordanian companies. 
5.4.5.1 IAS 1: Presentation of Financial Statements 
Much information related to this standard was explained before in the financial 
statements groups (i. e. balance sheet, income statement). None of the sample companies 
prepared "a separate statement of retained earnings". An explanation for this result 
could be that the major components of this statement (e. g. net profit or loss for the 
period, transaction with owners) were included in the changes in owners' equity 
statement. Hence, Jordanian companies did not choose to repeat these items in another 
statement. 
Another important note was that 68% of Jordanian companies disclosed "the fact that 
their financial statements comply with IASs". Companies must not disclose that they 
comply with IASs, unless they comply with all requirements of each applicable standard. 
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However, Jordanian companies mentioned this fact in the beginning of their significant 
accounting policies in order to enhance the perceived reliability of their financial 
statements. A further examination to ensure whether Jordanian companies actually 
comply with all requirements for each applicable standard is needed. However, the 
researcher supposed that if Jordanian companies disclosed this fact, then they were 
complying with IASs in general, even if they did not actually comply with all the 
requirements of each standard. 
Moving to other important disclosures, all statements published in the annual reports for 
all Jordanian companies included "comparative information for the previous period". 
This practice is supported by Companies Act Law No. 22 for the year 1997,114 which 
requires companies to show comparative financial statements. "The provision of such 
figures gives the external users the opportunity to conduct comparative analysis of the 
performance of the company" (Al-Mulhem, 1997: 215). 
Furthermore, all Jordanian companies "analysed the expenses using a classification 
based on either nature of expenses or their function within the enterprise". In addition, 
all companies disclosed "the accounting policies, including the measurement basis used 
in preparing the financial statements". 
However, none of Jordanian companies disclosed "the rights, preferences and 
restrictions for each class of share capital". Shareholding Jordanian companies issue 
only one type of shares, common stock' 15 Hence, it is not common accounting practice 
for Jordanian companies to disclose the rights and restrictions for common stock. 
Finally, only two companies disclosed the "level of precision used in the presentation of 
figures in the financial statements" (the decimal places used to show the precision of 
figures in the financial statements). 
114 Companies Act Law No. 22,1997, Article 140, par. A-1 115 Companies Act Law No. 22,1997, Article 95, Par. A 
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5.4.5.2 IAS 2: Inventories 
This standard is applicable for industry companies only. Inventory valuation method, as 
"inventory should be measured at lower of cost and net realizable value", was disclosed 
by 95% of Jordanian companies. In addition, 94% of Jordanian companies indicated 
"the cost formula used: FIFO, WA or LIFO". It is interesting to note that all Jordanian 
companies used either FIFO or WA methods. Suwaidan (1997: 138) reported a similar 
finding. He argued that tax authorities may require specific methods for tax purposes. 
However, Tax Law No. 25 for the year 2001 did not mention which inventory method 
should be used. Thus, all inventory pricing methods appear to be acceptable. "It is 
difficult to explain why no Jordanian company used the LIFO method, with its tax 
saving implication" (Suwaidan, 1997: 138). However, Jordanian companies may apply 
FIFO or WA methods as compliance with the principal treatment for inventory cost 
method. IAS 2 (paragraphs, 21 and 23) mentioned that FIFO and WA are used as a 
benchmark treatment to assign the cost of inventories. Meanwhile, LIFO is used as an 
allowed alternative treatment. Cooke (1989a: 257) found that 53% of Swedish 
companies used FIFO, which was supported by Financial Accounting Recommendation 
No. 2. Therefore, Jordanian companies may apply FIFO or WA methods, as being more 
recommended to be used than LIFO, by IASs. Street, Gray and Bryant (1998: 28) 
pointed out that during the comparability project for IASC, the LIFO and base stock 
methods should have been eliminated. Nonetheless, IASC reported that the LIFO 
method is an essential one, since it is common in certain countries. They commented, 
"IASC endorses FIFO and Weighted Average as the benchmark methods; LIFO is now 
the allowed alternative" (Street, Gray and Bryant, 1998: 28). 
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5.4.5.3 IAS 8: Net Profit or Loss for the Period, Fundamental Errors and Changes 
in Accounting Policies 
This standard is applicable to a few companies (9 companies) in the survey. All the 
relevant companies disclosed "the effect of change in accounting estimate in the 
determination of net profit or loss in the period of change or future periods". As regards 
fundamental error, only 38% of the companies disclosed "the nature of any fundamental 
error", 78% of these companies recognized "the correction amount of these errors for 
the correct period", and 63% disclosed "the correction amount for the prior period". 
In terms of accounting policies, all the companies to which they were applicable 
disclosed: "the change in accounting policy", "the reasons for this change", and "the 
amount of adjustments for the current period". Thus, companies' compliance with the 
change in accounting policy practices seems to be better than with the fundamental error 
practices. 
5.4.5.4 IAS 10: Events After the Balance Sheet Date, IAS 11: Construction 
contracts, and IAS 12: Income Taxes 
In terms of IAS 10,75 companies (64%) disclosed "the date when the financial 
statements were authorized for issue and who gave that authorization". Five companies 
(i. e. all those to which the item was applicable) had recorded "information after the 
balance sheet date and updated their disclosure". In addition, all these five companies 
disclosed "the nature of any non-adjusted event after the balance sheet date", which may 
or may not have an effect. 
Construction contracts (IAS 11) are not commonly disclosed in Jordanian accounting 
practice. There were only eight companies to which this standard was applicable. All 
these companies disclosed the "gross amount due to customers for contract work as a 
liability". Six of these companies (75%) disclosed "the methods used to determine the 
contract revenue recognized in the period", and two companies (25%) disclosed "the 
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stage of completion method". Seven companies (out of seven) disclosed "the amount of 
advance received, concerning contracts in progress", and "the gross amount due from 
customers for contract work as an asset". "The amount of contract revenue recognized 
as revenue in the period", was disclosed by two companies (out of seven). One 
company from these seven failed to disclose "the amount of retentions, concerning 
contract in progress". 
The Income taxes standard (IAS 12) was not commonly applied among companies, 
since Income Tax Law No. 25 for the year 2001 states what items should be included 
and excluded for tax purposes. However, some items did not contradict with this Law 
and were applicable to some companies. "Tax asset, as benefits related to a tax loss", 
was disclosed by 90% of the relevant companies. "The separation of tax assets and tax 
liabilities from other assets and liabilities" was the practice with highest disclosure 
among Jordanian companies, with a disclosure level of 98%. In addition, 96% of the 
sample companies "measured tax assets (liabilities) at the amount expected to be paid to 
(recovered from) the taxation authorities, using the tax rates and the tax laws". 
Concerning tax expense, 92% of the companies disclosed this expense separately from 
other expenses. 
Overall, the disclosure level for the income tax standard was noticeably higher than for 
the construction contracts and events after balance sheet date standards. An explanation 
for this is that income tax disclosures are supported by IASs and the Income Taxes Law, 
which may have a positive effect in increasing the level of income tax disclosure for 
Jordanian companies. 
5.4.5.5 IAS 16: Property, Plant and Equipment (PPE) 
The disclosure level for the items in this standard exceeded 90%. Only one company 
failed to disclose "the measurement basis used for determining the gross carrying 
amount of each class of PPE". In addition, three companies failed to determine "the 
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depreciation method used for each class of PPE". Six companies (5%) failed to disclose 
"the useful lives or depreciation rates for PPE". Moreover, 95% of the companies which 
disclosed "the depreciation method, assigned the straight line method as the 
depreciation rates" as required by Income Tax Law No. 25 for the year 2001. Suwaidan 
(1997: 139) argued that the tax authorities permit companies to use any depreciation 
method, according to their circumstances for their accounting purposes, but they must 
follow the income tax rates when preparing their income tax. However, as Suwaidan 
noted, none of the companies used a different method from those used for tax purposes. 
Thus, Jordanian companies did not prefer to use different appropriate methods, and the 
compliance with tax law rates was more important than the use of a different method, 
even if it would be better for their accounting purposes. Income Tax Law No. 22, for the 
year 2001, indicates rates of 2-20%, as depreciation rates for the different assets in the 
financial statements116 
In order to highlight the movements of PPE, "additionals and disposals for each class of 
PPE" were disclosed by 92% of Jordanian companies. "Other movements" were 
disclosed by 94% of these companies. Meanwhile, "expenditures related to the 
construction of PPE" were disclosed by 98% of Jordanian companies. 
As a result, PPE and depreciation disclosures scored a high level of disclosure, since 
they are supported by other regulations (i. e. Income Tax Law No. 22,2001), and the 
disclosure practices for these issues were familiar to all Jordanian companies. 
5.4.5.6 IAS 18: Revenue, IAS 19: Employee Benefits, and IAS 21: The Effect of 
Exchanges in Foreign Exchange Rates 
The majority of Jordanian companies (91%) disclosed the "accounting policies adopted 
for revenue recognition (IAS 18), including the methods to determine the stage of 
completion of transactions involving the rendering of services". 
116 For further information, see Chapter three, part 3.6.2: Income Tax Law No. 22,2001 
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"The total expenses about contribution benefit plan (IAS 19) in the income statement" 
was disclosed by 74% of companies. IAS 19 disclosure practices are not common in 
Jordan, since the Jordanian Labour Law for the year 1996, and The Social Guarantee 
Law No. 19 for the year 2001 deal with these issues. Foreign currency operations (IAS 
21) are not commonly disclosed in Jordan. Only two companies (Arab for Education 
and Investment and Jordan Electric Power) applied this standard and they disclosed "the 
amount of exchange differences arising during the period, which is included in the 
carrying amount of an asset". One company disclosed "the nature of the change when 
there is a change in the classification of a significant foreign operation". 
In general, Jordanian companies show a high level of disclosure for revenue recognition, 
and a reasonable level of disclosure for benefit plan expenses. However, it is not 
possible to obtain a general view about foreign currency operation in Jordan, since these 
are not common practices. 
5.4.5.7 IAS 22: Business Combination, IAS 23: Borrowing Costs, and IAS 24: 
Related Party Disclosures 
Disclosures for business combination were applicable to only four companies. These 
four companies disclosed "the names and description of the combining enterprises", but 
only one of them disclosed "the combination method". Furthermore, "the effective date 
of the combination" was disclosed by only two companies, while "the disposals 
resulting from combination" was applicable to three companies and was disclosed by all 
of them. 
Regarding the borrowing costs standard, five companies out of six (83%), which 
applied this standard, disclosed the following items: "accounting policy adopted for 
borrowing costs", and "the amount of borrowing costs capitalized during the period". 
However, only two companies disclosed the "capitalization rate used". 
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The extent of disclosure for related party relationships and transactions was 93%. 80% 
of companies, which applied this standard, mentioned "the type, the nature and the 
elements of related party transactions". 
As can be noticed above, disclosure for these standards was not common in Jordan 
(especially IAS 22 and IAS 23). Related party transactions scored a significant level of 
disclosure, while some non compliance was found in the business combination and the 
borrowing costs standards. 
5.4.5.8 IAS 27: Consolidated Financial Statements and Accounting for Investments 
in Subsidiaries, and IAS 28: Accounting for Investment in Associates 
Jordan had 40 companies with domestic subsidiaries in 2003. Thirty six companies 
(90%), which contained such subsidiaries, "included them in their consolidated 
financial statements, including the name and proportion of ownership", while 25 
companies (63%) described "the method used to account for subsidiaries". 
In terms of associates, 30 Jordanian companies had associates in 2003. Twenty eight of 
them (93%) prepared "a list of significant associates, including the proportion of 
ownership interest". "The method used to account for investments in associates" was 
disclosed by 25 companies (83%). 
Comparing between the two standards, Jordanian companies' disclosure of their 
associates was slightly higher than that of their subsidiaries. The method used to 
account for associates had a greater level of disclosure than the method used to account 
for subsidiaries. 
5.4.5.9 IAS 32: Financial Instruments, Disclosure and Presentation; and IAS 33: 
Earnings Per Share 
IAS 32 deals with types of financial assets, liabilities and equity in the financial 
statements and notes"7.76% of Jordanian companies disclosed "objectives and policies 
1 17 For further information, see Appendix 4.5.1.2.1 
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for their financial risk management". 64% of companies provided "information about 
the extent and nature of the financial instruments", while 86% explained "the 
accounting policies and methods adopted, including recognition criteria and 
measurement basis for each class of financial assets, financial liability and equity 
instrument". In addition, 74 companies out of 99 (74%), which applied this item, 
disclosed their "interest rate risk". However, only nine companies (7%), out of all 
sample companies (121), described "the information related to maximum credit risk". 
Turning to the earnings per share (EPS) standard, by reviewing the annual reports of the 
sample, 86 companies assigned profits, while 35 companies assigned losses in their 
income statements. "Positive EPS" (for 86 profit-making companies) was disclosed by 
80 companies (93%), whereas "negative EPS" (for 35 loss-making companies) was 
disclosed by 33 companies (94%). The effect of profitability on the extent of disclosure 
will be discussed later in this chapter. 
To calculate EPS, the numerator is the net profit or loss for the period, and the 
denominator is the weighted average number of ordinary shares. Only 27 companies out 
of 121 (22%) disclosed "the net profit or loss, as a numerator for calculation of EPS", 
while 101 companies (83%) disclosed "the weighted average number of ordinary shares, 
as the denominator for calculation of EPS". Jordanian companies seemed to assume that 
the users of their financial statements were aware that net profit or loss is the numerator 
for calculating EPS. However, a few companies (26) clarified this calculation in a 
separate paragraph. 
In summary, the extent of disclosure for IAS 32 items varies among Jordanian 
companies. A reasonable level of disclosure for financial risk management was 
recognized (76%). It was noticeable that the disclosure of interest rate risk was 
moderate (74%), whereas the exposure to maximum credit risk disclosure was low (7%). 
Thus, more mandated regulations are required in order to identify the maximum credit 
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risk information for Jordanian companies. Furthermore, even though EPS disclosures 
scored a significant level, the companies' indication of profit or loss as a numerator for 
calculation of EPS was low. Companies should be more aware about the fact that net 
profit or loss should be disclosed separately, as a numerator for the purpose of EPS 
calculations. 
5.4.5.10 IAS 35: Discontinuing Operations, and IAS 36: Impairment of Assets 
Discontinuing operations were applied by five Jordanian companies only. All these 
companies disclosed "the discontinuing operations in their financial statements". One 
company failed to indicate "the date of the event relating to a discontinuing operation". 
In addition, one company failed to determine "the carrying amount at the balance sheet 
date, of the total assets and total liabilities to be disposed of'. Furthermore, "the amount 
of revenue, expenses and profit or loss from ordinary activities attributable to the 
discontinuing operation during the period" was disclosed by three companies, while one 
company disclosed "the amount of net cash flow of the discontinuing operations". 
IAS 36 aims to describe the procedures that the company follows to ensure that its 
assets are carried at no more than their recoverable amount. Thus, 
"An asset is carried at more than its recoverable amount if its carrying 
amount exceeds the amount of to be recovered through use or sale of the 
asset. If this is the case, the asset is described as impaired and the standard 
requires the enterprise to recognize an impairment loss. "118 
Only one company (Jordan Telecom) applied IAS 36 practices. This company disclosed 
"the amount of impairment losses recognized in the income statement during the period 
for each class of assets". On the other hand, this company failed to disclose "the amount 
of reversals of impairment losses recognized in the income statement during the period 
for each class of assets". Other disclosures related to this standard were made by this 
118 International Accounting Standard IAS 36, Impairment of Assets, IASC, "International Financial Reporting Standards 2003", 2003, IASCF Publications Department, London, p 36-8 
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company, such as: "the circumstances that led to the recognition or reversal of the 
impairment loss" and "the description of cash-generating unit (such as whether it is 
product line, plant or business operation)". 
Generally, disclosure practices for these two standards were few in Jordan. Some 
companies did not comply with all IAS 35 requirements, whereas the only company 
which applied IAS 36 revealed a high level of disclosure. 
5.4.5.11 IAS 37: Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets, and IAS 
38: Intangible Assets 
Provisions disclosures were applicable to 107 Jordanian companies. "Additional 
provisions made in the period", "the amount used" and "the unused amount" for each 
class of provisions were disclosed by 88% of the companies to which it was applicable 
(107). A high disclosure level (98%) was noticed in "the amount of any expected 
reimbursements". Meanwhile, there were 79 companies for which disclosure of 
"outflow of economic benefits for each class of provisions" was applicable. Thirty- 
seven of these companies (47%) disclosed "the nature of the obligation and the expected 
timing for these outflows". In addition, of 16 companies to which "inflow of economic 
benefits" was applicable, only one company failed to disclose "the nature of these 
inflows". Therefore, Jordanian companies pay more attention to inflow benefits than to 
outflow expected benefits. 
Intangible assets were shown in 21 Jordanian companies' financial statements. Fourteen 
companies (67%) disclosed "the useful lives or the amortization rates and the 
amortization methods used". Moreover, 13 companies (62%) disclosed "the gross 
carrying amount, accumulated amortization, and the amortization expense in the income 
statement". Eleven companies (52%) prepared "a reconciliation of the carrying amount 
at the beginning and end of the period for each class of intangible assets". 
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An interesting point to note was that, among all Jordanian companies, "research and 
development expenses" were disclosed by 22% of them. An explanation could be found 
in Cooke's (1989a: 263) view. "It is clear therefore that the disclosure in this area is 
extremely poor. Companies are often wary of providing this information for competitive 
reasons". 
In summary, IAS 37 disclosures indicated a high extent of provisions disclosure (88%). 
A high level of disclosure was found also in inflow of economic benefits (94%), while a 
lower level of disclosure was found in expected outflow economic benefits (47%). 
Hence, regulations should focus on strengthening this type of disclosure. 
In terms of intangible assets, Jordanian companies disclosed intangible assets 
requirements to a moderate degree. However, research and development activities 
require more mandatory action to enhance the extent of disclosure for these activities. 
5.4.5.12 IAS 39: Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement, IAS 40: 
Investment Property, and IAS 41: Agriculture 
Recognition and measurement for financial instruments were applicable to companies 
which have these instruments. Out of 72 companies, 64 (89%) disclosed "the method of 
significant assumptions applied in estimating fair values of financial assets and financial 
liabilities that are carried at fair value". In addition, available for sale financial assets 
existed in 63 companies, and 8 companies (13%) failed to disclose "gains and losses 
arising from changes in the fair value of those assets". Ninety-one companies out of 102 
(89%) separated total interest income and total interest expense. 
Investment property standard was applicable to 13 companies in the sample. "The 
method and significant assumptions, applied in determining the fair value of investment 
property" were disclosed by nine companies. In addition, "whether investment property 
assets are valued by an independent valuer who has a professional qualifications or not", 
338 
was disclosed by only three companies (23%). In terms of "rental income from 
investment property", all the 15 companies displayed this item in the income statement. 
Furthermore, "repairs and maintenance expenses" were disclosed by 84% of all sample 
companies. 
One company only (National Poultry) applied IAS 41 requirements about agriculture. 
This company disclosed "each group of biological assets and the nature of their 
activities". In addition, "physical quantities of such assets", and "a reconciliation of 
changes in the carrying amount of biological assets between the beginning and the end 
of the current period", were also disclosed. However, the company failed to indicate 
"the methods of significant assumptions applied in determining the fair value of each 
group of assets". 
From the previous discussion, about the disclosure in each standard, the important 
accounting disclosures in Jordan can be identified. These disclosures are summarized in 
Table 5.4.5.1, with the percentage of compliance by Jordanian companies. 
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5.4.6 Financial History Information 
The overall mean of disclosure for this group was fairly low at 36%. The variation of 
disclosure was the highest (21%) in this group, compared to the other groups in the 
index. The only mandatory item, "chain of net income, distributed profit, shareholders' 
net equity and the price of security for the past five years", scored the highest level of 
disclosure in the group (79%). This item is mandated by DDAAS. 
Only one company (International Tobacco Industry) disclosed their "balance sheet for 
the last three years". In addition, this company disclosed "balance sheet and income 
statement for the last ten years", since it had a high extent of aggregate disclosure (78%). 
Two companies (Jordan Tourism Development Projects and Rum Metal Manufacturing) 
were not expected to disclose historical data for more than three years, since they were 
established only two years before the date of the study (2003). "Income statement for 
the past three years" was disclosed by three companies only. In terms of sales (revenue), 
26 companies (22%) revealed "this item for the last 3-5 years", whereas six companies 
(5%) disclosed "6-10 years sales (revenue)". "General historical data" were disclosed by 
69% of the companies. Finally, "other financial data for the past 3-5 years" were 
disclosed by 76 companies (64%) out of 119 to which they were applicable. 
In summary, a low level of disclosure for historical data was found among Jordanian 
companies. The reason could be due to the few requirements for such information, since 
all items in this group are voluntary, except one item, as shown above. IASs regulations 
may include some information about historical events. The importance of historical 
information is that it provides useful data in trend analysis (Botosan, 1997: 331). 
"According to the SRI International Survey (1987), 46.2% of the individual 
investors and 69.6 % of the professional investors surveyed rated that 
historical summary of operating results as important or extremely 
important" (Botosan, 1997: 331). 
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5.4.7 Ratios and Other Analysis 
Watson, Shrives and Marston (2002: 290) pointed out that ratio analysis is an important 
tool for performance measurement. However, Jordanian companies showed a low level 
of disclosure for this type of information, since the mean of disclosure was 33% with a 
high standard deviation of 18%. Thirty-eight companies disclosed "liquidity ratios" 
(31%), 37 companies disclosed "profitability ratios" (30%), and 28 companies (23%) 
disclosed "leverage ratios". Other important performance measures, specifically for 
investors, revealed a weak level of disclosure, such as: "return on shareholders' equity" 
(12%), "return on assets" (6%) and "rate of return required by company on its project" 
(3%). It is noteworthy that Jordanian companies disclosed other ratios, while reviewing 
their annual reports. Examples of these ratios, which were reported by 70 companies 
(58%) were: debt/equity, debt/total assets, distributed profit/capital, current assets/total 
assets, fixed assets/total assets, administrative expenses/ total expenses, selling and 
marketing expenses/total expenses, and distributed profit/total profit. 
Furthermore, a moderate extent of disclosure (69%) was observed in some items such as 
"growth rate in earnings" and "growth in units sold or average prices of units sold". 
While more than the half (53%) of Jordanian companies divided sales by different 
criteria (e. g. product types), less than a quarter (23%) of these companies divided net 
income according to these criteria. 
The evidence seems to indicate that mandatory items were disclosed more than 
voluntary items in this group. Two mandatory items had the highest extent of disclosure 
among other items in the group. These items, which are required by DDAAS, were 
"analysis of the company's financial status and action results during the fiscal year" 
(96%) and "comparative figures of net revenues and net income with the preceding 
fiscal year" (82%). The other mandatory item, required by IASs, "interest effect on 
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current and future results", was disclosed by only six companies (5%). The reason could 
be that Jordanian companies' major concern is to indicate whether they are exposure to 
the interest rate risk effect and hence they will not give details about this effect, 
specifically on future results. 
Finally, mandatory actions could strengthen the extent of disclosure for ratio analysis. 
Standardization of such practices is beneficial for the users to compare the financial 
statements for decision making (Watson, Shrives and Marston, 2002: 311). 
"An accounting standard on disclosure and measurement of ratios could 
help in this regard, and bridge the `understanding gap' between users and 
preparers " (Watson, Shrives and Marston, 2002: 311). 
5.4.8 Projected and Management Information 
The mean of disclosure for this group (43%) was higher than the mean of disclosure for 
the voluntary disclosure groups (groups 6,7 and 9 in Table 5.4.2), but lower than the 
mandatory disclosure groups (the first four groups in Table 5.4.2). Four items (24%) 
had a disclosure level more than 90%: "description of major types of products" (98%), 
"significant future development "(93%), "discussion of management's future plans" 
(92%) and "comparison of actual business performance to the previous one" (91 %). 
On the other hand, four items scored a level of disclosure less than 10%: "cash flow 
forecast" (1%), "research and development activities for the next year,, (1%), "planned 
advertisement" (2%) and "quantitative forecasts of sales and profits" (8%). 
As regards new development in the company, 101 companies (84%) disclosed their 
"new products" (services), while 68 companies (56%) explained their "completed and 
uncompleted projects". Moreover, only 14 companies (10%) indicated "the capital 
expenditure for the next year". 
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Although 43% of Jordanian companies presented "qualitative forecasts of sales and 
profits", only 8% of these companies supported these forecasts with numbers 
(quantitative). 
In terms of the production process, the extent of disclosure level for "productive 
capacity" was 25%. Fifty nine companies (49%) described their "production 
methods/services techniques". In addition, "production inputs, such as new material 
sources, and labour market", scored disclosure levels of 20% and 21 % respectively. 
Overall, Jordanian companies' disclosures for projected and management information 
varies among items, as shown above. Botosan (1997: 331) argued that such information 
is important for investors and analysts, but in many cases the users prefer to develop 
their own forecasts. In the Jordanian context, Suwaidan (1997: 140) pointed out that the 
weak disclosure for such information was due to the permanent critical political and 
economic situation in the Middle East, which makes it difficult to make accurate 
forecasts about business activities. As evidence, he noted that 
`for example, some companies indicated in their annual reports that the 
closure of the Iraqi market (which is one of the main importers of Jordanian 
products) resulted in a marked loss of anticipated sales" 
(Suwaidan, 1997: 140). 
Though this study supports Suwaidan's perspective, since many companies reported 
that the war on Iraq on the first quarter of 2003 affected their results, many companies 
also reported a significant development in their results after the war ended. Many Iraqi 
citizens had moved to Jordan and the political and economic situation had become more 
stable. Therefore, Jordanian companies were better able to forecast their future 
information, and the evidence seems to indicate that the mean disclosure for this 
information in this study (43%) is significantly higher than in Suwaidan's study (17%). 
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5.4.9 Market Based Information 
The mean of disclosure for this group was the lowest (31 %) among the other groups in 
the index. It was found that mandatory items (DDAAS items) scored the highest level of 
disclosure as follows: 
1- Names of senior shareholders and the number of shares owned by each of them 
where ownership amounts to 5% or more (94%). 
2- Number of owners of each security issued by the company and the categories of 
distributing the ownership of each (93%). 
3- The company's main market (38%). 
Seven voluntary items in this group (64%) had a disclosure level less than 20%. In 
addition, "price range of the company's share for the past few years", was disclosed by 
44% of Jordanian companies, making it the most disclosed voluntary item in this group. 
The reason could be that Jordanian companies disclosed their share price for the past 
few years, supported sometimes by charts, in order to illustrate the growth of their 
shares. Accordingly, investors may depend on such information to enable them to take 
appropriate decisions about investing in such companies. 
None of the companies in the sample disclosed "measures of customers' satisfaction 
with their products or services". "Information about marketing network and 
geographical concentration in the sales" was disclosed by only 18% of Jordanian 
companies. Regarding ASE, only eight companies indicated in which tier in ASE they 
were listed. Finally, "market ratios" were not common among Jordanian companies 
since only 12% of these companies disclosed such ratios. 
Overall, Jordanian companies should focus on displaying market information in their 
annual reports in order to increase the credibility of this information (e. g. market share 
price). Hence, more mandatory requirements are desirable to achieve this purpose. 
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5.4.10 General Observation 
In summary, the analysis of the previous nine groups of information highlights the 
following results: 
1- There was a high level of disclosure in the financial statements of Jordanian 
companies (balance sheet, income statement, cash flow and changes in equity 
statements). The explanation could be that all the items in these statements (which are 
the most important tools for investors for decision making) are mandatory required by 
IASs. Therefore, the major concern for Jordanian companies seems to be to comply 
with these requirements according to Securities Law No. 23 for the year 1997. 
2- General information scored a high level of disclosure among Jordanian companies. 
Such information was varied and mostly mandated by IASs, DDAAS or both. It can be 
emphasized that mandatory requirements have a significant role in improving the level 
of disclosure of such information. 
3- There was a moderate level of disclosure for other statements, supplementary 
information and notes. This information, which was required by IASs, formed the 
largest part of the disclosure index (47%). It contained general notes, significant policies 
and details about the number of financial statements. A step-by-step analysis of such 
items according to each IASs was provided 119 In addition, important disclosure 
practices were drawn from this analysis, as shown in Table 5.4.5.1. 
4- There was a low level of disclosure in the following groups: market based 
information, ratios analysis, financial history information, and projected and 
management information. Most items in these groups were voluntary and few 
mandatory items scored a high level of disclosure. Thus, one can argue that more 
mandatory requirements could strengthen the level of disclosure of such information. 
119 See parts 5.5.5 and 5.5.5.1-5.5.5.12 in this chapter 
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5- There was a higher variation in disclosure, for voluntary information (financial 
history, ratios analysis and market based information), than mandatory financial 
statement information. The higher standard deviation for voluntary information, shown 
in Table 5.4.1 illustrates this. This variation in voluntary information arises because 
disclosure of such information is optional. Therefore, it can not be predicted which 
items a company will be prepared to disclose, and the variation in disclosure for these 
items is greater. In contrast, mandatory information can be predicted, since the 
regulations require companies to disclose specific information. Thus, the gap for 
mandatory items is lower than for voluntary ones. 
5.5 Summary 
This chapter presented the results of evaluating the disclosure practices for 121 
Jordanian companies in 2003 (the first objective). The results indicated that there was a 
significant increase in the level of aggregate disclosure (its average was 69%) compared 
to previous studies in Jordan as seen in Table 5.2.2. In addition, the extent of aggregate 
disclosure varied among Jordanian companies and ranged from a low of 48% (Irma 
Investment and Financial Facilities Company) to a high of 86% (Jordan Telecom). 
Moreover, the extent of mandatory disclosure (MD) and voluntary disclosure (VD) was 
83% and 34% respectively, with a range from 64% to 94% from MD and 6% to 71% for 
VD. The detailed analysis for MD revealed that Jordanian companies comply with items 
mandated in both regulations, DDAAS and IASs (the compliance level was 91%), more 
than those mandated in either one of these regulations (the compliance level was 83% 
for DDAAS and 82% for IASs). Voluntary disclosure still exists in Jordan (its level was 
34%), although many of those items which were voluntary in previous studies (e. g. 
Suwaidan's study) had become mandatory by the time this study was undertaken. 
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The analysis of the content of annual reports disaggregated the disclosure index into 
nine groups of information: general information; balance sheet; income statement; cash 
flow and changes in equity statements; other statements, supplementary information and 
notes; financial history information; ratios and other analysis; projected and 
management information and market based information. The analysis revealed that 
there was a high level of disclosure for the first four groups (see Table 5.4.1). The 
reason could be due the mandatory requirements to disclose the financial statements and 
general information in accordance with the Securities Law No. 23 of 1997. 
As regards other statements, supplementary information and notes, the disclosure level 
was moderate (71%). Such information required by IASs and a comprehensive analysis 
for each IAS was undertaken and summarized in Table 5.4.4.1. Furthermore, the 
following groups of information: market based, ratios analysis, financial history and 
projected and management information revealed a low level of disclosure in the 
Jordanian annual reports. This could be ascribed to the fact that the majority of these 
group of items are voluntary and there is a high variation in disclosing voluntary 
information. 
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Chapter Six 
The Impact of Company Characteristics on Aggregate 
Disclosure: Univariate and Multivariate Analysis 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter reports the outcomes of the research methods used to achieve the second 
objective of the study. The second objective of this study, as presented in Chapter One, 
is to examine the relationship between the aggregate disclosure (mandatory and 
voluntary) and a number of company characteristics for Jordanian companies listed in 
the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE). The results of testing the hypotheses which were 
developed in Chapter Four will be discussed. Two levels of analysis will be applied: 
first, univariate analysis which investigates the relationship between each single 
variable and the extent of aggregate disclosure; second, multivariate analysis which 
examines the effect of company variables on the level of aggregate disclosure by 
employing a regression model using forced entry and stepwise methods. 
6.2 Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables 
Table 6.2.1 shows summary statistics of the independent continuous variables in the 
study. 
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6.3. Univariate Analysis 
Univariate analysis is used to assess the relationship between the extent of disclosure 
and each independent variable. For continuous variables (i. e. firm size, leverage, 
profitability, number of shareholders, assets in place, ownership structure, liquidity and 
listing age), correlation coefficients were used. Pearson product-moment correlation (a 
parametric test) was used when the normality assumption was satisfied, whereas 
Kendall's tau and Spearman rank correlation (non-parametric tests) were used if the 
assumption of normality was violated. 
T-test (parametric) and Mann Whitney U-test (non-parametric) were used to examine 
the impact of the three categorical variables (listing status, industry type and audit firm 
size) on the disclosure level. For further analysis, one way analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) (parametric) and Kruskall Wallis (non-parametric) were employed for 
variables which contain more than two groups (listing status groups) in order to 
illustrate the effect of each variable on the extent of disclosure. The results of univariate 
analysis are discussed below. 
6.3.1 Relationship between Firm Size and the Extent of Aggregate Disclosure: 
Four hypotheses (H1-H4) were formulated in order to test the relationship between firm 
size and the extent of aggregate disclosure. Total assets, sales, capital stock and net 
income were chosen to measure the firm's size. Tests of normality for those four 
variables are shown in Table 6.3.1.1. 
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Table 6.3.1.1: Test of normality for size variables 
Kolmogrov-Smirnov 
Variable Statistic df Sig. 
Total assets 0.336 121 0.000 
Sales 0.385 121 0.000 
Capital stock 0.340 121 0.000 
Net income 0.341 121 0.000 
As shown from the table above, the Kolmogrov-Smirnov (K-S) test indicates high 
significance values at the 5% level for all four distributions, indicating these variables 
are not normally distributed. Hence, non-parametric tests were applied in order to 
examine the relationship between firm size and the extent of aggregate disclosure. Two 
tests were appropriate for such an analysis: Kendall's rank correlation coefficient (tau) 
and Spearman's rank correlation coefficient (rho). Field (2005: 131) argued that 
Kendall's tau is preferable to Spearman's rank when there is a small set of data with a 
large number of ranks. In other words, if there are many scores with the same rank 
among all the scores, Kendall's tau should be used (Field, 2005: 131). Howell (1997: 293) 
supported Field's perspective, commenting that tau is a better estimator than 
Spearman's rank when we want to correlate ranks. 
"There is much to suggest that Kendall `statistic is actually a better 
estimate of the correlation in the population. As such we can draw more 
accurate generalizations from Kendall's statistics than from Spearman '5" 
(Field, 2005: 131). 
However, Spearman's rank correlation is still more popular and was applied in some 
disclosure studies (e. g. McNally, Eng and Hasseldine, 1982; Abd-Elsalam, 1999). 
Other studies applied Kendall's tau correlation (Buzby, 1975; Firth, 1979; Suwaidan, 
1997). 
In this study, both tests (Kendall's tau and Spearman's rank) were used in order to test 
the association of each size variable and the extent of aggregate disclosure. Kendall's 
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tau was used first and Spearman's rank test was used to support the results of Kendall's 
tau. The results of Kendall's tau test are shown in Table 6.3.1.2.120 
Table 6.3.1.2: Kendall's tau results for size variables 
Variable Kendall's tau correlation coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) No. of companies 
Total assets 0.363 0.000 121 
Sales 0.453 0.000 121 
Capital stock 0.269 0.000 121 
Net income 0.284 0.000 121 
The results show that there is a highly significant positive relationship between size 
variables and the extent of aggregate disclosure (the significance value is less than 
0.001). Sales has the strongest relationship with the extent of aggregate disclosure, since 
the tau value is the largest (0.453). Total assets ranks second (tau value =0.363), while 
net income and capital stock have smaller effects on the extent of aggregate disclosure 
(tau values = 0.284 and 0.269 respectively). 
To support such an association, Spearman's rank correlation was run and the results are 
shown in the following table: 
Table 6.3.1.3: Spearman's rank results for size variables 
Variable Spearman's rank correlation coefficient (rho) Sig. (1-tailed) No. of companies 
Total assets 0.520 0.000 121 
Sales 0.628 0.000 121 
Capital stock 0.383 0.000 121 
Net income 0.412 0.000 121 
The results in the table above again indicate that the relationship between the size 
variables and the aggregate disclosure level is significantly positive (the significance 
value is less than 0.00). Hence, Spearman's rank correlation results support Kendall's 
tau results. In addition, the four variables remain in the same ranking in relation to the 
120 SPSS for Windows was used for all the analysis in this and the next chapters. 
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strength of the relationship (sales is the first, 0.628; total assets is the second, 0.520; net 
income is the third, 0.412; and capital stock is the fourth, 0.383). 
Given the evidence, it could be said that the four hypotheses H1-H4 can be accepted at 
the 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels of significance, since there is a positive relationship 
between each of the size variables and the extent of aggregate disclosure. In previous 
studies in Jordan, Al-Issa (1988); Suwaidan (1997); Naser (1998); Naser, Al-Khatib and 
Karbhari (2002); and Al-Shiab (2003) found similar results. Studies of other countries 
that have found similar results include Singhvi (1968); Singhvi and Desai (1971); 
Buzby (1975); Stanga (1976); Firth (1979); McNally, Eng and Hasseldine (1982); 
Chow and Wong-Boren (1987); Cooke (1989a); Cooke (1989b); Tai, Au-Yeung, Kwok 
and Lau (1990); Cooke (1992); Hossain, Tan and Adams (1994); Wallace, Naser and 
Mora (1994); Wallace and Naser (1995); Al-Mulhem (1997); Inchausti (1997); Patton 
and Zelenka (1997); Craig and Diga (1998); Owusu-Ansah (1998); Abd-Elsalam (1999); 
Depoers (2000); Ho and Wong (2001); Robb, Single and Zarzeski (2001); Cooke and 
Haniffa (2002); Ferguson, Lam and Lee (2002); Eng and Mak (2003); Ali, Ahmed and 
Henry (2004) and Akhtaruddin (2005); Anderson and Daoud (2005); Aksu and Kosedag 
(2006); Barako, Hancock and Izan (2006). 
Finally, it can be concluded that big Jordanian firms, particularly in sales and total 
assets, disclose more information in their annual reports than small ones. 
6.3.2 Relationship between Leverage and the Extent of Aggregate Disclosure: 
Two measures were used for leverage in order to test hypotheses 5 and 6: total debt to 
total assets ratio (TD/TA) and long term debt to owner's equity ratio (LD/OE). Table 
6.3.2.1 presents the normality results for both variables. 
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Table 6.3.2.1: Test of normality for leverage variables 
Kolmogrov-Smirnov 
Variable Statistic df Sig. 
TD/TA 0.131 121 0.000 
LD/OE 0.319 55 0.000 
The results of K-S tests reveal that the distribution of both variables is not normal (Sig. 
is less than 0.05). Therefore, non-parametric tests (Kendall's tau and Spearman's rank 
correlation) were used in order to test the relationship between leverage and the extent 
of aggregate disclosure. The results of both tests are displayed in Tables 6.3.2.2 and 
6.3.2.3. 
Table 6.3.2.2: Kendall's tau results for leverage variables 
Variable Kendall's tau correlation coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) No. of companies 
TD/TA 0.117 0.029 121 
LD/OE 0.101 0.138 55 
Table 6.3.2.3: Spearman's rank results for leverage variables 
Variable 
Spearman's rank correlation coefficient 
(rho) Sig. (1-tailed) No. of companies 
TD/TA 0.178 0.025 121 
LD/OE 0.148 0.141 55 
Kendall's tau results illustrate that there is a significant positive association between the 
TD/TA ratio and the extent of aggregate disclosure at the 5% significance level (tau = 
0.117, p=0.029). Thus, the hypothesis (H5), that the extent of aggregate disclosure is 
positively related to the TD/TA ratio can be accepted at the 5% significance level. On 
the contrary, hypothesis (H6), that the extent of aggregate disclosure is positively 
related to the LD/OE ratio is rejected at the 5% level of significance (p = 0.138). 
121 df (number of companies) was 55 for LD/OE ratio since only 55 companies only had long term debt 
(LD) in their financial statements 
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Moreover, Spearman's rank correlation results in Table 6.3.3.2 support the previous 
conclusion, since rho = 0.178 for the TD/TA ratio with a significance level less than 5% 
(p = 0.025), while rho = 0.148 for the LD/OE ratio with a significance level more than 
5% (p = 0.141). 
Comparing these results with other Jordanian studies, Al-Isla (1988), Naser (1998), 
Naser, Al-Khatib and Karbhari (2002) found a positive association between leverage 
and the extent of disclosure for Jordanian companies. Al- Issa (1988: 105) concluded 
that companies with higher gearing ratios disclose more information. 
"This is consistent with the hypothesis that companies which have large 
borrowings are required by their creditors to provide additional 
information. Put differently, companies make additional disclosures in 
order to attract external finance" (Al Issa, 1988: 105). 
On the other hand, Al-Shiab (2003) found no association between leverage and the 
extent of disclosure. He ascribed this unexpected result to the role that banks play in 
Jordan, since leverage was often linked to bank loans. 
"As a result, more leverage would imply greater monitoring. Given that 
banks usually have direct access to information, such leverage needs not to 
imply a greater need for extensive external annual report disclosure in 
compliance with IAS" (Al-Shiab, 2003: 315). 
The results of other previous studies in other countries were also contradictory. While 
some of these studies (Malone, Fried and Jones, 1993; Hossain, Perera and Rahman, 
1995; Patton and Zelenka, 1997; Craig and Diga, 1998; Ferguson and Lee, 2002 and 
Barako, Hancock and Izan, 2006) found a positive relationship, others (Chow and 
Wong-Boren, 1987; Hossain, Tan and Adams, 1994; Raffournier, 1995; Wallace and 
Naser, 1995; Inchausti, 1997; Abd-Elsalam, 1999; Tower, Hancock and Taplin, 1999; 
Depoers, 2000; Ho and Wong, 2001; Cooke and Haniffa, 2002 and Ali, Ahmed and 
Henry, 2004, Aksu and Kosedag, 2006) did not find any relationship. Moreover, other 
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studies (Zarzeski, 1996; El-Jazzar, Finn and Jacob, 1999; Eng and Mak, 2003) found a 
negative relationship between leverage and the extent of disclosure122 
Overall, the evidence seems to indicate that Jordanian companies with higher leverage 
ratios disclose more information than those with lower leverage ratios companies. This 
result supports the perspective of agency theory that higher gearing companies disclose 
more information in order to avoid agency costs. However, the results of multiple 
regression analysis (as will be discussed later in this chapter) will enhance our 
understanding whether the leverage variable plays a significant role in explaining the 
extent of aggregate disclosure. 
6.3.3 Relationship between Profitability and the Extent of Aggregate Disclosure 
Profitability was measured by three variables: rates of return (ROR), earnings margin 
(EM) and return on equity (ROE) 
Three hypotheses (H7, H8 and H9) were formulated in order to examine whether there 
is a positive relationship between each of the profitability variables and the extent of 
aggregate disclosure. Tests of normality were run first in order to determine which type 
of test (parametric or non- parametric) should be used. The results of the normality tests 
are shown in Table 6.3.3.1. 
Table 6.3.3.1: Test of normality for profitability variables 
Kolmogrov-Smirnov 
Variable Statistic df Sig. 
ROR 0.151 121 0.000 
EM 0.468 121 0.000 
ROE 0.222 121 0.000 
The normality results show that the normality assumptions for the three profitability 
variables were violated, since in each case the significance value was less than 5%. 
122 For more information, see part 2.6.2 (leverage) in Chapter 2 
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Thus, non-parametric tests are appropriate here: Kendall's tau and Spearman's rank 
correlation. The results of Kendall's tau test are shown in the following table: 
Table 6.3.3.2: Kendall's tau results for profitability variables 
Variable Kendall's tau correlation coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) No. of companies 
ROR 0.188 0.001 121 
EM 0.102 0.048 121 
ROE 0.226 0.000 121 
The results in the table above indicate that the profitability variables have a significant 
positive effect on the extent of aggregate disclosure. ROE has the most effect since the 
correlation is 0.226 and significant at the 5% and 1% levels. ROR has the second most 
important effect (0.188) and EM is the least effective (0.102). However, both are 
significant at the 5% level. However, the strength of the correlation for the three 
variables is relatively small. 123 
Hence, hypotheses H6, H7 and H8 can be accepted at the 5% level of significance. The 
results of Spearman's rank correlation support such a conclusion, as shown below: 
Table 6.3.3.3: Spearman's rank correlation results for profitability variables 
Variable 
Spearman's rank correlation coefficient 
(rho) Sig. (1-tailed) No. of companies 
ROR 0.274 0.001 121 
EM 0.135 0.070 121 
ROE 0.328 0.000 121 
123 Cohen (1988, cited on Pallent, 2002: 120) suggests the following guidelines to determine the strength 
of the relationship: 
correlation r=0.10 to 0.29 -) small , correlation r=0.30 to 0.49 -* medium, correlation r=0.50 to 
1.00 -* large 
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The results above support the results of Kendall's tau test for the both variables: ROE 
and ROR (rho = 0.328, p=0.000 and rho = 0.274, p=0.001 respectively). 
EM was not found to have an effect on the extent of aggregate disclosure (p = 0.070). It 
is however shown that the association between EM and the extent of aggregate 
disclosure is significant at the 10% level. 
The results of this study support Naser (1998) and Naser, Al-Khatib and Karbhari 
(2002), who found a positive relationship between profitability and the extent of 
disclosure in Jordan. On the contrary, the results of this study are in conflict with 
Suwaidan (1997) and Al-Shiab (2003) who found no positive association between 
profitability and the level of disclosure for Jordanian companies. However, Suwaidan 
(1997: 153) found the relationship between return of equity and the extent of disclosure 
to be significant and positive at the 10% significance level. In addition, Al-Shiab 
(2003: 319) found that there was an association between profitability (estimated by 
return on investment) and the extent of disclosure for some years of his study (1999, 
2000 and the total period 1995-2000). Moreover, Al-Issa (1988: 104) concluded that 
Jordanian companies which report losses and/or lower rates of return disclose less 
information than companies which report profit and/or higher rates of return. 
Studies in other countries (Singhvi, 1968; Singhavi and Desai, 1971; Raffournier, 1995; 
Wallace and Naser, 1995; Patton and Zelenka, 1997; Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Cooke and 
Haniffa, 2002; and Ali, Ahmed and Henry, 2004; Aksu and Kosedag, 2006; Ghazali and 
Weetman, 2006) companies with high profit ratios disclose more information. However, 
other studies (Malone, Fries and Jones, 1993; Al-Mulhem, 1997; Inchausti, 1997; Abd- 
Elsalam, 1999; Tower, Hancock and Taplin, 1999; Ho and Wong, 2001; Eng and Mak, 
2003; Akhatruddin, 2005; Barako, Hancock and Izan, 2006) found no relationship. An 
interesting finding was revealed by Camfferman and Cooke (2002) who obtained 
contradictory results about profitability ratios in United Kingdom. They discovered a 
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negative relationship between net income margin (net income divided by turnover) and 
the extent of disclosure. However, they found a positive relationship between return on 
equity and the extent of disclosure. 
"These firm specific variables may serve as proxies for information 
asymmetries between investors, lenders and managers and therefore the 
directional relationship between the extent of disclosure and these variables 
may be ambiguous "(Camfferman and Cooke, 2002: 19). 
In general, Jordanian companies with higher ratios of return on equity and rates of 
return tend to have higher aggregate disclosure level and vice versa. 
6.3.4 Relationship between Number of Shareholders and the Extent of Aggregate 
Disclosure: 
It was hypothesised in H 10 that the number of shareholders affects positively the extent 
of aggregate disclosure. Before testing this hypothesis, a test of normality was run as 
shown in Table 6.3.4.1. 
Table 6.3.4.1: Test of normality for number of shareholders 
Kolmogrov-Smirnov 
Variable Statistic df Sig. 
Number of shareholders 0.315 120 0.000 
The significance value (Sig = 0.000) indicates a deviation from normality, since it is 
less than 5%. Thus, Kendall's tau and Spearman's rank correlation (non-parametric) 
tests were run as shown in the following table: 
Table 6.3.4.2: Kendall's tau and Spearman's rank correlation results for number 
of shareholders 
Test Correlation coefficient Sig (1-tailed) 
No. of 
companies 
Kendall's tau 0.149 0.008 120 
Spearman's rank correlation (rho) 0.222 0.007 120 
124 The data of number of shareholders for one company was not available 
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The results of Kendall's tau test indicate a significant positive relationship at both 5% 
and 1% levels between the number of shareholders and the extent of aggregate 
disclosure (tau = 0.149, p=0.008). Although the strength of relationship was small, it 
could be concluded that the hypothesis H10 can be accepted at the 5% significance level. 
Moreover, the results of Spearman's rank (rho) correlation test support these findings 
(rho = 0.222, p=0.007). 
The results are consistent with Suwaidan's (1997) finding of a significant positive 
association between number of shareholders and the extent of disclosure for Jordanian 
firms. Similar results were found in India (Singhvi, 1968), USA (Singhvi and Desai, 
1971; and Malone, Fries and Jones, 1993) and Sweden (Anderson and Daoud, 2005). 
6.3.5 Relationship between Listing Status and the Extent of Aggregate Disclosure: 
Listing status, like firm size, is one of the most important variables which has been 
tested by many researchers (see Table 2.6.1 in Chapter Two) in order to determine its 
effect on disclosure level. However, as far as the researcher is aware, this variable has 
not been tested in Jordan before. 
Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) comprises three tiers of stock markets. 125 The 
companies which fulfil the requirements of ASE regulations are listed in the first tier, as 
it is considered the major one. Other companies are put in the second and the third tiers 
or in a separate tier as unlisted companies. 126 Therefore, it was hypothesised (H 11) that 
companies which are listed in the first tier disclose more information than companies 
which are not listed in the first tier. 
Table 6.4.5.1 shows the extent of aggregate disclosure for both groups: 
its In 2004, the classification has been changed and there was only two markets in ASE: First and Second. 126 For more information about these requirements and classifications, see Chapter 3, part 3.7.1.1: Amman 
Stock Exchange. 
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Table 6.3.5.1: Descriptive statistics for the extent of aggregate disclosure for 
companies listed and not listed in the first tier 
Companies No. of Mean Max Min Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
companies (%) (%) (%) (%) 
Listed in the 
first tier 70 72.81 85.58 59.88 5.47 0.313 0.090 
Not listed in 
the first tier 51 66.74 80.23 47.93 6.54 -0.419 0.412 
The table shows that the average extent of aggregate disclosure for companies listed in 
the first tier (72.81%) is greater than that of companies not listed in the first tier 
(66.74%). In addition, the standard deviation (5.47%) for companies in the first tier is 
lower than that for companies not listed in the first tier (6.54%). Moreover, while the 
highest disclosing company (85.58%) is listed in the first tier, the lowest one (47.93%) 
is not listed in the first tier. 
The purpose of testing hypothesis Hi i is to determine the differences in the mean of 
aggregate disclosure for both groups. Therefore, two types of tests were used: the 
independent samples T-test (parametric) and Mann Whitney U-test (non-parametric). 
First, the test of normality for listing status variable is presented in Table 6.3.5.2. 
Table 6.3.5.2: Test of normality for listing status 
Kolmogrov-Smirnov 
Variable Statistic df Sig. 
Listed in the first tier 0.055 70 0.200 
Extent of disclosure 
Not Listed in the first tier 0.111 51 0.164 
A significance value of more than 5% indicates normality. As shown in the table above, 
the assumption of normality is met, which indicates a normal distribution for each group. 
Therefore, parametric tests are appropriate. 
The Independent sample T-test was used in order to compare the mean scores of 
aggregate disclosure for the two groups. The assumption of equality of variance 
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(homogeneity of variance) was checked first in order to test whether the variances of the 
two groups (listed in the first tier and not listed in the first tier groups) were equal 
(Dancey and Reidly, 2002: 216). Levene's test for equality of variance provided the 
following results: 
Table 6.3.5.3: Levene's test for equality of variance for listing status 
Levene's test for equality of variance 
F Sig. 
Extent of aggregate disclosure 
Equal variances assumed 
Equal variances not assumed 
2.159 0.144 
A non significant value more than 5% indicates equality of variances. From the table 
above, the value of 0.144 (>0.05) indicates the equality of variance and that there is no 
significant difference in variances between the two groups at the 5% level. Thus, the 
independent sample T-test based on equality of variances in SPSS was used. The results 
of the test are shown below 
Table 6.3.5.4: Independent sample T-test for listing status 
T- test for equality of means (equal variances assumed) 
t df Sig (1-tailed) Mean differences Std. error differences 
-5.382 119 0.000 -0.0606 0.0113 
The table above reveals that the mean of aggregate disclosure for companies listed in 
the first tier is significantly higher than that for companies not listed in the first tier (Sig. 
> 0.01). Thus, H10 can be accepted at the 1% and 5% significance levels. 
Size effect was calculated in order to indicate the magnitude of the differences between 
the both groups (not just whether the differences could have occurred by chance) 
(Pallant, 2001: 180). There are various statistics which measure the effect of size. 
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Pallant (2001: 180) pointed out that "Eta squared" is the most common statistics method 
for such a purpose. "Eta squared can range from 0 to 1 and represents the proportion of 
variance in the dependent variable that is explained by the independent (group) 
variable" (Pallant, 2001: 180). 
In this study, Eta squared was calculated as follows: 
t2 
t2+df 
_ 
(-5.382)2 
(-5.382)2+119 
_ 
29.966 
29.966+119 
_ 
29.966 
148.960 
= 0.201127 
The effect of size is large (0.20) which indicates a substantive finding that 20% (0.20 
* 100) of the variance in aggregate disclosure is explained by the listing status variable. 
A non-parametric test, the Mann Whitney U-test, was run also in order to confirm the 
previous findings. The results of this test are shown in the table below: 
Table 6.3.5.5: Mann-Whitney U-test results for listing status 
Extent of aggregate disclosure 
Z 
Assymp. Sig. (1-tailed) 
-4.790 
0.000 
The results of the table above are significant (p= 0.000) which means that there is a 
difference in the mean of aggregate disclosure for both groups: companies listed and not 
127 Pallant (2001: 181) provides the guidelines for this value: 0.01-0.05 = small effect, 0.06-0.13 = 
moderate effect and larger than 0.14 = large effect 
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listed in the first tier. Hence, the results of the Mann Whitney U-test (non-parametric) 
support the results of the independent sample T-test (parametric). 
For further analysis about the listing status variable, since this variable has not been 
investigated before in Jordan, companies were classified into four groups according to 
their listing status in ASE. A summary of descriptive statistics related to these groups 
and aggregate disclosure is presented in Table 6.3.5.6. 
Table 6.3.5.6: Descriptive statistics for listing status groups and the extent of 
aggregate disclosure 
No. of Percent Mean Std. deviation Max Min Skewness Kurtosis 
companies (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
Listed in the 51 42.1 72.71 5.571 85.58 59.88 0.281 -0.009 
first tier 
Listed in the 48 39.7 67.35 5.745 76.83 47.95 -0.681 1.381 
second tier 
Listed in the 14 11.6 67.13 6.749 80.23 57.63 0.438 -0.747 
third tier 
Not listed 8 6.6 62.99 9.840 76.96 47.93 0.199 -0.649 
Total 121 100 
The table above shows that the mean of aggregate disclosure is the highest for 
companies listed in the first tier. In contrast, the mean for non-listed companies is the 
lowest. In addition, companies listed in the first tier have the lowest standard deviation, 
while companies not listed in ASE have the highest. The company with the highest 
disclosure is listed in the first tier (85.58%), whereas that with the lowest one (47.93%) 
is not listed in the ASE. It is interesting to note that the mean of disclosure for 
companies listed in the second and the third tiers is almost the same (67%). 
128 Moreover, 
the third tier company with the highest aggregate information disclosure (80.23%) is 
larger than the highest-scoring company in the second tier (76.83%). Moreover, the 
128 This result supports the decision of merging the second and the third tiers into one tier, which came to 
effect in July 2004., Thus, ASE has become consisted of two markets: the First and Second Markets. 
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company with the lowest aggregate information disclosure in the third tier (57.63%) is 
larger than the lowest-scoring company in the second tier (47.95%). 
Table 6.3.5.7 shows the distribution of aggregate disclosure scores according to the 
listing groups. 
Table 6.3.5.7: Distribution of aggregate disclosure scores according to listing status 
groups 
Listing status details 
Disclosure groups 
(%) 
Listed in 
the first tier 
Listed in the 
second tier 
Listed in the 
third tier 
Not listed Total 
0.00-0.50 0 1 0 1 2 
0.51-0.60 1 4 2 3 10 
0.61-0.70 13 28 7 2 50 
0.71-0.80 32 15 4 2 53 
80+ 5 0 1 0 6 
Total 51 48 14 8 121 
As seen from the table above, two companies (one listed in the second tier and the 
other not listed) disclosed less than 50% of aggregate information. Meanwhile, six 
companies (five in the first tier and one in the third tier) disclosed more than 80% of 
aggregate information. In addition, the majority of companies (85%) in all groups (103 
out of 121) disclosed 61-80% of aggregate information in their annual reports. Thirty 
two companies (26% of the total) disclosed 0.71-80% of aggregate information, while 
the same numbers of companies in the second tier disclosed 0.51-0.70% of aggregate 
information. 
In order to test the relationship between the extent of aggregate disclosure and the 
listing status groups, one-way analysis of variance (one-way ANOVA) was undertaken. 
There are two assumptions of ANOVA that should be considered: 
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First, the normality assumption: companies must be distributed normally across status 
groups. A Kolmogrov-Smirnov (K-S) test of normality was run and the results are 
shown below: 
Table 6.3.5.8: Test of normality for listing status groups 
Kolmogrov-Smirnov 
Variable Statistic df Sig. 
Listed in the first tier 0.106 51 0.200 
Extent of disclosure Listed in the second tier 0.066 48 0.200 
Listed in the third tier 0.182 14 0.200 
Not listed 0.186 8 0.200 
The result of the K-S test indicates normality since the significance level for each listing 
status groups is more than 5%. In addition, the Skewness and Kurtosis values in table 
6.3.5.6 were found to be within the range of + 1.96. Therefore, the first assumption of 
ANOVA, regarding normality, was met. 
Second, the homogeneity of variance was tested. This assumption proposes that the 
variance scores for each group are not significantly different. Levene's test for 
homogeneity of variance is displayed in the table below 
Table 6.3.5.9: Levene's test of homogeneity of variances for listing status groups 
Levene's statistic dfl df2 Sig. 
2.659 3 117 0.051 
The significance value is just greater than 5% (0.051). Thus, it can be considered that 
the variance of all groups is similar and the homogeneity of variance assumption is not 
violated. 
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ANOVA indicates whether there is a significant difference among the mean aggregate 
disclosure scores for all groups listed in ASE. The findings of ANOVA are shown in 
Table 6.3.5.10. 
Table 6.3.5.10: ANOVA findings for listing status groups 
Sum of squares df Mean square F Sig. 
Between groups 0.116 3 0.039 10.355 0.000 
Within groups 0.437 117 0.004 
Total 0.554 120 
The table indicates that there is a significant difference in the extent of aggregate 
disclosure among the listing status groups in ASE (p = 0.000). 
Post hoc tests are used to compare all different combinations of the examined groups 
(Field, 2005: 339). With regard to listing status groups, post hoc tests were used to 
perform pairwise comparisons to compare all groups of listing status with each other. 
The results in table 6.3.5.11 reveal which pairs of groups have significantly different 
means. 
Table 6.3.5.11: Post hoc test for listing status groups and the extent of aggregate 
disclosure 
Multiple Comparisons 
Dependent Variable: extent of disclosure 
Tukev HSD 
95% Confidence 
Mean Interval 
(J) listing status Differenc Lower Upper 
I listing status details details e I-J Std. Error Sig. Bound Bound 
listed in the first tier listed in the second 
tier . 0536710* . 0122957 . 000 . 021624 . 085718 
listed in the third tier . 0558218* . 0184480 . 016 . 007740 . 103904 
not listed . 0971896* . 0232508 . 000 . 036590 . 157789 listed in the second tier listed in the first tier -. 0536710' . 0122957 . 000 -. 085718 -. 021624 listed in the third tier . 0021508 . 0185718 . 999 -. 046254 . 
050555 
not listed . 0435186 . 0233491 . 249 -. 017337 . 
104374 
listed in the third tier listed in the first tier -. 0558218* . 0184480 . 016 -. 103904 -. 
007740 
listed in the second 
tier . 0021508 . 0185718 . 999 -. 050555 . 
046254 
not listed . 0413678 . 0270985 . 425 -. 029260 . 
111996 
not listed listed in the first tier -. 0971896" . 0232508 . 000 -. 157789 -. 
036590 
listed in the second 
tier . 0435186 . 0233491 . 249 -. 104374 . 017337 
listed in the third tier -. 0413678 . 0270985 . 425 -. 111996 . 029260 
"i ne mean aitterence Is significant at the . 05 level. 
372 
The table above shows that there is a significant difference in means between 
companies listed in the first tier and between companies listed in each other tier: second, 
third and not listed (p <0.05). Therefore, the extent of aggregate disclosure differs 
significantly between companies listed in the first tier and those listed in other tiers. The 
largest difference of means was found to be between companies listed in the first tier 
group and those not listed (0.0972). Small differences were found between other pairs 
of groups: listed in the first tier and listed in the second tier (0.0537), and listed in the 
first tier and listed in the third tier (0.0558). 
A non-parametric test (Kruskall-Wallis test) was applied in order to confirm the above 
results. "Using the Kruskall-Wallis test as a non-parametric for confirmation will reduce 
the error of rejecting or accepting the null hypothesis when it is not" (Al-Shiab, 
2003: 307). The results of this test are shown in the following tables. 
Table 6.3.5.12: Kruskall Wallis results for listing status groups 
Listing status groups No Mean Rank 
Listed in the first tier 51 78.25 
Extent of aggregate Listed in the second tier 48 50.42 
disclosure Listed in the third tier 14 48.68 
Not listed 8 36.13 
Total 121 
Table 6.3.5.13 
Extent of aggregate disclosure 
Chi-square 22.452 
Df 3 
Assymp sig. 0.000 
The significance level in Table 6.3.5.13 is less than 5%, 1% and 0.1%, which means 
that there is a significant difference in the extent of aggregate disclosure means among 
companies in the four groups of listing status. Moreover, companies listed in the first 
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tier have the highest level of aggregate disclosure, since the mean rank is the largest 
(78.28), as seen in Table 6.3.5.12, while companies not listed in ASE score the lowest 
aggregate disclosure score (Mean rank = 36.13). 
In summary, listing status affects significantly the level of aggregate disclosure for 
Jordanian companies. No previous Jordanian studies have investigated this issue. 
Nonetheless, many previous studies in other countries (Singhvi and Devai, 1971; Firth, 
1979; Cooke, 1989a; Cooke, 1992; Malone, Fries and Jones, 1993; Hossain, Tan and 
Adams, 1994; Wallace, Naser and Mora, 1994; Hossain, Perera and Rahman, 1994; Al- 
Mulhem, 1997; Inchausti, 1997; Patton and Zelenka, 1997; Robb, Single and Zarzeski, 
1997; Glaum and Street, 2003; Ali, Ahmed and Henry, 2004, Anderson and Daoud, 
2005) found a significant association between listing status and the level of disclosure. 
Moreover, the importance of this variable requires different statistical tests in order to 
shed light on the nature of ASE tiers. Cooke (1989a: 15) argues that an investigation of 
the role of listing status is significant in order to increase our understanding about the 
behaviour of Swedish firms in disclosing their information. 
"Research on the extent of disclosure by unlisted and listed Swedish 
companies will represent an addition to knowledge. Furthermore, an 
examination of differences in the extent of disclosure between unlisted and 
listed companies will provide evidence on the proposition that large firms in 
Sweden behave very differently from the bulk of companies " (Cooke, 1989a: 
15). 
6.3.6 Relationship between Industry Type and the Extent of Aggregate Disclosure 
The companies, investigated in this study, were classified into two sectors: industrial 
and services. In fact, there are four sectors in ASE: banks, insurance, industrial and 
services. However, the bank and insurance sectors were eliminated from this study, 
since they are subject to specific requirements (e. g. International Accounting Standard 
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No. 30). In addition, the specific nature of operations of these two sectors makes their 
accounts not comparable with those of other sectors. 129 
There were 66 industrial and 55 services companies in the sample. The descriptive 
statistics for both sectors, in relation to aggregate disclosure, are shown in Table 6.3.6.1. 
Table 6.3.6.1: Descriptive statistics for extent of aggregate disclosure for both 
sectors 
Sector 
No. of 
companies 
Mean 
(%) 
Std. deviation 
(%) 
Max 
(%) 
Min 
(%) Skewness Kurtosis 
Industry 66 70.35 6.153 84.54 47.95 -0.626 1.938 
Services 55 68.03 7.343 85.58 47.93 0.059 0.113 
As can be seen from the table above, the mean of aggregate disclosure is greater for the 
industry sector (70%>68%). However, the difference is not large. In addition, the 
standard deviation for industrial companies is lower than the standard deviation for 
services companies. Furthermore, the company which has highest aggregate information 
disclosure (85.58%) was in the services sector (Jordan Telecom Services) and the one 
with lowest aggregate information disclosure (47.93%) was also in the services sector 
(Inma Investments & Financial Advances). 
A test of normality was run (see Table 6.3.6.2) in order to decide which type of test 
(parametric or non-parametric) should be applied to test hypothesis H12: there is a 
significant association between industry type and the extent of aggregate disclosure. 
Table 6.3.6.2: Test of normality for industry type 
Kolmogrov-Smirnov 
Variable Statistic df Sig. 
Industry 0.101 66 0.095 
Extent of disclosure 
Services 0.078 55 0.200 
129 For further information see part 4.5.5 in Chapter Four: Source of information, population and sample. 
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The K-S test reveals a significance value of more than 5% for both sectors: industry and 
services. Hence, the extent of aggregate disclosure for companies in both sectors 
approximates to the normal distribution. Therefore, the independent sample T-test 
(parametric) was used in order to detect whether there was a difference in the means of 
aggregate disclosure for both sectors. Before running this test, the assumption of 
equality of variance was checked in order to determine whether the variance of the 
extent of aggregate disclosure for both sectors was similar. Levene's test for equality of 
variance results is shown in Table 6.3.6.3. 
Table 6.3.6.3: Levene's test for equality of variance for industry type 
Levene's test for equality of variance 
F Sig. 
Extent of aggregate disclosure 
Equal variances assumed 
Equal variances not assumed 
2.886 0.092 
A significance value more than 5% assumes the equality of variances. Thus, the 
assumption of equality of variances is met (0.092 > 0.05). The findings of the 
independent sample T-test are illustrated below: 
Table 6.3.6.4: Independent sample T-test for industry type 
T- test for equality of means (equal variances assumed) 
t df Sig (2-tailed) Mean differences Std. error differences 
1.895 119 0.061 0.0232 0.0123 
The results indicate that there's no statistically significant difference in the mean of 
aggregate disclosure for both industrial and services companies (p > 0.05). Hence, H12 
can be rejected at the 5% significance level. 
In order to determine the effect of size and to indicate the magnitude of differences 
between the two sectors, "Eta squared" was calculated. The squared score was 0.0293 
(small effect), which means that only 2.93% of the variances in the extent of aggregate 
disclosure is explained by industry type. 
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The results in this study contradict Suwaidan's (1997) results in Jordan, which indicated 
an association between industry type and the extent of disclosure. This could be due to 
the type of industry included. Suwaidan's study focused upon voluntary disclosure and 
he included four sectors in his study: banks, insurance, industrial and services. However, 
this study is restricted to two sectors, industrial and services, because of the different 
requirements applicable to banking and insurance, as explained earlier. 
Furthermore, this study is consistent with Naser (1998), Naser, Al-Khatib and Karbhari 
(2002) and Al-Shiab (2003). Al-Shiab (2003) who found no association between 
industry type and the extent of aggregate disclosure for Jordanian companies. Although 
Al-Shiab (2003) did not find this association for each year separately (1995,1996,1997, 
1998,1999 and 2000), he found such an association for the period 1995 to 2000 as a 
whole. 
This comparison with previous studies, which report contradictory results, is confirmed 
by the Mann Whitney U-test (non-parametric). The result of this test is presented in 
Table 6.3.6.5. 
Table 6.3.6.5: Mann Whitney U-test results for industry group 
Extent of aggregate disclosure 
Z 
Assymp. Sig (1-tailed) 
2.139 
0.032 
The results of the table above indicate that there is a difference in the mean of aggregate 
disclosure level for industrial and services companies (p = 0.032), but only at the 5% 
level. Hence, one could argue that while parametric tests show no association, non- 
parametric tests detect such an association, which confirms the previous results in 
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Jordanian studies. 130 Multiple regression analysis, which will be discussed later in this 
chapter, will provide additional evidence about this relationship. 
Finally, the results of international studies are also contradictory. Some studies (Stanga, 
1976; Cooke, 1989b; Cooke, 1992; Raffournier, 1995; Wallace and Naser, 1995; Craig 
and Diga, 1998; Robb, Single and Zarzeski, 2001; Cammferman and Cooke, 2002) 
found an association between industry type and the disclosure level. Other studies 
(McNally, Eng and Hasseldine, 1982; Cooke, 1989a; Tai, Au-Yeung, Kwok and Lau, 
1990; Al-Mulhem, 1997; Inchausti, 1997; Patton and Zelenka, 1997; Owusu-Ansah, 
1998; Abd-Elsalam, 1999; Tower, Hancock and Taplin, 1999; Cooke and Haniffa, 2002; 
Ferguson, Lam and Lee, 2002; Eng and Mak, 2003; Akhtaruddin, 2005; Anderson and 
Daoud, 2005; Ghazali and Weetman, 2006) did not find any such relationship. 
6.3.7 Relationship between Assets in Place and the Extent of Aggregate Disclosure 
The impact of the assets in place on aggregate disclosure level has not been investigated 
in Jordan before, as far as the researcher is aware. The assets in place variable was 
checked for normality before choosing parametric or non-parametric tests. The results 
regarding this issue are displayed in the table below. 
Table 6.3.7.1: Test of normality for assets in place 
Kolmogrov-Smirnov 
Variable Statistic df Sig. 
Assets in place 0.085 12Y31 0.033 
The distribution of assets in place was not normally distributed, since the significance 
level was less than 5% (p = 0.033). Hence, a non-parametric test (Kendall's tau) was 
applied in order to test H13. The results are shown in Table 6.3.7.2. 
130 The results of the parametric test do not differ significantly from the non-parametric test results. The 
significance value in the parametric test was 0.061 which means that one could conclude that there is a 
difference in the mean of aggregate disclosure between the two sectors at the 10% level of significance. 131 The calculation of assets in place ratio (net book value of fixed assets / book value of total assets) 
could not be done for one company due to the lack of required information. 
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Table 6.3.7.2: Kendall's tau results for assets in place 
Variable Kendall's tau correlation coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) No. of companies 
Assets in place -0.002 0.486 120 
The table shows that there is a very weak negative (tau = -0.002) association between 
assets in place and the extent of aggregate disclosure. However, this result is not 
significant at the 5% significance level. Thus, H13, which proposes a negative 
association between assets in place and the extent of aggregate disclosure, can be 
rejected at the 5% level of significance. 
Spearman's rank correlation (non-parametric) was run in order to confirm this result. 
The findings are displayed in the Table 6.3.7.3. 
Table 6.3.7.3: Spearman's rank correlation for assets in place 
Variable 
Spearman's rank correlation coefficient 
(rho) Sig. (1-tailed) 
No. of 
companies 
Assets in place 0.003 0.486 120 
The result shows that the relationship between assets in place and the extent of 
aggregate disclosure remains weak (0.003). Despite the sign of the relationship being 
changed (+), the relationship is not significant at the 5% level. 
As shown before in this section, there was no previous research in Jordan, which 
examined the effect of this variable on disclosure level. In other countries, previous 
studies (e. g. Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Hossain, Tan and Adams, 1994; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman, 1995; Ho and Wong, 2001) found no relationship between assets in 
place and the level of disclosure. However, Haniffa and Cooke (2002) found a positive 
relationship between disclosure level and the proportion of assets in place. They 
ascribed this unexpected result to the different approach used to measure assets in place. 
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In general, assets in place does not play a vital role in explaining the extent of aggregate 
disclosure in Jordan. However, the small number of studies and the contradictory results 
require more studies in different countries. 
6.3.8 Relationship between Ownership Structure and the Extent of Aggregate 
Disclosure 
A negative effect of ownership structure on the level of aggregate disclosure was 
proposed in Hypothesis 14. The result of the K-S test of normality is shown in the 
following table. 
Table 6.3.8.1: Test of normality for ownership structure 
Kolmogrov-Smirnov 
Variable Statistic df Sig. 
Ownership structure 0.065 121 0.200 
The normality assumption is met, since the significance value is more than 5% (0.200), 
therefore parametric tests are appropriate here. A Pearson correlation coefficient test 
was run and the findings are shown in Table 6.3.8.2. 
Table 6.3.8.2: Pearson correlation results for ownership structure 
Variable Pearson's correlation coefficient (r) Sig. (1-tailed) No. of companies 
Ownership structure -0.004 0.484 121 
The findings indicate a very weak negative association between ownership structure and 
the extent of aggregate disclosure. (r = -0.004). Similar to assets in place, this 
association is not significant at the 5% level (p = 0.484). Thus, it could be inferred that 
H14 can be rejected at the 5% level of significance. This result is supported by the non- 
parametric test, Kendall's tau (tau = -0.005, p=0.470). 
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This conclusion is consistent with Suwaidan's (1997), Naser's (1998) and Naser, Al- 
Khatib and Karbhari's (2002) studies for Jordanian firms. Suwaidan (1997: 146) 
ascribed this association to the fact that the majority of institutional ownership 
shareholders in Jordanian companies have one or more representatives in the board of 
directors, so they have access to information. Therefore, annual reports may not be an 
important source of information. Moreover, Owusu-Ansah (1998: 613) argued that, in 
countries where ownership equity is highly concentrated (e. g. Jordan), there was little 
separation between ownership and management. 
"In such cases, capital owners have greater access to internal information 
of the company, and may not have to rely, to a greater extent, on public 
disclosure to monitor their investments. Thus, demand for adequate 
disclosure and reporting is generally low in such situations" (Owusu-Ansah, 
1998: 613). 
However, Al-Issa (1988) found that ownership was positively correlated with the level 
of disclosure for Jordanian firms. He (1988: 103) measured the disclosure for companies 
in which the Jordanian government has a share in the company's capital or these where 
it does not (joint or private). The level of disclosure was higher for jointly owned 
companies than for private ones (Al-Issa, 1988: 102). 
In international studies, some (Malone, Fries and Jones, 1993; Raffournier, 1995; 
Depoers, 2000, Eng and Mak, 2003; Anderson and Daoud, 2005) did not find an 
association between the ownership structure and the extent of disclosure level. However, 
others (Hossain, Tan and Adams, 1994; Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Cooke and Haniffa, 2002) 
found a positive association. In contrast, Gelb (2000) found a negative association 
between management ownership and the extent of disclosure. "Firms with lower levels 
of managerial ownership tend to provide more extensive disclosures in their annual 
reports and quarterly reports" (Gelb, 2000: 184). 
Overall, aggregate disclosure for Jordanian companies is not affected by the structure of 
their ownership. 
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6.3.9 Relationship between Liquidity and the Extent of Aggregate Disclosure 
The ratio of current assets to current liabilities was used to measure liquidity. The test 
for normality of distribution of this variable is shown below. 
Table 6.3.9.1: Test of normality for liquidity 
Kolmogrov-Smirnov 
Variable Statistic df Sig. 
Liquidity 0.301 121 0.000 
The significance value is less than 5%, which indicates a deviation from normality. 
Therefore, H15, which is concerned with the association between liquidity and the 
extent of aggregate disclosure, was tested using Kendall's tau and Spearman's rank 
correlation (non-parametric tests) as shown below in Table 6.3.9.2. 
Table 6.3.9.2: Kendall's tau and Spearman's rank correlation results for number 
of shareholders 
Test Correlation coefficient Sig (2-tailed) 
No. of 
companies 
Kendall's tau -0.024 0.692 121 
Spearman's rank correlation (rho) -0.049 
-- 7. 121 
The results, presented in the table above, show no significant relationship was found 
between liquidity and the extent of aggregate disclosure (tau = -0.024, p=0.692; rho =- 
0.049, p=0.594). Hence, H15 can be rejected at the 5% level of significance. 
Al-Issa (1988) discovered a similar result in Jordan. In addition, other studies (Wallace 
and Naser, 1995; Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Abd-Elsalam, 1999) support such a result. 
Meanwhile, Naser, Al-Khatib and Karbhari (2002) found, consistent with agency theory, 
a negative correlation between liquidity ratios and the disclosure level in Jordan. 
Wallace, Naser and Mora (1994) and Camffermann and Cooke (2002) studies in other 
countries support such a result. "It may also be argued that the weaker the ratio, the 
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greater the incentive to disclose, to allay fears and to inform shareholders that action 
is 
being taken" (Camfferman and Cooke, 2002: 11). 
The conclusion about this variable, in regard to Jordan, is that the evidence seems to 
indicate that liquidity ratio does not affect the level of aggregate disclosure for 
Jordanian companies. 
6.3.10 Relationship between Audit Firm Size and the Extent of Aggregate 
Disclosure: 
Table 6.3.10.1 shows the descriptive statistics of the aggregate disclosure level for 
companies audited by Big and Small audit firms. 
Table 6.3.10.1: Descriptive statistics of the aggregate disclosure level for companies 
audited by Big and Small audit firms 
Audit firm 
No. of 
companies 
Mean 
(%) 
Std. deviation 
(%) 
Max 
(%) 
Min 
(%) Skewness Kurtosis 
Big 64 71.10 6.29 85.58 57.24 -0.009 -0.147 
Small 57 67.28 6.82 82.59 47.93 -0.507 0.889 
The table shows that 64 companies (53%) are audited by the Big Jordanian audit firms, 
while the other 57 companies (47%) are audited by various local Jordanian audit 
firms132 In addition, the mean of aggregate disclosure for companies audited by big 
audit firms is larger (71%) than the mean for companies audited by small audit firms 
(67%). In addition, the company with the largest disclosure (85%) is audited by a big 
audit firm, while that with the lowest (47.93%) is audited by a small audit firm. 
The test of normality for audit firm size is shown below: 
132 For further information about Big and Small Jordanian audit firms, see Chapter Four, part 4.5.2.10: 
Audit firm size. 
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Table 6.3.10.2: Test of normality for audit firm size 
Kolmogrov-Smirnov 
Variable Statistic df Sig. 
Big audit firm 0.041 57 0.200 
Extent of disclosure 
Small audit firm 0.072 57 0.200 
The normality assumption is not violated since the significance value is more than 5%, 
thus, parametric tests can be used. The Independent sample T-test was used in order to 
compare the aggregate disclosure level for two groups: companies audited by big audit 
firms and companies audited by Small audit firms. Before running such a test, the 
homogeneity of variance was checked in order to detect whether the variances were 
equal for both groups or not. The result of Levene's test is shown in the next table. 
Table 6.3.10.3: Levene's test for equality of variances for audit firm size 
Levene's test for equality of variance 
F Sig. 
Extent of aggregate disclosure 
Equal variances assumed 
Equal variances not assumed 
0.199 0.656 
The findings indicate a significance value larger than 5% (0.656), which means that the 
homogeneity of variances assumption is met. The independent sample T-test based on 
equal variances was run using SPSS. The results of this test are shown in Table 6.3.10.4 
Table 6.3.10.4: Independent sample T-test results for audit firm size 
T- test for equality of means (equal variances assumed) 
t df Sig (1-tailed) Mean differences Std. error differences 
-3.206 119 0.001 -0.0382 0.0119 
The results illustrate that there is a highly significant difference in the mean of 
aggregate disclosure for both groups, since the significance value is less than 5% 
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(0.001). Hence, hypothesis H16, which proposes a significant positive association 
between companies audited by one of the Jordanian Big Three audit firms and the extent 
of aggregate disclosure, can be accepted at the 1% level of significance. 
"Eta squared" was calculated in order to measure the effect of size. The score was . 08, 
which indicates a moderate effect. In other words, 8% of the variance in aggregate 
disclosure level is explained by audit firm size. Moreover, the results of the T-test were 
confirmed by the Mann Whitney U-test, a non-parametric test (Z = -2.970, p=0.0015). 
The finding is consistent with previous studies in Jordan by Suwaidan (1997); Naser, 
Al-Khatib and Karbhari (2002); and Al-Shiab (2003). In addition, Suwidan (1997: 150) 
pointed out that the high significance level reveals a fundamental influence of the 
auditors on the level of disclosure of Jordanian firms. Furthermore, international studies 
(Singhavi and Desai, 1971; Ahmed and Nicholls, 1994; Raffournier, 1995; Wallace and 
Naser, 1995; Inchausti, 1997; Patton and Zelenka, 1997; Camffermann and Cooke, 2002; 
Glaum and Street, 2003) have also found a positive association between audit firm type 
and the disclosure level. On the contrary, other studies (Singhvi, 1968; Firth, 1979; 
McNally, Eng and Hasseldine, 1982; Tai, Au-Yeung, Kwok and Lau, 1990; Malone, 
Fries and Jones, 1993; Hossain, Tan and Adams, 1994; Hossain, Perera and Rahman, 
1995; Al-Mulhem, 1997; Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Abd-Elsalm, 1999; Depoers, 2000; Ali, 
Ahmed and Henry, 2004; Anderson and Daoud, 2005; Barako, Hancock and Izan, 2006) 
did not find any association. 
In summary, auditors in Jordan seem to play an important role in the disclosure policies 
of their clients. Article 75 of The Companies Act 2002, requires Jordanian firms to have 
their financial statements audited by CPA. Therefore, it could be said that Jordanian 
firms audited by Big audit firms in Jordan are likely to provide more details in their 
annual reports than others not audited by Big Jordanian audit firms. 
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"This behaviour may also be considered as a signal about auditing firms. 
Big Six audit firms may encourage their clients to provide comprehensive 
high quality' information in order to increase their own reputation " 
(Inchausti, 1997.62). 
6.3.11 Relationship between Listing age and the Extent of Aggregate Disclosure 
No previous studies, as far as the researcher is aware, were conducted in Jordan 
concerning the effect of the listing age on the level of disclosure. Non-parametric tests 
(Kendall's tau and Spearman's rank correlation) were applied since the assumption of 
normality was violated as shown in Table 6.3.11.1. 
Table: 6.3.11.1: Test of normality for listing's age 
Kolmogrov-Smirnov 
Variable Statistic df Sig. 
Listing age 0.239 121 0.000 
The findings of Kendall's tau and Spearman's rank correlation are presented in the next 
table: 
Table 6.3.11.2: Kendall's tau and Spearman's rank correlation results for listing 
age 
Test Correlation coefficient Sig (1-tailed) 
No. of 
companies 
Kendall's tau 0.174 0.003 121 
Spearman's rank correlation (rho) 0.242 0.004 121 
The results in the above table reveal a highly significant positive association between 
listing age and the extent of aggregate disclosure (tau = 0.174, p<0.001, rho = 0.242, p 
< 0.00 1). Thus, H17 can be accepted at the 1% level of significance. 
The results in previous studies about the effect of listing age on the level of disclosure 
are few. While Owusu-Ansah (1998) found in Zimbabwe a positive association between 
them, Haniffa and Cooke (2002) and Akhataruddin (2005) did not find any such 
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association in Bangladesh. The results of multiple regression analysis will shed light on 
this impact. However, more studies are required to explore this association in Jordan 
and other countries. 
6.4 Multivariate Analysis: Multiple and Stepwise Regression 
This section of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 6.4.1 reviews the regression 
model. Section 6.4.2 contains discussion of the regression assumptions. Section 6.4.3 
contains the results of the regression analysis using SPSS. In section 6.4.4, the results of 
the analysis using stepwise regression are discussed. 
6.4.1 The Regression Model: 
In order to assess the impact of each variable on the aggregate disclosure level, the 
following regression model was constructed: 
AD = ßo+ßl Size (TA, SA, CS, NI) + ß2 LE + ß3 Profitability (ROR, EM, ROE) + 
ß4NS+ß5LS+ß6IT+ß7AIP+ßs OS+ß9LIQ+ß1oAS+ßi1 LA+e 
Where, 
AD = Aggregate disclosure index 
Bi = The regression coefficient, I=0,1........, 11 
TA = Total assets 
SA = Sales 
CS = Capital stock 
NI = Net income 
LE = Leverage 
ROR = Rates on return 
EM = Earnings margin 
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ROE = Return on equity 
NS = Number of shareholders 
LS = Listing status (LS =a if listing in the first tier and 0 if otherwise) 
IT = Industry type (IT =1 if industrial and 0 if otherwise (services)) 
AIP = Assets in place 
OS = Ownership structure 
LIQ = Liquidity 
AS = Audit firm size (AS =1 if Big Three auditor, 0 if otherwise) 
LA = Listing age 
e= error term 
The regression model contains eight continuous variables (firm size, leverage, 
profitability, number of shareholders, assets in place, ownership structure, liquidity and 
listing age). The size variable consists of four proxies: total assets, sales, capital stock 
and net income, while the profitability variable consists of three proxies: rates of return, 
earnings margin and return on equity. In addition, the model contains three dummy (or 
nominal) variables, one variable for listing status (listed in the first tier or not), one 
variable for industry type (manufacturing or services) and one variable for audit firm 
size (Big or Small). The reason for choosing these variables to enter the regression 
analysis was explained by Wallace and Naser and Mora (1994: 49): 
"The motivation for selecting the variables to enter into the reduced 
regression is derived from their popularity in previous research. Popularity, 
here, means that a firm characteristic has featured, and has been shown to 
be significant predictor of disclosure indexes, in four or more country 
studies. Corporate size (asset or sales), liquidity, industry type, quotation 
status and auditor type have shown to be significant predictors of indexes of 
disclosure be previous studies. That is why these variables were entered in 
the reduced regression". 
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Before running the regression model, it was essential to check the major assumptions of 
regression. 
6.4.2 Regression Assumptions 
Five major assumptions had to be checked before running the regression model using 
SPSS: normality, multicollinearity, homoscedasticity, independence of the errors and 
sample size in regression (Field, 2005: 169). 
6.4.2.1 Normality 
This assumption assumes that the normal distribution of the independent variables 
should not deviate significantly from normality. Wetherill (1986: 180) argued that one 
major cause of non-normality in regression models is related to the outliers (residuals). 
Indeed, the residuals in the model may not be normally distributed, which means that 
the difference between the model and the observed data is more than zero (Field, 
2005: 170). "The assumption of normality is that errors of prediction are normally 
distributed around each and every predicted DV score" (Tabachnick and Fidel!, 
2001: 119)133. 
To assess the normality problem in this study, histograms and scatterplots were 
constructed for each continuous variable (dependent and independent). In addition, 
Skewness and Kurtosis coefficients for the residuals and K-S tests of normality of 
residuals were undertaken. The results of these tests revealed that the data set adhered to 
normality for the dependent variable (extent of aggregate disclosure). For independent 
variables, the size variables, leverage, profitability variables, number of shareholders 
and liquidity deviated significantly from normality, whereas assets in place and listing 
133 DV refers to dependent variable 
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age did not differ markedly from normality. The ownership structure variable also 
indicated normality134 
One of the most common techniques used by many researchers to deal with the non- 
normality problem is transformation of data. Field (2005: 79) argued that the purpose of 
the transformation is to modify the distributional problem. "This involves 
mathematically modifying the scores using various formulas until the distribution looks 
more normal" (Pallant, 2001: 78). However, the transformation approach is not 
recommended universally. The reason for this is that it may be difficult to interpret data 
after transformation (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001: 80). In addition, Erickson and 
Nosanchuck (1992: 93) commented, "After transformation, many things can happen to 
outliers; outliers in the row data may stop being outliers (`false outliers') or persist, or 
new outliers may be revealed ('hidden outliers')". Therefore, Tabachnick and Fidell 
(2001: 81) pointed out that it is better to check the data after transformation. Indeed, it is 
recommended to try more than one transformation procedure in order to alleviate the 
non-normality shape of the data and reduce the outliers. 
There are different methods of transformation: log transformation, square root of 
transformation and reciprocal transformation (Field, 2005: 80). In general, log 
transformation is the most common way and was used by many researchers (Ahmed and 
Nicholls, 1994; Hossain, Tan and Adams, 1994; Wallace and Naser, 1994; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman, 1995; Raffournier, 1995; Al-Mulhem, 1997; Inchausti, 1997; 
Patton and Zelenka, 1997; Suwaidan, 1997; Craig and Diga, 1998; Owusu-Ansah, 1998; 
Depoers, 2000; Ho and Wong, 2001; Ferguson and Lee, 2002; Ali, Ahmed and Henry, 
2004; Makhija and Patton, 2004; Ansah and Yeoh, 2005). 
134 See the K-S tests of normality results in part 6.3 (univariate analysis) to assess the normality for each 
variable. 
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In this study, transformation was undertaken for the following continuous variables: 
size variables, leverage, profitability variables, number of shareholders and liquidity 
variables. Different methods of transformation were used according to the extent of the 
deviation from normality. Tabachnick and Fidell (2001: 81) suggested that if the 
distribution differs moderately from normal (as in the case of leverage here), a square 
root is an appropriate approach. They suggested using a log transformation if the 
distribution differs significantly from normality (in this case, size variables, number of 
shareholders and liquidity variables). Finally, if the deviation is severe (as with the 
profitability variables), they suggested using inverse transformation. 
After different trials of transformation, significant improvements were noticed in the 
histogram and scatterplot shapes. In addition, skewness, kurtosis and K-S tests revealed 
that the normality assumption was not violated. Nonetheless, it should be noted that net 
income (one of the size variables) and long term debt / owner's equity ratio (one of the 
leverage variables) did not reveal any improvement in their distribution pattern. The 
decision was taken to eliminate net income from the regression model, since there were 
still three variables as measures of size (total assets, sales and capital stock), and also to 
reduce the multicollinearity effect (as will be shown later in this section). Suwaidan 
(1997: 160) excluded this variable from his regression analysis. 
"Since the profit variable was the variable least frequently employed in 
similar studies as a measure of size, the decision has been made to exclude 
the profit variable from this analysis as a measure of size" (Suwaidan, 
1997: 160). 
In addition, the ratio of long term debt to owner's equity (measure of leverage) was 
excluded due to the non-normality problem and the number of missing observations 
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required for calculation of this ratio, which could be the reason for this non- 
normality. 135 
The next table shows the skewness, kurtosis and K-S tests for the continuous variables 
before and after the transformation. 
135 Sixty six companies did not have this ratio since they did not have long term debt (the numerator) in 
their financial statements. However, leverage was still measured by using total debt / total assets ratio. 
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6.4.2.2 Multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity exists when there is a high correlation between two or more 
independent variables (predictor variables) in the regression model (Brace, Kemp and 
Snelgar, 2003: 213). Field (2005: 174) pointed out that if the collinearity is found to be 
high, the probability that a good predictor will be found to be non-significant is 
increased. Hence, such a predictor is inappropriately rejected from the regression model. 
There are two approaches to identify multicollinearity: 
First, scanning the correlation matrix for all predictor variables using Pearson's product 
moment correlation. The degree of multicollinearity is determined by addressing the 
correlation coefficients among variables. "A high correlation between any pair of 
independent variables may indicate the presence of multicollinearity" (Suwaidan, 
1997: 161). The degree of correlation is considered to be high and causes a 
multicollinearity problem if it exceeds 0.80 or 0.90 (Field, 2005: 174; Pallent, 2001: 137). 
However, some degree of multicollinearity was found in some studies, when the size of 
correlation was above 0.70 (Wallace, Naser and Mora, 1994; Wallace and Naser, 1994; 
Al-Mulhem, 1997; Suwaidan, 1997). 
In this study, the correlation matrix was run using SPSS. A high level of correlation was 
found among the following variables in Table 6.4.2.2.1: 
394 
Table 6.4.2.2.1: Highly correlated variables 
Total assets Sales Capital stock TD/TA ROR EM ROE Liquidity 
(log) (log) (log) (sqr) (inverse) (inverse) (inverse) (log) 
Total assets 
(log) 1.000 
Sales 
(log) 0.807 1.000 
Capital stock 
(log) 0.876 0.646 1.000 
TD/TA 
(sqr) 0.317 0.250 0.198 1.000 
ROR 
(inverse 0.068 0.193 -. 042 -0.370 1.000 
EM 
(inverse) 0.090 0.221 0.004 -0.398 0.734 1.000 
ROE 
(inverse) 0.080 0.173 -0.031 -0.062 0.667 0.499 1.000 
Liquidity 
(log) -0.188 -0.079 -0.202 -0.719 0.383 0.449 0.165 1.000 
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The table shows a high level of correlation (above 0.70) between the following 
variables: firm size variables, total assets and sales (0.807) and between total assets and 
capital stock (0.876); between total debt to total assets ratio (TD/TA) and liquidity 
(-0.719); and between two variables of profitability, ROR and EM (0.734). 
To control the impact of multicollinearity, the following steps were undertaken: 
1- Multicollinearity related to size variables was addressed by running two models 
including total assets in the first one and sales and capital stock in the second one. 
2- Multicollinearity between TD/TA ratio and liquidity was solved by running each of 
the models mentioned in the first step, twice: the first run included TD/TA ratio and the 
second one included liquidity. 
3- Multicollinearity for profitability variables, ROR and EM, was addressed by applying 
first three regression models incorporating one of those profitability variables each time 
in order to evaluate the model by addressing the R square of each model. The model 
which incorporated EM was found to have the least explanatory power. In addition, EM 
has a high correlation with ROR (0.734), whereas ROR and ROE have a lower 
correlation, less than 0.70 (0.667), which was not considered to be harmful. Therefore, 
the decision was taken to exclude EM from the analysis and to include both ROR and 
ROE in each model. 
The foregoing steps were supported by previous empirical studies. Suwaidan (1997: 162) 
eliminated one of the assets variables (total assets), since it had a high correlation with 
other size variables, and had the least explanatory power in the model (i. e. step three). 
In addition, Al-Mulhem (1997: 243) and Wallace, Naser and Mora (1994: 49) dropped 
one of the size variables (assets and sales), since the correlation between them was high. 
"As a result, we dropped sales from the full regression because we 
considered one of the collinear variables (assets and sales) redundant and 
so both were not needed for predicting the index of comprehensive 
disclosure" (Wallace, Naser and Mora, 1994: 49). 
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Overall, two regression models were run in this study in order to highlight the effect of 
each independent variables (company's characteristics) on the dependent variable 
(aggregate disclosure extent) while controlling the effects of multicollinearity. The first 
model incorporated total assets and the second model incorporated sales and capital 
stock. Each model was run twice. The first run included TD/TA ratio, while the second 
run included liquidity. Both ROR and ROE were included in each model. 
The second approach to identify multicollinearity is to calculate the variance inflation 
factor (VIF). "VIF is an alternative measure of collinearity (in fact it is the reciprocal of 
tolerance) in which a large value indicates a strong relationship between predictor 
variables" (Brace, Kemp and Snelgar, 2003: 221). 
VIF is equal to 1/ 1-R2, where R2 is derived from regressing each independent variable 
on all the other independent variables (Suwaidan, 1997: 161). VIF more than 10 is 
considered to indicate high level of multicollinearity (Field, 2005: 175). In this study, 
VIF for all variables, while running the regression models, remained below 10, which 
indicated the absence of a multicollinearity problem. Moreover, tolerance, which is the 
reciprocal (1 / VIF) should be above 0.1 or 0.2 in order to avoid multicollinearity (Field, 
2005: 175). All values of tolerance in the regression models were found to be above 
these critical values. Hence, the multicollinearity problem was controlled, while running 
the regression models. The results of these models will be explained later in this chapter. 
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6.4.2.3 Homoscedasticity 
The homoscedasticity assumption assumes that the standard deviations of errors 
prediction are equal for all explanatory (independent) variables (Tabachnick and Fidell, 
2001: 121). Indeed, this assumption requires the residuals should have the same or 
similar variance. The converse of homoscedasticity is heteroscedasticity, which occurs 
when the variances are unequal. 
Examination of the scatterplots of the regression models, which were run in this study, 
indicates whether this assumption is violated or not. The next figures show the 
scatterplots of the regression standardised predicted value against the residuals for both 
models (each model was run twice, as explained before). 
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Figure 6.4.2.3.1: Scatter plot of the first regression model (first run) 
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Figure 6.4.2.3.2: Scatter plot of the first regression model (second run) 
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Figure 6.4.2.3.3: Scatter plot of the second regression model (first run) 
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Figure 6.4.2.3.4: Scatter plot of the second regression model (second run) 
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From the figures above, the variances seem to be equal, since the spread of the shapes 
indicates equality in width for residuals at all values of the explanatory variables. Hence, 
the assumption of homoscedasticity does not appear to be violated. 
Moreover, for categorical variables (listing status, industry type and audit firm size), 
Levene's test was applied in order to check whether the variances in the groups are 
equal or unequal. A significance value less than 5% reveals that the test is significant 
and there is a difference among variances. Thus, the assumption of homogeneity is not 
supported. The contrary occurs if the significance value is more than 5%. The results are 
shown in the following tables: 
Table 6.4.2.3.1: Test of homogeneity of variance for listing status 
Levene Statistic dfl df2 Sig. 
Based on Mean 2.159 1 119 0.144 
Based on Median 2.234 1 119 0.138 
Extent of disclosure Based on Median and 2.234 1 117.761 0.138 
adjusted df 
Based on trimmed mean 2.192 1 119 0.141 
Table 6.4.2: 3.2: Test of homogeneity of variance for industry type 
Levene Statistic dfl df2 Sig. 
Based on Mean 2.886 1 119 0.092 
Based on Median 2.429 1 119 0.122 
Extent of disclosure Based on Median and 2.429 1 117.761 0.122 
adjusted df 
Based on trimmed mean 2.872 1 119 0.093 
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Table 6.4.2.3.3: Test of homogeneity of variance for audit firm size 
Levene Statistic dfl df2 Sig. 
Based on Mean 0.199 1 119 0.656 
Based on Median 0.193 1 119 0.661 
Extent of disclosure Based on Median and 0.193 1 117.585 0.661 
adjusted df 
Based on trimmed mean 0.186 1 119 0.667 
The results indicate that there is no difference between the variances, since the 
significance value for all grouped variables was more than 5%. Therefore, it could be 
concluded that the assumption of homoscedasticity is met. 
Generally, the assumption of homoscedasticity is checked in order to ensure that the 
regression model is run efficiently and the variances remain similar for all independent 
variables. "If the assumption of homoscedasticity is not satisfied, the regression 
estimates are still unbiased and consistent, but they are not efficient (no longer have 
minimum variances)" (Suwaidan, 1997: 163). 
6.4.2.4 Independence of Errors: 
Another assumption of multiple regression is related to errors. Tabachnick and Fidell 
(2001: 121) pointed out that the errors of prediction should be uncorrelated (independent 
of one another). The Durbin-Watson test is used to test the autocorrelation of errors. In 
particular, it measures whether adjacent residuals are correlated or not (Field, 2005: 170). 
The test value varies between 0 and 4, and a value of 2 indicates uncorrelation of errors. 
Negative correlation occurs if the value of the test is significantly above 2, while 
positive correlation occurs if the value is significantly below 2 (Field, 2005: 170). 
However, Field (2005: 170) argued that the number of explanatory variables in the 
regression model and the number of observals are major determinants of the value of the 
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Durbin-Watson test statistic. The problem here is that there is no exact acceptable value, 
by which independence of errors can be judged. However, Field (2005: 170) pointed out 
a conservative rule that values less than 1 or greater than 3 are certainly cause for 
concern. Moreover, values near 2 may be biased depending on the sample and the 
model. 
In this study, the Durbin-Watson values for the two models were between 1 and 3 
(model 1, first run = 1.081; model 1, second run = 1.090; model 2, first run = 1.208; 
model 2, second run = 1.215). Hence, the evidence seems to indicate that both models in 
this study meet the assumption of independence of errors. 
6.4.2.5 Sample Size in Regression Analysis: 
The sample size in this study is 121 companies, as shown in Part 4.5.5 in Chapter 4. The 
question which can be raised here is: Is this number of companies enough to apply 
multiple regression analysis? 
Different rules have been set, but Field (2005: 172) argued that the required sample size 
depends on the expected effect size that we are trying to assess, and how strong the 
relationship we are trying to measure is. In addition, Tabachnick and Fidell (1996: 132) 
pointed out some determinants of sample size, such as the desired power, alpha level, 
number of predictors and the expected effect size. 
Pallant (2001: 136) argued that it is better to get a large sample in order to generalize the 
results. Green (1991: 508) provides two rules for the minimum size of sample required. 
The first one is related to whether one is interested in testing the overall fit (multiple 
correlation) of the regression model. In this case, the sample required = 50 + 8m, where 
m is the number of predictors. The second rule is related to testing each predictor within 
the model (partial correlation). Thus, the sample required =104 + m. 
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Field (2005: 173) argued that in most regression models, researchers are interested in 
testing the overall fit (multiple correlation) and in the contribution of individual 
predictors (partial correlation). Hence, Green (1991: 509) recommended computing the 
sample size according to both the above rules and using the largest one. 
"Researchers who evaluate hypotheses concerning partial correlation in 
addition to hypotheses about multiple correlation should determine 
minimum sample sizes for both types of tests and select the largest of these 
minimum sample sizes as the Nfor their study" (Green, 1991: 509) 
With regard to this study, according to the first rule, the sample size required = 
50+ 8x11 = 138 companies (the number of predictors is 11 in this study), while the 
sample size, according to the second rule = 104 + 11 = 115 companies. 
As explained in section 4.5.5 in Chapter Four, the number of companies, from which 
collection of annual reports was possible, was 145 companies. The researcher collected 
reports from 121 companies. 136 This number is considered to be acceptable since it is 
more than 115, even though it is less than 138. Such a number is consistent with 
Suwaidan's sample of 102 companies with eight predictors. 137 Therefore, the sample 
size in this study is considered to be large enough in order to run multiple regression 
analysis and generalize the results. 
136 The remaining 27 companies could not be included for various reasons. See part 4.5.5 in Chapter 4 for further information. 
137 According to the first rule, Suwaidan's sample required = 5+8x8 = 114, while according to the second 
rule, Suwaidan's sample required = 104 +8= 112. 
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6.4.3 Results of the multiple regression analysis 
Before evaluating the results, it should be noted that the multiple regression analysis 
was run using SPSS and the forced entry method (Enter method in the SPSS). 
According to this method, all the explanatory variables are entered into the model 
simultaneously in order to indicate whether these variables contribute significantly in 
the prediction of the disclosure level (Suwaidan, 1997: 105). The findings in both 
models are assessed at the 5% significance level. 
6.4.3.1 First Model 
In this model, sales and capital stock were excluded to avoid the problem of 
multicollinearity as explained in section 6.4.2.2. In addition, TD/TA ratio was included 
in the first run, while liquidity was included in the second run. The results of this model 
are explained in the following tables: 
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Model 1: First run 
Table 6.4.3.1.1: Model Summary 
R Rz Adjusted R2 Standard error of the estimate F Sig. 
0.712 0.507 0.456 0.0498 9.900 0.000 
Table 6.4.3.1.2: Multiple regression results (coefficients) 
Standardised coefficients 
Model 1: first run Beta T Sig. 
Total assets (log) 0.475 5.360 0.000 
TD/TA (sqr) -0.105 -1.215 0.227 
ROR (inverse) -0.061 -0.550 0.583 
ROE (inverse) 0.317 3.261 0.001 
Number of shareholders (log) 0.032 0.367 0.714 
Listing status 0.198 2.335 0.021 
Industry type 0.218 2.831 0.006 
Assets in place 0.056 0.686 0.494 
Ownership structure 0.064 0.792 0.430 
Audit firm size 0.122 1.541 0.126 
Listing age 0.038 0.455 0.650 
408 
Model 1: Second run 
Table 6.4.3.1.3: Model summary 
R R2 Adjusted R2 Standard error of the estimate F Sig. 
0.712 0.507 0.456 0.0498 9.912 0.000 
Table 6.4.3.1.4: Multiple regression results (coefficients) 
Standardised coefficients 
Model 1: second run Beta T Sig. 
Total assets (log) 0.448 5.471 0.000 
ROR (inverse) -0.042 -0.396 0.693 
ROE (inverse) 0.305 3.209 0.002 
Number of shareholders (log) 0.046 0.519 0.605 
Listing status 0.213 2.520 0.013 
Industry type 0.204 2.655 0.009 
Assets in place 0.109 1.142 0.256 
Ownership structure 0.054 0.659 0.511 
Audit firm size 0.144 1.882 0.063 
Listing age 0.024 0.287 0.775 
Liquidity 0.115 1.242 0.217 
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Tables 6.4.3.1.1 and 6.4.3.1.2 reveal the significance statistics of the first run of Model 
1. As shown from table 6.4.3.1.1, R2 = 0.507, which means that the model, which 
includes eleven variables, explains 50.7% of the variance in the aggregate disclosure 
level. This percentage is considered to be respectable according to Pallant's perspective 
(2001: 145). In addition, the overall model is significant, since F=9.900 and the 
significance value is less than 1% (0.000). 
An examination of the model's predictors (variables) shows that the size variable (total 
assets) makes the strongest contribution in explaining the extent of aggregate disclosure, 
since it is significantly associated (t = 5.360, p=0.000). This result is consistent with 
Suwaidan (1997) and Al-Shiab (2003) in Jordan. In addition, the result is consistent 
with the univariate analysis of this study, which found size to be the most explanatory 
variable in explaining the level of aggregate disclosure (See Section 6.3.1 in this 
chapter). 
Conflicting results were found for the profitability variables. While ROE was found to 
be highly correlated with the aggregate disclosure level (t = 3.261, p=0.001), ROR was 
found to be not significantly associated (t = -0.550, p=0.583). In univariate analysis, a 
significant relationship was found between these two profitability variables (ROR and 
ROE) and the extent of aggregate disclosure, while multiple regression shows that ROE 
is the only one associated. The reason for this could be the minor collinearity effects 
which explain the lack of significance. As shown earlier (Section 6.4.2.2), the 
correlation matrix shows some multicollineaity between ROR and ROE (0.667). 
Despite this high correlation, VIF values show that multicollinearity between these two 
variables is not a problem. Thus, contradictory results could occur, since the effect of 
multicollinearity (even though it is minor) still exists. Similarly conflicting results were 
found in Jordan by Al-Shiab (2003). Moreover, Raffournier (1995), Patton and Zelenka 
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(1997) and Depoers (2000) reported contradictory results when both univariate and 
multivariate analysis were used in their studies of correlation between profitability and 
the extent of disclosure. 
The dummy variables, industry type (t = 2.831, p=0.006) and listing status (t = 2.335, 
p=0.021) were found to be significant at the 5% level. The multiple regression results, 
to some extent, supported the univariate results for these two variables. There was 
consistency between the two analyses (univariate and multivariate) for listing status, 
since both analyses found a significant association between listing status and the extent 
of aggregate disclosure. For industry type, as regards univariate analysis, by using a 
parametric test, no significant relationship with the aggregate disclosure level was found, 
while using a non-parametric test indicated that such a significant relationship existed. 
Multivariate analysis supported the non-parametric test findings at the 5% significance 
level. Indeed, in univariate analysis, the parametric test revealed a significant 
association between industry type and the extent of aggregate disclosure at the 10% 
significance level. 138 
In previous studies in Jordan, Suwaidan (1997) found an association between disclosure 
level and industry type, while Al-Shiab (2003) did not find such an association. The 
reason for the disparity in the case of Al-Shiab (2003) could be due to the classification 
of industry type used. Al-Shiab (2003) used one industry type (manufacturing) and 
classified it into five sectors: 1) Machinery and metal industry 2) Mining and building 
equipment 3) Textile 4) Food and other services 5) Chemical. In this study, two main 
sectors were used for industry type: manufacturing and services. This classification 
could affect the results in both studies. In contrast, Suwaidan (1997) used a similar 
138 See section 6.3.6 in this Chapter 
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classification to the one used in this study. 139 This could be a reason why his results 
were consistent with this study's results. As regards listing status, no results could be 
found in previous Jordanian studies, since this variable is tested for the first time, as far 
as the researcher is aware, in Jordan. 
For other variables in the model, audit firm size is significant at the 13% significance 
level (t = 1.541, p=0.126). Thus, it could be concluded, with a lower level of 
significance, that companies which are audited by one of the Big Three Jordanian audit 
firms disclose more information than companies which are audited by non Big Three 
Jordanian firms. This result supports the results in univariate analysis. However, the 
significance level was higher in univariate analysis. Suwaidan (1997) and Al-Shiab 
(2003) found similar results. While Al-Shiab (2003) found a highly significant 
association (significance level at 1%), Suwaidan found this association at a lower level 
of significance (10%). However, the analysis of Model 2 in this study will show the 
improvement of significance level for audit firm size variable, as will be explained. 
Univariate analysis showed a significant association between leverage (TD/TA ratio) 
and the level of aggregate disclosure, while multivariate analysis did not capture any 
significant association (t = 1.215, p=0.227). The reason could be due to the role of the 
banks in providing more loans for the companies. In such a case, the banks have a 
stronger monitoring role, which enables them to access the information of the company. 
Hence, the need for disclosing more information in the annual reports decreases. Patton 
and Zelenka (1997: 619) express a similar point of view: 
"As a result, more leverage would imply greater bank monitoring. Given 
that banks usually have direct access to information, such leverage need not 
imply a greater need for extensive external annual report disclosure" (Patton and Zelenka, 1997.619). 
139 Suwaidan's classification for industry type was: 1) Banks 2) Insurance 3) Services 4) Manufacturing. Suwaidan included banks and insurance sectors, since his disclosure was voluntary. 
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There was disagreement between univariate and multivariate analysis, with respect to 
the number of shareholders and listing age. While univariate analysis showed a 
significant association at the 5% level of significance, these variables were found to be 
insignificant in the regression analysis (number of shareholders: t=0.367, p=0.714; 
listing age: t=0.455, p =0.650). The reason could be due to the minor multicollinearity 
effects between the independent variables. In addition, in relation to the number of 
shareholders, this variable could be measured as a proxy of asset size (i. e. Cooke, 
1989a). Hence, the impact of this variable on the level of disclosure could be reflected 
in the firm size variables. However, no high multicollinearity was found between this 
variable and the firm size variables. 140 Indeed, Suwaidan (1997) found similar results 
for the number of shareholders variable, to this study. He found this variable was 
significantly associated with the extent of disclosure at the 5% level in the univariate 
analysis. Such an association disappeared in the multivariate analysis. 
In relation to listing age, in univariate analysis, the association was found significant 
when the actual scores of listing's age were used. Moreover, the results for the effect of 
listing age and the disclosure level were also contradictory in other previous studies. '4' 
The remaining variables, assets in place and ownership structure were found to be 
insignificant and did not have a significant effect on the extent of aggregate disclosure (t 
= 0.686, p=0.494; t=0.792, p=0.430 respectively). These results are consistent with 
the univariate analysis of this study. 
140 The correlation between number of shareholders and firm size variables (total assets, sales and capital 
stock) was 0.124,0.207 and 0.072 respectively. 141 See section 6.3.1.1 in this chapter 
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The second run of Model 1 (see Tables 6.4.3.1.3 and 6.4.3.1.4), which incorporated 
liquidity instead of TD/TA ratio, provided similar results to those of the first run. The R2 
remained the same (0.507), with a similar F value (9.912). The exception here is that 
audit firm size became significant at the 7% level of significance (t = 1.882, p=0.063). 
Liquidity did not affect the level of aggregate disclosure, since the significance value 
was considerably more than 5% (t = 1.242, p=0.217). 
Similar to the first run of Model 1, total assets had the highest impact, since the Beta 
coefficient = 0.448 (p = 0.000). In addition, ROE was still highly associated with the 
level of aggregate disclosure at the 1% level of significance. 
6.4.3.2 Second Model 
This model incorporates sales and capital stock as measures of firm size instead of total 
assets. The first and second run results of the Second Model are illustrated below. 
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Model 2: First run 
Table 6.4.3.2.1: Model summary 
R R2 Adjusted R2 Standard error of the estimate F Sig. 
0.726 0.526 0.472 0.0490 9.724 0.000 
Table 6.4.3.2.2: Multiple regression results (coefficients) 
Standardised coefficients 
Model 2: first run Beta T Sig. 
Sales (log) 0.403 3.639 0.000 
Capital Stock (log) 0.123 1.189 0.237 
TD/TA (sqr) -0.070 -0.855 0.394 
ROR (inverse) -0.104 -0.925 0.357 
ROE (inverse) 0.304 3.171 0.002 
Number of shareholders (log) 0.031 0.358 0.721 
Listing status 0.177 2.110 0.037 
Industry type 0.169 2.211 0.029 
Assets in place 0.013 0.158 0.875 
Ownership structure 0.064 0.794 0.429 
Audit firm size 0.175 2.272 0.025 
Listing age 0.013 0.150 0.881 
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Model 2: Second run 
Table 6.4.3.2.3: Model summary 
R R2 Adjusted Rz Standard error of the estimate F Sig. 
0.724 0.525 0.471 0.0491 9.666 0.000 
Table 6.4.3.2.4: Multiple regression results (coefficients) 
Standardised coefficients 
Model 2: first run Beta T Sig. 
Sales (log) 0.380 3.546 0.001 
Capital Stock (log) 0.125 1.202 0.232 
ROR (inverse) -0.081 -0.767 0.445 
ROE (inverse) 0.293 3.113 0.002 
Number of shareholders (log) 0.036 0.408 0.684 
Listing status 0.187 2.222 0.028 
Industry type 0.164 2.139 0.035 
Assets in place 0.039 0.406 0.685 
Ownership structure 0.058 0.723 0.471 
Audit firm size 0.186 2.449 0.016 
Listing age 0.008 0.092 0.927 
Liquidity (log) 0.057 0.635 0.527 
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The findings of the first run of Model 2, as seen from Tables 6.4.3.2.1 and 6.4.3.2.2, 
indicated that this model is still significant (F= 9.724, p=0.000), with a little increase 
in the R2 (0.526). Thus, 52.6% of the variance in the extent of aggregate disclosure is 
explained by the model (i. e. the independent variables). In regard to the explanatory 
variables, sales, with the highest Beta coefficient (0.403) was the best explanatory 
variable of the extent of aggregate disclosure at the 1% significance level (t = 3.639, p= 
0.000). Meanwhile, the other firm size variable, capital stock, was not significant at the 
5% level (t = 1.189, p=0.237). This could be due to the minor multicollinearity 
between these two firm size variables, as shown in the correlation matrix. 142 However, 
the multiple regression model was run without incorporating sales in order to avoid 
multicollinearity. This model shows that capital stock was a significant variable in 
explaining the extent of aggregate disclosure at the I% level of significance. 
In addition, the profitability variable, ROE, made a significant contribution in 
explaining the level of aggregate disclosure (Beta = 0.304) at the 1% significance level 
(t = 3.171, p =0.002). Three dummy variables were significant at the 5% level: listing 
status (t = 2.110, p =0.037), industry type (t = 2.211, p=0.029) and audit firm size (t = 
2.272, p=0.025). It should be noted that audit firm size, which was significant at the 
5% level in Model 2, was significant at the 10% level in Model 1. The reason could be 
due to the minor multicollinearity between this variable and the others. This 
multicollinearity decreased a little in Model 2, which reveals an improvement in the 
significance level for the audit firm size variable. 
The other variables, which were insignificant in Model 1, and remained insignificant in 
Model 2 were: number of shareholders, assets in place, ownership structure and listing 
age. 
142 The correlation coefficient between sales and capital stock was 0.646. The decision was taken that this 
multicollinearity was not harmful, since it was less than 0.70. 
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The second run of Model 2 (see Tables 6.4.3.2.3 and 6.4.3.2.4), which replaced TD/TA 
ratio with liquidity ratio, was also highly significant (F = 9.666, p=0.000). Similar to 
the first run of the model, R2 which explains the variation of the aggregate disclosure 
was 52.5%. Sales and ROE were found to be significant at the 1% level (t = 3.546, p= 
0.001, t=3.113, p=0.002 respectively). Moreover, three dummy variables were found 
to be significant at the 5% level as follows: audit firm size (t = 2.449, p=0.016), listing 
status (t = 2.222, p=0.028) and industry type (t = 2.139, p=0.035). The remaining 
variables which were still insignificant, similar to the previous findings of the first 
model, were: number of shareholders, assets in place, ownership structure, listing age 
and liquidity. 
In summary, regression analysis indicates that there is more than one variable, which 
can explain the level of aggregate disclosure (firm size, profitability, listing status, 
industry type and audit firm size). Thus, stepwise regression is favourable in such a case 
in order to shed light on the effect of each individual variable. 
"If the initial analysis reveals that there are two or more significant 
predictors then you could consider running a formal stepwise analysis 
(rather than forced entry) to find out the individual contribution of each 
predictor" (Field, 2005: 184). 
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6.4.4 Results of the Stepwise Regression Analysis 
The idea behind stepwise regression is based on the following statistical criterion. The 
researcher measures many variables and is trying to choose the ones, which improve the 
overall prediction (Aron and N. Aron, 2002: 268). Therefore, using SPSS, the researcher 
enters one variable each time to the model in order to determine whether the prediction 
of the overall model has improved (the R2 has increased) (Al-Mulhem, 1997: 244). 
Inchausti (1997: 58) pointed out that the decision about which variable is entered first 
depends on the partial correlation coefficient. He (1997: 58) commented: 
"The independent variable that is the most correlated with the dependent 
one is introduced first in the model. Subsequently, the other exogenous 
variables are included one by one, on the basis of the partial correlation 
coefficients. " 
However, some authors (Pallant, 2001; Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001; Aron and N. Aron, 
2002) argued that stepwise regression procedure is a controversial issue, since it is 
based on a purely statistical criterion (rather than on a sound theoretical base). Thus, the 
results from such an analysis are based on the sample studied and if a new sample is 
selected, the combination of the best predictors might be different (Aron and N. Aron, 
2002: 269). 
On the other hand, stepwise regression is an acceptable procedure to determine which 
predictors are correlated with the difference between an outlier and remaining cases 
(Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001: 138). Furthermore, it is useful to use stepwise regression 
in applied research in order to detect the best predictors in the model without caring 
about the theoretical base (Aron and N. Aron, 2002: 270). Many researchers in disclosure 
studies (Ahmed and Nicholls, 1994; Hossain, Tan and Adams, 1994; Raffournier, 1995; 
Al-Mulhem, 1997; Inchausti, 1997; Patton and Zelenka, 1997; Al-Shiab, 2003) 
employed stepwise regression procedure in order to support the results of multiple 
regression analysis. 
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In this study, stepwise regression was run using SPSS. The results of this regression at 
the 5% significance level are shown below. 
Table 6.4.4.1: Model summary 
Model R R2 Adjusted R2 Std. error of the estimate F Sig. 
1 0629 0.396 0.391 0.0527 76.117 0.000 
2 0.656 0.431 0.421 0.0514 43.483 0.000 
3 0.679 0.461 0.447 0.0502 32.494 0.000 
4 0.701 0.491 0.473 0.0490 27.230 0.000 
5 0.714 0.509 0.488 0.0483 23.265 0.000 
Table 6.4.4.2: Stepwise regression results (coefficients) 
Standardized coefficient 
Model Beta t Sig 
1 Sales (log) 0.629 8.725 0.000 
Sales (log) 0.597 8.353 0.000 
2 ROE (inverse) 0.188 2.636 0.010 
Sales (log) 0.563 7.918 0.000 
3 ROE (inverse) 0.206 2.934 0.004 
Audit firm size 0.178 2.534 0.013 
Sales (log) 0.539 7.688 0.000 
ROE (inverse) 0.244 3.486 0.001 
4 Audit firm size 0.207 2.984 0.003 
Industry type 0.179 2.574 0.011 
Sales (log) 0.474 6.254 0.000 
ROE (inverse) 0.215 3.044 0.003 
5 Audit firm size 0.218 3.174 0.002 
Industry type 0.161 2.328 0.022 
Listing status 0.157 2.064 0.041 
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The results of the stepwise regression depend on a step-by-step entering process for the 
variables, which has the highest correlation with the aggregate disclosure level. The first 
variable entered was sales (Model 1). This variable explained (R2) about 39.6% of the 
extent of aggregate disclosure with a very high significant F value (76.117), p=0.000). 
Thus, similar to the multiple regression results, the firm size variable (sales) was the 
best explanatory of the level of aggregate disclosure. 
In the second step, ROE was entered (Model 2), which led to an improvement of the 
explained percentage (R2= 43.1%), with a high F value (43.483, p=0.000). Therefore, 
Model 2, which included sales and ROE, was better than Model 1 in explaining the 
variation of aggregate disclosure. Audit firm size was entered in the third step (Model 3) 
and Rz was increased to 46.1%, with a continuing high F value (32.494, p=0.000). 
Industry type was entered in the fourth step (Model 4), with an increase in the 
explanatory power indicator (R2 = 49.1%) and a high significant F value (27.230, p= 
0.000). Finally, in Model 5, listing status was entered, which increased the R2 value to 
50.9% with a continuing high significant F value (F= 23.265, p =0.000). 
Therefore it can be concluded that the following variables, sales, ROE, audit firm size, 
industry type and listing status explained about 51% of the extent of aggregate 
disclosure. In addition, those variables were significant at the 5% level. The addition of 
more variables did not improve the explanatory power (R2) of the model. This result 
was consistent with multiple regression results, and confirmed that those variables were 
the best explanatory variables of the extent of aggregate disclosure. 
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If we compare these results to the previous results in Jordan, Al-Shiab (2003) found 
three explanatory variables in his stepwise regression model: company size, audit firm 
size and industry type. However, the explanatory power (R2) of his model was 
considerably less (18.4%) than that in this study (50.9%). Furthermore, this model had a 
high explanatory power compared to other international studies. Raffournier (1995) 
concluded that sales and international listing status were the most explanatory variables 
with an explanatory power of 42%. Al-Mulhem (1997) found that listing status, sales 
and rates of return explained 43% of the extent of aggregate disclosure, while Inchausti 
(1997) found that assets, audit firm and listing status variables explained a similar 
percentage (43.3%). In addition, other studies had less explanatory power than this 
study, for example Haniffa and Cooke (2002), RI = 47.9%, Ghazali and Weetman 
(2006), RI = 36.1%. Furthermore, the explanatory power in this study is close to Ahmed 
and Nicholls (1994) and Depoers (2000), since the R2 in these studies equal 53.8% and 
53.76% respectively. Table 6.4.4.3 summarizes the explanatory power (R2) in different 
studies, which used stepwise regression analysis. 
Table 6.4.4.3: The explanatory power (R2) in different studies which used stepwise 
regression analysis 
Study Year Country The explanatory power (R2) (%) 
Ahmed and Nicholls 1994 Bangladesh 53.8 
Raffournier 1995 Switzerland 42 
Al-Mulhem 1997 Saudi Arabia 43 
Inchausti 1997 Spain 43 
Depoers 2000 France 53.8 
Haniffa and Cooke 2002 Malaysia 47.9 
Al-Shiab 2003 Jordan 18.4 
Ghazali and Weetman 2006 Malaysia 36.1 
Omar (this study) 2007 Jordan 50.9 
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Finally, it could be said that Jordanian firms that gain more sales, have a higher 
profitable percentage of ROE, are audited by one of the Big Three Jordanian audit firms 
and are listed in the first tier disclose more information than other companies. 
A summary of the results of both univariate and multivariate analysis is contained in 
Table 6.4.4.3. 
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6.5 Summary 
The objective of this chapter was to investigate the effect of a number of company 
characteristics on the extent of aggregate disclosure for Jordanian firms' annual reports. 
This investigation was conducted using both univariate and multivariate analysis. 
Different types of tests, as seen from Table 6.4.4.3, were applied in order to test the 
relationship between these variables and the aggregate disclosure level. Univariate 
analysis revealed that firm size variables (total assets, sales, capital stock and net 
income), leverage variables (TD/TA ratio and LD/OE), profitability variables (ROR, 
EM and ROE), number of shareholders, listing status, industry type, audit firm size and 
listing age are associated with the extent of aggregate disclosure. 
Using multivariate analysis, two models were run (each one was run twice) to avoid 
multicollinearity problems. Each one of the models explained more than 45% (R2) of 
the variation of the aggregate disclosure level with a highly significant F value (more 
than 9). In addition, both models revealed similar results. The size variables (total assets 
and sales) were the most powerful explanatory ones at the 5% significance level. 
Moreover, the profitability -variable (ROE) contributed significantly in explaining the 
extent of aggregate disclosure at the 5% level of significance. The other dummy 
variables, which were found to be significant at the 5% level, were listing status and 
industry type. Audit firm size was found to be significant at the 10% level in the first 
model and at the 5% level in the second model. Three variables (TD/TA ratio, number 
of shareholders and listing age), which were found to be significant in the univariate 
analysis, were found to be insignificant in multivariate analysis. The reason could be 
due the minor multicollinearity effect between the variables. In addition, the different 
approaches of analysis (in the case of listing age) could cause these conflicting results. 
Stepwise regression analysis supported the multiple regression results. The model 
explained more than the half of the variation in aggregate disclosure, with a highly 
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significant F value (more than 23). The explanatory variables in stepwise regression, 
which were found to be significant, were consistent with those in multiple regression: 
sales (firm size variable), ROE (profitability variable), audit firm size, industry type and 
listing status. 
427 
Chapter Seven 
The Change of Disclosure in Compliance with the New 
Regulations in Jordan 
7.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to present and analyse the data collected for achieving the 
third objective of the study. As introduced in Chapter One, the third objective of this 
study is concerned with examining whether Jordanian companies comply with the new 
regulations (i. e. The Securities Law No. 23,1997) 144 An evaluation of the annual 
reports of 60 Jordanian companies for two periods (1996 and 2003) will be presented. 
The evaluation will be conducted using the aggregate, mandatory and voluntary indices 
and also by using parametric and non-parametric tests. The mandatory disclosure index 
will be used in order to test the effect of both regulations: International Accounting 
Standards (IASs) and Directives of Disclosure and Auditing and Accounting Standards 
(DDAAS). In addition, a comparison for each regulation (IASs, DDAAS and IASs 
+DDAAS)'45 for the two periods will be shown. Furthermore, the extent of voluntary 
disclosure will be tested for both periods. 
The relationship between mandatory and voluntary disclosure will be tested in order to 
determine the effect of mandatory disclosure on the level of voluntary disclosure. 
Finally, a comprehensive comparison between the results of this study and previous 
research in Jordan (i. e. Suwaidan's study, 1997) will be carried out. 
144 New at the time of the study. 145 DDAAS requirements were 25 items, IASs requirements were 239 items and DDAAS+IASs 
requirements were 14 items. 
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7.2 Sampling Method 
To determine the level of compliance and the effect of the new regulations on the extent 
of disclosure, two matched samples were employed. Matched annual reports were 
obtained for 60 companies for the periods before (1996) and after (2003) the issue of 
The Securities Law No. 23,1997, when IASs were introduced in Jordan. 146 The reason 
for choosing the year 1996 is because it is the year prior to issue of the Law, while 2003 
was chosen since it allows sufficient time for the new regulations to become established 
and understood by the corporate sector. In addition, Al-Shiab (2003) found that there 
was a drift up (not a jump up as he expected) in the level of disclosure for the post 
mandatory action period (1998-2000) compared to the pre-mandatory action period 
(1995-1998). Thus, one could expect that Jordanian companies in 2003 would be more 
familiar with IASs since the application of these standards was investigated 5 years after 
such standards became mandatory for Jordanian companies. 
The industrial and services sectors were chosen in this study since banks and insurance 
companies are subject to specific and different disclosure requirements (e. g. IAS 
No. 30). 147 The selection of the sample was undertaken in a two-step process: 
1- Personal visits were made to the ASE in order to obtain the annual reports for both 
periods (1996 and 2003). The researcher collected the annual reports for the year 2003 
for the purpose of the first and the second objectives as discussed before. 148 The concern 
here was to collect the annual reports for the year 1996, which could be matched with 
those of 2003. Some companies had merged with others, had been de-listed from the 
ASE or gone out of business, and thus could not be included in this study. 
146 The Securities Law No. 23 for the year 1997, Article 24, Chapter Six. 147 See Chapter Four Section 4.5.5. 
148 See Chapter Four Section 4.5.5. 
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After several visits to the ASE library and to the companies themselves149 65 annual 
reports were obtained for industrial and services companies listed in ASE in the year 
1996, and a matching set of their annual reports for the year 2003. 
2- From the 65 annual reports, five companies could not be included in the sample. Four 
of them contained incomplete information, particularly the chairman's report (it 
contained only the financial statements information); and the financial year for one 
company (Al-Zay Company) was not at the end of the calendar year. ISO 
Thus, 60 companies were the final sample and the annual reports were collected for 
both periods: 1996 and 2003. This sample contained 38 industrial companies and 22 
services companies. The descriptive statistics related to this sample are displayed in 
Table 7.2.1: 
149 Many companies in Jordan do not keep their annual reports for long periods (such as 6 or seven years). 
Therefore, it was difficult to obtain the annual reports for the year 1996. 150 The financial year for this company ended on 30/6 and hence the annual report for this company was 
not consistent with the annual reports for the other companies, whose financial year ended on 31/12. 
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The mean of the total assets was about JD 30 m in the year 1996, and increased to 
approximately JD 34.5 m in the year 2003. The companies ranged in their total assets 
from 314.506 to about 391 JD m in 1996, and from JD1.2 m to about JD 343 m in 2003. 
The mean of sales was greater for companies in 2003 (JD 29.5 m) than the mean in 
1996 (JD 21 m). In addition, sales varied from JD 28.649 to JD 493.4 m in 1996 and 
from JD 24.919 to JD 793.2 m in 2003. As regards capital stock, the mean rose from 
7.95 and in the year 1996 to 11.56 and in the year 2003. The range of capital stock was 
from JD 174.500 to JD 79.69 m for 1996 companies and from JD 500.000 to JD 83.32 
m for 2003 companies. Finally, average net income was JD1.36 m in the year 1996 
and decreased to JD 215.800 in the year 2003151. Moreover, there was a wide range of 
profitability, since net income varied from JD 4.5 m losses to JD 34.1 m profits in 1996, 
and from JD 58 m losses to JD 8.64 m profits in 2003. 
7.3 Extent of Aggregate, Mandatory and Voluntary Disclosures for Matched Pairs 
Sample 
Table 7.3.1 shows the level of aggregate, mandatory and voluntary disclosure for the 
companies in both periods: 1996 and 2003 in rank order of 2003 aggregate disclosure. 
In addition, Table 7.3.2 shows the mean of aggregate, mandatory and voluntary 
disclosure for industry and services companies for both periods: 1996 and 2003. 
151 The decrease on net income in 2003 was due to the extraordinary loss incurred by Arab Potash 
Industry Company (net loss was 58000000 diner), which was affected significantly by the loss of one of 
its subsidiaries (Jordan Magnesia). However, the aggregate disclosure level for Arab Potash Industry 
Company was high (ranked the second with 83.82%) and the decision was made to include this company 
in the sample, since it affected only on the number of net income, which did not affect the results of the 
study. 
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Table 7.3.1 above shows that all the companies in the sample, except two companies 
(Wooden Industries and Al- Inma Investment and Financial Advances) had an increase 
in the extent of aggregate disclosure from 1996 to 2003. Jordan Phosphate Mines 
disclosed more aggregate information than the other companies for the periods, 1996 
and 2003 (74% and 84.5% respectively). This company ranked second for aggregate 
disclosure in the main sample for the year 2003, after Jordan Telecom Company (86%). 
The lowest aggregate disclosing company for 2003 was Al-Inma Investment and 
Financial Facilities (48%). This company had a slight decrease (-2%) in its aggregate 
level from 50% in 2003 to 48% in 1996. The lowest aggregate disclosing company for 
the year 1996 was Jordan Himmeh Mineral (44%). This company had a significant 
increase (+22%) in the level of aggregate disclosure in 2003, reaching a ranking of 83 
with an aggregate disclosure level of 66%. 
As regards the extent of mandatory disclosure, the level of such disclosure increased for 
all the companies (60 companies) from 1996 to 2003. Jordan Industrial Resources 
Company scored the highest (94%) for 2003, while its score in 1996 was 71%; thus 
there was a significant increase (+23%) for this company. The highest score for 
mandatory disclosure in 1996 was 80% for Jordan Phosphate Mines (the highest 
aggregate disclosing company also), and this company also had the second highest 
mandatory score in 2003 (93%). Arab Real Estate Development had the lowest 
mandatory disclosure in 1996 (53%), but its mandatory disclosure level increased 
significantly to reach 75% in 2003, an increase of +22%. In addition, Al-Inma 
Investment and Financial Facilities company, which ranked lowest for both aggregate 
and mandatory disclosure level for 2003 (48% and 64% respectively), had a slight 
increase (+2%) in its mandatory disclosure level from 62% to 64% in 2003. 
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With regard to the level of voluntary disclosure, 37 companies (62%) had an increase in 
voluntary disclosure level from 1996 to 2003. Jordan Electric Power disclosed more 
voluntary information (71%) than any other company. The increase (+28%) in the 
extent of voluntary disclosure for this company was significant, from 43% in 1996 to 
71% in 2003. Meanwhile, Jordan Himmeh Mineral, which had the lowest aggregate 
disclosure score (44%) in 1996, also had the lowest voluntary disclosure score in 1996 
(14%). In addition, Al-Inma Investment and Financial Facilities had a significant 
decrease (-14.5%) in the level of voluntary disclosure, from 24.5% in 1996 to 10% in 
2003. This company disclosed the least aggregate (48%), mandatory (64%) and 
voluntary (10%) information in 2003. 
Table 7.3.2 shows that the mean of aggregate, mandatory and voluntary disclosure was 
greater for industrial companies than services companies for periods, 1996 and 2003. As 
regards the mean of aggregate disclosure, there was an increase for both sectors from 
1996 to 2003 (12.87% and 13.27% respectively). For mandatory disclosure level, the 
mean increased for both sectors from 1996 to 2003 (16.63% and 17.16% respectively). 
Voluntary disclosure level increase for both sectors from 1996 to 2003 (3.37% and 
3.11% respectively). While the mean of aggregate and mandatory disclosure level 
change was greater for industrial companies than services ones, the mean of voluntary 
disclosure level change was greater for services companies than industrial ones. 
Finally, it could be said that there was a significant improvement in the level of 
disclosure (aggregate and mandatory) for the majority of Jordanian companies, 
comparing for the periods, 1996 and 2003. The next table illustrates the distribution of 
the three indices among the companies according to the change (positive or negative) in 
the level of disclosure from 1996 to 2003. 
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Table 7.3.3: Distribution of the three indices among companies according to the 
change in the level of disclosure 
Aggregate disclosure Mandatory disclosure Voluntary disclosure 
Change No. of 
companies % 
No. of 
companies % 
No. of 
companies % 
Less than 0.00 (negative) 2 3.33 20 33.33 
0.00-0.10 13 21.67 5 8.33 23 38.33 
0.10-0.20 39 65.00 34 56.67 14 23.33 
More than 0.20 6 10.00 21 35.00 3 5.00 
Total 60 100 60 100 60 100 
The table shows that 58 companies, out of 60 (97%), had a positive change in their level 
of aggregate disclosure. In addition, all the Jordanian companies in the sample (60) had 
an increase in the level of mandatory disclosure. Meanwhile, the level of voluntary 
disclosure had increased for 37 companies (62%). Moreover, 52 companies (87%) 
scored an increase of less than 20% in the level of aggregate disclosure, whereas 39 
(65%) and 37 (62%) companies had an increase less than 20% in the level of mandatory 
and voluntary disclosure respectively. In contrast, 6 companies (10%) scored an 
increase more than 20% in the level of aggregate disclosure, while 21 companies (35%) 
and 3 companies (5%) scored such an increase in their mandatory and voluntary 
disclosure respectively. 
As regards the negative change (decrease), only two companies (Wooden Industries and 
Al-Inma Investment and Financial Facilities) had a small decrease in the level of 
aggregate disclosure (3% for Wooden Industries and 2% for Al-Inma Investment and 
Financial Facilities). In addition, while none of the companies manifested negative 
change in the level of mandatory disclosure, the level of voluntary disclosure was 
decreased for 20 companies (33%) in the sample. 
153 The extent of voluntary disclosure for three companies (Jordan Phosphate Mines, Jordan Press and 
Publishing and Arab International Education and Investment) remained the same. Thus, the change in the 
voluntary disclosure level for these companies was zero. 
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7.4. The Change in Disclosure Practices for Periods, 1996 and 2003 
Table 7.4.1 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the three indices: aggregate 
disclosure (AD), mandatory disclosure (MD) and voluntary disclosure (VD) for the 60 
companies in the periods, 1996 and 2003. 
Table 7.4.1: Descriptive statistics to the three indices: Aggregate disclosure, 
Mandatory disclosure and Voluntary disclosure for periods, 1996 and 2003 
Aggregate disclosure Mandatory disclosure Voluntary disclosure 
1996 2003 
Change 
(± 0/0) 1996 2003 
Change 
(± %) 1996 2003 
Change 
(± %) 
Mean (%) 57.21 70.33 +13.12 66.85 83.16 +16.31 32.99 36.20 +3.21 
Maximum (%) 74.33 84.54 +10.21 79.85 93.75 +13.90 65.38 70.59 +5.21 
Minimum (%) 43.64 47.93 +4.29 52.73 63.87 +11.14 14.00 10.00 -4.00 
Std. deviation (%) 6.09 6.86 +0.77 5.68 5.55 -0.13 9.59 12.90 +3.31 
As seen from the table above, there was an increase in the mean of all three indices. The 
largest increase was for the mandatory disclosure index (+16.31), while the aggregate 
disclosure index average ranged from 57.21% in 1996 to 70.33% in 2003, with a 
13.12% increase. In addition, the voluntary disclosure index mean increased slightly 
(+3.21%) from 32.99% in 1996 to 36.20% in 2003. 
The increase in the maximum score for the three indices, was higher for the mandatory 
index (+13.90), than for the aggregate index (+10.21 %) and voluntary index (+5.21 %). 
Similarly, the minimum score increased for the mandatory index (+11.14) more than for 
the aggregate one (+4.29%). However, the minimum score for voluntary index 
decreased from 14% to 10%. 
These results illustrate that the level of disclosure has increased in 2003 compared with 
1996. The new regulations (i. e. Securities Law No. 23 for the year 1997) could be the 
reason for this increase, particularly as the case of greatest increase was mandatory 
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disclosure. Therefore, further analysis of the extent of mandatory disclosure was 
conducted as shown in the next table. 
Table 7.4.2: Extent of mandatory disclosure according to DDAAS requirements, 
IASs requirements and DDAAS+IASs requirements 
DDAAS IASs DDAAS+IASs 
Change Change Change 
1996 2003 (± %) 1996 2003 (± %) 1996 2003 (± %) 
Mean (%) 59.91 85.47 +25.56 69.24 82.56 +13.32 60.07 91.56 +31.49 
Maximum 
(%) 82.61 100.00 +17.39 79.00 92.63 +13.63 81.82 +100.00 +18.81 
Minimum 
(%) 31.82 29.17 -2.65 53.75 68.35 +14.60 44.44 50.00 +5.56 
Std. deviation 
(%) 9.81 12.80 +2.99 6.03 5.53 -0.50 8.06 12.64 +4.58 
The table shows that the level of compliance with mandatory disclosure regulations 
(DDAAS, IASs and DDAAS+IASs) increased significantly in 2003 compared to 1996. 
The greatest increase in the mean was related to DDAAS+IASs regulations (+31.49%). 
In addition, the mean of the DDAAS regulation increased by 25.56%, and that of IASs 
increased by 13.32%. 
Moreover, in 2003 (the post-regulation period), there was full compliance with DDAAS 
and DDAAS+IASs regulations among Jordanian companies (see Table 7.4.2). However, 
no company (of the 60 sampled) was found to be fully-compliant with IASs regulation 
(the maximum was 92.63%). Nevertheless, this is an improvement over 1996, when no 
company fully complied with the regulations, and the maximum scores were 82.61%, 
79% and 81.82% for DDAAS, IASs and DDAAS+IASs respectively. 
The evidence seems to indicate that the level of disclosure has been improved for 
Jordanian companies, since the enactment of the new regulations (i. e. Sec Law No. 23 
for the year 1997). DDAAS are mentioned clearly in the annual reports for the year 
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2003 according to Securities Law No. 23 for the year 1997.154 Meanwhile these 
requirements were voluntarily disclosed by the companies in 1996. Thus, the level of 
DDAAS disclosure in 2003 was more than the level in 1996 (see Table 7.4.2). In 
addition, IASs were applied in Jordan from 1998 under the Securities Law No. 23 for the 
year 1997,155 although, Jordanian companies were voluntarily disclosing IASs in their 
annual reports in 1996 (the mean of IASs in 1996 was 69%). Nonetheless, the response 
to the mandating of IASs was positive, leading to an increased level of compliance for 
IASs to 83% in 2003. Moreover, the items which were required by more than one 
regulation (DDAAS+IASs) had the highest degree of compliance by Jordanian 
companies in 2003. The average of DDAAS+IASs regulation disclosure was 91%. 
Hence, it could be inferred that more regulations (e. g. stock exchange and IASs 
regulations) could increase the level of compliance, since the control over non- 
compliance will be more effective. 
Comparing with previous studies, Owusu-Ansah and Yeoh (2005) discovered that the 
compliance level for post Financial Reporting Act of 1993 (FRA) period was higher 
than those in the pre-FRA period in New Zealand. They ascribed this result to the 
mandatory action introduced by FRA. 
"The current findings suggest that corporate compliance with regulatory 
disclosure requirements could be improved with stringent enforcement 
mechanisms such as legal backing of financial accounting standards" 
(Owusu-Ansah and Yeoh, 2005: 108). 
In Egypt, Abd-Elsalam (1999) found that the level of disclosure for Egyptian listed 
companies increased significantly in 1995 (post-period) compared to 1991 (pre-period). 
"The increase in disclosure of the requirements of the new regulations 
supports the theory which justifies regulation in emerging markets. It also 
supports the theory which argues that accounting regulation is one of the 
154 Securities Law No. 23 for the year 1997, Article 6, Chapter Two. 
iss Securities Law No. 23 for the year 1997, Article 24, Chapter Six. 
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important factors causing improvement in disclosure" (Abd-Elsalam, 
1999: 188). 
In Jordan, Al-Shiab (2003) found that the compliance with IASs was higher for the post 
mandatory action period (1998-2000) than the pre mandatory action period (1995-1998). 
Nonetheless, he (2003: 280) concluded that there was a drift up (not a jump up as he 
expected) in the level of disclosure over the period 1995-2000. In addition, he found 
that the disclosure level was quite low for both periods because the regulation system in 
Jordan was not efficient enough to impose the requirements. 
In this study, the response to mandatory requirements was greater than reported by other 
studies in Jordan, since the level of compliance with each mandatory regulation was 
high, as seen in Table 7.4.2. Therefore, it is reasonable to think that the regulations in 
Jordan play a vital role in increasing the level of disclosure. Tower, Hancock and Taplin 
(1999: 296) argued that accounting regulation is important in order to increase the 
compliance with accounting measurement and disclosure requirements. Furthermore, 
Inchausti (1997: 63) pointed out that regulations are essential in order to increase the 
level of disclosure. 
"Therefore it may not be possible to leave disclosure to the market alone, 
and it may be necessary to regulate accounting in order to ensure that firms 
satisfy the information needs of different users" (Inchausti, 1997: 63). 
7.5 Testing the Differences in the Disclosure Indices for both Periods, 1996 and 
2003 
The t-test for related sample (matched-pair t-test) is used in order to compare the means 
of the same subjects at two different points of time (Bryman and Cramer, 1997: 152). 
Field (2005: 287) explained that this test is a parametric one and has two major 
assumptions: 
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1- Data are drawn from normally distributed population. 
2- Data are measured at least at the internal level. 
The Kolmogrov-Smirnov test of normality was run for each disclosure index in order to 
assess the normality assumption. As Suwaidan (1997: 124) noted, the disclosure index 
lies more on an ordinal scale than an interval scale. However, the Wilcoxon signed rank 
test (non-parametric) was used when the assumptions of the t-test, specifically the 
normality one, were not met. 
"It is the non parametric alternative to the repeated measure t-test, but 
instead of comparing means, the Wilcoxon converts scores to ranks and 
compares them at Time 1 and Time 2" (Pallent, 2001: 262) 
The differences between each disclosure index (AD, MD and VD) will be tested for the 
periods, 1996 and 2003. In addition, for each mandatory regulation (DDAAS, IASs and 
DDAAS+IASs), the differences will be tested for 1996 and 2003 periods. 
7.5.1 Testing the Differences in the Aggregate Index (AD) in 1996 and 2003 
A test of normality (K-S) was run first in order to verify the normality assumption as 
shown in table 7.5.1.1. 
Table 7.5.1.1: Test of normality for AD in 1996 and 2003 
Kolmogrov-Smimov 
Variable Statistic df Sig. 
AD 1996 0.051 60 0.200 
AD 2003 0.072 60 0.200 
As shown from the table above, the significance value for the index in both periods was 
more than 5% (Sig =0.200). Thus, the levels of aggregate disclosure for both periods 
appear to be normally distributed. Hence, a paired sample t-test was applied in order to 
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test whether there was a change in the extent of aggregate disclosure between the 
periods, 1996 and 2003. The results of this test are shown in the following tables: 
Table 7.5.1.2: Paired samples statistics for AD 1996 and AD 2003 
No Mean (%) Std. deviation (%) Std. error mean (%) 
Pair 1 AD 1996 
AD 2003 
60 
60 
57.21 
70.33 
6.09 
6.86 
0.78 
0.88 
Table 7.5.1.3: Paired sample test for AD 1996 and AD 2003 
Paired 
difference mean Std. deviation t df Sig (2-tailed) 
Pair 1 AD 1996 
-13.11 6.00 -16.928 59 0.000 
AD 2003 
A significance value less than 5% indicates significant difference between AD 1996 and 
AD 2003. As shown in Table 7.5.1.3, the significance value was 0.000, which means 
that there is a significant difference in the extent of aggregate disclosure for the periods, 
1996 and 2003. To indicate which score was higher, Table 7.5.1.1 presents the mean 
scores for AD 1996 and AD 2003. The mean of AD 1996 (57.21%) was less than the 
mean of AD 2003 (70.33%). Thus, it can be concluded that there was a significant 
increase in the level of aggregate disclosure in 2003 compared with 1996. 
A Wilcoxon signed rank test (non-parametric) was run also in order to support the 
previous findings. '56 The results of this test are shown in Table 7.5.1.4 and Table 7.5.1.5. 
Table 7.5.1.4: Ranks for AD 1996 and AD 2003 
N Mean rank Sum of ranks 
Negative ranks 2 3.50 7.00 
AD 1996-AD 2003 
Positive ranks 58 31.43 1823.00 
Ties 0 
Total 60 
156 See Chapter Four, Part 4.5.4.1, which discusses the benefit of using both techniques: parametric and 
non-parametric tests. 
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Table 7.5.1.5: Test statistics for AD 1996 and AD 2003 
AD 1996 - AD 2003 
Z 
Asymp. Sig (2-tailed) 
-6.084 
0.000 
The first table explains the rank scores for both indices. Negative scores refer to the 
number of companies whose aggregate disclosure in 1996 was greater than in 2003, 
while positive scores refer to the number of companies whose aggregate disclosure in 
2003 was more than 1996. Therefore, 58 companies, out of 60 (97%) had a higher 
aggregate disclosure score in 2003 than in 1996. The negative Z score in Table 7.5.1.4 
(-6.084) with a significance value less than 5% (p=0.00) reveals that there was a 
significant increase in the aggregate disclosure level in 2003 compared to 1996. 
Therefore, the results of the Wilcoxon signed rank test (non-parametric) support the 
results of the paired sample t-test (parametric). 
In summary, Jordanian companies provided more aggregate information in their 2003 
annual reports than in their 1996 annual reports. Testing the differences in the 
mandatory disclosure for both periods is essential in order to show the impact of the 
regulations on the disclosure practices. The next discussion will explain the results of 
such a test. 
7.5.2 Testing the Differences in the Mandatory Index (MD) in 1996 and 2003 
A normality test was run in order to determine which type of test (parametric or non- 
parametric) should be used. The results of this test are presented in Table 7.5.2.1. 
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Table 7.5.2.1: Test of normality for MD in 1996 and 2003 
Kolmogrov-Smirnov 
Variable Statistic df Sig. 
MD 1996 0.089 60 0.200 
MD 2003 0.078 60 0.200 
The results indicate that the normality assumption is not violated, since the significance 
value is more than 5% (p=0.200). Thus, a parametric test (paired-sample t-test) was 
applied as shown in Tables 7.5.2.2 and 7.5.2.3. 
Table 7.5.2.2: Paired samples statistics for MD 1996 and MD 2003 
No Mean (%) Std. deviation (%) Std. error mean (%) 
Pair 1 MD 1996 
MD 2003 
60 
60 
66.85 
83.81 
5.08 
5.55 
0.73 
0.71 
Table 7.5.2.3: Paired sample test for MD 1996 and MD 2003 
Paired difference Std. deviation t df Sig (2-tailed) 
mean (%) (%) 
Pair 1 MD 1996 
-16.96 5.31 -24.702 59 0.000 
MD 2003 
Table 7.5.2.3 reveals that there was a significant difference in the extent of mandatory 
disclosure for Jordanian companies for the two periods, 1996 and 2003, since the 
significance value is less than 5% (p= 0.000). In addition, Table 7.5.2.2 illustrates that 
the mean score for MD in 2003 was higher than the mean score for MD in 1996 
(83.85>66.85). Therefore, the evidence seems to indicate that the mandatory disclosure 
level had increased in 2003 compared to 1996. 
Furthermore, the previous results are supported by the non-parametric test (Wilcoxon 
signed rank) as shown in the following tables: 
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Table 7.5.2.4: Ranks for MD 1996 and MD 2003 
N Mean rank Sum of ranks 
Negative ranks 0 30.50 0.00 
MD 1996-MD 2003 
Positive ranks 60 1830.00 
Ties 0 
Total 60 
Table 7.5.2.5: Test statistics for MD 1996 and MD 2003 
AD 1996- AD 2003 
Z 
Asymp. Sig (2-tailed) 
-6.736 
0.000 
As shown in Table 7.5.2.4, all the companies (60) had positive scores, which indicates 
that the level of disclosure for the whole sample in 2003 was higher than the level in 
1996. The negative Z score in Table 7.5.2.5 (-6.736) indicates that there was a 
significant increase in the level of mandatory disclosure in 2003 compared to 1996 (p = 
0.000). Thus, the results in both tests (parametric and non-parametric) are similar. 
The mandatory disclosure index (MD) comprises three partial indices according to the 
regulations: DDAAS index, IASs index and DDAAS+IASs index. The change in the 
level of each index was examined for the periods, 1996 and 2003, in order to determine 
the impact of each regulation on the level of mandatory disclosure. The following 
analyses will explain the outcomes. 
7.5.2.1 Testing the Differences in the DDAAS, IASs and DDAAS+IASs Indices in 
1996 and 2003 
In order to check whether the three indices were normally distributed, the K-S test of 
normality was run as shown in Table 7.5.2.1.1. 
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Table 7.5.2.1.1: Test of normality for DDAAS, IASs and DDAAS+IASs indices in 
1996 and 2003 
Kolmogrov-Smimov 
Variable Statistic df Sig. 
DDAAS 1996 
DDAAS 2003 
0.111 
0.163 
60 
60 
0.063 
0.000 
IASs 1996 
IASs 2003 
0.167 
0.084 
60 
60 
0.000 
0.200 
DDAAS +IASs 1996 
DDAAS +IASs 2003 
0187 
0.298 
60 
60 
0.000 
0.000 
The normality assumption is not violated if the significance value is more than 5%. As 
seen from the table above, there is at least one significance value for each index less 
than 5%. Hence, a non-parametric test (Wilcoxon signed rank) was applied. Tables 
7.5.2.1.2 and 7.5.2.1.3 show the results of this analysis. 
Table 7.5.2.1.2: Ranks for DDAAS, IASs and DDAAS+IASs indices in periods, 
1996 and 2003 
N Mean Sum of 
rank ranks 
Negative ranks 4 17.50 46.00 
DDAAS 1996-DDAAS 2003 
Positive ranks 56 31.86 1784.00 
Ties 0 
Total 60 
Negative ranks 0 0.00 0.00 
IASs 1996-IASs 2003 
Positive ranks 60 30.50 1830.00 
Ties 0 
Total 60 
Negative ranks 1 4.00 4.00 
DDAAS+IASs 1996 - DDAAS+IASs 2003 
Positive ranks 59 30.59 1826.00 
Ties 0 
Total 60 
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Table 7.5.2.1.3: Test of statistics for DDAAS, IASS and DDAAS+IASs indices in 
1996 and 2003 
DDAAS 1996- IASs 1996- DDAAS+IASs 1996- 
DDAAS 2003 IASs 2003 DDAAS+IASs 2003 
Z -6.736 -6.398 -6.712 
Asymp. Sig (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Table 7.5.2.1.2 displays the positive and negative rank scores for each index. Positive 
ranks reveal that the score for each regulation index (DDAAS, IASs and DDAAS+IASs) 
in 2003 is higher than in 1996, while negative rank scores mean that scores were higher 
in 1996 than 2003. Therefore, for the DDAAS index, 56 companies (93%) disclosed 
more DDAAS information in 2003 than in 1996. In addition, all the companies (60) 
disclosed more IASs information in 2003 than in 1996. Just one company disclosed 
more DDAAS+IASs information in 1996 than in 2003, while the other companies (59) 
disclosed more of such information in 2003 than in 1996. 
Furthermore, Z scores were negative for the three indices as shown in Table 7.5.2.1.3 
(-6.736, -6.398, -6.712 for DDAAS, IASs and DDAAS+IASs respectively), with a 
significance value less than 5% for all three indices (p =0.000 for each index). 
Therefore, it can be concluded that there was a significant increase in the level of 
mandatory disclosure under each regulation (DDAAS, IASs and DDAAS+IASs) in 
2003 compared to 1996. In other words, Jordanian companies seem to comply with 
regulations, specifically the new ones (i. e. Temporary Securities Law No. 23 for the year 
1997), in their annual reports. 
In summary, the new regulations in Jordan have played a significant role in improving 
the level of mandatory disclosure in the annual reports for Jordanian companies. This is 
consistent with Tower, Hancock and Taplin's (1999: 295) argument that accounting 
standards can help the preparation of financial statements by mandating a certain format 
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of presentation, requiring explicing measurement techniques, ensuring an increasing in 
the disclosure level and requiring that additional information is disclosed. They 
(1999: 296) commented also, "Accounting regulation is deemed necessary to improve 
comparability via enhanced compliance with accounting measurement and disclosure 
requirements". 
7.5.3 Testing the Differences in the Voluntary Index (VD) in 1996 and 2003 
Table 7.5.3.1 presents the results of normality test (K-S) for the voluntary index (VD) in 
1996 and 2003. 
Table 7.5.3.1: Test of normality for VD in 1996 and 2003 
Kolmogrov-Smirnov 
Variable Statistic df Sig. 
VD 1996 0.127 60 0.017 
VD 2003 0.123 60 0.025 
The significance value for VD in both periods is less than 5%, which means that the VD 
index in both periods is not normally distributed. Thus, the Wilcoxon signed rank test 
(non-parametric) was employed and the results of this test are shown as follows: 
Table 7.5.3.2: Ranks for VD 1996 and VD 2003 
N Mean rank Sum of ranks 
Negative ranks 20 28.57 1057.00 
VD 1996-VD 2003 
Positive ranks 37 29.80 596.00 
Ties 3 
Total 60 
Table 7.5.3.3: Test statistics for VD 1996 and VD 2003 
VD 1996- VD 2003 
Z 
Asymp. Sig (2-tailed) 
-1.831 
0.067 
452 
The first table reveals that the number of companies which disclosed more voluntary 
information in 2003 than in 1996 was 37 (positive ranks). Meanwhile, the number of 
companies which disclosed more voluntary information in 1996 than in 2003 was 20 
companies (negative ranks). Three companies disclosed the same level of voluntary 
information in periods, 1996 and 2003. 
The second table shows that there is no statistically significant difference in the level of 
VD for the periods, 1996 and 2003, since the significance value is more than 5% (p= 
0.067). Hence, the level of voluntary disclosure for the sample of 60 companies did not 
differ significantly in 2003 compared to 1996. 
As noticed in Table 7.4.1, the mean voluntary disclosure level had increased slightly 
from 33% in 1996 to 36% in 2003 for the 60 Jordanian companies. Comparing with 
previous studies in Jordan, the level of voluntary disclosure was slightly lower than the 
level of voluntary disclosure in Al-Issa (1988) and Suwaidan (1997) (44% and 39% 
respectively). Therefore, although the level of mandatory disclosure has increased 
significantly, as discussed in this chapter, there are incentives for voluntary disclosure 
in Jordan. The effect of mandatory disclosure on voluntary disclosure depends on 
whether mandatory and voluntary disclosures are substitutes or complements. The next 
discussion will highlight the effect of mandatory disclosure on voluntary disclosure. 
7.6 Testing the relationship between mandatory disclosure and voluntary 
disclosure 
A test of normality was run first in order to indicate which type of test (parametric or 
non-parametric) should be used. Table 7.6.1 shows the results of this test. 
453 
Table 7.6.1: Test of normality for MD 2003 and VD 2003 
Kolmogrov-Smirnov 
Variable Statistic df Sig. 
MD 2003 0.078 60 0.200 
VD 2003 0.123 60 0.025 
The normality assumption is violated, since the significance value is less than 5% (p = 
0.025) for VD 2003. Hence, non-parametric tests (Kendall's tau and Spearman; s rank) 
were applied as shown in Table 7.6.2. 
Table 7.6.2: Kendall's tau and Spearman's rank correlation results for the 
relationship between MD 2003 and VD 2003 
Test Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) No. of companies 
Kendall's tau 0.338 0.000 60 
Spearman's rank correlation (rho) 0.461 0.000 60 
The results of both tests reveal a high significant positive relationship between 
mandatory and voluntary disclosure for the year 2003 (the significance value is less than 
0.01). It may be that mandatory disclosure had a positive influence on the level of 
voluntary disclosure for Jordanian companies. In other words, the increase in the level 
of mandatory disclosure encouraged an increase in voluntary disclosure. 
This result supports the perspective of Naser and Nuseibeh (2003: 57), who found a 
positive and significant association between mandatory and voluntary disclosure. In 
addition, this result agrees with Dye's (1985: 548) argument that mandatory disclosure 
complements voluntary disclosure'57 
Moreover, the previous studies in Jordan related to the level of voluntary disclosure 
were conducted before the new regulations (i. e. Securities Law No. 23 for the year 1997). 
Therefore, their type of disclosure was voluntary by nature. It should be noted that 
many of the voluntary items that were investigated in previous studies have become 
157 The relationship between mandatory and voluntary disclosure was discussed in Chapter Two, part 
2.3.1.3: The relationship and interaction between mandatory and voluntary disclosure. 
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mandatory through the new regulations in 1998. Therefore, it is interesting to compare 
the level of disclosure in this study for all Jordanian companies (121 companies) with 
other previous studies in Jordan in order to detect the level of mandatory and voluntary 
disclosure before and after the regulations. The next discussion will provide such an 
analysis. 
7.7 Comparison between the extent of disclosure in Suwaidan's study and this 
study 
To shed light on the effect of the new regulations (i. e. Securities Law No. 23 for the 
year 1997) on the extent of disclosure in Jordan, the next discussion presents a 
comparison between the extent of disclosure before the new regulations (Suwaidan's 
study) and after (this study). 
Table 7.7.1 shows the mean of disclosure for different groups in both studies. 
Table 7.7.1: The mean of disclosure for different groups in Suwaidan's study and 
this study 
Suwaidan's study (1997) This study (2003) 
Groups158 No. of 
Items 
Mean 
Disclosure 
(%) 
Standard 
Deviation 
(%) 
No. of 
Items 
Mean 
Disclosure 
(%) 
Standard 
Deviation 
(%) 
1- General Information 17 39.88 33.92 31 85.41 12.90 
2- Balance Sheet Information 15 65.39 34.38 47 91.28 7.469 
3- Income Statement Information 14 56.53 30.46 24 89.76 8.309 
4- Financial History Information 7 32.52 29.20 7 35.66 20.88 
5- Ratios and Other Analysis 10 17.99 13.89 19 33.41 18.35 
6- Projected and Management 
Information 9 17.21 18.63 17 42.88 12.43 
7- Market Based Information 3 2.61 1.66 11 30.65 15.97 
Total'59 75 33.16 23.16 156 58.30 13.683 
* Source: Suwaidan (1997: 137) 
158 Suwaidan did not include cash flow statement as a separate group. In addition, supplementary 
information and notes were included in a group called: income statement and other statements. 159 Weighted Average is used for Mean Disclosure and Standard Deviation. 
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The table shows that no group mean of disclosure in Suwaidan study was higher than 
the mean of disclosure in this study, though the disclosure investigated by Suwaidan's 
was undertaken voluntarily, since his study was conducted before the new regulations in 
Jordan. In addition, the voluntary mean of disclosure, which was presented mostly in 
the last four groups in Table 7.7.1, was higher in this study than in Suwaidan's. 
Moreover, mandatory items, which form most of the first three groups in the table 
above, scored higher for disclosure in this study than equivalent items in Suwaidan's 
study. 
Comparison between voluntary and mandatory items in both studies is presented in 
Tables 7.7.2 and 7.7.3 
First, Table 7.7.2 presents the voluntary items in Suwaidan's study which had become 
mandatory by the time of this study. 
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It could be noted from the table above that 18 items show an increase in their level of 
disclosure, from Suwaidan's study (when they were voluntary) to this study (mandatory 
disclosure). The change was significant for some items, for instance: "information on 
senior executives" (+95.70%), "earnings per share" (+93.12%), "largest shareholders 
and size of holdings" (+89.21%), "post balance sheet events" (+88.24%), "number of 
employees" (+72.27%) and "method used for revenue recognition" (+66.39%). 
To determine the effect of the change of the level of disclosure in both studies, the mean 
disclosure for the items in Table 7.7.2 was calculated as follows: 
In Suwaidan's study, the number of items was 26 (denominator). Therefore the mean of 
disclosure equals: 
Total amount of extent of disclosure 
Number of items 
= 1655.2161 
26 
= 63.65 
Meanwhile, the number of items in this study (denominator) was 27, because item No. 
12, "original cost of fixed assets and accumulated depreciation" was divided into two 
items (as shown in footnote 48). Hence, the mean of disclosure equals: 
Total amount of extent of disclosure 
Number of items 
= 2409.22 
27 
= 89.23 
161 See Table 7.7.2 
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The conclusion from the previous discussion is that the extent of disclosure for 
previously voluntary items (Suwaidan's study) which have become mandatory (this 
study), according to the new regulations (i. e. Securities Law No. 23 for the year 1997), 
has been increased significantly (from 63.65% to 89.23%). Thus, such regulations have 
a positive impact in improving the level of disclosure among Jordanian companies. 
Second, turning to the extent of voluntary disclosure, Table 7.7.3 displays the extent of 
disclosure for voluntary items in Suwaidan's study and this study. 
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The number of voluntary items showing an increase level of disclosure was 17. The 
change for some items was significant, such as: "discussion of major industry trends" 
(+78.43%), "summary of major products/services produced" (+53.25%), "new product 
/service development" (+48.45%), "price range of the company's share for the past few 
years" (+42.95%), and "growth rate in earnings" (+39.18%). However, 11 items showed 
a decrease in the level of disclosure, for example: "sales (revenues) for the past 3-5 
years" (-19.73%), "sales (revenues) for the past 6-10 years" (-17.23%), "description of 
marketing network" (-17.1%), and "breakdown of sales (revenues) by major product 
lines or customer classes or geographical locations" (-12.95%). 
However, some items which were not disclosed by any company in Suwaidan's study 
were disclosed by a few companies in this study, for instance: "market value of 
inventory" (one company), "cash flow for the next year", "breakdown of expenses into 
fixed and variables" (two companies), and "rate on return required by the company on 
its project" (four companies). 
In order to compare the levels of disclosure in the two studies, the mean of voluntary 
disclosure for the items in Table 7.7.3 has been calculated for both studies, as follows: 
The number of items (the denominator) in Suwaidan's study was 28. Thus, the mean 
equals: 
Total amount of extent of disclosure 
Number of items 
= 670.98163 
28 
= 23.96 
163 See Table 7.7.. 3 
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The number of items in this study (the denominator) was 29, since item No. 14, 
"information on sales (revenues) for the next year", was divided into two items (as 
shown in footnote 49). Therefore, the mean equals: 
Total amount of extent of disclosure 
Number of items 
= 1056.236 
29 
= 36.42 
As a result, though mandatory disclosure has been increased significantly after the new 
regulations, voluntary disclosure still exists. Moreover, voluntary disclosure has been 
improved after the new requirements, which indicates that mandatory actions may have 
a positive effect on the extent of voluntary disclosure in the Jordanian environment, as 
shown in section 7.6 in this chapter. 
7.8 Summary 
This chapter has investigated the differences in the disclosure practices (aggregate, 
mandatory and voluntary) for 60 Jordanian annual reports, before the regulations (1996) 
and after (2003). Particular focus was placed on the change of mandatory disclosure, in 
order to reveal whether Jordanian companies comply with the different types of 
regulations: DDAAS, IASs and DDAAS+IASs. In addition, the extent of voluntary 
disclosure was compared with a previous study in Jordan (Suwaidan's study) in order to 
show the different levels of disclosure in both studies before and after the regulations. 
Various statistical techniques (e. g. paired sample t-test and Wilcoxon signed rank test) 
were employed using a matched pairs sample (60 companies) in 1996 and 2003. 
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The results indicate that there was a significant increase in the level of aggregate and 
mandatory disclosure for Jordanian companies in 2003 compared with 1996. However, 
the level of voluntary disclosure did not differ significantly for Jordanian companies in 
the periods, 1996 and 2003. The average aggregate disclosure level increased from 57% 
in 1996 to 70% in 2003 (+13%). In addition, the average mandatory disclosure level 
increased from 67% in 1996 to 83% in 2003 (+16%). Meanwhile, the average of 
voluntary disclosure increased slightly from 33% in 1996 to 36% in 2003 (+3%). 
Moreover, 58 companies (97%), out of 60, had an increase in their level of aggregate 
disclosure in 2003 compared to 1996, while all the sample (60 companies) had an 
increase in the level of mandatory disclosure in 2003 compared to 1996. 
Further analysis of the mandatory disclosure level reveals that Jordanian companies 
complied with DDAAS+IASs regulations more than each one of them separately. The 
evidence seems to indicate that the compliance for DDAAS+IASs was significantly 
large, since the level of disclosure increased from 60% in 1996 to 91.5% in 2003 
(+30.5%). In addition, DDAAS regulation had a fundamentally positive effect on the 
level of disclosure, since compliance with DDAAS was increased from 60% in 1996 to 
85.5% in 2003 (+25.5%). Moreover, the level of compliance with IASs was increased 
from 69% in 1996 to 82.5% in 2003 (+13.5%). 
The relationship between mandatory and voluntary disclosure was examined in order to 
indicate the impact of the new regulations on the voluntary disclosure level. The 
findings revealed a significant positive association between mandatory and voluntary 
disclosure for Jordanian companies. Thus, it could be concluded that the new 
regulations affect positively the level of voluntary disclosure. This finding supports 
Dye's (1985) perspective that mandatory disclosure complements voluntary disclosure. 
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A comprehensive comparison between the level of disclosure in this study and the level 
of disclosure in a previous study in Jordan (i. e. Suwaidan's study) was conducted. 
The findings reveal that the voluntary items in Suwaidan's study, which had become 
mandatory by the time of this study, had a significant increase in the level of disclosure 
from 64% to 89%. In addition, voluntary disclosure still exists after the new 
requirements (i. e. Securities Law No. 23 for the year 1997). Thus, the regulations 
have had a fundamental positive effect on improving the level of disclosure by 
Jordanian companies. 
Finally, one could argue that the adoption of new disclosure requirements (e. g. DDAAS 
and IASs) enhanced the level of disclosure in the annual reports of Jordanian companies. 
The nature of disclosure has been changed from a voluntary to an aggregate one 
(mandatory + voluntary). The regulators in Jordan should focus more on imposing more 
than one enactment in order to increase the level of disclosure. Abd-Elsalam (1999: 188) 
pointed out that the increase of disclosure according to the new requirements is 
evidence of the role of such regulations in improving the level of disclosure. Tower, 
Hancock and Taplin (1999: 296) mentioned three major justifications for accounting 
regulation as follows: 
"(1) There exist inadequate incentives for preparers to disclose data; 
(2) Users possess unequal amounts of information; 
(3) There exist incentives to suppress unfavourable data in an unregulated 
environment. " 
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Chapter Eight 
Analysis and Results of Interviews 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the analysis of the interviews conducted, as well as descriptions of 
the informants, the design of the questions and the framework used to summarize the 
results into general themes or ideas. General analytical approach procedures described 
in Chapter Four in figure 4.6.3.4.1 were applied during the analysis of interviews. In 
addition, the interview results will be linked with both the research objectives and 
relevant literature. The purpose of this linkage is to enhance our understanding about 
financial statement disclosure in Jordan and to examine the results of the interviews in 
the light of previous studies so as to validate the results. This linkage may lead to new 
themes or ideas for future studies to be conducted in Jordan. The chapter ends with a 
summary of the results. 
This chapter begins with a discussion of the design of the interview questions (Section 
8.2). The general analytical approach procedures (steps) are applied in the next Sections 
as follows: Section 8.3 summarises the process of converting the recorded data into 
transcript form (step one). Section 8.4 reviews specific features of the interviewees (step 
two). In Section 8.5, the interview analysis using coding and grouping procedures (steps 
three and four) is discussed. Section 8.6 summarises the analysis framework and 
presents the findings and results (step five). Sections 8.7 and 8.8 link the interview 
results with the research objectives and literature (step six). Section 8.9 provides a 
summary identifying generalisations and themes derived from the interview analysis 
(step seven). 
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8.2 Designing Questions 
It is important to establish in the beginning that the interviews were conducted after the 
analysis of quantitative data. As shown in Chapter Four (Section 4.4), a sequential 
explanatory design was adopted in this study. Quantitative data analysis was undertaken 
first, and then qualitative data analysis (interviews) was used to explore the findings and 
provide a deeper understanding of the results (e. g. unexpected results) of qualitative 
analysis. 
"The purpose of the sequential explanatory design is typically to use 
qualitative results to assist in explaining and interpreting the findings of a 
primarily quantitative study" (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2003: 227). 
Therefore, the underpinning for designing the questions in the interviews was the results 
of the quantitative analysis. In addition, other topics related to disclosure issue as 
identified in the literature were addressed in the interviews. The general topics and 
themes covered in the interviews are summarized as follows: 
1- Aggregate disclosure: comparison between the aggregate disclosure level before and 
after the regulations. 
2- Mandatory disclosure: IASs, DDAAS and IASs + DDAAS requirements. 
3-Manadtroy and voluntary disclosure: comparison and the effect of regulations on 
voluntary disclosure. 
4- Regulations: role of regulators, responsibility, penalties, understanding the 
regulations, reasons for changing the disclosure regulations and the effect of many 
regulations on the disclosure level. 
5- The relationship between aggregate disclosure and company's characteristics. 
6- The effect of the International Organization of Securities Commission (IOSCO) on 
the level of disclosure. 
7- ASE changes: technical and structural change. 
8- The effect of privatization on the disclosure level. 
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9-Annual reports: particularly, sufficiency and timing 
Designing the questions is a crucial process in interviews (Collis and Hussey, 2003: 168). 
The researcher used a semi structured design, enabling him to guide the interviews by 
introducing the topic then asking specific questions in order to obtain more specific 
information. The purpose of this design was to identify the perspectives and views of 
the related parties (regulators, auditors and financial analyst). This purpose enhanced 
understanding of the findings, and enabled differences and similarities among the 
respondents to be identified. 
Most questions were designed using phrases, which express perspectives and views, for 
example: Why do you think that to be the case? What is your point of view regarding 
this issue? Did you expect that to be the case? 
The number of questions varied among interviewees according to the group (regulators, 
auditors and financial analyst). However, some questions (eleven in all) were asked in 
all the interviews, due to their importance and in order to capture different views about 
some results. Other questions varied among interviewees according to the interviewees' 
responses. Each group of interviewees requires specific questions related to their 
experience and knowledge about the disclosure issues. 
In summary, the design of questions is summarized into two dimensions: 
1- General questions asked in all interviews, due to their importance and to reveal the 
differences among interviewees. 
2- Specific questions, which varied among interviewees according to their experience 
and knowledge about the disclosure issue. 
General and specific questions are shown in Appendix 8.1. 
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The following Sections, 8.3 to 8.8 will discuss the analytical procedures approach 
shown in Figure 4.6.3.4.1 in Chapter Four, which was applied in analysing the interview 
data. The linkage between each procedure (step) with the process of interview analysis 
in this study is shown in Table 8.2.1. 
470 
10 
W 
v 
0 
a 
a 
ýs 
4.4 
0 
0 
v 
a a 
H 
N 
06 
A 
F0 
yý M to 
Vý U 00 
O 
00 
O 
00 
Ö 
U 
00 
N 
U7 
6U) 
00 
"--" 
U 
2 
c4 ý, 'd 
to 
N 
0 
.b 
'7 I- O 
U 
° 
w 
b 
M 
3 
CO fl 
° 
Co 
CO C 
2 
u 
y Ei 
° 
U 
TJ 
u 
ti 
cu 
it 
Gi 
0 
Cu 
U 
3 
0 
c°a 
Ö 
U 
2 
. 
ýU 
0 
E 
to 
CO 
v 
431 
ö 
C 
ö 
°' 
V 
ö 
w 
o 
ß 
CO 0 
= 
CO 
O 
Q) 
Ei 
CU 
,ý 
Cr' 
° 
" V] 
CO 
0 
"- 
vý 
E 
m 
- 
r'' 
L. i 
ö 
.5 
e 
M 
°' 
CO 
r. 
r. 
b 
tr. ý' 
p 
or. 
° ö 
ä 
Q 
O 
y 
CA 
ýr 
". 7 
F 
t2 
) 
:1 
iC 
C 
cu 
2 {"ý 
N 
E 
ö 
° 
a) 
CU b 
0 
. - 
!n 
° 
ý^ 
3 
0 
U 
U 
O 
IU-i 
0 
O 
. ýy ö 
b 
E 
v' e 
0 
'CO 
.2 
". 
r"i 
U 
,n 
-: S 
o 
Z 
m 
b 
0 
Ion 
ýp 
m 
> 
x' 
"- 
a) 
V 
0 
. C+ 
3 
r3 
cÖ 
CO 
IUi 
- 
0 
u 
CO 
IU 
U 
O 
-0 O 
u 
°Q 
.2 
> 
9-1 
- 
V7 
0 a' 
cC 
U 
. 
" 
Chi 
° 
0 
0 
ca 
O 
0 
'4J 
CO 
0 
RS 
- 
RS 
C 
Fy7 
C:, ~ 
'O 
° 
° ° 
3 
°' 
U 
. -5 
o 
r- 
iC 
U 
'b 
u 
%Z o 
co 
a 
U 
gis, 
N 
C 
q 
cn 
CO 
52 
4 
U 
_ 
ä 
Z 
O 
O 
'ýy 
`CO 
5 
go 
ö 
cd 
y 
~ 
tß/1 
E 
CO 
Lr 
L. 
C7 
vý 
ä 
U 
(V 
== 
C 
y 
w 
ce 
U 
0 
ä 
P, 
O 
b 
Ö 
tu 
2 
CO 
O 
". 
ýr 
b 
U 
y 
12 
th 
-d 
ö 
-0 
CO 
w 
-L7 
CO 
0 
E 
N 
0 
U 
'ý 
L" 
'3 
- 
. a) 
CO 
m 
ö 
w 
. "ý,. 
0 ° 
GO, N 
Cl) 
Q. 
° 
ä 
r. 
° 
ics 
00 
'L7 
00 
ti CO 
°On 
R7 
U 
Ei 
'4C 
U 
10 
U 
CO 
C 
o 
ä 
V 
- N M ýi 
N 
`o O\ 
° 
00 
0 
0 
'o .O 
U N C) 
f2 
o 
0 
u 
C) 
UE 
U 
,3 
w 
10 
ý 
:j 
'ý 
o 
E 
o 
.& 
y 
ä 
r. 
Cl co 
E 
0 
y CC O 
p ö Ö 
o 
U 
O 
y 
O Cl 
CC 
Co 
5 
W 
bA 10 Cl 
o 
y E 
ä ö °y 
U 
'Lj 
.C 
O Ö 
,D t3 O 
Q 
U 
O 
13.1 
ý 
O 
y 
ä5 
M 
C) 
= 
aS 
y 
yC 
w 3 
.c 
O 
Ü 
1° ro 
w aD 
o 
u 
' 
w 
= 
ö 
.. 
y o0 on 
9 
r. 
y 
CC 
yC 
Cl) 
C) 
E! 
Ü 
y 
O 
CC 
y 
O 
U 
C) 
a 
U 
O 
y 
Q3 C) C v 
V' ýD N 
N 
'ýi- 
8.3: Converting Audio Recorded Data into Written Text (Step one) 
Interviews were conducted using a tape-recorder. Rubin and Rubin (1996: 126) pointed 
out that audiotapes enable the researcher to retrieve data in an accurate form. Kvale 
(1996: 160) remarked on the importance of the tape-recorder as follows: 
"The usual way of recording interviews today is with a tape recorder. The 
interviewer can then concentrate on the topic and the dynamics of the 
interview. The words and their tone, pauses, and the like, are recorded in a 
permanent form that can be returned to again and again for re listening". 
The researcher followed the sequence as shown in Figure 8.3.1 to conduct his 
interviews. 
Figure 8.3.1: The Sequence of the Interview Process 
Interviews were conducted in 
the Arabic Language 
I Interviews were recorded using I 
a tape-recorder 
Interviews were converted to a 
transcript written Arabic text 
Transcripts were translated to 
the English Language 
Interviews were analysed and 
interpreted in the English 
Language 
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After recording, the transcription process is tedious; it may take a day's typing to 
transcribe a one-hour interview (Gilbert, 1993: 147). However, Silverman (2000: 149) 
argued that the advantage of detailed transcripts is that the researcher can improve the 
transcriptions and the analysis may take off in a different direction not limited by the 
original transcript. He (2000: 149) added: 
"You can inspect sequences of utterances without being limited to the 
extracts chosen by the first researcher. For it is within these sequences, 
rather than in single turns of talk, that we make sense of conversation. " 
However, the transcription is considered to be an inadequate record of non-verbal 
actions (Mason, 1996: 53). "It does not include the visual aspects of the situation, neither 
the setting nor the facial and bodily expressions of the participants" (Kvale, 1996: 161). 
Moreover, translating the Arabic text to the English text in this study may not give a 
fully accurate transcript because some Arabic verbal utterances (especially non formal 
language) have no English equivalent. Mason (1996: 53) argued that the decision about 
which verbal utterances to turn into text and the process of doing it depends on the 
person who is doing the translation. He added, "for some verbal utterances, there simply 
are not written English translation! " Finally, the interviews were analysed and 
interpreted in English in this study. The language which was used was informal, as 
recommended in qualitative studies, so as not to lose the original meaning. (Collis and 
Hussey, 2003: 49). 
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8.4 Interview Details (Step two) 
The researcher conducted five interviews. Details about these interviews are shown in 
Table 8.4.1. 
Table 8.4.1: Interview Details 
No Name Group Job Description Date Time Duration 
Head of the Disclosure and 
1 Dr. Abd-Alraouf Regulators Control Department in Securities 08/06/2006 1.30 -2.00 hours 
Rababaa Exchange Committee (JSC) 
Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) 
2 Rami Al-Hadidi Regulators Lawyer 05/07/2006 1.00-1.30 hours 
Executive Partner in Arab 
3 Mnzr Hammoda Auditors Professional Audit Company 09/07/2006 1.30-2.00 hours 
(Grant Thornton) 
Mohammed Financial Manager of Selwan Financial 
4 Abu-Qalbin Analysts Brokers Company in ASE 15/07/2006 1.00-1.30 hours 
Executive Manager in Allied 
Accountants Audit Company 
5 Ali Samara Auditors (Ernst & Young), and member in 16/07/2006 1.00-1.30 hours 
Jordanian Association of 
Certified Public Accountants 
(JACPA) 
Al-Mulhem (1997: 28) argued that as a result of the complexity in the economic 
environment, there are a large number of users of financial reports. Examples of these 
users are: shareholders, creditors, managers, auditors and regulators. Therefore it was 
not considered practical to undertake interviews with all user groups of financial 
statements. Indeed, the decision in choosing the user groups depended on their 
relationship with the scope of this research and its objectives. The scope of this research 
is to explore the disclosure behaviour after the new regulations and recent developments 
in Jordanian Capital Market. Hence, it was decided to interview participants from three 
groups: regulators, auditors and a financial analyst. Regulators were included, since the 
study explores the change in the extent and nature of disclosure, specifically after the 
new disclosure requirements in Jordan. Hence, the regulators in JSC and ASE are 
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appropriate parties who could provide a comprehensive view of the change in the 
disclosure environment in Jordan. 
In addition, the researcher aimed to investigate the compliance with disclosure 
requirements, specifically IASs and for this, auditors were considered the most 
appropriate party. Auditors advise companies in preparing their annual reports and they 
have extensive experience in auditing financial statements according to IASs. Thus, 
auditors were able to provide a detailed understanding about their experiences, 
perspectives and suggestions as regards the IASs and ASE requirements. 
Financial analysts are another essential party who provide assistance for investors to 
take investment decisions so develop expertise in disclosure. Financial analysts depend 
on information (disclosure) for analysis and decision making. Therefore, disclosure is 
an essential issue for them in order to improve information quality and their decision 
making. In addition, financial analysts have an incentive (like the other parties) to keep 
up-to-date with regulations and requirements related to the disclosure issue (as will be 
shown later in the interview analysis). 
Company managers were considered outside the scope of this study for the following 
reasons: 
1- Managers of Jordanian companies are often not directly responsible for preparing the 
financial statements, since their responsibility, basically, is for planning and controlling 
the company. Their common practice to delegate this responsibility for preparing the 
financial statements to their auditors, who are experienced in following the requirements 
of IASs and JSC. 
Therefore, in Jordan auditors usually prepare and ensure the financial statements 
comply with IASs and JSC requirements. 
476 
2- Managers have a limited view about the disclosure practices in Jordan, since each 
manager is concerned about the disclosure practices of his company only. Meanwhile, 
auditors have a comprehensive view about disclosure practices, since they audit many 
companies and hence they are better placed to identify similarities and differences in 
these practices. 
3- The major part of this study is concerned with the mandatory disclosure, since the 
disclosure index contains 278 mandatory items, which constitute about 84% of the total 
index. Therefore, the disclosure requirements were the main subject discussed in the 
interviews. The voluntary disclosure still exists in Jordan, but the disclosure trend in 
Jordan has become mandatory. Many items previously voluntary in Jordan have become 
mandatory after the new regulations were implemented (see Chapter Seven, Section 7.7). 
Therefore, it was decided to undertake interviews with the parties who were sufficiently 
aware about the mandatory disclosure requirements in Jordan, such as regulators and 
auditors. 
Interviewing many related parties is undoubtedly beneficial in order to enhance our 
understanding about disclosure issues in Jordan. However, the limitation of time and 
access caused the researcher to meet only those parties most relevant to achieving the 
purposes of this research: regulators, auditors and a financial analyst. Including other 
parties such as managers and investors would have required focusing more on the users' 
preferences in the financial statements, which this study was not specifically 
concerned. 164 
164 More discussion about these issues will be presented in Chapter Nine: limitations and future research. 
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8.5 The Interview Results (Steps three and four) 
The interviews were interpreted according to the different themes and aspects of 
disclosure as described in Section 8.2, taking into consideration the perspectives of 
regulators, auditors and a financial analyst. This analysis covered steps three and four of 
the qualitative approach related to coding the data and grouping these codes into 
categories. Accordingly, different aspects of each category are discussed according to 
the views of the different parties. 
In the account that follows, interviewees are identified by surname as follows: 
1- Rababaa (regulator) 
2- Al-Hadidi (regulator) 
3- Hammoda (auditor) 
4- Samara (auditor) 
5- Abu-Qalbin (financial analyst). 
First: Aggregate disclosure before and after regulation 
Regulators' view: The increase of aggregate disclosure extent was due to these major 
reasons: 
A- The awareness toward disclosure was increased: before 1997, companies considered 
disclosure as unimportant and they were not convinced about the justifications for it. 
After 1997, a new culture was created that disclosure is right for shareholders and 
companies should not hide information. "The disclosure is a legal obligation which 
should be met" (Al-Hadidi). 
B- The new regulations imposed penalties: the purpose of these is not to punish 
companies, but to make them fulfil these requirements. 
C- The effort of the JSC, which follow-up companies through regular meetings in order 
to improve the disclosure culture. 
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Auditors' view: Their view was similar to the regulators, as they attributed this increase 
to two main reasons: 
A- The existence of JSC and the new regulations. "The existence of JSC, whose duties 
are to achieve transparency in the financial statements, was important for investors and 
the national economy" (Hammoda). 
B- The penalties, which forced companies to disclose information: Hammoda 
commented on the purpose of penalties: 
"The purpose was not to collect funds through these penalties, but the 
purpose was to re-educate the shareholders companies in terms of 
compliance with disclosure. Thus, compliance become natural for the 
companies. " 
Moreover, Hammoda divided disclosure level into stages as follows: 
A- Before 1997 disclosure level was low 
B- 1997-2000 disclosure level was still not high 
C- 2000-2005 E: =: ==> disclosure level was improved (e. g. 82% in 2003) 
D- 2005-2006 E-=> disclosure level is high (it could be 90% or 95%). 
The major reason for the high level of disclosure in 2005-2006, in his view, is the 
penalties. 
"The only reason for that is the penalties which were applied seriously in 
2005. The penalties covered 90% of shareholders companies; since the JSC 
was looking for any non-disclosure item, even if it was minor" (Hammoda). 
Financial Analyst's view: The increase occurred due to three reasons: 
A- Development of capital market in Jordan. 
B- The increased awareness of investors, brokers and shareholders' companies. 
C- The new regulations of the JSC. 
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Second: Mandatory Disclosure (MD) 
A- MD Extent: 
Regulators' view: There was an agreement that the percentage of MD level is as 
expected and considered to be good. Moreover, the non-disclosure percentage (18%) 
does not reflect that companies do not want to disclose, but sometimes there are 
problems in the financial statement preparation and audit process. Therefore, a well- 
planned process is applied in order to reach the full disclosure level (i. e. 100%) by 
individual meetings with each company and seminars to improve the disclosure culture 
and to remind the company of the legal side of disclosure. As a result, Al-Hadidi 
commented, "As I am a member of more than one board of directors, I can be sure that 
companies are concerned significantly with the mandatory disclosure issue in terms of 
timing and precision". 
Auditors' view: They estimated that the percentage of disclosure is higher (i. e. 90% or 
95%). In 2003, the JSC alerted companies without penalties (warnings) and the 
disclosure level was 82%. After 2003, there were penalties and hence the disclosure 
level has improved and could reach 95%: "After 2003, the JSC was beyond the warning 
stage to the penalties stage and this improved the mandatory disclosure" (Hammoda). 
Financial Analyst's view: He estimated a high percentage (like the auditors). The effect 
of penalties was the reason for the high level of MD, since they were stringent and led 
to cessation in shares trading of such companies. In addition, the JSC gave the 
companies a period of time to adjust their situation. 
B- Compliance with IASs, DDAAS and IASs + DDAAS: 
Regulators' view: Compliance with IASs and compliance with DDAAS are similar, 
since the JSC ensures that the compliance should be for all requirements: "The 
similarity of percentage refers to the compliance with the law, which requires 
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adherence to both requirements (IASs and DDAAS)" (Al-Hadidi). Indeed, IASs have 
become part of the Company Act and even companies should be used to them, since the 
companies prepare the financial statements according to these standards. 
However, the focus of the JSC is on the general framework of IASs, since compliance is 
the auditor's responsibility. Nonetheless, the JSC follows-up the auditors to ensure 
companies comply with IASs. Thus, the JSC's role is: 
1- Applying all requirements (DDAAS and IASs) 
2- Following-up auditors to ensure that IASs are complied with by companies. 
As regards compliance with both, DDAAS + IASs requirements, increasing the 
requirements could improve compliance in Rababaa's view, while Al-Hadidi argued 
that it will certainly improve the compliance. Both regulators pointed out that there 
should not be too many requirements, as this could confuse companies and make it 
difficult to comply: "In this case, the companies will not comply with regulations and 
will search for approaches for not disclosing information" (Al-Hadidi). Moreover, the 
harmonization trend should be taken into consideration. "Therefore, the JSC reviews all 
the items and continuously deals carefully with the issue of imposing the items for more 
than one regulation" (Rababaa). 
Auditors' view: Compliance with IASs came before compliance with DDAAS, since 
Jordan applied IASs in 1984 by the Audit Law165. However, the regulatory bodies at 
that time did not have an enforcement mechanism to apply these standards. 
Hammoda stated that compliance with IASs is restricted to big company audits. The 
reason is that such companies (i. e. Big Four) in Jordan are controlled by the main office, 
16$ Article 21 of the Audit Law 1985 mentioned that the auditor should ensure that the financial 
statements are prepared in accordance with GAAP. However, the Law did not give a specific definition of 
GAAP and the IASs were applied voluntarily in that time since there was no clear paragraph in the 
regulations to mandate IASs. In addition, there was no enforcement mechanism (i. e. JACPA) which had 
the legal power to apply IASs among Jordanian companies. 
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which requires compliance with IASs. In addition, these IASs are mentioned in the 
Companies Act. 
"Thus, except the big audit companies in Jordan, I think that there is no 
compliance with IASs. It is good to notice that 90% of shareholding 
companies in Jordan are audited by big audit companies, and the remaining 
10% are audited by 400 or 500 audit offices. These 10% are shareholding 
companies, but in reality it is family business" (Hammoda). 166 
Moreover, the development in JSC staff (availability of expertise) created the ability to 
analyse whether the financial statements are prepared in accordance with IASs or not. 
Thus, the compliance with both regulations, DDAAS and IASs has increased. 
There was a difference in opinion between the auditors as regards the effect of having 
more than one regulatory system influencing the compliance level. Hammoda reported 
that this effect does not necessarily improve the compliance level. He ascribed his 
perspective to the problem of efficiency in developing countries. In other words, 
regulators are not competent enough to improve regulations as they lack the resources 
and funds to attract qualified persons. In addition, developing countries depend heavily 
on donations from developed countries (e. g. USA and UK). For example, an expert 
from the USA visits Jordan for 3 or 6 months to complete a certain assignment. 
However, when he finishes and leaves, the governmental bodies are unable to continue 
his work and the problem remains. 
On the other hand, Samara believed that increase in regulations would improve the 
compliance level, since companies will realize that an item is required by more than one 
system of regulation. In addition, such increase occurs through cooperation among 
166 In Jordan, auditors prepare the financial statements for the companies (as shown in this chapter, part 
8.4). Hence, this could affect their independency. Porter, Simon and Hatherly (2003: 72) argued that the 
independency of the auditor affect the credibility of the financial statements and this will affect the users 
financial decisions. Thus, this is an implication for the companies in Jordan to depend more on 
themselves for preparing their statements by improving their knowledge about IASs and other disclosure 
requirements. 
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many regulatory bodies (e. g. Telecommunication Commission, Transportation 
Commission) with accountants and auditors. 
Financial Analyst's view: The compliance perspective has a financial effect. It will 
increase the investors' confidence and will attract other companies to invest in Jordan. 
In addition, the stock price of the complaint company will increase. "These companies 
will comply with JSC requirements in order to keep the disclosure level similar for both 
requirements: IASs and JSC regulations" (Abu-Qalbin). 
However, Abu-Qalbin stated that increasing the regulations will not be useful for 
shareholder companies, because these regulations are similar, since the JSC regulations 
are derived from IASs regulations: "It is framed in a different way but it is the same 
content", Abu-Qalbin commented. He remarked also, "I believe that unifying all 
regulations in one disclosure law is better than many disclosure regulations". 
C- IASs: 
The two main issues discussed as regards IASs are: 
1- Sufficiency: 
Regulators' view: Mentioning IASs in one paragraph in the Securities Exchange Law is 
enough for compliance according to the regulations. This is considered sufficient, since 
IASs were mandated under the Securities Exchange Law. 
"The compliance with IASs is part of the compliance with the Securities 
Exchange Law, and if any company is not complying with IASs, it is 
considered that it is not complying with the Securities Exchange Law" 
(Rababaa). 
Auditors' view: They agreed that one paragraph is enough. However, Hammoda argued 
that it is necessary to have experts in the JSC in order to ensure that auditors comply 
with IASs, otherwise, auditors will not comply. Samara mentioned that these standards 
are imposed by more than one system of regulation (e. g. SEC and Companies Act), 
483 
hence compliance is sufficient. In addition, JACPA's role is to inform all auditors of the 
need to comply with IASs. 
Moreover, compliance with IASs in annual reports is enough. However, Samara pointed 
out that there are some deficiencies, since there could be a conflict among regulations. 
For example, some transactions, which are conducted in accordance with IASs in the 
financial statements, may be rejected by other regulations (e. g. Tax Law) and may be 
required to be prepared according to different requirements. 
2- lASs with most compliance in Jordan: 
Auditors' view: IAS No. 1, which is related to presentation of the financial statements, 
is the standard which companies most comply with in Jordan. In addition, there are 
standards, which are related to assets and liabilities assessment. "In general, companies 
comply with most of the standards, but IAS. No. 1 is the main one" (Samara). 
Hammoda noted that big audit companies in Jordan comply with these standards, and 
show full understanding about them. However, small audit companies are not 
sufficiently aware of these standards. 
Third: Mandatory disclosure (MD) and Voluntary disclosure (VD): 
1- Comparison between MD and VD: 
Regulators' view: The extent of MD is more than the extent of VD, since companies' 
awareness of MD items is greater than for VD items. "The mandatory disclosure is the 
basic here" (Al-Hadidi). Al-Hadidi pointed out that some companies disclose voluntary 
information as if it were mandatory. Voluntary disclosure may distinguish some 
companies from others (i. e. signalling theory): ' 67 "The companies are competing in the 
timing of disclosure and to be recognized for it disclosing before others" (Rababaa). 
167 An interpretation of voluntary disclosure is the market signalling model or theory. Suwaidan (1997: 9) 
claimed that the companies disclose additional information in the market to distinguish themselves from 
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Rababaa argued that disclosure depends on a balance between two concerns: 
A- The need for information for decision taking may lead companies to disclose more 
information. 
B- The disclosure is seen as a burden, since the company discloses more information 
than is necessary. 
Al-Hadidi believed that changing voluntary items to mandatory items would improve 
the level of disclosure. However, this should be done under the control of the JSC. 
"The JSC always receives all the mandatory and voluntary information. 
Hence, if the JSC discovers that one or more voluntary item becomes 
essential to be disclosed, it amends it to be mandatory by regulation ". 
Auditors' view: The management philosophy towards disclosure determines its level 
(MD and VD). This requires the availability of qualified employees (e. g. financial 
analysts) to improve the level of disclosure. However, Samara pointed out that the 
process of disclosure should be organized and not dependent on management's mood. 
"It is preferable to have instructions which indicate the mandatory and voluntary items, 
how to calculate the voluntary items and the reference for this calculation" (Samara). 
Moreover, "the change of voluntary items to mandatory items would improve the 
disclosure level, as long this change is gradual" (Hammoda). On the other hand, 
Samara commented: 
"I do not believe that mandating more items will improve the level of 
disclosure. The voluntary disclosure should remain voluntary, but it should 
be more codified and not depend on the company's mood and its 
management. " 
Both auditors discussed the example of the disclosure level for ratios. This level is good 
in developed countries and it should be improved in Jordan by mandating some ratios 
gradually. "If the change was for the five basic ratios in the beginning, then seven ratios, 
other low-performance companies. For further information see Chapter Two, Section 2.3.1.2: Voluntary 
Disclosure. 
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then ten ratios, the companies would comply with these ratios by regulations" 
(Hammoda). 
Furthermore, Samara pointed out that the level of environmental disclosure is limited in 
Jordan and it should be improved. 
Financial analyst's view: His perspective was that changing voluntary items to become 
mandatory would improve the disclosure level. This is because many voluntary items 
are hidden to investors. Hence, mandating these items would help the investors to take 
appropriate decisions. 
2- The indirect effect of regulations on VD level: 
Regulators' view: There were different opinions about this effect. Rababaa stated that 
there is no effect, while Al-Hadidi thought that there is a positive effect. "If the 
regulations did not exist, the voluntary disclosure level would decrease to 15% or 20%" 
(Al-Hadidi). Rababaa justified his view by arguing that VD was natural for companies, 
even before the regulations were issued, since it depends on companies' awareness 
towards disclosure. 
"The level of voluntary disclosure is increased by improving awareness 
among companies so as to reach that the disclosure is useful and will 
improve the company's image in the public" (Rababaa). 
Meanwhile, Al-Hadidi pointed out that companies aim to distinguish themselves in 
both MD and VD. Rababaa supported this view, saying that the JSC has noticed the 
existence of competition among companies as regards timing of disclosure and the level 
of VD. 
Auditors' view: There is a positive effect of regulations on disclosure and this will 
improve the investment environment in Jordan. In addition, this effect is beneficial for 
the Company Controller, as the compliance with disclosure requirements will facilitate 
the analysis and management of company performance. 
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Financial Analyst's view: VD does not exist in Jordan, since it depends on the 
company's mood. 
"If the disclosure is beneficial for the company or its directors, the company 
will disclose information. On the contrary, if the disclosure is harmful for 
the company, for example, if it has faced loss or unsuccessful business, the 
company will hide information even if the regulations require disclosing 
such information" (Abu-Qalbin). 
Thus, disclosure should be mandatory in Jordan and not voluntary, since companies 
keep hiding information if it is harmful, even if they are penalized. 
Fourth: Regulations 
1- Regulators' role and responsibility: 
Regulators' view: They agreed that the ASE regulations are the main enforcement 
mechanisms for increasing the level of disclosure in Jordan. 
"Without doubt, the JSC is the major enforcement organization, and without 
the presence of the JSC, we would not find the development in the disclosure 
issue (despite the presence of other enactments such as the Companies Act 
and JA CPA Law" (Rababaa). 
Al- Hadidi added, "The JSC is the only enforcement mechanism, which forces the 
companies to disclose information, since it has the authority and the control to apply 
these regulations. " 
The power of this role arises from the authority of the JSC, which applied these 
regulations. Indeed, the JSC has the authority to supervise auditors by imposing specific 
requirements which they must follow. In addition, "the JSC focuses on the disclosure 
related to shareholding companies, while JA CPA focuses on the audit issue" (Rababaa). 
Auditors' view: There were major differences in the two auditors' perspectives. 
Hammoda believed that ASE regulations are the main enforcement mechanism and 
JACPA was reluctant to impose any regulation, although they have the authority to do 
so. However, Samara believed that JACPA has more enforcement power than the JSC. 
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Hammoda criticised JACPA in two major points: first, it does not impose any penalties. 
Second, it does not form any committees in order to inspect and analyse the technical 
level of company audits. An example of the weak role of JACPA is related to the 
subscription fees, which the Audit Law requires to be paid by JACPA (0.005 of earned 
fees on each client). "We have about 500 audit companies in Jordan, and up to now, 
only three have paid this subscription" (Hammoda). 
Moreover, Hammoda pointed out the reasons for this weakness of JACPA's role, as 
accumulated effects of the process of establishment of JACPA, as follows: 
A- The enactment of the Audit Law in 1984 led to the licensing of hundreds of 
unqualified persons as auditors. 
B- The majority (90%) of JACPA members were unqualified and less than 10% were 
qualified. Hence, for 16 years, JACPA was managed by unqualified management. 
C- Recent developments of the JACPA board: five qualified members and three 
unqualified members. 
D- Big audit companies have started to support JACPA, but it needs a long time to 
resolve the problem. 
Hammoda pointed out that the role of JACPA could be made more effective as follows: 
"To achieve this purpose, the JACPA should develop its performance 
through controlling the audit career in Jordan. Committees should inspect 
the quality control of the audit companies. In addition, JACPA should 
prevent unfair competition among audit companies. Therefore, many 
committees should exist, such as a quality control committee, professional 
ethics committee and penalties committee. " 
Samara contradicted Hammoda's view, since he believed that JACPA's scope is larger 
than that of the JSC. Some companies are large and invest in Jordan, but are not listed in 
the ASE. These companies are under the umbrella of JACPA and it follows them up. 
"We can tell that our effort is reasonable and we need the support of many parties, 
particularly the audit companies in order to improve our work" (Samara). 
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Financial Analyst's view: His view was similar to that of the majority of respondents, 
since he replied that AFM has a significant role in providing important information to 
investors. "The most influential tool, in relation to which companies are concerned to 
comply with all its requirements, is AFM" (Abu-Qalbin). 
Moreover, the effect of such compliance will attract new investors for the companies. 
2- Penalties 
Regulators' view: The level of penalties is stringent and sufficient. The companies 
avoid penalties for two major reasons: A- It is costly. B- It harms the company's image 
and reputation. 
The reason for non-compliance in the beginning was due to lack of knowledge about 
regulations. Thus, the solution was to increase this knowledge. 
"Penalties are the last resort the JSC applies in the case of non- 
compliance .... the purpose of the penalties is not to impose 
high financial 
cost, which is harmful for the company" (Rababaa). 
Evidence of the concern of the JSC with regard to the penalties issue, is that the JSC is 
one of the few organizations in the Arab World to publish all the penalties imposed on 
companies in its annual reports. 
"The JSC is one of the few organizations in the Arab World which publish 
in its annual reports all the penalties, which have been imposed on the 
companies and the persons in the companies (management and employee) " 
(Rababaa). 
Auditors' view: There was a difference in the auditors' opinions. Hammoda stated that 
penalties are stringent, while Samara thought they are not stringent enough. Hammoda 
commented, "I think that there is no other means, and without penalties, compliance 
will remain weak because it is related to our culture and nature". Meanwhile, Samara 
commented, "The JSC gives warnings to shareholder companies, thus the level of 
penalties should be more than now". 
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Financial Analyst's view: He believed that penalties are not effective. He justified his 
opinion by focusing on the relationship between JSC and companies, which he thought 
should be friendly and not built on penalties. "Thus, there should be discussions and 
suggestions between companies and JSC in order to increase the level of disclosure" 
(Abu-Qalbin). 
3- Understanding the regulations 
Regulators' view: Rababaa believed that the companies are responsible for 
understanding the regulations. "The JSC is not an educational institute, but it has the 
responsibility of enhancing the understanding of these regulations" (Rababaa). 
Meanwhile, Al-Hadidi thought that this is the responsibility of different regulators such 
as the JSC and Ministry of Industrial and Commerce. He stated that regulators should 
educate people about regulations. Both regulators (Rababaa and Al-Hadidi) pointed out 
the importance of seminars, leaflets, magazines and other media sources, in order to 
enhance understanding of disclosure. 
Moreover, a suggestion was made by Al-Hadidi, to have a query department in the JSC 
for guiding and helping companies as regards the disclosure issue. 
"The purpose of this Section would be to give assistance to the companies 
as regards the disclosure issue and not to penalize them, because in this 
case, companies would not contact this Section in the future" (Al-Hadidi). 
Auditors' view: They pointed out that understanding the regulations is a shared 
responsibility among regulators and auditors. Hammoda pointed out that for every 
aspect of disclosure, one party has responsibility. Auditors are responsible in relation to 
IASs, since they are more aware than other parties about IASs, whereas JSC is 
responsible for other aspects of disclosure. 
Samara pointed out that JACPA has a vital role in enhancing understanding about the 
regulations, but it lacks funds and resources. However, he explained its role as follows: 
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"JCPAI provides considerable support in training, recruitment and holding 
training courses every two or three weeks. In addition, JACPA issues 
bulletins continuously about disclosure and regulations. Furthermore, 
JCPAI cooperates with the Companies Controller by providing important 
information about disclosure and how to develop it ". 
In addition, Samara pointed out that all related parties (i. e. JSC, Companies Control, 
JACPA and shareholding companies) should work on a campaign in order to improve 
the understanding about disclosure. 
Financial analyst's view: He stated that it is the JSC's responsibility. The JSC should 
hold seminars for companies and should require companies to attend these seminars in 
order to enhance this understanding. "Hence, the disclosure will provide transparency 
for investors and will protect them" (Abu-Qalbin). 
4- Reasons for changing the disclosure requirements 
Regulators' view: They divided the reasons into general and specific reasons. The 
general reasons are: 
A- With the effect of globalization and in order to increase the economic growth in the 
country, it is necessary to improve the investing process. 
B- Developments in the technology (e. g. electronic trading in ASE). 
The specific reasons are: 
A- Development in the Jordan capital market in recent years: a large investment 
environment to attract investors. 
B- The role of IOSCO, which will be discussed later in this chapter. 
The purpose of changing these requirements is to: 
A- Increase the level of disclosure in Jordan 
B- Protect the investors (specifically the foreign ones) and create a safe investment 
environment. 
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Auditors' view: This change is considered to be a development in the disclosure process. 
Samara pointed out that the crisis which occurred in East Asian countries (e. g. 
Indonesia, Singapore) in recent years was due the lack of disclosure and non- 
compliance. "Therefore, there is international pressure to change regulations in order 
to increase the level of transparency and the level of disclosure" (Samara). 
Financial analyst's view: The main reason for change is to develop the process of 
financing the capital market. The JSC is responsible for this, since it organizes the 
capital market and manages the relationship between investors, ASE and brokers. The 
JSC is the strongest controlling body in the market. "The JSC is a non-profit 
governmental institute, and has direct contact with the Prime Minister. In addition, it is 
separated from SDC and ASE" (Abu-Qalbin). 
5- Unifying the disclosure regulations: 
Regulators' view: There was agreement that there should be cooperation among 
regulators in order to decrease the gap of disclosure requirements in different laws. 
Rababaa argued that JSC believes that the combination of different disclosure 
requirements is useful. "The existence of one regulatory mechanism unifies the 
responsibilities and it is better for controlling purposes" (Rababaa). 
However, Al-Hadidi thought that unifying is a difficult task. He pointed out that the 
financial statements could be approved by all regulators, but sometimes statements 
which are approved by the JSC could be rejected by the Tax Department. "Thus, there 
should be a kind of cooperation among regulators" (Al-Hadidi). 
Fifth: The relationship between aggregate disclosure and company's 
characteristics 
Regulators' view: There was agreement about the variables expected to affect the level 
of disclosure in Jordan. 
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"The big, profitable companies, which are listed in the first tier and audited 
by one of the Big Four audit companies, comply with regulations and hence 
disclose more information" (Rababaa). 
In addition, regulators emphasized the important role of management in disclosure. 
"The failure of companies to disclose is attributable to the management" (Rababaa). 
Moreover, the volume of information in the annual reports depends on the availability 
of qualified employees, who draw the attention of management to the importance of 
disclosure. Big companies, which have resources and funds, could assign qualified staff, 
while small companies could not. 
Auditors' view: Their view was similar to the regulators' view, that it is common to 
find that these variables explain the level of disclosure, especially the size of the audit 
company. Samara reported that big audit companies refuse to verify any financial 
statements if they are not prepared in accordance with disclosure requirements. He 
added: 
"Our office imposes on all auditors that any departure should be noted and 
any requirement should be disclosed in order to increase level of mandatory 
disclosure to 100%. In addition, our reputation is important and hence we 
improve the disclosure level. Moreover, we provide the Companies 
Controller with all the information, which is required to be disclosed. " 
However, the auditors emphasized more strongly than the regulators the importance of 
management in determining the level of disclosure. The management philosophy 
towards disclosure was summarized as follows: 
"Some management are aware enough and have vision regards the 
disclosure issue. The annual reports for such companies are well prepared 
and explained clearly. On the contrary, some management, even though the 
company is big, do not disclose enough information or do not fulfil the 
disclosure requirements, since their vision towards disclosure is not mature 
enough " (Hammoda). 
In addition, the awareness of shareholders is important and could form a pressure on 
management to disclose information. However, shareholders in Jordan often lack such 
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awareness. For example, in the general meeting between shareholders and management, 
the management provides a luxury lunch or dinner. The shareholders are appreciative, 
but they do not realize that this lunch or dinner is paid for from their share in the 
company. 
Hammoda pointed out that there is a linkage between management philosophy and 
shareholders awareness, since "where there is a harmony towards disclosure and its 
importance between both sides, the disclosure level will improve". 
Financial analyst's view: His perspective supported the regulators and auditors, as 
regards the role of management in determining the disclosure extent. However, he did 
not think that variables such as firm size affect the disclosure level in Jordan. "The 
disclosure for all companies, whether big or small ones, is still disclosure" (Abu- 
Qalbin). He defended his view by providing an important example about disclosure in 
the Arab Bank in Jordan. The Arab Bank is considered to be the largest shareholder 
company in Jordan and an indicator of the health of the ASE. Up to now, no disclosure 
has been disseminated as regards this bank during the year (except for quarterly and 
semi annual reports). The focus here is on disclosure of the significant events. He 
remarked 
`It did not disclose any significant events in order to provide information 
for investors to take their decisions of buying or selling the bank stocks. Is 
the reason the management philosophy towards the disclosure issue? Or 
could the JSC not force the Arab Bank to disclose the significant events? Or 
does the management consider these events as non-significant ones? Or is 
the management not concerned about whether the stock price has increased 
or decreased? " 
Hence, the financial analyst emphasized the importance of disclosing significant events. 
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Sixth: The influence of International Organization of Securities Commission 
(IOSCO) on the level of disclosure in Jordan 
Regulators' view: The effect is beneficial, since Jordan has benefited from the 
experience in developed countries (e. g. USA and UK) in this field. 
"By being a member in the TOSCO, this will enable the JSC to benefit from 
the expertise in developed countries and apply it in Jordan, and surely the 
disclosure level will be improved in Jordan " (Al-Hadidi). 
IOSCO requires two conditions in order to develop the capital market in Jordan: 
1- Setting up a controlling organization (JSC) in AFM. 
2- Setting up an adequate stock exchange according to the international standards (ASE). 
IOSCO set up the minimum requirements of disclosure. Jordan received these standards 
and adopted those which are appropriate to its environment. In addition, the JSC needs 
to develop the disclosure regulations in order to keep in line with other international 
markets, specifically when attending international seminars. JSC role is to enhance the 
disclosure culture among companies which existed before. 
"This requires a fill understanding of corporate disclosure that would be 
beneficial for companies and not harmful. Thus, this culture needs to have 
sufficient time to be familiar for companies " (Rababaa). 
Financial analysts' view: He supported the regulators' view that IOSCO has a positive 
effect. He remarked: 
"Being a member of TOSCO has improved AFM's image in the world; it is 
more favourable than the Gulf oil markets. This step has attracted many 
investors, and confidence in AFM has become high, since the international 
institutes have become interested in it". 
The financial analyst presented statistics which show the interest of investors in AFM, 
as follows: 
1- The increase in the volume of transactions: it has reached a high of 180 Jordanian 
million diners (jmd) per day, but it has decreased to 35-40 jmd, due to the political 
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events which have occurred in the region. Before, in 1992,1993 and 1995 it did not 
exceed JD 700,000 or 800,000 per day. 
2- The increase in number of broker offices: before 1995, there were 31 brokerage 
offices, and now there are 75-80 offices. 
3- The increase in foreign investments, which accounts for more than 43% of the total 
investments in Jordan. 
4- The increase in the number of investors: 650,000 investors in Jordan, out of 
5,500,000 (population of Jordan approximately), which is about 12%. 
5- Improved economic growth: the percentage of growth has increased to reach 3-5%, 
which is considered to be good, according to the International Bank statistics, which test 
growth rates of countries. 
Seventh: Effect of ASE changes 
1- Technical change (availability of information) 
Regulators' view: Technological development, especially the AFM website and the 
electronic listings are the main features of the technical change. Rababaa compared the 
process of obtaining information in the past and the present as follows: 
A- In the past: the only way to disseminate information was through the newspapers, 
and it was considered to be costly and a waste of time. 
B- In the present: information is obtained through the internet (website) and this has 
significantly improved the speed of disseminating information. 
Al-Hadidi pointed out that all information related to the stock exchange, the companies 
and the regulations are available in the website. However, he claimed that some 
information is not up-to-date. He added: 
"The most important information is the regulations and the instructions, 
which the JSC shall disseminate them in the appropriate time. Hence, this 
information should be updated in the website, since it is not available 
anywhere else, such as newspapers ". 
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Auditors' view: Their perspective was similar to that of the regulators, about the 
development of electronic listings and the AFM website. Hammoda thought that the 
information in the website is sufficient, especially on the regulations. Meanwhile, 
Samara argued that the website does not have enough information about companies. He 
suggested two major issues in this regard: 
A- Developing a separate website including information about companies and changes 
of company information, such as change in company's activities, changes in company's 
structure, future plan of the company. 
B- Establishing an organization for the small investors in Jordan, under the control of 
the JSC. "This organization should be financed from the JSC, and should have a 
website in order to control the key persons in the companies to protecting the small 
investors" (Rababaa). 
Financial analyst's view The technical development, especially the website, is the major 
improvement. He considered the information on the website to be enough for decision- 
making. 
2- Structure of ASE (Two tiers instead of three) 
Regulators' view: There is no need for three tiers, since the division is an administrative 
matter and being in the first or Second tier is a kind of disclosure. "The companies in 
the first tier are big and profitable and this creates a kind of competition among 
companies to be in the first tier" (Rababaa). The third tier is related to the unlisted 
companies and these companies are transferred to the Securities Depository Centre 
(SDC). Meanwhile, Al-Hadidi pointed out that the companies in the first market are not 
distinguished from those in the Second market. The factor which determines whether 
the company is in the first or the Second market is the number of trading days for the 
stocks (the ability of the stock to be traded usually). 
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Financial analyst's view: He had a different perspective. He ascribed this new structure 
to the new restriction policy in ASE. This policy indicates that new companies in the 
market, which have not issued any financial statement, should be in the Second market. 
"I believe that when these companies have issued one or two financial statements and 
their financial position has become stable, it is possible to be in the first market" (Abu- 
Qalbin). In addition, Abu-Qalbin presented a vital example about this policy, related to 
Tameer Company in Jordan. This company is a big one (its capital is about JD 253 m), 
but it is new and has not issued any financial statement. Hence, ASE has put this 
company in the Second market until it issues financial statements, and then it could be 
considered for the first market. 
Eighth: Effect of privatization on disclosure level in Jordan 
Regulators' view: There was a difference of opinion between regulators. Rababaa 
argued that privatization improves the level of disclosure. The reason could be that the 
government needs to attract investors for privatized companies, and the appropriate way 
to do this is to increase the disclosure level in order to attract a good price for its shares. 
"The government is responsible for improving the image of privatized companies by 
increasing the level of disclosure and transparency in order to attract investors" 
(Rababaa). 
On the other hand, Al-Hadidi argued that privatization does not have an impact on the 
disclosure level. The management view towards disclosure plays a major role in the 
disclosure extent. 
"It is possible to find a governmental company that discloses more 
information than the private one, since the management of these companies 
are more aware about the importance of disclosure " (Al Hadidi). 
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Auditors' view: There is a positive effect of privatization on the disclosure level. "If the 
purpose of privatization is to attract a strategic partner or foreign investor, this 
requires compliance with IASs and a high level of disclosure" (Samara). 
Hammoda pointed out that this impact occurred because each privatization process 
requires a financial advisor. This advisor manages the privatization procedures (i. e. 
revaluation of the shares) and depends on disclosure to take his decisions. 
However, Hammoda stated that privatization could not affect the disclosure level if it 
occurs under political restriction. For example, the process of privatization of Royal 
Jordanian Airways was Secret and the government arranged for relevant information to 
be held in a data room for three days. Each investor was allowed to appoint a financial 
advisor, and these advisors stayed in this room for three days to get the information. 
Hence, the buyer depended on the advisor's information to provide the appropriate price 
about the privatised company. "In such a case, the disclosure is limited and depends on 
the government procedures" (Hammoda). 
Moreover, Samara provided evidence about the importance of management in 
indicating the disclosure level in the case of Jordan Telecom Company as follows: 
"Telecom Company before 1997 had a low disclosure level because the 
management was not aware enough towards disclosure. Own the 
management was changed, and the disclosure regulations were changed, 
the awareness towards disclosure increased. Thus, there was concern about 
disclosure and regulations, which had a positive effect on the level of 
disclosure ". 
Financial analyst's view: His view was that privatization is a distinct process and has 
specific purposes in terms of disclosure. "Sometimes, the purpose is to maintain the 
stock price in the market around its average in order to protect the Jordanian 
shareholders" (Abu-Qalbin). 
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An example of this purpose is the privatization of Jordan Telecom. The government 
intended to keep the stock price around its average (5,36-5,40 diner) in order to protect 
Jordanian shareholders from any negative speculation. "To achieve this purpose, the 
government did not disclose the real price of the privatization or the shares which were 
put up for sale or the time scale of the process" (Abu-Qalbin). 
Ninth: Annual reports 
1- Sufficiency for decision taking 
Auditors' view: There was a difference of perspective between the auditors. Samara 
believed that annual reports are the most useful disclosure tool for users, while 
Hammoda disagreed. Both of them indicated the significance of periodic and semi 
annual reports. However, Hammoda pointed out that significant event reports are 
important. The reason could be that one important event could affect the company 
significantly, and its effect may be immediate, whereas annual reports contain historical 
information. Examples of such significant events include significant loss due to a huge 
fire, or a court decision causes two million diners to be payable. Hammoda added, 
"Thus, these disclosures should be disclosed immediately, since they are more 
important than the annual reports, which contain the historical information". 
Financial analyst's view: He argued that all disclosures are important for decision 
making, whether it is annual reports or semi annual. However, Abu-Qalbin supported 
Hammoda's view that the significant events disclosures are the most important ones, 
since these kinds of disclosures affect the business of the company or its growth in the 
future. He added: 
"These kinds of disclosure should be disclosed on time without delay in 
order to be beneficial for users. The delay of such disclosures until the end 
of the year will be useless and I think non-disclosure of these items in this 
case is better than disclosing it". 
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Furthermore, Abu-Qalbin asserted that he did not depend on the annual reports for 
decision making, since they are not sufficient. "I depend on my personal analysis and 
my relationships with companies in order to obtain information, analyse it and take my 
decision" (Abu-Qalbin). He recommended that the JSC should require all shareholding 
companies to disclose significant events immediately in order to increase the benefit for 
all users and not for specific persons only. 
2- Timing of annual reports 
Auditors' view: Annual reports are issued two or three months after the end of the year. 
Thus, these annual reports contain historical information, which may not affect the 
company's business in the present and the future. 
Financial analyst's view: The timing of issue of annual reports is not appropriate, since 
the period from the end of the year until preparation of the financial statements is long. 
This could have negative effect, since many directors who have information could sell 
or buy shares before others and this will harm small investors who do not have 
information. Therefore, "the previous period should be shorter and should be 15 days 
after the end of the fiscal year, since all companies are able to do that..... and 
regulators should minimize this period" (Abu-Qalbin). 
3- Disclosure of Financial statements 
Auditors' view: They argued that the high level of compliance for financial statements 
is due to two major reasons: 
A- It is required by more than one regulation (i. e. Companies Act, Securities Exchange 
Law). "Therefore, the annual reports of any company will not be accepted if these 
statements are not included" (Hammoda) 
B- It is issued by auditors, which ensures that there is no departure in the statements. 
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Auditors suggested other items related to the audit, which should be disclosed (Samara 
suggested mandating these items) in the annual reports by the companies such as: 
1- The name of the responsible person in the audit office 
2- Other fees the auditor earned except for the audit work. 
3- The volume of the relationship between the auditor and the company. 
"Sometimes the company represents a significant portion of the income for 
the auditors, and hence this affects his independence. Thus, the auditor 
could be more flexible about some items, for example, the allowance of bad 
debts or the inventory, in order to maintain the financial relationship with 
his client" (Hammoda). 
4- The auditor's verification of his responsibility. 
8.5.1 Summary 
The foregoing discussion is a detailed analysis of the interview data collected. This 
analysis covers steps three and four in the general analytic procedure. These steps are 
related to the process of coding and grouping the codes into smaller groups according to 
themes and patterns. 
The next procedure (steps five) involves summarizing these themes or patterns into 
general subjects in order to construct findings and results. These themes and patterns are 
combined into more general ones in order to present the findings and results. Figure 
8.5.1 illustrates how the categories in this Section could be grouped into more general 
subjects, as will be shown in the next Section 
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Figure 8.5.1.1: Linkage between Section 8.5 and Section 8.6 
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1- I Aggregate disclosure 
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8.6 The Interview Framework (General Observation): 
The interview framework is shown in the next figure: 
Figure 2.8.1: The Interview Framework 
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The four main subjects in the interviews were: 
1- Extent of disclosure. 
2- Content of disclosure. 
3- Relationship between disclosure and some variables. 
4- Regulations and role of regulators. 
First: Extent of disclosure 
1- Aggregate disclosure 
The major reasons for the increase in aggregate disclosure are: 
A- Improved awareness towards disclosure, among companies, investors, brokers and 
shareholders. 
B- The development of regulations, which imposed new disclosure requirements. 
C- The existence of the JSC and its role of following up companies. 
D- The penalties, which force companies to comply with disclosure requirements. 
E- The development of the capital market in Jordan. 
2- Mandatory Disclosure (MD) 
A- MD Level: 
The level of MD (82%) is good, but the respondents expected a higher level (90% or 
95%). The penalties are the main factor contributing to this level, although they did not 
exist in 2003. Thus, the level of MD could reach 95% nowadays, since penalties are 
imposed on companies. 
B- DDAAS, IASs and DDAAS+IASs: 
- Compliance: 
The compliance with DDAAS requirements and with IASs requirements is similar 
because the JSC ensures that the compliance should be for all requirements. 
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Compliance with IASs came before compliance with DDAAS, since IASs was applied 
in Jordan in 1984 by the Companies Act. 
- IASs: 
Auditors indicated that the compliance with IASs is restricted to the Big Four audit 
companies for the following reasons: 
A- It is required by many regulators, such as the: Companies Act, JSC and other 
regulations. 
B- They are controlled by the main audit offices, which ensure that these audit 
companies apply IASs when preparing the financial statements. 
In summary, JSC's role of ensuring that the compliance with both DDAAS and LASS 
is illustrated in the next figure. 
Figure 8.6.2: JSC role as regards DDAAS and IASs compliance 
JSC requirements 
DDAAS IASs 
Follow up companies Auditors responsibility 
- DDAAS + IASs: 
There were different views among interviewees about the effect of many regulations on 
the compliance level. These views are shown in the next table: 
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Table 8.6.1: Views about the effect of many regulations on the compliance level 
Interviewee Group Positive Effect No Effect 
Rababaa Regulators 
Al-Hadidi Regulators 
_ 
Hammoda Auditors 
Samara Auditors 
Abu-Qalbin Financial Analyst 
_ 
Supporters of a positive effect argued that companies pay more attention to items which 
are required by more than one regulator. However, there are limits to their support, 
since too many regulations could burden and confuse companies. 
On the other hand, those who thought there is no effect pointed out that regulations are 
similar and JSC regulations are drawn from IASs, but in a different frame. In addition, 
the most appropriate solution to increase compliance is not by imposing more 
regulations, but by training the regulators themselves to be capable of analysing and 
imposing such regulations. 
3- Voluntary disclosure (VD) and its relationship with mandatory disclosure 
The extent of voluntary disclosure depends on two major things: the company's 
management and the company's culture and awareness. Company awareness towards 
mandatory items is more than for voluntary items, since it is required by regulations. 
The next table illustrates the different views about the effect of MD (regulations) on VD: 
Table 8.6.2: Views about the effect of MD on VD 
Interviewee Group Positive Effect No Effect 
Rababaa Regulators 
Al-Hadidi Regulators 
_ 
Hammoda Auditors 
Samara Auditors 
Abu-Qalbin Financial Analyst 
_ 
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However, there should be a balance between MD and VD. In other words, VD should 
remain and if the JSC discovers that one or more voluntary item has become essential, it 
should make it mandatory. An example of VD in Jordan is ratios, which should be 
reviewed regularly in order to mandate more ratios which are beneficial for decision 
making. 
Finally, companies disclose voluntary information in order to distinguish themselves 
(signalling theory). 
Second: Content of disclosure 
1- Sufficiency and timing: 
Annual reports are considered to be useful in general and so are semi-annual and 
periodical reports. The most important reports which companies should disclose on time 
are the significant events reports. These kinds of reports are important because: 
A- The effect of one significant event (e. g. extraordinary loss) could be more serious 
than all other disclosures. 
B- The effect of significant events is immediate, while the effect of other disclosures (i. e. 
annual reports) is historical. 
As regards timing of annual reports, the time of issuing them (two or three months after 
the end of the year) is not appropriate. Many directors could take decisions before other 
investors during this period and hence harm them. Thus, this period should be 
minimized to 15 days, for example. 
The content of annual reports, as regards audit information is not enough and the 
auditors suggested other items to be disclosed (and preferably made mandatory): 
- The name of the responsible persons in the audit office 
- Any other fees the auditor earns on other services except the audit work. 
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- The financial volume relationship between the auditor and the companies, which 
affects his independence (less financial relationship =* more independence). 
2- MD Information 
- IASs: 
One paragraph in the Securities Exchange Law regarding application of IASs for all 
companies is considered to be sufficient. This paragraph includes all IASs and hence the 
compliance with IASs will be part of compliance with Securities Exchange Law. In 
addition, compliance with IASs is required by more than one regulation (i. e. Companies 
Act) and this will increase the level of compliance. However, this compliance requires 
the availability of experts in the JSC who can analyse and check whether auditors 
comply with IASs. 
According to the auditors, Jordanian companies' level of compliance with IASs is 
enough, but there are some deficiencies. This occurs because of the different 
perspectives between the auditors and the management and because of the conflict 
among different laws (e. g. Tax Law and Securities Exchange Law). However, if the 
compliance is not enough, the auditor will note it in his report or require the company to 
comply with IASs. 
Compliance is greatest for IAS No. 1, the presentation of financial statements. In 
, addition, there 
is good compliance with assets and liabilities assessment standards. 
However, a higher percentage of compliance is found to be linked with big audit 
companies in Jordan, while the small ones are not aware enough about IASs. 
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Third: Relationship between disclosure extent and some variables: 
1- Relationship between disclosure extent and the companies' characteristics: 
The results indicated that it is normal (expected) to find that firm size, profitability, 
industry type, listing status and audit firm size to be the most explanatory variables. The 
comparison in the next table illustrates the effect of company firm size and audit firm 
size: 
Table 8.6.3: The effect of firm size and audit firm size 
No Item 
Company size Audit firm size 
Big 
companies 
Small 
companies 
Big audit 
firms 
Small audit 
firms 
1 Resources 
2 Qualified Accountants 
3 
Compliance with 
requirements 
4 Detailed annual reports 
Another variable which is considered to be important and affect the level of disclosure 
is the management philosophy (vision) towards disclosure. In addition, the 
shareholders' awareness and vision could affect the disclosure level. A comparison 
between two kinds of managements and shareholders is shown in Table 8.6.4. 
Table 8.6.4: Comparison between two kinds of managements and shareholders 
Management Shareholders 
Has vision toward Does not have vision Aware about Not aware about 
disclosure toward disclosure disclosure disclosure 
Fulfils requirements Does not fulfil Push management to Lack knowledge about 
and annual reports are requirements and annual disclose all disclosure and so 
well cleared and reports do not contain information for management can 
explained in details enough disclosure decision taking ignore disclosing 
I important items 
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Hammoda pointed out that there is a linkage between both management and 
shareholders, as there should be harmony between both sides in order to improve the 
disclosure level. 
2- The relationship between disclosure and privatization: 
Different perspectives about the effect of privatization on the disclosure extent are 
shown in the following table 
Table 8.6.5: Perspectives about the privatization effect on the disclosure extent 
Interviewee Group Positive Effect No Effect 
Rababaa Regulators 
Al-Hadidi Regulators 
Hammoda Auditors 
Samara Auditors 
Abu-Qalbin Financial Analyst 
Supporters of a positive effect argued that privatization requires a financial advisor, who 
manages the process of privatization. Thus, the advisor depends on disclosure to take 
his decisions and hence the government depends on his decisions. Meanwhile, 
supporters of no effect pointed out that privatization is a separate process and could 
have specific purposes in terms of disclosure. For example, sometimes the government 
does not disclose information about the real price of the privatized company shares in 
order to avoid the speculation which negatively affects the privatized company (as in 
the case of Jordan Telecom Company). 
Fourth: Regulations and the role of regulators 
1- Changing the regulations: 
The reasons for changing the disclosure requirements are: 
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A- Globalization and advanced technology which have affected the investment 
environment. 
B- Development of Jordan's capital market, which has attracted foreign and local 
investors. 
C- The role of IOSCO in improving the capital market in Jordan. 
D- More advanced steps as the existence of JSC, SDC and ASE required change in the 
regulations. 
E- The East Asian crisis, which occurred in recent years, was related to the lack of 
disclosure and non-compliance with IASs. Thus, international pressure has existed to 
change the regulations in order to increase the level of transparency and disclosure. 
2- Responsibility: 
JSC and ASE are the main enforcement mechanisms for increasing the level of 
disclosure in Jordan. In addition, Samara argued that JACPA could cover non- 
shareholding companies and hence its scope is larger than the JSC. However, JACPA's 
role is limited, since it has been unable to impose any regulations, although the law has 
given it the authority to do so. 
3- Penalties: 
There was a difference in views among respondents as to whether penalties is an 
effective enforcement mechanism for compliance. These views are shown in Table 8.6.6. 
Table 8.6.6: Views about the effectiveness of penalties as an enforcement 
mechanism 
Interviewee Group Effective Not Effective 
Rababaa Regulators 
_ 
Al-Hadidi Regulators 
_ 
Hammoda Auditors 
_ 
Samara Auditors 
Abu-Qalbin Financial Analyst 
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The importance of penalties is summarized in two major points: 
A- The high fines, which are costly for the companies, force companies to comply with 
regulations. 
B- The companies are concerned about their image and reputation. Thus, they avoid 
incurring penalties, to maintain their good image in the market. 
The purpose of penalties is not to harm companies, but to force companies to comply 
with regulations. It should be noted that discussions and suggestions between 
companies and the JSC should take place in order to increase the level of disclosure. 
4- Understanding the regulations: 
The views about the party responsible for enhancing understanding of the regulations 
are shown in the table below. 
Table 8.6.7: Views about the responsible party of enhancing the understanding 
about regulations 
Responsible party 
Interviewee Group 
Companies JSC 
Different parties 
(shared responsibility) 
Rababaa Regulators 
Al-Hadidi Regulators 
Hammoda Auditors 
Samara Auditors 
Abu-Qalbin Financial Analyst 
Different methods could be applied in order to enhance this understanding: 
A- Publishing leaflets, magazines and bulletins which illustrate the disclosure 
requirements. 
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B- Holding seminars and training courses which explain the disclosure requirements. 
Each company would be required to attend such seminars in order to enhance the 
understanding about disclosure. 
C- Establishing a query Section in JSC, which would guide companies and provide 
assistance regarding the disclosure issue. 
5- Unification 
The idea of combining the disclosure requirements in one disclosure law met with 
different responses. Rababaa argued that the JSC is totally in favour of such 
combination. Meanwhile, Al-Hadidi pointed out that such unification is difficult to be 
achieved, because of possible conflict among regulations. 
Furthermore, Samara argued that having multiple laws increases the level of disclosure. 
6- Regulators: 
- JSC: 
JSC is the control body in the capital market in Jordan. The JSC's purpose is to organize 
the capital market through managing the relationship between the investors and the ASE, 
and between the investors and the brokers. 
The JSC has some attributes: 
A- It is a non-profit governmental organization. 
B- It has a direct contact with the Prime Minister. 
C- It is an independent body and separate from other organizations, such as ASE and 
SDC. 
The existence of the JSC has improved the disclosure level significantly in Jordan. The 
JSC's efforts regards improving the disclosure level in Jordan could be summarized in 
the following points: 
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A- JSC is considered the main enforcement mechanism for imposing regulations, which 
has the authority and control for doing this. 
B- JSC follows up all non-compliance issues by imposing penalties on companies. 
C- JSC observes auditors by issuing directives on audit standards, which the auditors 
have to follow. 
D- JSC is responsible for explaining and disseminating the disclosure requirements 
through different sources of media, seminars, leaflets and bulletins in order to enhance 
understanding of the disclosure requirements. 
It should be noted that the JSC should have experts and qualified staff that can ensure 
that companies comply with the regulations. For instance, the expert could analyse the 
financial statements in order to ensure that they are prepared in accordance with IASs 
and hence to ensure that auditors apply IASs. 
- ASE: 
*Statistics: 
A- Increase in foreign investment which exceeds 43% of the total investments in ASE. 
B- Increase in the volume of transactions, which reach about JD 50 m nowadays, while 
it was no more than JD 700,000 or 800,000 before 1995. 
C- Increase in the number of brokerage offices, which has reached 75-80 offices, 
compared to 31 brokerage offices before 1995. 
D- Increase in the number of investors to reach about 650,000 (12%) investors out of 
5,500,000 (population of Jordan). 
E- Improvements in economic growth, at a rate of 3-5%. 
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*Technical Change: 
A- Development in electronic listings, which improve the speed of transactions. 
B- Developing an interactive website, which is considered a sufficient tool of obtaining 
information about regulations 
C- Suggestions: 
- Updating all information on the website regularly. 
- Creating a separate website including all information about companies, such as 
appointment of new directors, change in the company's activities and plans for the 
future. 
*Structural Change: 
Perspectives about dividing ASE into two markets instead of three: 
A- Administrative matter: the previous division (three markets) included listed 
companies in the first and Second markets, while unlisted companies were included in 
the third market. The new division (two markets) includes listed companies in the first 
and Second markets, while unlisted companies are transferred to the SDC. 
B- Difference: no difference could be found between the two markets. The factor which 
determines whether the company to be in the first and the Second market is related to 
the ability of the stock to be deliberated (the number of deliberation days for the stock). 
C- Restricted matter: new companies are listed in the Second markets. These companies 
have not issued any financial statements and hence the ASE has the right to restrict 
these companies to the Second market. When these companies issue financial 
statements and disseminate more information about their situation, they will be 
transferred to the first market. 
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-JACPA: 
The birth of JACPA was weak and passed through different stages as follows: 
A- The Audit Law in 1984 had deficiencies, as it gave the licences to hundreds of 
unqualified persons to work as auditors. 
B- The reorganization process through classifying the audit offices to A, B and C 
classes was not useful. 
C- The majority (90%) of JACPA members were unqualified, and till 2000 (for 16 
years), the JACPA was managed by unqualified management. 
D- The recent change in the JACPA board is an improvement, as it includes five 
qualified auditors and three unqualified auditors. 
E- Big audit companies have started to support JACPA. However, it needs a long time 
to adjust its performance. 
Therefore, JACPA does not have any regulatory role and can not exert any real 
influence on accounting, although the law has given it the authority to do so. 
The major criticisms of JACPA- according to Hammoda- are: 
A- It can not impose penalties. 
B- It can not form any committees (such as quality control committee, professional 
ethics committee) in order to inspect, analyse and control the audit companies. 
However, JACPA lacks funds and resources to achieve its purposes. JACPA's role in 
improving the disclosure level is summarized as follows: 
A- Holding training courses every two or three weeks in order to enhance the 
understanding about disclosure. 
B-Issuing bulletins, leaflets, and magazines in order to improve the awareness towards 
disclosure. 
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C- Cooperation with the Companies Controller and other parties (e. g. JSC) in order to 
provide information about disclosure and how to develop it. 
D- Following up auditors to ensure that IASs are complied with. 
In summary, JACPA's role in Jordan is still weak. The major reason for that could be 
due to the weakness surrounding the establishment of the organization, as explained 
above. In addition, the lack of resources and funds could be a significant reason for this 
weak role. However, Samara (a member of JACPA) stated that JACPA is working hard- 
within the available resources- to improve the disclosure level in Jordan. 
- IOSCO: 
IOSCO set up the minimum requirements which companies should comply with. Jordan 
has reviewed all the standards which have been formed by IOSCO and has adopted the 
standards which are appropriate for Jordan's environment. 
Joining IOSCO has saved the time and effort of developing new disclosure 
requirements in Jordan. Indeed, IOSCO has played a vital role in developing the capital 
market in Jordan. IOSCO required the following terms to develop the capital market in 
Jordan: 
A- Setting up a controlling body in the capital market (JSC). 
B- Setting up an appropriate stock exchange (ASE) according to the international 
standards. 
Joining IOSCO has had beneficial effects as follows: 
A- It communicates with international capital markets and hence enables JSC to benefit 
from the expertise in developing countries as regards the disclosure issue. 
B- It improves the image of AFM in the world, which attracts many investors to invest 
in Jordan and the international institutes have become interested in it. 
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8.7 Linking the Interview Results with the Research Objectives 
The purpose of the interviews was to interpret the study results, especially any 
unexpected results. Thus, there is a linkage between the interview results and the 
research objectives, because the results from the quantitative methods, which were 
directly related to the objectives, also formed the framework for the interviews. This 
linkage is explained as follows: 
1- The first objective of the study was to explore the disclosure practices in Jordan 
(mandatory and voluntary). The first and Second subjects in the interview framework 
are the extent and the content of disclosure (see Figure 8.5.1). These subjects enhance 
our understanding about the disclosure practices in Jordan, specifically mandatory 
disclosure practices (DDAAS and IASs). Thus, disclosure practices in Jordan could be 
explained according the interview results. 
2- The Second objective of the study was to examine the relationship between the 
aggregate disclosure and the company's characteristics. The third subject in the 
interview framework focuses on this relationship. The interview results emphasized that 
firm size, audit firm size, industry type, listing status and profitability contribute in 
explaining the extent of disclosure. In addition, they suggested other variables such as 
the management tools (i. e. management awareness and attitude) and shareholders' 
awareness as important variables for explaining the extent of disclosure. Thus, these 
variables and others (e. g. privatization) could be topics for future work; this will be 
considered further in the Discussion chapter in this study. 
3- The third objective of the study was to investigate whether or not Jordanian 
companies comply with mandatory disclosure requirements. This objective focused on 
regulations and compliance with these regulations. The fourth subject of the interview 
framework is related to the regulations and the role of regulators. The regulations were 
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discussed in detail, explaining the reasons for changing them, the responsibility of 
regulators and the level of understanding of these regulations. Furthermore, the 
interview results shed light on the most effective regulators in Jordan as regards the 
disclosure issue (i. e. JSC and ASE). Therefore, the results about regulations in the 
interviews provide a comprehensive understanding about the compliance behaviour 
towards disclosure requirements in Jordan. 
8.8 Linking the Interview Results with the Literature Review: 
The results of the interviews supported the quantitative results in this study. In addition, 
some interesting results in the interviews were supported by the literature review as 
follows: 
1- The interviewee pointed out that the regulations and the new requirements are one of 
major reasons for the improvement in the disclosure level in Jordan. Owusu-Ansah and 
Yeoh (2005: 92) argued that an adequate enforcement mechanism in the regulatory 
system is an effective tool for improving compliance with regulations. In addition, Abd- 
Elsalam (1999: 188) pointed out that the new regulations in Egypt are the major reason 
for the increase in the level of disclosure from 1991 to 1995. 
"The increase of the requirements of the new regulations supports the 
theory which justifies regulation in capital markets. It also supports the 
theory which argues that accounting regulation is one of the important 
factors causing improvement in disclosure" (Abd-Elsalam, 1999: 188). 
2- The interviews emphasized the importance of the JSC as a major enforcement 
mechanism in the regulatory system. Craig and Diga (1998: 257) stated that SEC 
regulations are a significant source of disclosure requirements. "They determine 
company listing criteria; impose continuous reporting obligation and mandate specific 
items of disclosure" (Craig and Diga, 1998: 257). Moreover, Frost and Pownall (1994: 79) 
commented about the role of SEC in capital markets as follows: 
520 
"The SEC's two main compliance programmes are the review and comment 
process and its enforcement action. The review process is designed to 
determine whether disclosures are adequate, and applies to both foreign 
and domestic users. If disclosures are inadequate, the SEC requests 
corrective action". 
3- The interview results emphasized that firm size, audit firm size, listing status, 
industry type and profitability are main variables explaining the extent of disclosure in 
Jordan. Many researchers (e. g. Cooke, 1989a; Al-Mulhem, 1997; Al-Shiab, 2003; 
Akhtaruddin, 2005) have found similar results as shown in Chapter Six in this study. 
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4- The interview results indicate that voluntary disclosure is a source of distinctiveness 
for the company and companies compete in disclosing more voluntary information. The 
signalling theory explains this behaviour of voluntary disclosure. This theory indicates 
that companies disclose additional information in the market to distinguish themselves 
from other low- performance companies (Suwaidan, 1997: 9). In addition, companies 
could disseminate detailed information in order to avoid any firm mis-evaluation (Helay, 
Hutton and Palepu, 1999: 488). Al-Htaybat and Napier (2006: 17) pointed out that 
signalling theory has been used in previous research (e. g. Suwidan, 1997; Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2002) in order to explain the incentives for managers to disclose more 
information in the annual reports. 
5- Some interviewees argued that the level of mandatory disclosure affects the level of 
voluntary disclosure positively. Dye (1985: 546) pointed out that if the mandatory and 
voluntary disclosures are complementary, more mandatory disclosure may increase the 
level of voluntary disclosure. Moreover, Naser and Nuseibeh (2003: 57) found a positive 
association between mandatory and voluntary disclosure. 
6- The interviews emphasized the importance of the management awareness and 
attitudes as influences on disclosure extent. These characteristics were discussed in 
168 In addition, the literature review in Chapter Two in Section 2.6: Disclosure and company 
characteristics explains the results related to these variables and the researchers who found similar results 
to those of this study (see Table 2.6.1). 
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previous research (e. g. Jaggi and Low, 2000; Ho and Wong, 2001; Hanifaa and Cooke, 
2002; Anderson and Daoud, 2005; Barako, Hancock and Izan, 2006; Ghazali and 
Weetman, 2006). Haniffa and Cooke (2002: 318) pointed out that corporate governance 
factors should be taken into consideration, since it is the board of directors who prepare 
the annual reports and disclose them. 
"The future being considered here involve the human aspect alone with 
individual's interactions in shaping reality, while other environmental 
factors, especially firm specific characteristics, reflect non- human aspects 
of disclosure practice" (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002: 318). 
However, Haniffa and Cooke (2002: 318) reported that despite the growing body of 
literature regarding this issue, the effect of managerial variables on the disclosure level 
has not been extensively explored. Therefore, the interview results along with the 
literature provide the underpinning for exploring this issue in Jordan. 
7- The interview results highlighted the importance of disclosing significant ratios in the 
annual reports. Moreover, mandating some ratios could be beneficial for investors. 
Watson, Shrives and Marston (2002: 290) argued that ratio disclosure is beneficial in 
order to assess the company's performance. The interview results emphasized that 
voluntary information (for example ratios) should be codified and that instructions 
about how to calculate them and the reference for these calculations should be explained. 
In this regard, Watson, Shrives and Marston (2002: 311) pointed out that setting 
standards for ratios will allow users to compare companies' performance more easily. 
"An accounting standard on disclosure and measurement of ratios could help in this 
regard, and bridge the `understanding gap' between users and prepares" (Watson, 
Shrives and Marston 2002: 311). 
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8.9. Summary 
This chapter has reviewed the interview information, the designing of questions for 
these interviews, and method of analysis. It then presented the results and a framework 
of the major themes or subjects covered in the interviews. 
The researcher conducted five interviews with two regulators, two auditors and one 
financial analyst. The interview questions were designed in accordance with the results 
of the quantitative data analysis. The purpose of these questions was to enhance our 
understanding concerning the findings of the quantitative analysis, since the approach 
applied in this research was a sequential approach in accordance with general analytical 
procedures, as explained in Section 4.4 in the Research Methodology chapter. 
The interview results were summarized in the interview framework. This framework 
includes four main subjects related to the disclosure issue: extent of disclosure, content 
of disclosure, relationship between disclosure and some variables and the regulations 
and role of regulators. 
The generalizations which could be concluded from the interview data are summarized 
as follows: 
1- The major reasons for improving the disclosure extent in Jordan are: the development 
of new regulations, the existence of JSC, the development of a disclosure culture and 
awareness, the penalties and the development of the capital market in Jordan. 
2- Many regulations may improve the level of disclosure, with the proviso that too 
many could be a burden or source of confusion for companies. Thus, it is suggested that 
the JSC should review every item carefully before imposing more than one regulation 
on it. In addition, unifying these regulations in one disclosure law is a purpose to be 
achieved but there are some difficulties. 
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3- Annual reports are considered to be useful, but not sufficient for decision taking. In 
addition, there is a delay in issuing the annual reports and the period should be shorter 
(15 days for example). Moreover, the most useful reports for users which the 
interviewees mentioned are the significant events reports. These reports should be 
issued on time to be beneficial for users. 
4- IASs are applied properly in Jordan only by the Big Four Audit companies. The 
small audit companies lack qualified auditors and resources. IAS No. 1 and the 
standards related to the assets and liabilities assessments are the standards which gain 
most compliance in Jordan. The paragraph in the Securities Law which explains that all 
shareholding companies should apply IASs is considered sufficient, since all the IASs 
are included in this paragraph. 
5- The management awareness towards disclosure is an important variable explaining 
the extent of disclosure among companies, besides other company characteristics (firm 
size, audit firm size, listing status, industry type and profitability). This variable should 
be discussed in future research, as should the effect of privatization on the disclosure 
level in Jordan. 
6- The reasons for changing the disclosure regulations in Jordan are development of the 
capital market; globalization and the advanced technology which creates a conducive 
investment environment; the role of IOSCO which creates JSC, SDC and ASE as 
required institutes to develop capital market in Jordan; and the international pressure 
and interest in AFM which encouraged improvement in disclosure and transparency. 
7- JSC is the main enforcement mechanism for increasing the disclosure level in Jordan. 
The existence of the JSC and its authority to impose regulations are the major reasons 
for the improvement in the disclosure level in Jordan. 
8- Responsibility for enhancing understanding about the regulations is shared among 
different parties: JSC, JACPA, Companies Control and shareholding companies. This 
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understanding could be achieved by different tools, such as seminars, leaflets and 
magazines, or developing query Sections in JSC and ASE. 
9- The development in ASE has two major aspects: 
A- Technical development including the interactive website and electronic listings. 
B- Structural development including the reduction of the markets in ASE to two 
instead of three, for control and administrative purposes. 
10- The role of JACPA in Jordan is still weak, due to the shortenings at the time of 
establishment of this organization. The effort of JACPA in improving the disclosure 
level in Jordan is still limited since it lacks capability and resources. JACPA should 
follow up the audit offices in Jordan through forming different committees for 
inspection and ensuring the quality of the audit conducted by these firms. 
11- JSC and ASE should focus on assigning experts and qualified persons in order to 
analyse and decide whether the financial statements are prepared in accordance with the 
requirements. In addition, JACPA should assign qualified auditors, who are able to 
manage and analyse the audit work of the audit offices in Jordan. 
12- Jordan's joining IOSCO, as the first Arab member, has many advantages such as: 
A- Obtaining assistance for developing the capital markets in Jordan 
B- Communicating with international capital markets, specifically the developed ones, 
enabling AFM to save time and the effort of developing the disclosure requirements by 
learning from the experience of these markets. 
C- Improving the image of AFM in the world, which attracts many investors and 
increases the interest in AFM from the international institutes. 
Finally, it should be noted that the purpose of the qualitative analysis was not to develop 
new theories about the disclosure issue. Indeed, the researcher did not have a large 
enough sample of interviewee (five interviews were conducted) to develop new theories 
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about disclosure. However, theories already exist and the researcher has supported the 
results of the quantitative analysis in order to enhance our understanding about the 
disclosure issue in Jordan. Such understanding will be discussed comprehensively in the 
next chapter which contains discussion, conclusions and recommendations of this study. 
526 
Chapter Nine 
Conclusions, Implications, Limitations and Future Research 
9.1 Introduction 
The developments in the Jordanian Capital Market (JCM) in the last 15 years have been 
significant. A privatization programme was started in the five year plan period (1993- 
1997) in order to improve the private Sector led approach over major state owned 
enterprises. In addition, a programme of fundamental economic reform was adopted 
under the reign of His Majesty (HM) King Abdullah II, from 1999, supported by the 
International Market Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. This programme aims to open 
Jordan to the world and to introduce various agreements with the USA and the 
European Union (EU) in order to develop the Jordanian economy169 Moreover, Jordan 
has attracted many investors by several agreements with different countries, 
necessitating a stable regulatory environment to protect these investments. One of the 
most important requirements which investors rely on for decision making is the 
disclosure requirements. 
In this respect, the Temporary Securities Law No. 23 in 1997 was a significant step and 
turning point for the JCM. The major objective of this law was to restructure and 
regulate the JCM and to achieve transparency in the market in line with international 
standards 170. The essential feature of the law was the separation of the supervisory and 
legislative role from the executive role, with the replacement of the Amman Financial 
Market by three new institutions: Jordan Securities Commission (JCM), Amman Stock 
Exchange (ASE) and Securities Deposit Centre (SDC). 
169 Source: Jordan Investment Board: http// www. jib. com. jo [Accessed 15/01/2007] 170 Source: Amman Stock Exchange: http//www. ase. com jo [Accessed 15/01/2007] 
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In the light of these developments, this study explored the extent of disclosure in 
corporate annual reports for Jordanian companies listed in the ASE, since the 
introduction of the new regulations affecting the JCM (e. g. the Temporary Securities 
Law No. 23,1997). In particular, the major objectives of the study were: 
1) To evaluate the extent of aggregate, mandatory and voluntary disclosure practices for 
Jordanian companies listed in Amman Stock Exchange (ASE). 
2- To examine the relationship between the aggregate disclosure (mandatory and 
voluntary) and a number of company characteristics (financial and non-financial) for 
Jordanian companies listed in ASE. 
3- To investigate whether or not Jordanian corporations in ASE comply with mandatory 
disclosure requirements when they prepare their annual reports. 
4- To develop a disclosure framework by undertaking interviews with related parties (i. e. 
regulators, auditors and financial analysts) in order to enhance our understanding about 
the disclosure issue in Jordan and to understand and explain the findings of the 
quantitative approach which was applied to meet the first three objectives of the study. 
The chapter will start with a brief reminder of the research methodology which was 
applied to achieve the research objectives (Section 9.2). Section 9.3 summarizes the 
findings and conclusions of the study. Section 9.4 presents the contribution of this study 
to knowledge. The implications and recommendations are discussed in Section 9.5. 
Section 9.6 identifies the limitations of the study. Section 9.7 suggests areas for future 
research. 
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9.2 Research Methodology 
The researcher adopted a sequential explanatory triangulation design in order to achieve 
the research objectives. This design incorporated both quantitative and qualitative data 
collection and analysis. Quantitative data collection and analysis was used to achieve 
the first three objectives of the study. For the purpose of the first and Second objectives, 
an aggregate comprehensive disclosure index of 331 items was constructed (278 
mandatory items and 53 voluntary items- see Appendix 4.5.1.3.1-). The index 
encompassed nine groups of information: general information; balance sheet 
information; income statement information; cash flow and changes in equity statements; 
other statements, supplementary information and notes; financial history information; 
ratios and other analysis; projected and management information; and market based 
information. The items in the index were weighted using a dichotomous approach, in 
which an item was given 1 if disclosed and 0 if not disclosed. This approach has been 
used in many previous studies (see Chapter Four, Table 4.5.1.4.1). The reliability and 
validity of the index were evaluated in order to minimize subjectivity (see Chapter Four, 
Section 4.1.5). The aggregate index was calculated by dividing the actual scores 
awarded by the maximum possible scores appropriate for the company. 
Furthermore, 17 hypotheses were formulated in order to examine the relationship 
between the extent of aggregate disclosure (dependent variable) and the company's 
characteristics (independent variables): firm size, leverage, profitability, number of 
shareholders, listing status, industry type, assets-in-place, ownership structure, liquidity, 
audit firm size, and listing age. 
A sample of 121 companies (55 services and 66 industries) was investigated to fulfil the 
first and Second objectives of the study. This sample represents 83% of the 145 
companies listed in the ASE for the year 2003 (see Chapter Four, Table 4.5.5.1). 
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As regards the third objective, an index of mandatory items (278 items) was employed 
in order to measure compliance with the new disclosure requirements. As with the 
aggregate index, the unweighted approach was used. A matched sample of 60 
companies was selected for two years, 1996 and 2003 (before and after the new 
regulations) in order to test the effect of the new regulations on compliance. The 
researcher has chosen the 2003 mandatory disclosure checklist and applied it on 1996 in 
order to compare the compliance level for both periods and to show the effect of the 
new regulations on the disclosure level for Jordanian companies. 
Qualitative data were collected by means of semi-structured interviews. The resulting 
data was analysed using general analytical procedures (see Chapter Five, Figure 
5.6.3.4.1). The purpose of the interviews was to explain and enhance the understanding 
of the findings of the quantitative data. Thus, the sequential explanatory triangulation 
design provided a comprehensive understanding concerning disclosure in Jordan. 
9.3 Conclusion and Results 
9.3.1 Evaluating the Extent of Aggregate, Mandatory and Voluntary Disclosure 
Practices for Jordanian Companies (The First Objective) 
1- There was a significant increase in the level of aggregate disclosure (its average was 
69%) compared to that found in previous studies in Jordan, for example, 44% for Al- 
Issa (1988); 39% for Suwaidan (1997); and 45% in 1995,46% in 1996,47% in 1997, 
51% in 1998,54% in 1999 and 56% in 2000 for Al-Shiab (2002). In addition, the extent 
of aggregate disclosure varied among Jordanian companies and ranged from a low of 
48% (Inma Investment and Financial Facilities Company) to a high of 86% (Jordan 
Telecom). 
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2- The extent of mandatory disclosure (MD) and voluntary disclosure (VD) was 83% 
and 34% respectively, with a range from 64% to to 94% for MD and 6% to 71 % for VD. 
The detailed analysis for MD revealed that Jordanian companies comply with items 
mandated in both regulations, DDAAS and IASs (the compliance level was 91%), more 
than those mandated in either one of these regulations (with a compliance level of 83% 
for DDAAS and 82% for IASs). Voluntary disclosure still exists in Jordan (its level was 
34%), although many of those items which were voluntary in previous studies (e. g. 
Suwaidan's study) had become mandatory by the time this study was undertaken. 
3- There was a high level of disclosure in the financial statements of Jordanian 
companies, 91% for balance sheet, 89% for income statement, 93% for cash flow and 
changes in equity statements. In addition, general information scored a high level of 
disclosure among Jordanian companies (85%). The reason could be due to the 
mandatory requirements to disclose the financial statements and general information in 
accordance with Securities Law No. 32 of 1997. 
4- There was a moderate level of disclosure for other statements, supplementary 
information and notes. This information, which was required by IASs, formed the 
largest part of the disclosure index (47%). It included general notes, significant policies 
and details about the number of financial statements. A step-by-step analysis of such 
items according to each IASs revealed significant disclosure practices as shown in Table 
5.5.5.1, Chapter Five. In addition, IAS Nol, presentation of financial statements, was 
the standard which gained most compliance. The interview results supported this high 
compliance with IAS No. 1. In addition, IAS No. 16, property, plant and equipment 
(PPE), gained a high degree of compliance. This finding, too, was supported by the 
interview results. 
5- There was a low level of disclosure in the following groups: 30% for market based 
information; 33% for ratios and other analysis; 35% for financial history information; 
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and 43% for projected and management information. The majority of the items in these 
groups were voluntary and the few mandatory items scored a high level of disclosure. 
This suggests that more mandatory requirements would strengthen the level of 
disclosure of such information. Interviewees expressed different views about whether 
mandatory disclosure affects the level of voluntary disclosure. However, they 
considered that voluntary disclosure should remain and if the regulators (i. e. JSC) 
discovered that one or more voluntary item has became essential, they should make it 
mandatory. 
6- There was a greater variation in disclosure, for voluntary information (financial 
history, ratios analysis and market based information), than mandatory financial 
statement information, as affected in the higher standard deviation for voluntary 
information, shown in Table 5.5.1. This variation in voluntary information arises 
because disclosure of such information is optional. Therefore, it cannot be predicted 
which items a company will be prepared to disclose, and the variation in disclosure for 
these items is greater. In contrast, mandatory information can be predicted, since the 
regulations require companies to disclose specific information. Thus, the gap for 
mandatory items is lower than for voluntary ones. 
The interview analysis indicated that companies are more aware of mandatory items 
than voluntary items because of the impact of the regulations. 
9.3.2 Analysis of Relationship between Aggregate Disclosure and Level of the 
Company's Characteristics (the Second Objective) 
1- Univariate analysis was used to assess the relationship between the extent of 
aggregate disclosure and each independent variable. The results revealed that firm size 
variables (total assets, sales, capital stock and net income); leverage variables (TD/TA 
and LD/OE); profitability variables (ROR, EM and ROE); number of shareholders; 
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listing status; industry type; audit firm size and listing age are significantly associated 
with the extent of aggregate disclosure at least at the 5% level of significance. 
2- In the multivariate analysis, multiple regression models were used in order to assess 
the impact of each variable on the aggregate disclosure level. Two models were run 
(each one was run twice) to avoid multicollinearity problems. Specifically, for size 
variables, total assets was run in the first model and sales and capital stock in the 
Second model. In addition, to control the multicollinearity between TD/TA ratio and 
liquidity, each model was run twice, with TD/TA ratio in the first run and liquidity in 
the Second run. 
Each model explained more than 45% (R2) of the variation in the aggregate disclosure 
level with a highly significant F value (more than 9). Both models revealed similar 
results. The size variables (total assets and sales) were the most powerful explanatory 
variables at the 5% significance level (Beta was 0.403 for sales and 0.38 for total assets). 
In addition, the profitability variable ROE contributed significantly in explaining the 
extent of aggregate disclosure at the 5% level of significance. The other variables found 
to be significant at the 5% level were listing status and industry type. As regards audit 
firm size, it was found to be significant at the 10% level in the first model and at the 5% 
level in the Second model. Three variables (TD/TA ratio, number of shareholders and 
listing age), which were found to be significant in the univariate analysis, were also 
found to be insignificant in the multivariate analysis. The reason could be due to a 
minor multicollinearity effect between the variables. 
3- Stepwise regression analysis was used to support the multiple regression results and 
to detect the best predictors in the model. The model explained more than the half of the 
variation in the aggregate disclosure with a highly significant F value (more than 23). 
The explanatory power of the model in this study was higher than in many previous 
studies (e. g. R2 for Al-Shiab (2003) in Jordan was 18.4%; R2 for Ghazali and Weetman 
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(2006) in Malaysia was 36.1%) as shown in Table 6.4.5.3. The explanatory variables in 
stepwise regression, which were found to be significant at the 5% level, were consistent 
with those in multiple regression: sales (firm size variable), ROE (profitability variable), 
audit firm size, industry type and listing status. 
Table 9.3.2.1 presents a summary of the univariate and multivariate analysis for the 
research hypotheses at the 5% significance level 
534 
Table 9.3.2.1: Results for the research hypotheses using univariate and 
multivariate analysis 
Multivariate analysis 
Variable Hypothesis Proxy 
Univariate Multiple Stepwise 
analysis regression regression 
H1 Total assets Supported Supported Not supported 
H2 Sales Supported Supported Supported 
Firm size H3 Capital stock Supported Not supported No supported 
H4 Net income Supported Not supported Not supported 
H5 Total debt/total assets Supported Not supported Not supported 
Leverage H6 Long term debt/owners equity Not supported Not supported Not supported 
H7 Rates of return (ROR) Supported Not supported Not supported 
Profitability H8 Earnings margin (EM) Not supported Not supported Not supported 
H9 Return on equity (ROE) Supported Supported Supported 
Number of 
shareholders H10 Number of shareholders Supported Not supported Not supported 
Dummy dichotomous variable 
of I if the company listed in 
Listing status HI I the first tier and 0 if it is listed Supported Supported Supported 
in the Second or third tier 
Dummy dichotomous variable 
Industry type H12 of 1 for manufacturing and Supported'7' Supported Supported 
zero otherwise 
Ratio of the book value of 
fixed assets (net of 
Assets in place H13 depreciation) to the book Not supported Not supported Not supported 
value of total assets 
Ownership H14 Ratio of institutional Not supported Not supported Not supported 
structure ownership 
Ratio of company's current 
Liquidity H15 assets to current liabilities Not supported Not supported Not supported 
Dummy dichotomous variable 
of I if the company audited 
Audit firm size H16 by one of the Jordanian Big Supported Supported '72 Supported 
Four and 0 otherwise 
The period from the first date 
of listing the company in the 
Listing age H17 ASE to financial year ended Supported Not supported Not supported 
in 2003 
"' The parametric test Independent sample T-test indicated that this variable is not significant at the 5% level (p=0.061). However, Mann Whitney U-test revealed that this variable is significant at the 5% level (p= 0.032). In addition, multivariate analysis (multiple and stepwise regression) indicated that this 
variable is significant at the 5% level. 
172 Audit firm size was found to be significant at the 10% level in the first regression model and at 5% in 
the Second model. 
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Furthermore, the interview results indicated that firm size, audit firm size, listing status, 
industry type and profitability are important variables which affect the level of 
aggregate disclosure for Jordanian companies. In addition, other variables such as 
management's awareness and attitudes, and stakeholders' awareness are considered by 
the interviewees to be important. 
9.3.3 Investigating whether Jordanian Companies in ASE Comply with the 
Mandatory Disclosure Requirements (The Third Objective) 
1- There was a significant increase in the level of aggregate and mandatory disclosure 
for Jordanian companies in 2003 compared with 1996. However, the level of voluntary 
disclosure did not differ significantly in the two periods. The average aggregate 
disclosure level increased from 57% in 1996 to 70% in 2003 (+13%). In addition, the 
average mandatory disclosure level increased from 67% in 1996 to 83% in 2003 (+16%). 
Meanwhile, the average of voluntary disclosure increased slightly from 33% in 1996 to 
36% in 2003 (+3%). 
Moreover, 58 companies (97%), out of 60, had an increase in their level of aggregate 
disclosure in 2003 compared to 1996, while the entire sample (60 companies) had an 
increase in the level of mandatory disclosure in 2003 compared to 1996. Meanwhile, 37 
companies (62%) had an increase in voluntary disclosure level from 1996 to 2003. 
Interviewees ascribed the increase in the disclosure level in Jordan to the development 
of new regulations, the existence of the JSC, the development of a disclosure culture 
and awareness, the penalties for non-disclosure and the development of the capital 
market. 
2- The analysis of the mandatory disclosure level revealed that Jordanian companies 
complied with DDAAS+IASs regulations more than each one of them separately. The 
evidence seems to indicate wide compliance with DDAAS+IASs, since the level of 
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disclosure increased from 60% in 1996 to 91.5% in 2003 (+30.5%). In addition, the 
DDAAS regulation had a fundamental positive effect on the level of disclosure, since 
compliance with DDAAS was increased from 60% in 1996 to 85.5% in 2003 (+25.5%). 
Moreover, the level of compliance with IASs was increased from 69% in 1996 to 82.5% 
in 2003 (+13.5%). 
The interview results suggested that extensive regulation may improve the level of 
disclosure, with the provision that too many regulations could be a burden or source of 
confusion for companies. Thus, it was suggested that the JSC should review every item 
carefully before imposing more than one regulation on it. In addition, unifying these 
regulations into one disclosure law was thought to be worth pursuing, although there are 
some difficulties. 
3- There was a significant relationship between mandatory and voluntary disclosure at 
the 5% significance level. Thus, one can argue that the new regulations may affect 
positively the level of voluntary disclosure, which supports Dye's (1985) perspective, 
that mandatory and voluntary disclosure are complementary. 
4- The comparison between the level of disclosure in this study and the level of 
disclosure in a previous study in Jordan (i. e. Suwaidan's study) revealed that the 
voluntary items in Suwaidan's study, which had become mandatory by the time of this 
study, had a significant increase in the level of disclosure from 64% to 89%. Thus, the 
nature of disclosure has been changed from voluntary to an aggregate one (mandatory + 
voluntary). Table 9.3.3.1 provides a comprehensive comparison between this study and 
other studies in Jordan. 
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Table 9.3.3.1: Comparison between this study and other disclosure studies in 
Jordan 
Suwaidan's study Al-Shiab's study This study 
Year 1992 1995-2000 1996 and 2003 
Scope of the Voluntary disclosure Mandatory disclosure Aggregate disclosure 
study (mandatory and 
voluntary disclosure)) 
Firm size, number of Firm size, leverage, 
shareholders, institution profitability, number of 
ownership ratio, Firm size, audit firm size, shareholders, listing 
Company's government ownership, industry type, profitability status, industry type, 
characteristics industry type, auditing and capital structure assets-in-place, 
firm size, profitability, ownership structure, 
frequency of external liquidity, audit firm size, 
financing listing age 
- 121 companies in two 
102 companies for the year Sectors: services and 
Sample 1992 for in the four 50 industrial companies industrial173 
Sectors: banks, insurance, for the period 1995-2000 - 60 companies as a 
services and industrial matched pair sample 
331 items: an index 
including voluntarily and 
mandatory items with 
distinction between them. 
As regards mandatory 
items, the regulation 
which requires the item is 
mentioned (IASs or JSC). 
Each item in the 
aggregate index is 
supported by the previous 
studies which employed 
it. The index 
75 items: an index encompasses nine 
Items composed of seven groups: 273 items: A disclosure categories: 1) general 
numbers and 1) general information, 2) checklist of questions for information, 2) balance 
types of balance sheet, 3) income each standard sheet, 3) income 
disclosure statement and other statement, 4) cash flow 
items statements, 4) projections and changes in equity 
and future information, 5) statements 5) other 
financial history, 6) ratios statements, 
and other statistics, 7) supplementary 
market based information. information, and notes 6) 
financial history 
information, 7 ratios and 
other analysis, 8) 
projected and 
management information, 
9)market based 
information. 
173 Two Sectors only were selected in this study, banks and insurance companies were not included, since 
they are subject to separate disclosure requirements (i. e. IAS No. 30). Suwaidan's study was conducted 
before the new regulations (before 1998). Therefore the scope of his study was on voluntary disclosure, 
where his index would be equally applicable to all four Sectors. 
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Statistical 
Tests 
The level of 
disclosure 
%) 
The 
relationship 
between 
disclosure 
and 
company's 
characteristics 
-Parametric tests: T-test, 
one way analysis of 
variance and multiple 
regression. 
-Non parametric test: 
Kendall's tau correlation, 
Mann Whitney U-test, 
Kruskal Wallis 
39 
-Univariate analysis: 
1- Positive relationship: 
firm size, number of 
shareholders, government 
ownership, size of auditing 
firm, international contact 
of audit firm, frequency of 
external financing, 
industry type 
2- Neutral relationship: 
institutional ownership 
ratio, profitability 
-Multivariate analysis 
(multiple regression): 
1- Positive relationship: 
firm size, institutional 
ownership, government 
ownership, industry type 
and audit firm size 
-Parametric tests: T-test, 
one was analysis of 
variance, multiple 
regression, stepwise 
regression. 
- Non parametric tests: 
Mann Whitney U-test, 
Kruskal Wallis 
45 in 1995,46 in 1996,47 
in 1997,51 in 1998,54 in 
1999 and 56 in 2000 
- Univariate analysis 
1- Positive relationship: 
firm size, industry type, 
audit firm size 
2- Neutral relationship: 
profitability, capital 
structure 
-Multivariate analysis: 
First: Multiple regression 
1-Positive 
relationship: 
firm size, audit firm 
size 
2- Neutral 
relationship: 
industry type, 
profitability and 
capital structure 
Second: Stepwise 
regression: 
I- Positive 
relationship: 
firm size, audit firm 
size, industry type 
2- Neutral 
relationship: 
profitability and 
capital structure 
-Parametric tests: 
Pearson's correlation, T- 
test, one was analysis of 
variance, multiple 
regression, stepwise 
regression. 
-Non parametric tests: 
Kendall's tau correlation, 
Spearman's rank 
correlation, Mann 
Whitney U-test 
69 for aggregate 
disclosure, 83 for 
mandatory disclosure and 
34 for voluntary 
disclosure 
-Univariate analysis: 
I- Positive relationship: 
firm size, leverage 
(TD/TA), profitability 
(ROR and ROE), number 
of shareholders, listing 
status, industry type, 
audit firm size, listing 
age. 
2- Neutral relationship: 
assets in place, ownership 
structure and liquidity 
-Multivariate analysis: 
First: Multiple regression 
1- Positive relationship: 
firm size (total assets and 
sales), Profitability 
(ROE), listing status, 
industry type, audit firm 
size 
2- Neutral relationship: 
leverage, number of 
shareholders, assets in 
place, ownership 
structure, liquidity, listing 
age 
Second: Stepwise 
regression 
1- Positive relationship: 
firm size (total assets and 
sales), Profitability 
(ROE), listing status, 
industry type, audit firm 
size 
2- Neutral relationship: 
leverage, number of 
shareholders, assets in 
place, ownership 
structure, liquidity, listing 
age 
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9.4 Contribution of this Study to Knowledge 
This research makes the following contributions: 
1- It investigates the scope of aggregate disclosure (mandatory and voluntary) in Jordan 
after the new regulations. As far as the researcher is aware, the previous studies in 
Jordan focused either on voluntary disclosure (i. e. Suwaidan, 1997) or part of 
mandatory disclosure (i. e. Al-Shiab, 2003). This study covered all disclosure aspects, 
mandatory (fASs and DDAAS) and voluntary. Hence, this study provides a 
comprehensive guide for understanding the level of mandatory and voluntary disclosure 
in Jordan. 
2- The disclosure index used in this study is one of the largest indices in disclosure 
studies, since it contains 331 mandatory and voluntary items. This index can be utilized 
by different users (e. g. investors, financial analysts) to assess the extent of disclosure by 
companies. In addition, it can be utilized -using the mandatory index- in order to assess 
companies' compliance with regulations. The index can be up-dated by adding new 
disclosure requirements and other voluntary items appropriate for Jordanian companies. 
Thus, the index could be a benchmark for regulators as well as researchers and users for 
future analysis and evaluation. 
3- Exploring the disclosure behaviour in Jordan using a triangulation design (sequential 
explanatory design) implies a new approach to understand the issue of disclosure in 
developing and developed countries. Using both quantitative and qualitative methods 
provides a fuller and more comprehensive picture about the disclosure issue. In 
particular, using a triangulation design clarifies many issues which could not be 
understood using one approach. Therefore, the disclosure framework in this study could 
be employed to explain different issues about disclosure, such as the relationship 
between disclosure and company characteristics, and the influence of regulations on the 
extent and content of disclosure. Moreover, the disclosure framework could be explored 
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further to include new variables such as management awareness or new aspects such as 
corporate governance. 
9.5 Implications and Recommendations 
1- The most notable finding of the study is the increase in the level of aggregate 
disclosure for Jordanian companies. This increase could be ascribed, according to the 
interview results, to the development of a new regulatory system in Jordan and the 
existence of the JSC, as the major regulatory body in AFM. This result supports the 
regulation theory which argues that regulations are one of the significant factors which 
cause development in disclosure. Thus, financial disclosure in Jordan has become 
regulated as it is not possible to leave disclosure to the market mechanism. 
Furthermore, this result implies that the increase in financial disclosure level is a 
reaction to the changes in the Jordanian economy. As discussed in Chapter Three, 
Jordan has adopted a private Sector led approach to dominate the economy and the 
Jordanian Capital Market has been separated into three new institutions: ASE, JSC and 
SDC. These changes were intended to attract new investments and to establish a well- 
planned investment environment in Jordan. Therefore, developing a new regulatory 
system was one of the most important tools to enable Jordan to achieve its economic 
and investment goals. 
2- The compliance with IASs is considerable, according to the interview results (the 
compliance level was 82%). However, IAS No. 1, presentation of financial statements 
and IAS No. 16, property, plant and equipment, gain the most compliance in Jordan. 
The open economy and the investment environment need companies to comply more 
with other IASs. For example, regulators in Jordan should focus on improving the 
compliance level for standards related to investments (i. e. IAS 32 and IAS 39 which are 
related to financial instruments). In addition, there has been an increase in the number of 
541 
the companies in Jordan and a broadening of their nature, to include several subsidiaries 
and associates. Hence, regulators should focus on increasing the compliance level for 
IAS 27, consolidated financial statements and accounting for investments in subsidiaries, 
and IAS 28, accounting for investments in associates. A suggestion for regulators is to 
compile a checklist of all important applicable IASs and disseminate it to all Jordanian 
companies. This checklist should be updated periodically in accordance with new 
disclosure requirements issued by IASB, and in accordance with new developments in 
the Jordanian economic and investment environment. 
3- A low level of disclosure was found in the following groups: market based 
information, ratio analysis, financial history information, and projected and 
management information. These groups contain some important information for 
decision making, such as liquidity and profitability ratios, company's future plans, 
quantitative and qualitative forecasts of sales and profits, growth in market shares, and 
company's main markets. The low level of disclosure for the above items indicates that 
there is scope for additional disclosure. The regulators should give more importance to 
these items. Indeed, the evidence from the interviews seems to indicate that ratios 
should be reviewed regularly in order to mandate more ratios which are beneficial for 
decision making. 
Furthermore, there was wide variation in disclosure of information in the above groups 
(voluntary information). This variation implies that the amount of voluntary information 
in the annual reports of Jordanian companies differs considerably, since such 
information is optional and can not be predicted. Therefore, the regulators in Jordan 
should investigate whether the scope of disclosure in Jordanian annual reports is 
adequate to meet the needs of users. A suggestion made by the interviewees was to 
review voluntary items regularly and if any item is found to have become essential, it 
should be made mandatory. For now, however, voluntary disclosure still exists in 
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Jordan and varies widely among companies. The evidence of the interviews revealed 
that companies disclose more information to distinguish themselves (signalling theory). 
4- One of the major findings of this study is that the most important variables 
influencing the level of aggregate disclosure in Jordan are firm size, profitability, listing 
status, industry type and audit firm size. Hence, since the extent of disclosure is related 
to firm characteristics, the regulators in Jordan should focus on firms that are small, not 
profitable, not listed in the first tier, in the services Sector and not audited by the one of 
Big Three audit firms, in order to improve their aggregate disclosure level in the annual 
reports. These companies have an incentive to improve their disclosure extent in order 
to compete with other companies. 
Firm size is the most important variable which affects the variation of disclosure level 
for Jordanian companies. This result is consistent with disclosure theories (e. g. agency 
and political theories) and with previous studies in different countries (see Table 2.6.1). 
Therefore, as regards investment decision making, large firms will provide more 
information for users than small firms. The resources and the expertise of the large 
firms could make them role models for other companies in the market. 
Jordanian companies were found to disclose more profitability ratios than other types of 
ratios (e. g. liquidity ratios). Profitability ratios could be sign of high performance and 
may attract more investors to the company. 
Firms which are listed in the first tier were found to disclose more information than 
other firms listed in the Second and third tiers. It is reasonable to think that the higher 
disclosure for first tier listed companies is a response to greater interest in their shares 
on the stock exchange and other. Indeed, for companies to be listed in the first tier, they 
must fulfil certain conditions regarding issued capital and profitability, 74. Thus, it is 
expected to see large firms in the first tier because of the needs for external financing. 
174 See Chapter Three: Part 3.7.1: Amman Stock Exchange. 
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Furthermore, the importance of listing status as a major factor influencing the variation 
in disclosure implies that regulators in the stock markets (i. e. JSC) have the most 
important role in improving the disclosure level in Jordan. This is consistent with the 
interview results, which indicated that the existence of the JSC is one of the major 
reasons for the improvements of the disclosure level in Jordan. 
Manufacturing companies disclose more information than services companies in Jordan. 
The nature and complexity of the activities of these companies require more information 
to be disclosed. In addition, some IASs (i. e. IAS No. 2, Inventories) are more applicable 
to manufacturing companies than service ones. 
Companies audited by Big Three Jordanian audit firms disclose more information than 
other companies audited by other audit firms. A policy implication of this result is that 
regulators (e. g. JACPA) should encourage small audit firms to comply with all 
disclosure requirements, particularly the financial statements requirements. However, 
small audit firms lack the resources and expertise to follow the Big Three audit firms. 
The interview results indicated that the majority of Jordanian companies listed in ASE 
are audited by one of the Big Three. Hence, a suggestion could be made that companies 
listed in ASE, specifically companies listed in the first tier, should be audited by one of 
the Big Three. These companies are in the public eye and imposing such a procedure 
will increase the disclosure level and improve its quality. 
Another important variable that should be noted is the ownership structure. Overall, 
aggregate disclosure for Jordanian companies is not affected by the structure of their 
ownership. 
Overall, the regulators in Jordan should take into consideration the costs and the 
benefits associated with increased disclosure for firms which are small, not profitable, 
not listed in the first tier, in the services Sector and not audited by the Big Four. It is 
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clear that firms will disclose more information if the benefits to these firms exceed the 
costs (cost-benefit theory). Any increase in disclosure for these firms may cause higher 
costs and smaller benefits and hence they will be reluctant to disclose any additional 
information. 
5- The study indicated that the JSC is the most important regulator which affects the 
level and nature of disclosure in Jordan. The JSC, as a governmental non profitable 
organization, manages the relationship between investors, the ASE and brokers. In 
addition, the existence of the JSC is the major reason for improvement in the disclosure 
level in Jordan, since the enforcement mechanism was introduced when it come into 
existence. "The enforcement stage should be given to the entity equipped with the 
power to enforce, that is the government" (Taplin, Tower and Hancock, 2002: 187). The 
interview results suggested the following recommendations to improve the JSC's role: 
A) Imposing more penalties on non-complying companies and following-up this 
procedure seriously. Indeed, according to the interview results, in 2005, the JSC 
introduced a more stringent penalties system to enforce compliance with the regulations. 
B) Observing auditors by issuing directives on audit standards, which the auditors have 
to follow. Indeed, this is a shared responsibility between the JSC and the JACPA who 
should observe auditors and compel them to comply with regulations. The role of 
JACPA will be discussed further, later in the discussion. 
C) Explaining and disseminating all disclosure requirements through various media, 
seminars, leaflets and bulletins in order to enhance understanding of the disclosure 
requirements. However, the JSC should have experts and qualified staff in order to 
ensure that companies have an adequate understanding about disclosure requirements. 
Therefore, it is suggested that programmes be held regularly for JSC staff to update 
them with all new regulations and standards. In addition, the JSC and the JACPA could 
cooperate to exchange expertise in order to enhance the understanding about all 
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regulations (DDAAS and IASs). Furthermore, regular meetings between the JSC and 
company managers would increase awareness about the disclosure requirements. Indeed, 
this awareness has been noticed in Jordan recently, according to the interview results, 
since a disclosure culture has become essential for the companies. Therefore, 
companies' awareness and attitudes have become one of the most important factors 
which determine the disclosure level for Jordanian companies. 
In general, the JSC is essential for disclosure improvement in Jordan. It is considered to 
be the linkage between investors and companies through disclosure. The government in 
Jordan should keep supporting the JSC with resources and experts in order to achieve its 
objectives. 
6- JACPA's role is still weak, despite the authority given to it by law. The reason for 
this weakness, it appears from the interviews, is related to its unorganized establishment 
and the lack of resources and funds. Therefore, the government in Jordan should give 
more support and power to the JACPA in supervising and controlling the profession. 
The importance of such support implies control over auditors in order to enforce 
compliance with the disclosure requirements and standards. One suggestion for 
improving the role of the JACPA is to maintain a quality programme for auditors and to 
update them regularly with all requirements and standards related to disclosure. In 
addition, imposing penalties on audit companies, found guilty of violations, could be an 
effective tool for compliance with disclosure requirements. What should be noted is that 
the JACPA should focus more on small audit firms than big ones. The big audit firms in 
Jordan (i. e. Big Three) are influenced by their international partners who have their own 
quality and supervision programmes. Furthermore, the JACPA and the JSC could work 
together by establishing a specific committee composed of members from both the 
JACPA and the JSC, to be responsible for disclosure requirements and any standards 
the companies and auditors must comply with. 
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7- The increase in investment in ASE has a significant implication for the role of the 
ASE in the Jordanian economy. The ratio of market capitalization to GDP was 326% in 
2005 and hence the Jordanian government has realized that the ASE is a fundamental 
resource in the Jordanian economy. The significant improvements in ASE in the last 
few years have had a positive impact on the volume of investment in the ASE. 
Examples of such improvements in the ASE are electronic trading and the interactive 
website, which save investors' time and effort. Moreover, joining the IOSCO, as the 
first Arab member, has improved the Jordanian capital market in a number of ways such 
as: 
A) Facilitating communication with international capital markets in the developed 
countries in order to obtain assistance and expertise for developing disclosure 
regulations in Jordan; 
B) Improving Jordan's image as a safe investment environment protected by a stringent 
regulatory system, which attracts Arab and international investors to Jordan. 
As a result, non-Jordanian investment in 2005 accounted for about 45% of all 
investments in Jordan and the market capitalization reached JD 26607 million. 
The government in Jordan should enhance the role of the ASE as a major resource for 
the economy. The fundamental changes in the Jordanian investment environment 
require the regulators in Jordan to strengthen the ASE's regulations and update it with 
essential disclosure and investment requirements. 
8- Annual reports are considered to be useful, but not sufficient for decision making. In 
addition, there is a delay in issuing the annual reports (two or three months after the end 
of the financial year). Thus, regulators in Jordan should take into consideration other 
sources of information (e. g. significant event reports) for decision making. In addition, 
the period of issuing the annual reports should be shorter (15 days for example-as 
suggested by one of the interviewees-) for beneficial decisions. The recent requirement 
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to issue quarterly and semi annual reports is an example of an advanced step in ensuring 
the sufficiency of information, which will enhance credibility and timeliness for better 
decision making. 
9- The comparison with previous studies in Jordan revealed that Jordan has started a 
new era of disclosure under a new regulatory system. Moving from voluntary to 
mandatory disclosure requires full cooperation among the different regulators in Jordan 
such as the JSC, ASE, SDC, JACPA, and the Companies Controller (Financial 
Controller). Unifying all the disclosure requirements of the different laws, in one 
disclosure law could improve compliance and could help users to improve their decision 
making effectiveness; however, unification is still difficult to achieve. 
10- The interaction between mandatory and voluntary disclosure suggests that 
mandatory and voluntary disclosure are not separate elements in financial reporting. 
Both should be taken into consideration when exploring the disclosure issue and its 
related behaviour. Understanding the interaction between mandatory and voluntary 
disclosure will provide the regulators with useful insights about the disclosure pattern in 
the market. For example, the positive relationship between mandatory and voluntary 
disclosure could be a sign that the increase in the level of mandatory disclosure 
encourages an increase in voluntary disclosure. However, some interviewees did not 
support this view, since the likelihood of providing voluntary disclosure is independent 
of mandatory disclosure. Thus, it could be said that there is still no clear pattern of 
relationship between mandatory and voluntary disclosures. Moreover, users of the 
annual reports (e. g. investors) should be advised not to suppose that there is a positive 
relationship between the level of mandatory disclosure and voluntary disclosure. In 
other words, companies that are better in disclosing mandatory items are not always the 
companies that disclose more voluntary information. 
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9.6 Limitations 
1- The focus of this study was on one source of information, which is the annual reports. 
Although annual reports are considered to be the most important source of information 
(see Chapter Four, Section 4.5.5), there are other sources of information in Jordan that 
could be useful for decision making, such as interim reports, AFM publications, 
prospectuses and financial press releases. In particular, internet sources could include 
beneficial information. These sources of information sources were not included in this 
study. 
2- There was difficulty obtaining the annual reports for some companies and a lack of 
recent information about Jordanian companies. However, several personal visits to the 
ASE's library and to companies enabled the researcher to obtain a large number of 
companies. The population of Jordanian companies listed in ASE for two Sectors, 
industrial and services was the sample in this study. Thus, the number of companies was 
121 out of 145 (84%). 
3-The study has investigated the level of aggregate disclosure using the annual reports 
for one single year, 2003. Thus, this study is a cross-Sectional one and can only 
examine correlations and is unable to establish causal relationships. To overcome this 
limitation, it would be necessary to adopt a longitudinal approach, to shed light on the 
disclosure behaviour for a longer period. In addition, evaluation of compliance with the 
new regulations would be more beneficial if the comparison was for two or three years 
before the new regulations (e. g. 1994-1996) with two or three years after the new 
regulations (e. g. 2000-2003). Moreover, the changes in regulations have become an 
important phenomenon in Jordan, since the establishing of the new regulatory system. 
Hence, there is a need to evaluate the relevance of disclosure at regular intervals. 
4- The quantity of information in the disclosure index does not reflect the quality of 
disclosure. Suwaidan (1997: 234) argued that the idea of what information should be 
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disclosed to satisfy the user needs does not depend on full disclosure, but rather on 
adequate disclosure. In this study, the mandatory items were specified by the 
regulations. Thus, the more a company disclosed the mandatory items, the more it 
complied with the regulations. On the other hand, the voluntary items were optional and 
depended on the attitude of the company's management. Thus, companies which 
disclose more voluntary information are not necessarily better than those which 
undertake less voluntary disclosure. Many voluntary items could be irrelevant for users' 
needs. "The questions of how much information should be disclosed by a company and 
what constitutes adequate disclosure are still open and controversial" (Suwaidan, 
1997: 234). However, exploring the users needs and perspectives was not part of this 
study, as will be discussed later in relation to areas for future research. 
5- Construction of the disclosure index and assigning scores implies subjective 
judgement and a personal perspective on the part of the researcher. The disclosure index 
in this study is a proxy for measuring the extent of disclosure by the company. Bias 
exists here, since the researcher relied on contents of the annual reports, which may not 
always contain accurate information about the company. Thus, the index is not a perfect 
indicator of the level of disclosure. In addition, deciding what is applicable for the 
company or not is affected by the researcher's perspective, which could be biased. 
However, as noted in Section 4.5.1.5 in Chapter Four (reliability and validity of the 
disclosure index), extensive steps were taken to reduce these biases. 
The problem occurs due to the inherently subjective nature of disclosure. Marston and 
Shrives (1991: 708) expressed this dilemma as follows: 
`In the social sciences many common research tools attract sonic 
controversy and disagreement. Measuring company information disclosure 
can not be carried out in a precise scientific way. Researcher subjectivity 
can not be completely removed, nor is it reasonable to expect that it can be. 
The value of the resulting disclosure scores and their subsequent use in 
testing hypotheses can not, therefore, be viewed uncritically. The efforts of 
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the researcher to minimize subjectivity and design a more objective index 
are of relevance here ". 
6- The R2 (explanatory power) in multiple regression analysis was about 50% which 
means that the multiple regression model, which contained eleven variables, explains 
about 50% of the variation in the aggregate disclosure level. Although this percentage is 
a considerable one, it means that other variables that were not included in the model 
could affect the level of disclosure, such as cultural and corporate governance variables. 
7- The different statistical techniques used in this study could lead to mixed results 
compared with previous studies. In addition, the assumptions of multiple regression, as 
it other disclosure studies, could not be met exactly, and caused some bias during the 
analysis of data. For example, the multicollinearity problem caused conflicting results 
between univariate and multivariate analysis. Although the researcher employed two 
models in multiple regression to control multicollinearity, a minor collinearity effect 
still existed. For instance, the univariate analysis showed a significant relationship 
between the profitability variables (ROR and ROE) and the extent of aggregate 
disclosure, while multiple regression shows that ROE was the only one associated. The 
reason was the minor collinearity between ROR and ROE. 
Another example is related to industry type and its relationship with the extent of 
aggregate disclosure. The parametric test (T-test) showed that there is no relationship 
between industry type and the extent of aggregate disclosure. However, the non- 
parametric test (Mann Whitney U-test) revealed that there is a relationship and also 
multivariate analysis (multiple and stepwise regression) indicated that there is 
relationship. 
In general, Wallace, Naser and Mora (1994: 43) argued that the major reasons for the 
mixed results in disclosure studies are as follows: 
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"The changing features of prior studies, such as the number of firms 
included in the sample, the type and number of firm characteristics 
examined, the number of information items that formed the basic of the set 
of disclosure indexes as a dependent variable, the different statistical 
methodologies used to analyse the data and the different settings (i. e. 
countries) of the study, have jointly or severally contributed to the mixed 
results from these studies" 
8- There are a number of limitations as regards the interview data and analysis 
A- Translating the Arabic text into English text may not give a fully accurate transcript 
because some Arabic verbal utterances (especially non formal) have no English 
equivalent. This implies some subjectivity, since it depends on the researcher who did 
the translation. This process is a difficult process and hence, subjectivity could not be 
avoided. However, the researcher reduced the subjectivity by matching the appropriate 
meaning for these Arabic verbal utterances to English, which would not affect the 
general meaning of the words or the sentence. 
B- The study focused on interviewing specific user groups, regulators, auditors and a 
financial analyst, since they are the most relevant groups, as discussed in Chapter Eight, 
Section 8.4. Including more user groups such as managers and investors would provide 
different perspectives about disclosure issues in Jordan. Hence, it would enhance our 
understanding about disclosure behaviour in Jordan. 
C- The sample size in the interview analysis (five interviewees) was small because it 
was viewed as a Secondary source of data collection. In addition, these interviews 
required official permission. While average duration was 1'/2 hours, more time would 
have given the opportunity to discuss further issues about disclosure in Jordan. 
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9.7 Future Research 
1- The study relied on one channel of disclosure (the annual reports). Future research 
might be extended to investigate the disclosure practices for other forms of information, 
such as quarterly and interim reports, AFM publications, financial press releases and 
significant event reports. 
Moreover, the recent developments in technology and communications suggest a need 
to pay more attention to internet sources of information. The traditional sources of 
information have become less satisfaction in meeting users needs, in regard to 
timeliness, keeping up to date with recent information and regulations and access to 
information. Al-Htaybat and Napier (2005: 22) found that the majority of listed 
companies in the ASE in 2004 still lacked a website. In addition, they found that most 
of the listed companies used the website for advertising purposes and less than 10% of 
the listed companies (mainly banks) used the internet as a communication channel. 
They (2005: 23) commented, 
"The current situation for online financial disclosure by Jordanian 
companies lags behind internet financial reporting by companies in 
European countries in the last 1990s. " 
Therefore, it would be interesting to investigate the level of internet disclosure after the 
new developments of technology, communications and regulations. Moreover, future 
research could identify the firm specific characteristics which influence the online 
disclosure practices for Jordanian companies. Furthermore, the effect of regulations (e. g. 
JSC requirements) on this kind of disclosure could be an open area for future research. 
2- The study explored the relationship between aggregate disclosure and the company's 
characteristics for a single year only. Additional research is needed to extend the current 
study for a longer period of time. This could enable disclosure practices to be assessed 
for different periods. In addition, it would provide an indication of the consistency and 
the explanatory power of company characteristics over the period. 
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3- An extension of the study could be to compare disclosure between Jordan and other 
developing countries in the region (i. e. Middle Eastern countries). Collecting data for 
more companies in different countries, especially those with different disclosure 
regulations, would enhance the validation of the results in this study and would 
determine the differences and similarities in policy makers' decisions. Such studies 
would be useful to the literature on comparative international accounting. 
4- The study investigated the relationship between aggregate disclosure (dependent 
variable) and the company's characteristics (independent variables). An interesting topic 
for research would be to include voluntary disclosure and mandatory disclosure as 
dependent variables and examine the relationship of each of them with the company's 
characteristics. Furthermore, disclosure groups (e. g. balance sheet, income statement) 
could be used as a disclosure index for each group and linked with company 
characteristics. Such an examination would determine the specific variables related to 
each index and would explain the variation in disclosure in each group more precisely. 
5- Potential influences on the level of disclosure are not limited to the company 
characterises which were tested in this study. Future research could include corporate 
governance and cultural factors. The issue of corporate governance has become 
significant in developed and developing countries in recent years. Corporate governance 
is concerned with the relationship between management, board of directors and other 
shareholders. Corporate governance should be considered in disclosure studies because 
it is the board of directors that manage disclosure of information in the annual reports. 
Corporate governance factors that could be explored in Jordan are: non-executive 
directors' ownership, role duality, proportion of family members in the board, and the 
existence of an audit committee. Moreover, cultural factors such as the level of 
education of directors and financial controller are possible factors to be explored. Study 
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of corporate governance and cultural factors is needed in Jordan, since few or no studies 
have tested the relationship between the level of disclosure and these factors in Jordan. 
6- An extension of the current study could test the relationship between the level of 
disclosure and market-determinant characteristics of the company such as share price 
and dividends payout. In addition, firms tend to disclose more information in order to 
reduce information asymmetry between firms and investors. Hence, by attracting more 
investors to the firm's shares, it is expected to reduce the cost of capital for the company. 
However, the relationship between the level of disclosure and cost of capital is still an 
open area for future research. In addition, information asymmetry proxies such as bid- 
ask spread could be included for future research. 
7- The interaction and relationship between mandatory and voluntary disclosure is still 
under discussion. While quantitative results indicate a positive association, some 
interview results did not support such a result. Therefore, this is a motivation for future 
research to extend and test this relationship in different periods and for a larger sample. 
Such study will have a significant implication for regulators, that the flow of 
information in the capital market should consider the interaction among all different 
channels of information (i. e. mandatory and voluntary disclosures). In addition, the 
policy makers will have adequate knowledge to design the disclosure regulations in 
light of their influence on the level of disclosure for other sources of information (i. e. 
voluntary disclosure). Exploring such an interaction will provide an implication for 
researchers that mandatory and voluntary disclosures are not separated elements and 
researchers should take into consideration the relationship between them. Furthermore, 
exploring the interaction between components of mandatory disclosure (e. g. IASs, JSC 
requirements) and the different kinds of voluntary disclosure (e. g. press releases, online 
information) is also left for future research. 
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8- An avenue for future research is to assess which IASs and disclosure practices are 
likely to be the most useful for investors and other stakeholders. A questionnaire or 
opinion survey based on the results of this study could be conducted to determine the 
most useful disclosure practices in Jordan. In addition, exploring users' perspectives 
about the disclosure practices after the new regulations has become essential. The users' 
perspectives about credibility, understanding, timeliness and access to information 
could be discussed in future research. These perspectives could be viewed through the 
annual reports and through other sources of information (e. g. interim reports, online 
information). Furthermore, a questionnaire survey exploring the users' views about the 
effect of disclosure regulations on users decision making would be an area for future 
research. 
9- Since this study employed an unweighted disclosure index, the findings might be 
different if a weighted disclosure index were employed. The weighted index assesses 
the importance of each item in accordance with specific users' perspective (e. g. 
investors, financial analysts). The results of using a weighted disclosure index could be 
compared with the results of this study. 
10- The disclosure of ratios is an essential issue for future research. This kind of 
disclosure would enable indication of the important ratios and the approaches to 
calculating them. Thus, the extent of disclosure of ratios would affect the decision 
making process. An approach suggested by Watson, Shrives and Marston (2002) is to 
employ qualitative methods using grounded theory in order to develop a theoretical 
framework of ratio disclosure. 
In addition, it would be interesting to employ triangulation methods (quantitative and 
qualitative) in order to understand and explore different issues in relation to disclosure. 
11- The impact of privatization on the disclosure behaviour is an interesting area of 
research. Jordan has adopted a privatization programme in order to attract new 
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investments. To date, 66 transactions in the privatization have been completed175. Hence, 
it would be interesting to explore the disclosure behaviour of the enterprise concerned, 
before and after the privatization, in order to explore the effect of privatization. In 
addition, the growth of non-Jordanian investment in the ASE would provide a basis for 
exploring the influence of foreign investment ownership on the level of disclosure. 
12- The recent developments in AFM open the race for future studies under these 
developments. For example, the Securities Law No. 76 for 2002, which came to effect in 
1/3/2004, would provide new regulations for disclosure studies in Jordan. In addition, 
ASE was restructured into two markets, from three, in July 2004. Moreover, from 
July 2005, companies in ASE were listed in three major Sectors, instead of four. These 
Sectors are classified into numerous sub categories: the financial Sector includes four- 
sub Sectors, the services Sector includes eight sub-Sectors, and the industry Sector 
includes eleven-sub Sectors. These new structural changes in AFM provide the 
underpinning to explore the disclosure issue under these new developments. 
175 Source: The Executive Privatization Commission: http//www. epc. gov jo [Accessed 25/01/2007] 
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Appendix 6.4.3.1: Results of Multiple Regression Runs 
Model 1 (First Run) 
Variables Entered/Removed 
Model 
Variables 
Entered 
Variables 
Removed Method 
1 log 
transformed 
total assets, 
assets in 
place, 
lognosha, 
industry type, 
audit firm size, 
inverse 
transorformati 
on of roe, 
square root of Enter 
total debt to 
total asets, 
listed and 
unlisted 
status, 
ownership 
structure, 
company age, 
inverse 
transformation 
of ror 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: extent of disclosure 
Model Summanp 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Durbin- 
Watson 
1 . 7123 . 507 . 456 . 0498048 
1.081 
a. Predictors: (Constant), log transformed total assets, assets in place, 
lognosha, industry type, audit firm size, inverse transorformation of roe, 
square root of total debt to total asets, listed and unlisted status, 
ownership structure, company age, inverse transformation of ror 
b. Dependent Variable: extent of disclosure 
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ANOVA? 
Sum of 
Model Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 
. 270 11 . 025 
9.900 . 0005 
Residual 
. 263 106 . 002 
Total 
. 533 117 
a. Predictors: (Constant), log transformed total assets, assets in place, lognosha, 
industry type, audit firm size, inverse transorformation of roe, square root of total 
debt to total asets, listed and unlisted status, ownership structure, company age, 
inverse transformation of ror 
b. Dependent Variable: extent of disclosure 
Coeffcientsa 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
Std. 
Model B Error Beta t Si . Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) 
. 135 . 096 1.413 . 
161 
square root of total 
debt to total asets -. 
029 . 024 -. 105 -1.22 . 
227 . 623 1.605 
inverse 
transformation of ror -, 
068 . 123 -. 061 -. 550 . 
583 . 376 2.657 
inverse 
transorformation of . 295 . 090 . 317 3.261 . 
001 . 492 2.031 
roe 
lognosha 
. 002 . 007 . 032 . 367 . 714 . 
612 1.635 
listed and unlisted 
status . 027 . 012 . 198 2.335 . 021 . 
649 1.541 
industry type 
. 029 . 010 . 218 2.831 . 
006 . 787 1.271 
assets in place . 013 . 019 . 056 . 686 . 
494 . 699 1.431 
ownership structure . 018 . 023 . 064 . 792 . 
430 . 702 1.424 
audit firm size . 016 . 011 . 122 1.541 . 126 . 
739 1.354 
company age . 000 . 000 . 038 . 455 . 650 . 
660 1.515 
log transformed total 
assets . 052 . 010 . 475 5.360 . 000 . 
592 1.689 
a" Dependent Variable: extent of disclosure 
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Model 1 (Second Run) 
Variables Entered/Removed 
Model 
Variables 
Entered 
Variables 
Removed Method 
1 log of liquidity, 
audit firm size, 
listed and 
unlisted status, 
industry type, 
ownership 
structure, 
inverse 
transorformatio Enter 
n of roe, 
company age, 
log transformed 
total assets, 
lognosha, 
assets in place, 
inverse 
transformation 
of ror 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: extent of disclosure 
Model Summary' 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Durbin- 
Watson 
1 
. 712a . 507 . 456 . 0497894 1.090 
a. Predictors: (Constant), log of liquidity, audit firm size, listed and unlisted 
status, industry type, ownership structure, inverse transorformation of 
roe, company age, log transformed total assets, lognosha, assets in 
place, inverse transformation of ror 
b. Dependent Variable: extent of disclosure 
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ANOVA? 
Sum of 
Model S uares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 
. 270 11 . 025 9.912 . 0005 
Residual 
. 263 106 . 002 
Total 
. 533 117 
a. Predictors: (Constant), log of liquidity, audit firm size, listed and unlisted status, 
industry type, ownership structure, inverse transorformation of roe, company age, 
log transformed total assets, lognosha, assets in place, inverse transformation of 
ror 
b. Dependent Variable: extent of disclosure 
Coefficient? 
Unstand 
Coeffic 
ardized 
ients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Collinea 
Statisti 
rity 
cs 
Std. 
Model B Error Beta t Sig. Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) 
. 120 . 096 1.258 . 211 inverse 
transformation of -. 046 . 117 -. 042 -. 396 . 693 . 417 2.396 ror 
lognosha 
. 003 . 007 . 046 . 519 . 605 . 594 1.684 listed and unlisted 
status . 029 . 011 . 213 2.520 . 013 . 
654 1.529 
industry type 
. 028 . 010 . 204 2.655 . 009 . 
785 1.274 
assets in place . 026 . 022 . 109 1.142 . 256 . 
513 1.950 
ownership 
structure . 015 . 023 . 054 . 659 . 511 . 695 
1.439 
audit firm size . 019 . 010 . 144 1.882 . 063 . 791 
1.265 
company age . 000 . 000 . 024 . 287 . 775 . 658 1.520 log transformed smed 
tassets total . 049 . 009 . 448 5.471 . 000 . 694 1.442 
inverse 
transorformation 
. 283 . 088 . 305 3.209 . 002 . 
515 1.943 
of roe 
log of liquidity 
. 015 . 012 . 115 1.242 . 217 . 540 
1.852 
a Dependent Variable: extent of disclosure 
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Model 2 (First Run) 
Variables Entered/Removes' 
Model 
Variables 
Entered 
Variables 
Removed Method 
inverse 
transformation 
of ror, audit 
firm size, 
company age, 
ownership 
structure, log 
transformed 
capital stock, 
industry type, 
square root of 
total debt to . Enter total asets, 
listed and 
unlisted status, 
assets in 
place, 
lognosha, 
inverse 
transorformatio 
n of roe, log 
transfRrmed 
sales 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: extent of disclosure 
Model SummarI' 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Durbin- 
Watson 
1 
. 726a . 526 . 472 . 0490368 
1.208 
a. Predictors: (Constant), inverse transformation of ror, audit firm size, 
company age, ownership structure, log transformed capital stock, 
industry type, square root of total debt to total asets, listed and unlisted 
status, assets in place, lognosha, inverse transorformation of roe, log 
transformed sales 
b. Dependent Variable: extent of disclosure 
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ANOVP 
Sum of 
Model Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 
. 281 12 . 023 9.724 . 0005 
Residual 
. 252 105 . 002 
Total 
. 533 117 
a. Predictors: (Constant), inverse transformation of ror, audit firm size, company age, 
ownership structure, log transformed capital stock, industry type, square root of 
total debt to total asets, listed and unlisted status, assets in place, lognosha, 
inverse transorformation of roe, log transformed sales 
b. Dependent Variable: extent of disclosure 
Coefficients? 
Unstanda 
Coeffic 
rdized 
ients 
Standardized 
Coefficients Collinearity S tatistics 
Std. 
Model B Error Beta t Sig. Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) 
. 243 . 111 2.193 . 031 
square root of total 
debt to total asets -. 020 . 023 -. 070 -. 855 . 394 . 667 1.498 
lognosha 
. 002 . 007 . 031 . 358 . 721 . 602 1.661 listed and unlisted 
s status tatu . 024 . 011 . 177 2.110 . 037 . 
639 1.565 
industry type 
. 023 . 010 . 169 2.211 . 
029 . 776 1.289 
assets in place . 003 . 019 . 013 . 158 . 
875 . 677 1.476 
ownership structure . 018 . 023 . 064 . 794 . 429 . 
704 1.421 
audit firm size . 024 . 010 . 175 2.272 . 025 . 762 
1.313 
company age . 46E-005 . 000 . 013 . 150 . 881 . 593 
1.688 
log transformed 
sales . 030 . 008 . 403 3.639 . 000 . 368 2.714 
log transformed 
capital stock . 016 . 014 . 123 1.189 . 237 . 419 
2.388 
inverse 
transorformation of . 282 . 089 . 304 3.171 . 002 . 
492 2.032 
roe 
inverse 
transformation of -. 115 . 125 -. 104 -. 925 . 357 . 357 2.804 ror 
a" uepenclent Variable: extent of disclosure 
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Model 2 (Second Run) 
Variables Entered/Removed' 
Model 
Variables 
Entered 
Variables 
Removed Method 
log of liquidity, 
audit firm size, 
listed and 
unlisted status, 
industry type, 
ownership 
structure, 
inverse 
transorformatio 
n of roe, Enter 
company age, 
log transformed 
capital stock, 
lognosha, 
assets in place, 
inverse 
transformation 
of ror, log 
transformed 
sales 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: extent of disclosure 
Model Summar' 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Durbin- 
Watson 
1 
. 724a . 525 . 471 . 0491131 
1.215 
a. Predictors: (Constant), log of liquidity, audit firm size, listed and unlisted 
status, industry type, ownership structure, inverse transorformation of 
roe, company age, log transformed capital stock, lognosha, assets in 
place, inverse transformation of ror, log transformed sales 
b. Dependent Variable: extent of disclosure 
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ANOVA? 
Sum of 
Model Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 
. 280 12 . 023 9.666 . 0005 
Residual 
. 253 105 . 002 
Total 
. 533 117 
a. Predictors: (Constant), log of liquidity, audit firm size, listed and unlisted status, 
industry type, ownership structure, inverse transorformation of roe, company age, 
log transformed capital stock, lognosha, assets in place, inverse transformation of 
ror, log transformed sales 
b. Dependent Variable: extent of disclosure 
Coefficientsa 
Unstand 
Coeffic 
ardized 
ients 
Standardized 
Coefficients Collineari Statistics 
Std. Toleran 
Model B Error Beta t Sig. ce VIF 
(Constant) 
. 224 . 108 2.062 . 042 lognosha 
. 003 . 007 . 036 . 408 . 
684 . 583 1.714 listed and unlisted 
s status tatu . 025 . 011 . 187 2.222 . 028 . 639 
1.566 
industry type 
. 022 . 010 . 164 2.139 . 035 . 769 1.301 
assets in place . 009 . 022 . 039 . 406 . 685 . 499 2.002 
ownership structure . 016 . 023 . 058 . 723 . 471 . 699 1.431 
audit firm size . 025 . 010 . 186 2.449 . 016 . 782 
1.278 
company age . 57E-005 . 000 . 008 . 092 . 
927 . 589 1.697 log transformed 
sales . 029 . 008 . 380 3.546 . 
001 . 395 2.533 
log transformed 
capital stock . 017 . 014 . 125 1.202 . 232 . 
419 2.389 
inverse 
transorformation of . 272 . 087 . 293 3.113 . 002 . 512 1.954 roe 
inverse 
transformation of ror -. 
090 . 117 -. 081 -. 767 . 445 . 404 2.474 
log of liquidity 
. 007 . 011 . 057 . 635 . 527 . 
555 1.803 
a. Dependent Variable: extent of disclosure 
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Appendix 6.4.4.1: Results of Stepwise Regression Run 
Variables Entered/Removecf 
Model Variables Entered 
Variables 
Removed Method 
1 Stepwise (Criteria: 
log transformed sales . Probability-of-F-to-enter <_ . 
050, 
Probability-of-F-to-remove >_ . 100). 2 Stepwise (Criteria: 
inverse transorformation of roe . Probability-of-F-to-enter <_ . 
050, 
Probability-of-F-to-remove >_ . 100). 
3 Stepwise (Criteria: 
audit firm size . Probability-of-F-to-enter <_ . 
050, 
Probability-of-F-to-remove >_ . 100). 4 Stepwise (Criteria: 
industry type 
. Probability-of-F-to-enter <_ . 050, Probability-of-F-to-remove >= . 100). 
5 Stepwise (Criteria: 
listed and unlisted status . Probability-of-F-to-enter <_ . 
050, 
Probability-of-F-to-remove >_ . 100). 
a. Dependent Variable: extent of disclosure 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 
. 6295 . 396 . 391 . 0526753 2 
. 656b . 431 . 421 . 0513751 3 
. 679c . 461 . 447 . 0502059 4 
. 701d . 491 . 473 . 0490110 5 
. 714e . 509 . 488 . 0483188 
a. Predictors: (Constant), log transformed sales 
b. Predictors: (Constant), log transformed sales, inverse 
transorformation of roe 
C. Predictors: (Constant), log transformed sales, inverse 
transorformation of roe, audit firm size 
d. Predictors: (Constant), log transformed sales, inverse 
transorformation of roe, audit firm size, industry type 
e. Predictors: (Constant), log transformed sales, inverse 
transorformation of roe, audit firm size, industry type, 
listed and unlisted status 
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ANOVA 
Sum of 
Model Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 
. 211 1 . 
211 76.117 . 000a 
Residual 
. 322 116 . 003 
Total 
. 533 117 
2 Regression 
. 230 2 . 
115 43.483 . 000b 
Residual 
. 304 115 . 
003 
Total 
. 533 117 
3 Regression 
. 246 3 . 
082 32.494 . 0000 
Residual 
. 287 114 . 
003 
Total 
. 533 117 
4 Regression 
. 262 4 . 065 
27.230 . 000d 
Residual 
. 271 113 . 
002 
Total 
. 533 117 
5 Regression 
. 272 5 . 054 
23.265 . 0000 
Residual 
. 261 112 . 002 
Total 
. 533 117 
a. Predictors: (Constant), log transformed sales 
b. Predictors: (Constant), log transformed sales, inverse transorformation of roe 
C. Predictors: (Constant), log transformed sales, inverse transorformation of roe, audit 
firm size 
d. Predictors: (Constant), log transformed sales, inverse transorformation of roe, audit 
firm size, industry type 
e. Predictors: (Constant), log transformed sales, inverse transorformation of roe, audit 
firm size, industry type, listed and unlisted status 
f Dependent Variable: extent of disclosure 
646 
Coefficientsa 
Unstandardized Standardized 
Coefficients Coefficients 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) 
. 385 . 036 
10.745 . 000 
log transformed sales . 047 . 005 . 
629 8.725 . 000 
2 (Constant) 
. 285 . 052 
5.506 . 000 
log transformed sales . 045 . 005 . 
597 8.353 . 000 
inverse transorformation 
of roe . 
175 . 066 . 188 
2.636 . 010 
3 (Constant) 
. 278 . 051 
5.488 . 000 
log transformed sales . 042 . 005 . 
563 7.918 . 000 
inverse transorformation 
191 065 . 206 2.934 . 
004 
of roe . . 
audit firm size . 024 . 009 . 
178 2.534 . 013 
4 (Constant) 
. 250 . 050 
4.956 . 000 
log transformed sales . 040 . 005 . 
539 7.688 . 000 
inverse transorformation 
of roe . 
227 . 065 . 244 
3.486 . 001 
audit firm size . 028 . 009 . 
207 2.984 . 003 
industry type 
. 024 . 009 . 
179 2.574 . 011 
5 (Constant) 
. 292 . 054 
5.434 . 000 
log transformed sales . 036 . 006 . 474 
6.254 . 000 
inverse transorformation 
of roe . 200 . 066 . 215 
3.044 . 003 
audit firm size . 029 . 009 . 
218 3.174 . 002 
industry type 
. 022 . 009 . 
161 2.328 . 022 
listed and unlisted status . 021 . 010 . 
157 2.064 . 041 
a. Dependent Variable: extent of disclosure 
647 
Appendix 8.1: General and specific questions of the interviews 
First: General questions (twelve questions) to all related parties (regulators, 
auditors and the financial analyst): 
1- The aggregate disclosure level for Jordanian companies in 2003 was about 70%, 
while it was not exceeding 45% before 1997, why do you think this increase happened? 
2-The level of compliance for mandatory requirements was 82%, did you expect this 
result? What do u comment about that? 
3- The compliance for DDAAS requirements and for IASs requirements was 
approximately similar (83% and 82% respectively), what is your point of view about 
that? 
4- The compliance for both DDAAS+IASs requirements (14 items) was about 91 %, 
which was higher than the compliance for each regulation, do you think by increasing 
the items, which are imposed to more than one regulation will improve the compliance 
level? 
5-Do you think that ASE regulators are the most enforcement mechanism for increasing 
the level of disclosure in Jordan? Do you think that other organizations should be 
involved, such as JACPA? 
6-Do you think the penalties for non-compliance are enough? What are other stringent 
enforcements you suggest beside penalties? 
7-Who is responsible on enhancing the understanding about regulations? 
8- What are the reasons for changing the disclosure requirements? 
648 
9-The level of disclosure for mandatory information such as: chairman's report, 
financial statements and notes and supplementary information was more than 70%, 
while the level of disclosure for voluntary information such as: financial history ratios 
and market information did not exceed 40%, what do you think about this result? Do 
you think by mandating voluntary items will improve the level of disclosure? 
10- The variables: firm size, profitability, listing status, industry type and audit firm size 
were found the most explanatory variables for the extent of disclosure? What do you 
comment? Do you think there are other variables affect the level of disclosure in Jordan? 
11- The companies are required to disclose information according to different Laws (i. e. 
Companies Act Law, Tax Law and Securities Law), how can ASE regulators cooperate 
with other regulators in order to decrease the gap among the different Laws? Is there 
any possibility to combine all disclosure requirements, which companies apply in one 
disclosure law? 
12- The privatization trend in Jordan has increased recently, how do you think this trend 
will affect the disclosure level in Jordan, specifically Jordan Telecom Company was the 
most disclosing company (85%) and going in public after the government sells its share? 
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Second: Specific questions: 
1- In Securities Law, it has mentioned that companies shall apply IASs in their annual 
reports; do you think it is enough to make companies comply with them? Is there other 
ways you can apply to ensure this compliance is adequate? (regulators and auditors) 
2- The extent of voluntary disclosure is still exist in Jordan in 2003 (the level was 34%), 
do you think the regulations will affect this extent positively or negatively? Do you 
suggest mandating more items or leaving the companies to disclose more voluntary 
items? (regulators, the financial analyst and one of the auditors) 
3- By being the first Arabic member of IOSCO (International Organization for 
Securities commission), how this will affect the level of disclosure in Jordan? 
(regulators and one auditor) 
4- The companies are required to disclose information according to different Laws (i. e. 
Companies Act Law, Tax Law and Securities Law), how can ASE regulators cooperate 
with other regulators in order to decrease the gap among the different Laws? Is there 
any possibility to combine all disclosure requirements, which companies apply in one 
disclosure law? (regulators and the financial analyst) 
5- The recent changes in dividing ASE into two markets instead of three, what are the 
reasons and expectations? (regulators and the financial analyst) 
6- Do you think the annual reports are the most disclosing tool for users? What other 
tools could be useful for them? (auditors and the financial analyst) 
7- Which IASs do you think that companies most comply with? (auditors) 
8- Are the auditors having an adequate understanding about disclosure requirements? 
(auditors) 
9- Who is the most responsible part about ensuring that companies are complying with 
disclosure requirements? (Auditors, regulators, others... ) (auditors) 
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10- The compliance with financial statements was the most (cash flow statement: 94%, 
balance sheet: 91% and income statement: 89%), what do you comment about this 
result? (auditors) 
11- What is the role of JACPAI in improving the disclosure level in Jordan? How can it 
cooperate with other organizations in order to improve the disclosure level? (auditors) 
12- Do you think the compliance with IASs is enough in the Jordanian annual reports? 
What are the deficiencies about this issue? What procedures could be apply in order to 
ensure this compliance is adequate? (auditors) 
13- 99% of Jordanian companies disclosed the auditor's report, while 88% of them 
disclosed the auditor's fees, do you think there are other items related to auditing the 
companies shall disclose? (auditors) 
14- Do you think the annual reports enough to take your decisions? What other tools 
could be useful for them? (the financial analyst) 
15- Do you think that companies issue the annual reports on its time? (the financial 
analyst) 
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